Scots Abroad, Nationalism at Home: Kailyard and Kilt as Gatekeepers? 1885 – 1979

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October 2015
The emigration of the Scots from the 18th to the 20th century has produced a diaspora. The thesis outlines how many diasporas are involved in the nationalist projects of their homeland. However, over the chronology of this study and beyond, whilst there were active movements to amend or end the Union of 1707, it has been found that the Scots were not. The thesis then proposes some explanations for this.

Chapters one and two introduce methods, research material and context; they describe the Union, the emigrations and diasporas. The study uses for comparison purposes the Irish and Norwegian diasporas. Lines of enquiry such as nationalism, the use of soft power and gatekeeping behaviour are presented, with a discussion of Scottish nationalism.

The study examines the approach to involving the diaspora of five groups; both SHRAs, the International Scots Home Rule League, the National Convention and the NPS/SNP. The response of Scottish MPs in the diaspora in England to the many attempts to legislate for home rule is also examined.

The approach to the diaspora was found to be badly executed and targeted. Few visits were made, and only to the US and Canada. Communication was unfocussed and spasmodic. The Scottish associational clubs were frequently used as a conduit. A small part of the whole diaspora, these acted as gatekeepers, selectively mobilising for themselves as an elite which had no need of nationalism as they could succeed without it. Comparing the Irish, whose diaspora successfully supported its nationalist causes at home, is instructive.

The study concludes that the spasmodic and amateurish nature of contact, the nature of the Associations and that of the diaspora itself were the main culprits in this case of a diaspora indifferent to the fate of nationalism in its home land.
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Chapter One. Introduction

For over two hundred years the Scots have demonstrated a significant mobility, both within the United Kingdom, Europe and beyond. Whilst significant, this emigration was not unusual for that period, with many Europeans leaving for the New World. Many of these nationalities formed diasporas. Diasporas are a force in identity formation. They reside outside of their kin-state but can in some ways claim a stake in it. It is claimed that the Scots formed a diaspora as a result of their emigration, an issue that will be examined in detail.

Many diasporas are deeply involved in the nationalist projects of their homelands. Insofar as such projects are usually democratic and emancipatory, those in the diaspora can feel free to endorse ethnic and exclusionary movements. This can take many forms. Established generations of Irish-Americans made substantial funding available to the Provisional IRA in their military intervention in the politics of Northern Ireland. Other examples might be overseas Israeli nationals returning home en masse to vote in elections. Also, Croats abroad paying for the election campaigns of a favoured candidate such as Franjo Tudjman, in this case rewarded with 10 percent of the seats in parliament dedicated to represent the diaspora. The Kurdish PKK derived support from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. An informal tax of 2% levied on Eritreans abroad sustained a war on the Ethiopian border as well as helping to shape peace and subsequent re-construction. There has been a political debate on whether Scotland should have a form of self-government from the late nineteenth century to the present day. This thesis is concerned with the Scots abroad and their support or otherwise for Scottish Home Rule or Nationalism.

1 Brock, 1999, p.232
2 Shain and Barth, 2003, p.450
3 Harper, 2005, p.139
4 Werbner, Diaspora, 2000, p.5
5 Byman, D., 2005, p.246
6 Vertovec, 2009, pp.94-5
7 Romano, 2006, pp. 58-9
8 Vertovec, 2009, p.95
This introduction will lay out the theoretical framework of the thesis. It contains a methods section proposing the use of a comparative case study approach and the case selection process. It will also introduce the main concepts employed. The chapter also examines chronology and introduces matters of contextualisation; that of the formation of the Union of 1707, an introduction to the migration of the Scots over the period from the Union to the end of the chronology of the research and a description of Scottish Nationalism. Finally the chapters and their contents will be introduced.

**Theoretical Framework**

The Scots abroad have been described as ‘relatively disinterested’ in Scottish nationalism, and have hardly ever become involved in campaigning or political organising. The first question to be addressed will test the hypothesis that the Scots abroad did not support the nationalist movements in their many forms in any way which impacted upon their success. If the results support this hypothesis then reasons for this failure will be proposed and defended.

This question drives out several sub-questions which lead to the key concepts the study will employ. Firstly, the propensity of diaspora to engage with the nationalist projects of their home lands must be gauged. Secondly, the conditions which foster such an interest must be understood. Thirdly, the conditions that obtain where there is no interest should be investigated. The history and nature of emigration, particularly the great nineteenth century European emigrations, underpins much of the narrative. There will also be four main concepts deployed in the arguments; those of nationalism, diasporas, ‘soft power’ and gatekeepers.

This section will lay out an analytical strategy for the study. The focus will be the choice and deployment of comparative case studies and the method of case selection. It will further lay out the sources used for the enquiry. The purpose of this section is to defend an approach, rather than present competing tools. Whilst it is the intention to use comparisons in this thesis, the limitations of this method should be recognised and accounted for.

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9 Sim, 2011b, p.213
Systematic comparative case study is one of the primary means for establishing social scientific generalisations in macro political enquiry.\(^\text{10}\) It is one of the basic methods of general empirical propositions.\(^\text{11}\) Comparison serves several purposes in political analysis. Comparison across several cases, usually countries, enables research to assess whether a particular phenomenon is simply a local issue or part of a broader trend. A further useful function is that of developing, testing and refining theories about causal relationships.\(^\text{12}\) This thesis will identify and attempt to explain why the Scottish diaspora had little interest in nationalist projects in its home land. It will therefore be appropriate to compare the Scottish diaspora with other diasporas to find causal relationships between its nature and its behaviour.

However, the principal problem facing the method in such research is that there are many variables and few cases.\(^\text{13}\) The first issue faces all social research, in that the number of relevant variables is very high. The second is a reflection of the highly limited number of societies, political cultures and countries,\(^\text{14}\) around two hundred, available for analysis. There are methods available for the mitigation of these difficulties. One is to combine two or more variables that express an essentially similar underlying characteristic. Thus the number of cells in the matrix describing the relationship is reduced. The difficulty of the restricted number of cases available can be overcome by focussing the analysis on comparable cases. Comparable cases in this context means similar in a number of important characteristics that can be treated as constants.\(^\text{15}\) This allows the analysis to concentrate on variables not so controlled. It will be demonstrated below that the selection of cases in this enquiry has deployed these techniques in order to mitigate the perceived difficulties with the comparative method. Case selection will be dealt with first, followed by the selection of variables.

\(^{10}\) Goodin and Klingemann, 1992, p.749  
\(^{11}\) Lijphart, 1971, p.682  
\(^{12}\) Marsh and Stoker, 2010, p.285  
\(^{13}\) Lijphart, 1971, p.685  
\(^{14}\) Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p.30  
\(^{15}\) Lijphart, 1971, p.687
This chapter began with a list of diasporas which had intervened in some way in nationalist or political projects in their home lands. The section later in this introduction describing the main concepts deployed in the enquiry will describe diasporas and list many more. This list must be reduced in order to bring a greater focus onto the subject matter, that of the nationalist projects of a Northern European country which is part of a long term Union with another state. To do this, a number of characteristics were identified to provide a set of variables that could be regarded as constants in case selection. These variables need to be related to emigration, which usually causes diasporas, the nature of political governance of the subject cases and the existence of a nationalist project at home. Those selected are summarised below, with the rationale for inclusion.

*Significant contemporary emigration*; The Scot’s emigration was significant as a proportion of the contemporary population. Migrations make diasporas, so for this reason alone this should be part of the selection criteria. *Emigration characterised as ex-European to the ‘new world’*; Scots principally left as part of the European process of colonising relatively recently discovered territories, particularly those that formed both the first and second British empires. *Diaspora formed*; the enquiry is about the behaviour of a particular diaspora. *Union with another state*; a significant characteristic of the Scottish case, which led to the rise of nationalist projects in favour of amending or ending the Union. *Nationalism at home*; there were nationalist projects founded in Scotland, therefore comparable cases would also benefit from having a nationalist cause at home.

There is some agreement that the top three exporters of people during the nineteenth century emigrations were Ireland, Norway and Scotland.\(^{16}\) These satisfy the emigration requirement. The table below summarises the performance of these cases in the other characteristics listed above.

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\(^{16}\) Brock, 1999, p.202
Table I: Diaspora comparisons; Characteristics of Country of Origin

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<th></th>
<th>Scotland</th>
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<td>Ex-European to ‘new world’ emigration</td>
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<td>Diaspora formed</td>
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Whilst there are similarities which justify a comparison of these diasporas with that of the Scots, there are also differences. It is possible that the Irish migration could in part be regarded as primed by conflict with the British. However the migration was primarily part of a European pattern with diverse reasons for leaving.\(^{17}\) The contention that the Norwegian comparison is valid is also driven by the many similarities. It appears, however, devoid of one aspect found in the others, that of a nationalist movement at home. Chapter two provides further granularity of detail to support the choice of the Irish and Norwegian diasporas for the case study. This section of this chapter now turns to the identification of the variables to be examined to analyse the behaviours of these cases.

The variables are identified from the behaviours of the selected cases in the engagement of the diaspora with the nationalist projects in their home land. These will be seen to be; the size and nature of associational aspect of the diasporas, the nature of the engagement, the nature of the diasporas and home land support for nationalism. These variables are intended to encompass the wide range of activities that comprise a diaspora’s transnational behaviours, including but not exclusively, remittances, the exercise of soft power, travel, newspapers, correspondence, direct political action and violent intervention. The proposition is that if a hypothesised relationship between two or more variables exists over a wide range of settings then there are stronger grounds for arguing that relationship. The complexity of political life in society does not render the use of comparisons inappropriate.

\(^{17}\) Bielenburg, 2000, p.11
Sources

To establish the wider context of the emigration of Scottish people, research encompassed not only books and papers on the Scots’ emigrations but also on the emigrations of other European peoples. This was supplemented by generic material on migration including features such as assimilation and remittances. This enabled a wider view of Scottish emigration to establish that although it was significant for Scotland, it was not unusual. The causes were researched at the broadest level, entailing some quantitative work summarised from published migration sources. The works of Harper and Brock were particularly useful in this respect.

The research into the people that made up this migration drew on the National Library of Scotland (NLS) and its ‘Scots Abroad’ database. This contains over 300 letters, pamphlets and books published by Scots abroad in North America and Australasia, describing their emigration and life in new countries. Whereas this was possible for Scots and to a lesser extent the Irish emigrations, little such material was available on the Norwegians. Here letters reproduced or discussed in published material had to be the sole original resource. The National Archives at Kew provided cabinet and ministry papers for historical background.

The nature of diasporas was explored using the extensive discourse available in books and journals. The research was conducted mainly through the works of Esman, Cohen, Brubaker, Scheffer and Vertovec’s volumes on migration, diasporas and transnationalism. In particular, recent work on the involvement of diasporas in the nationalist projects of their homelands was useful. This research has been mainly based on post-Soviet state making. However, other examples of diaspora-supported agencies at work in Asia and the Middle East have been useful. In the case of the Scots, the NLS provided sources to gain greater granularity into the Scottish associational culture. This was not available to the same extent for the Irish and only rarely for the Norwegians. The preparation of the commentary on nationalism, soft power and gatekeepers was entirely theoretical, and in the main provided by the subject discourse in the literature. Background theory on nationalism was largely researched from the
works of Tilly, Billig, Gellner, and Miller and Siedentop. Barth provides guidance on the contribution of ethnic groups and Craig, Mitchell and Nairn contributed to the discourse on nationalism with a partly Scottish viewpoint. For soft power, the original concept from Nye was used, as well as interpretive studies from Parmar and Cox. The Irish perspective on the use of soft power was instructed principally by Cochrane. The use of gatekeepers as a paradigm in social science research was investigated through the work of Bach and Bristow, Van Hoof et.al., Garrido, Hanley, and Haralambos.

The sources for the study of Scottish nationalism and its engagement with the diaspora constitute the chief use of original material. The majority of the work was based upon several archives in the NLS. The Scottish National Party (SNP) has deposited several archives; Acc.6679, 7295, 10754, 13115 and 11987. These were used for example to research fund raising committee papers particularly those from 1976 to 1980, for evidence of income from abroad or attempts to raise money from the diaspora. Correspondence of the General Business Committee provided background information on Party structure and activities, as did correspondence with the Parliamentary group. Particularly useful were files 17-25 in Acc.10754, detailing the correspondence with, and papers of, the Scottish National Party Association, set up to oversee branches abroad. Acc.11987 contains agendas, minutes and papers for the National Council, National Executive Committee and the National Assembly from 1964 to the end of the period under review. It also includes papers from the General Business Committee and other Party committees as well as the National Secretary’s correspondence. Items relevant to the Scottish Convention and Scottish Covenant Association as well as the SNP are held in Acc.7295. Amongst other papers, this holds Scottish National Convention minutes from 1942-1949 as well as papers from the Scottish Covenant Association. SNP conference and National Council minutes from 1936-37 and 1941-46 are also included, as are many reports and papers from the post-war period. There also are some miscellaneous financial records. The Scottish Convention material was also available for analysis at Dep.242, and Acc.6419.
The Scottish Secretariat papers in Acc.3721 provide the personal papers of Roland Muirhead and material regarding the second Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), National Party of Scotland (NPS), SNP and others from circa 1916 to circa 1960. It holds 146 boxes containing over 2,500 files. This research examined around 180 files for correspondence, support, membership details and proof of remittances to the Scottish Home Rule and SNP organisations.

Acc.6038 contains the correspondence of Arthur Donaldson, Chairman of the SNP from 1960-69. Acc.11908 also has Donaldson’s papers as well as a large amount of Party information. Other personal papers used were those of Robert McIntyre, SNP MP for Motherwell and Wishaw in Acc.10090; James A. A. Porteous in Acc.7505, whose papers include policy papers on finance and taxation; Professor Gavin Kennedy in Acc.11565; George Dott in Acc.5542, 5927, 8371, 12222 and 12947. Additionally, those of Andrew Gibb in Acc.9188, Tom Gibson in Acc.6058, Neil Gunn in Dep.209, Box 15, Gordon Wilson in Acc.13099 and D. C. C. Young in Acc.6419 were accessed. The Scotland-UN material was sourced at Acc.12735. Compton Mackenzie, of Scots descent but born in England, was a founder member of the National Party of Scotland. His autobiography, My Life and Times, Octaves 6 and 7, were used to research his contribution from the diaspora.

Additional historical material for research into the diaspora and emigration was used; Acc.10623 contained papers from the McArthur Family from Nairn, and Acc.8611 was the source of late Jacobite material. The Cunningham diaries were sourced from Acc.13089. The Illustrated Oban Magazine archive is to be found in the public library in Oban, Argyll. All files accessed are noted in an appendix to the bibliography.

**Members of Parliament**

Scots living and working in England who were MPs in Westminster were in a unique position to influence the success of the movements established to promote Scottish self-government. They alone in the diaspora could contribute directly to the peaceful enactment of the legislation to support the aim of these movements. The object of chapter five is therefore to identify behaviour
supporting Scottish self-government by Scots abroad in Parliament. Here research material is provided by books covering the political and parliamentary activity of the period. The detail is analysed from online Hansard. Also used were the contemporary pamphlets and letters providing comment on the events in the Houses of Parliament. For the Commons, individuals were identified from Hansard, and then a combination of Wikipedia, Who was Who, biographies, and the Dictionary of National Biography were used to obtain biographical and therefore location details of the MPs. It was important to locate these people in the diaspora.

There were three main categories of Scots to consider; those Scots who represent Scottish constituencies but lived and worked in England, their emigration has taken place, they are abroad; secondly those Scots who represented English constituencies and lived in England were in the diaspora; thirdly there are those who had roles and domiciles in both England and Scotland. To avoid doubt over this third category, these transnational emigrants have been excluded from the list. Those born and living in Scotland and travelling to Westminster for Parliament were visitors. Whilst they may have attended Scots Society events in London whilst Parliament was sitting, they were not part of the diaspora as there has been no permanent or semi-permanent emigration. There are also English, or other nationalities, representing Scots constituencies. The research is not concerned with these.

With regard to those in the House of Lords, the sources used for biographical information were Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage, Edition 105, 1978, Debrett’s People of Today 2009 and various volumes of Who was Who. Burke’s lists over 2,200 persons entitled to sit in the House, so it was difficult to note those Lords who had been present but silent. Those who contributed in the debates made up the sample. The identification of Scots in the diaspora amongst the Lords’ members and amongst those speaking to the early Bills was more problematic than it was for those in the Commons in the October 1974 Parliament. For this latter cohort the criteria were those of identified Scots-born persons representing an English constituency. For the earlier debates, stretching from 1889 to 1928 over 23 different occasions, MPs who represented Scots constituencies but lived and worked in England were
selected. The criteria used were residency in England at the time of the debates and Scots-born. Additionally some members referred to their Scots lineage in their speeches, and thus could be identified.

Participation in the debates in the Commons on the 23 pre-World War Two Bills and motions was analysed. Similar analysis was carried out on those who spoke in the devolution debates over the Scotland and Wales Bills of 1976 and the Scotland Bill of 1978. For this latter Bill, the passage through the Lords is analysed in a similar manner.

**Newspaper Research 1976-79**

To research newspaper correspondence, the method used was to first of all establish a timeframe. The period January 1976 to March 1979 was used, to encompass the original issue of the White Paper, the Parliamentary debates, the introduction of the Bills, the Royal Assent in 1978, and finally the referendum in March 1979. Issues of *The Times* and *The Scotsman* were examined for letters on devolution from Scots abroad, including England, in the periods January to August 1976, October to December 1977, January to July 1978 and January to March 1979. The time periods chosen are aligned with periods of activity in the debate and passage of the Bill.

**Main Concepts**

**Nationalism**

This section considers the nation and nationalism and applies some characteristics of nationalism to the Scottish movements for home rule and independence. What is not considered is the nature of democracy and its relationship to nationalism through forms of self-government. The nature of democracy in the United Kingdom and the host lands of the diaspora changed considerably over the chronology of the study, for example through extensions of the franchise. These changes are useful context, and are dealt with in later chapters.

An appropriate concept to place at the start of a consideration of nationalism is that of the ethnic group. Briefly, this can be defined as; biologically self-perpetuating, having fundamental cultural values, characterised by
interaction, self-identifying and identified as distinguishable from other such groups.\textsuperscript{18} However the nebulous terms of ‘nationalism’\textsuperscript{19} and ‘nation’ should not be solely based upon ethnicity, as there can be no certain connection between descent, which is based upon biology, and interests, which are founded in human needs and purposes.\textsuperscript{20} However, ethnicity is essentially ascriptive in character, its status unrelated to achievement, age, sex or religion.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore nationality must spring from additional sources.

Further tests must be applied. ‘A Nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sacrifices which one has made, and which one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past (and the) existence of a nation is an everyday plebiscite.’\textsuperscript{22} The test of interest is maintained by the everyday actions of its members. The members so identified may be seen as a society, a unit which rejects or discriminates against others.\textsuperscript{23} Such a group has an ethnic boundary, something which is social in nature but may also have territorial counterparts.\textsuperscript{24}

Nationality, then, could be a ‘common bond of sentiment whose adequate expression would be a state of its own and therefore normally tends to give birth to such a state.’\textsuperscript{25} The implication of such propositions is that every nation should have its own state, and correspondingly every state should have its own nation. This implies homogeneity, a complete fit between nationality and politics.\textsuperscript{26} Put another way, theories of nationhood imply that ‘a people, place and state should be bound in unity.’\textsuperscript{27} However, one source estimates that the number of identifiable ethnic-linguistic groups on the planet is around 8,000. Yet there are only around 200 states at present.\textsuperscript{28} Therefore most states constitute several races,\textsuperscript{29} which supports the case made above for the distinction between descent and interests. A nation is not necessarily a state, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item 18 Barth, 1969, p.11
  \item 19 Mitchell, 1996, p.7
  \item 20 Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.135
  \item 21 Barth, 1969, pp.13-14
  \item 22 Mitchell, 1996, p.20; Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.136
  \item 23 Barth, 1969, p.11
  \item 24 Ibid., p.15
  \item 25 Max Weber quoted in Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.136
  \item 26 Ozirimli, 2003, p.16
  \item 27 Billig, 1995, p.77
  \item 28 Gellner, 2006, p.43
  \item 29 Craig, 2009, p.234
\end{itemize}
although it is not enough to conflate the concepts of nation and state into that of ‘nation-state,’ it is an analytic truth that the nation state can fulfil the aspirations of those who belong to the nation embodied in the state.\textsuperscript{30} If a state is therefore more than simply the geographical boundary of its writ,\textsuperscript{31} then that is relevant to an enquiry into the political actions of its diaspora.

Nationalism can appear to be based at the periphery of established nations, as the property of others, those opposed to that establishment.\textsuperscript{32} Alternatively, if applied to the ideological means by which nation states are reproduced and maintained, it becomes a continual process, not intermittent,\textsuperscript{33} recalling the continuous test of interest referred to earlier. In support of the established state and those on the periphery, in an ideal form it continues to be reproduced as a cause worth more than the individual life.\textsuperscript{34} Nationalism can also be understood as any pursuit by ruling class self-interest and has therefore existed as long as the nation state.\textsuperscript{35} This view, an argument goes, has become narrower in the last two hundred years and has distilled into two different phenomena; state-led nationalism and state-seeking nationalism.\textsuperscript{36} In this model, state-led nationalism is invoked by rulers who spoke in a nation’s name and asked its citizens to identify with it and subordinate their interests to those of the state. This grew from the need to extract the ever expanding needs of war and to substitute direct top to bottom government for indirect rule through semi-autonomous feudal intermediaries.\textsuperscript{37}

Alternatively, state-seeking nationalism would be invoked by representatives of a group that did not have collective control over an area and claimed autonomous political status, even a separate state, on the grounds that the group had a distinct coherent identity.\textsuperscript{38} However, the articulation of national slogans is frequently not the exclusive enterprise of a single elite leadership. In

\textsuperscript{30} Miller and Siedentop, 1983, p.141
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p.140
\textsuperscript{32} Billig, 1995, p.5
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p.6
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p.177
\textsuperscript{35} Tilly, 1994, p.133
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Tilly, 1994, p.138
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p.133
some respects the UK acts like this, with the elite groups in the constituent states having different priorities. This could lead to a future of incessant splintering of states into segments controlled by one ostensibly unified group or another.\textsuperscript{39} This scenario recalls the importance of interests discussed above.

Consideration of nationalism enquires how the many ethnic groups and social norms of the past were homogenised. The notion implies that there has to be a mechanism, or mechanisms, that eliminate or reduce ethnic and social differences so as to fit people into the common national mould. One solution is to imagine a continuum of such mechanisms between voluntary practices on the one hand and vicious practices on the other.\textsuperscript{40} Another view is to regard nationalism as a response to the unequal development of global capitalism as it created those in need of development or modernisation, who were then fallen victim to some kind of domination, to which the only response was the local popular struggle of nationalism.\textsuperscript{41} This overview of nation and nationalism has provided some characteristics with which to examine the Scottish movements formed to support home rule and independence.

Firstly, a nation is not solely a singular ethnic construction, but is maintained by actions conforming to interests. Secondly, nationalism is about a common bond of sentiment where existing states re-enforce allegiance, as well as about minorities seeking statehood; the established and peripheral, the state-led and the state-seeking. Thirdly, whilst there has been an historic movement towards self-determination through state-seeking nationalism, state-led nationalism has also strengthened allegiance to existing structures. Fourthly, the mechanism that grinds toward homogeneity can be peaceful or violent. Fifthly, no state is homogenous and cultural similarities can hide political differences driven by differing interests. Finally, these differences may combine to result in a continual sub-division of polities. Therefore it may be concluded that all states are artificial and that state boundaries are not fixed in perpetuity, as the history of the UK demonstrates.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} Tilly, 1994, p.144
\textsuperscript{40} Ozirimli, 2003, p.17
\textsuperscript{41} Nairn, 1981, p.128
\textsuperscript{42} Mitchell, 2014, p.4
Diasporas

Diasporas are neither recent nor ancient objects. They have for the main part been a by-product of emigration. Diasporas are made up of the original immigrants plus subsequent generations, as long as they choose or are forced to remain a separate community.\(^43\) They arrive as conquerors and settlers, like Spaniards in America or the Normans in England; as refugees escaping war or persecution, like Tamils in Canada or Huguenots in South Africa; as labourers, or as merchants or highly educated professionals.\(^44\) However, not all these movements have resulted in a diaspora. The British Isles has been the subject of many inward migrations; Saxon, Anglo and Danish for example, but there is no talk of a Saxon or Danish diaspora in Britain today. However there have also been Irish, Pakistani and Polish immigrants and they are referred to as having formed a diaspora. Defining diasporas has become more difficult as the word has been applied to ever more populations of migrants. Many groups of modern migrants, once known by names such as exile groups, overseas communities, or ethnic minorities are now characterised as diasporas.\(^45\)

In view of this proliferation, there is a need to present some primary characteristics of diasporas. First, the term diaspora. The widening theorisation of diasporas amongst academics includes disciplines such as history, literature, anthropology and sociology amongst forty five sub-groups identified in a sampling.\(^46\) A Google search on the word ‘diaspora’ yielded over 54 million hits.\(^47\) One list of diasporas distinguishes between historical and modern, naming amongst the former; Armenian, Greek, Gypsy, Indian and Jewish, amongst the latter; African American, Iranian, Irish, Italian and Kurdish. Neither list includes the Scots.\(^48\) Another refers to twenty-nine other ‘putative ethno-cultural or country defined diasporas’ from academic literature, including that of the English and Scots, as well as minority groups formed by the movement of borders across people, as with, for example, Russians in Latvia.\(^49\) A diaspora is not just constituted of a number of immigrants of various generations; it is those

\(^{43}\) Esman, 2009, pp.9-10
\(^{44}\) Ibid., p.3
\(^{45}\) Kenny, 2013, pp.10-11
\(^{46}\) Brubaker, 2005, p.6
\(^{47}\) Search carried out 1\(^{st}\) October 2012
\(^{48}\) Sheffer, 2003, pp.104-5
\(^{49}\) Brubaker, 2005, p.3
who proactively make claims about their descent, who practice, project and claim that ethnicity. It is possible, by drawing on the contributions of writers on diasporas, to distil four characteristics. Developed further in chapter two, these are introduced here. The first is special dispersal. The second, orientation to a homeland and the third, boundary maintenance. Lastly, ethnic consciousness should be sustained over a long period of time. This is of importance in considering the Scots, as their migration took place over a period of over two hundred years. The descendants of first generation migrants of the late nineteenth century were fourth or fifth generation in the mid-twentieth century, and yet may still populate the diaspora alongside first generation new arrivals.

**Soft power**

Power means a more or less organised hierarchical cluster of relations. Soft power, as applied to international relations, is characterised by the ability to influence others without visible threat or coercion. It is the power of attraction, the influence of example. It is the ability of a state, or other actor, to get what it wants by persuading others to adopt its goals. Soft power co-opt rather than coerces. It can be attractive because it is cheaper. The resources of a state that produce soft power are thought to be its culture, its policies and its values.

When ideas impact policy it is usually at the level of policy making elites. Therefore where soft power affects public attitudes it can only be successful where the elite are influenced, especially with regard to foreign and security policy. The case can also be made that the post-war success of the US was a

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50 Koinova, 2011b, p.336
51 Brubaker, 2005, pp.5-6; Cohen, 2008, p.17
53 Cochrane, 2007, p.216
54 Parmar and Cox, 2010, p.1
55 Nye, 2004, p.5
56 Parmar and Cox, 2010, p.4
57 Nye, 2004, p. 68
58 Parmar and Cox, 2010, pp.56-8
result not just of its acceptable culture and policies but also of its military preponderance.\textsuperscript{59} There is a further difficulty with the paradigm of soft power in this thesis as it concerns non-state actors, diasporas.

Chapter two will elaborate further on how diasporas influence political outcomes in their homelands. Diasporas generally only have soft power attributes to wield influence, having little military power, save remittances to buy arms and the ability to send men to fight. The soft power of a diaspora will vary with its organisation, the wealth of its members and their sense of responsibility for the outcomes to be influenced. Nye infers that it is the internet that has made the soft power of non-state actors a factor in international relations.\textsuperscript{60} However this enquiry predates the internet. These caveats make the apparent success of the Irish and Irish-Americans in exercising soft power over part of the American policy-making elite less easy to understand. However, an attempt must be made, as the Scots failed to replicate it.

This soft power paradigm was devised with interstate relations in mind. Soft power flows from one actor influencing another, as was earlier noted, to do its bidding using resources such as culture, values and policies to bring this about. Whilst accepting that there may be alternative concepts of power,\textsuperscript{61} Cochrane extends the soft power model to intrastate relations.\textsuperscript{62} As pressure groups can only work with soft power, influencing legislators, this appears a reasonable position to take. Diasporas are complex constructs, with their own cultural and political elites. Any homeland nation’s attempt to define a community as a diaspora and create a privileged relationship with co-ethnics is a tricky enterprise. It must distinguish between the membership of a trans-state community and the rights and duties of the legal construct of citizenship of the host state.\textsuperscript{63} This notion of soft power as exercised by a diaspora is used to discuss the successful influence of the Irish diaspora during the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ from 1969.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p.72
\textsuperscript{60} Nye, 2004, pp.97-8
\textsuperscript{61} Cochrane, 2007. p. 216 for Boulding’s notion of threat, exchange and integrative power.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} King and Melvin, 1999, p.114
Gatekeepers as Actors in Social and Political Domains

The concept of the gatekeeper is one which will be used to illustrate the position of the Scottish Associations with regard to both the rest of the diaspora and the Home Rule and Independence groups courting it for support. Gatekeeping has widespread use as a metaphor for national government responses to unwelcome developments.\(^{64}\) It is also used to theorise the action of intermediaries in the supply of many categories of public goods and services. Two brief examples follow.

Pharmacists act as gatekeepers with regard to medium risk drugs such as paracetamol and codeine, by asking questions of the customer to ensure the drug is taken responsibly.\(^{65}\) Secondly, a feature of many primary care health systems is the requirement to visit a generalist, a GP in the UK, acting as a gatekeeper and coordinator of care.\(^{66}\) However, there is an understanding that national governments, as with other institutions and associations, cannot be ‘black boxed’ with uniform assumptions about their responses but must be nuanced to reflect their heterogeneity and that of their networks.\(^{67}\) Further examples will follow in chapter six.

With some exceptions, the main avenue of communication with the diaspora was through the Scottish Associations. It was only later in the period that the futility of this was appreciated. However, the nature of the associations is the key to understanding their response; the nuancing will be effected by examining the ‘black box’ and looking in detail at the objectives of these organisations, the people they attracted and the politics they manifest. The next section of this introduction deals with some subjects of context.

The Union

This thesis seeks to address the reasons why Scots abroad lent little support to the various movements for home rule and independence. However, without the Union of Scotland and England in 1707 there would have been no such

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\(^{64}\) Bache and Bristow, 2003, p.405  
\(^{65}\) Van Hoof et. al., 2014, p.354  
\(^{66}\) Garrido et. al., 2011, p.28  
\(^{67}\) Ibid., p.406
movements. This section addresses the reasons for that Union and the events that formed it.

When Queen Elizabeth of England died in March 1603 she had no children or surviving siblings. Accordingly, her cousin James VI of Scotland became James I of England.68 James's Union was a dual monarchy, enlarging his territories.69 He styled himself King of Great Britain.70 However, he would need to harmonise the British imperial monarchy with the Scottish perspective of upholding aristocratic republicanism and an Anglo-centric view which threatened to reduce Scotland to political dependency.71 The idea of an Incorporating Union was mooted by James in 1603.72 There was opposition to virtually every aspect of his proposal in Scotland and England.73 Even some watered down proposals were dropped in 1607.74

This demonstrated how far the two nations were from a union. Mutual dislike between the Scots and English was nothing new, and it had intensified in the aftermath of 1603.75 Three parties would need to be convinced of the need for a union; the Crown would have to realise that nothing short of union would solve the executive difficulties of ruling Scotland in absentia, the English Parliament would have to be persuaded that the gains would offset the disagreeable prospect of sharing their spoils with the Scots76 and the Scots would have to feel there were enough advantages to warrant them joining with such a bitter historical enemy.77 It was economic friction that caused Charles II to start negotiations for a Union.78 These were to fail, and there were no further endorsements by Charles of union negotiations.79

68 Levack, 1987, p.1
69 Ibid., pp.1-3
70 Ibid., p.8
71 Macinnes, 2007, p.54
72 Levack, 1987, p.4
73 Ibid., p.8
74 Ibid.
75 Brown and Whatley, 2008, p.2
76 Devine, 1999, p.3
77 Holmes, 1969, p.177
78 Macinnes, 2007, p.83
79 Holmes, 1969, p.178
At his accession to the throne in 1685, James II and VII began trade talks which failed.\textsuperscript{80} In Scotland, the fact that James was ‘the only Papist we have been plagued with since the Reformation,’ and had a son, galvanised Presbyterian opposition.\textsuperscript{81} After rejecting James in favour of William and Mary, the Scottish Convention unanimously decided to make overtures to the English Parliament on a union. This was ignored in Westminster.\textsuperscript{82} With the Revolution of 1689-91, James was replaced by his elder daughter Mary and her husband William of Orange, William III. The Act of Settlement left William to rule Scotland with whatever tools of patronage and persuasion that he could fashion.\textsuperscript{83}

William’s opposition to France had a negative impact on Scottish trade. William was unable to prevent the Company of Scotland breaking the monopoly of the (English) East India Company. He was also unable to prevent the Scottish Company from founding a colony in Central America at Darien, the property of the Spanish crown, William’s ally in his opposition to Louis XIV of France. This attempt to establish an international empire without the heavy cost of territorial empire or Navy ended in abysmal failure.\textsuperscript{84} The failure of the project brought the truth that the composite monarchy was no longer serving Scottish interests to the forefront of Scottish political consciousness.\textsuperscript{85} It has been claimed that the main importance of Darien was that it converted the English Crown to the idea of a union.\textsuperscript{86}

There were other issues facing Scotland. There was the future of a regal union with a neighbour that looked first to its own interest,\textsuperscript{87} the issue of succession gave a patriotic fillip to Scottish Jacobitism.\textsuperscript{88} There was also considerable anxiety amongst Presbyterians, faced with a regionally strong Episcopalian body and a resurgent Roman Catholic Church. There were worries about the economy and finally Scotland’s Parliament was unable to defend the nation’s

\textsuperscript{80} Macinnes, 2007, p.86
\textsuperscript{81} Whatley, 2013, p.74
\textsuperscript{82} Holmes, 1969, p.183
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p.179
\textsuperscript{84} Devine, 2003, p.46
\textsuperscript{85} Brown and Whatley, 2008, p.15; Devine, 2003, p.47
\textsuperscript{86} Holmes, 1969, pp.179-180
\textsuperscript{87} Riley, 1978, p.203
\textsuperscript{88} Macinnes, 2007, p.243
sovereign interests and to promote its agriculture, commercial needs, or manufacturing.\textsuperscript{89}

Scotland was a distinctive, though not major, European state, with trade with the Stuarts’ overseas dominions as well as the Swedes, Dutch and the Danes.\textsuperscript{90} The timing of the Act of Union was influenced by the War of the Spanish Succession in various ways.\textsuperscript{91} The alienation of Scotland by dragging it into the War threatened relations between England and Scotland and reduced the acceptability in Scotland of the Hanoverian succession.\textsuperscript{92} French diplomats granted Scotland \textit{favoured nation} status in Louis XIV’s war against William III. Supporters of Jacobitism and opponents of any Union with England, the French infiltrated money and agents into Scotland.\textsuperscript{93}

The re-orientation of Scottish export trade during the seventeenth century to England fed a desire for an economic union.\textsuperscript{94} It also made it easier to point the finger of blame at England. A letter written in 1704 by Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, an intellectually accomplished and well-travelled member of the 1702 parliament,\textsuperscript{95} who was initially in favour of union, described that ‘our Trade was formally flourishing’ and that trade with France had been very advantageous.\textsuperscript{96} Fletcher also notes that whilst the latter had declined, so had Scotland’s traditional markets in the Baltic, ‘before the \textit{Dutch} had wholly possessed themselves of that advantageous Traffick.’\textsuperscript{97} He goes on ‘Upon the Union of the Crowns not only all this went to decay but our Mony was spent in \textit{England} not amongst ourselves.’ However, the most pressing of Scotland’s burdens in the 1690s were the years of bad harvests which led to famine in 1697.\textsuperscript{98} These were coupled with political infighting amongst influential Scots magnates vying for a monopoly of influence on the King. The result was an ungovernable and

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p.243  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p.138  
\textsuperscript{91} Brown and Whatley, 2008, p.34  
\textsuperscript{92} Levack, 1987, p.11  
\textsuperscript{93} Macinnes, 2007, pp.238-9  
\textsuperscript{94} Holmes, 1969, p.187  
\textsuperscript{95} Macinnes, 2007, p.105  
\textsuperscript{96} Fletcher of Saltoun, 1704, p.18  
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{98} Whatley, 2006, p.141
non-viable kingdom.\textsuperscript{99} By 1700 it seemed that the overthrow of the Stuarts had been followed by a decade of human and natural disasters.\textsuperscript{100}

Also by 1700, William had concluded that the only solution to the governance issues was an incorporating union.\textsuperscript{101} The death of the remaining child of Anne, who was to succeed William in 1702, rendered some urgency to the issue of the succession, both in Scotland and England. The English Parliament responded with the 1701 Act of Settlement, choosing the Hanoverian elector, George. The serious possibility that Scotland would not accept the Hanoverian succession coupled with the issues caused by the war with France, threatened the Regal Union and England’s security.\textsuperscript{102}

A new Scottish Parliament had to be called within 20 days of William III’s death in 1702. Elected after the Darien disaster, it was likely to be anti-English.\textsuperscript{103} Britain was again at war with France; a war that was unpopular in Scotland due to its effect on trade, the fact that Scotland had not been consulted, and the additional burden of taxation on an impoverished country. The Jacobite supporters in Scotland made much of this, opposed as they were to war against Louis XIV, supporter and financier of their pretender James.\textsuperscript{104}

The conversion of the English to a pro-union position came as a result of events in Edinburgh in 1703 and 1704. The new Scottish Parliament was more independent than any had anticipated. Its members were aligned around informal groupings. The largest was the Court Party, the party of government. The Country Party was a loose confederation connected mainly by antagonism to the governing clique. The Jacobites (or Cavaliers) would pragmatically align with the Country Party. This Scottish Parliament proceeded to pass acts which gave Scotland the option of opting out of a British (English) Foreign Policy that had done them nothing but harm since 1689.\textsuperscript{105} Scotland could now exercise a veto over its participation in any British war.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{100} Devine, 1999, p.35; Fry, 2006, p.50
\textsuperscript{101} Lee, 2003, p.21
\textsuperscript{102} Levack, 1987, p.11
\textsuperscript{103} Holmes, 1969, p.180
\textsuperscript{104} Brown and Whatley, 2008, p.16
\textsuperscript{105} Holmes, 1966, p.181
\textsuperscript{106} Levack, 1987, p.218
Parliament in England now had to deal with the problem of the Scots.\textsuperscript{107} English ministers decided there was no solution possible but a Union.\textsuperscript{108} As a result in 1705 they passed the Alien Act; unless the Scots appointed commissioners to start negotiations for Union and recognise the Hanoverian succession by December 25\textsuperscript{th} 1705, their citizens not domiciled in England would be treated as aliens and their trade blocked.\textsuperscript{109} The Scots' reaction to this was hostile.\textsuperscript{110} However, the Scottish Parliament took only three months to conclude that the Scots should enter a treaty with England and that the Queen should appoint commissioners from Scotland to negotiate the terms.\textsuperscript{111} Even so, there were few openly supportive MPs, only a great inclination to get a treaty under way.\textsuperscript{112}

In 1706 the Scots agreed to political incorporation and the Hanoverian succession in exchange for free access to British and colonial markets.\textsuperscript{113} By passing a separate Act for Securing the Scottish Religion, opposition to union from the Kirk was blunted.\textsuperscript{114} At the same time there was no agreement as to an alternative. Union with Holland or France and even a new republic had been loosely discussed.\textsuperscript{115} However, such proposals found little support.\textsuperscript{116} Scotland needed a strong government and constitutional solution; no other serious remedy had been put forward. Roxburgh, leader of the Country Party reluctantly stated 'I know no way but this union.'\textsuperscript{117} Following this brief description of the causes and events that led to the Union, a further contextual discussion is included in this introduction. This is on Scottish nationalism.

**Scottish Nationalism: A Description with Reference to Some Paradigms of Nationalism**

Any discussion on post-1885 Scottish Nationalism should start with the United Kingdom, one of a short list of countries that has been identified as truly

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{107} Whatley, 2006, p.212
\bibitem{108} Holmes, 1966, p.181
\bibitem{109} Whatley, 2006, pp.213-4
\bibitem{110} Ibid., p.224
\bibitem{111} Ibid.
\bibitem{112} Ibid., p.225
\bibitem{113} Macinnes, 2007, p.281
\bibitem{114} Whatley, 2006, pp.306-7
\bibitem{115} Ibid., p.199
\bibitem{116} Brown and Whatley, 2008, p.8
\bibitem{117} Whatley, 2006, p.303
\end{thebibliography}
multinational.118 Whilst reflecting the characteristic of un-homogeneity, the United Kingdom is something of an exception to the view above of nationhood binding people, place and state.

As a would-be nation, rather than a name, Great Britain was invented in 1707, with the Act of Union.119 Scotland joined England and Wales in a union of policy rather than affection.120 The United Kingdom was formed when the union was extended to Ireland in 1801. It is populated not by ‘United Kingdomers’ but by Irish, Scots, Welsh and English. These groupings, who think of themselves as nations, can also think collectively of Britain, and of themselves sometimes as British.121 The UK can be thought of as a collection of different Unions rather than a homogenous state.122 However, ‘English’ can be a sub-text for ‘British’ and this was a big issue for early Scottish Home Rule organisations. A writer in the home rule journal ‘Scottish Nation’ used the early mobilisations of the First World War to bitterly object to the Army being described as English in national newspapers.123

Moreover, at the time of the Union and for at least a hundred years hence, attachment to Scotland, and even England, was complicated by the fact that these countries were neither united in themselves nor distinct from each other. In terms of language, religion, levels of literacy, social organisation and ethnicity the Scottish Lowlanders had more in common with people in Northern England than they did with their own fellow countrymen in the Highlands.124 What was central to eighteenth century Britain was the Protestant religion. The division between Catholic and Protestant was enshrined in law from the late seventeenth century to 1829, and whereas Protestant dissenters from England

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118 Ozirimli, 2003, p.19
119 Colley, 2003, p.11
120 Ibid., p.12
121 Mitchell, 1996, p.38. This persists over time. See the Independent Newspaper, 11th August 2014. Asked to rank their Scottishness against their Britishness, only 26 per cent (of Scots) said they were "more Scottish than British"; the lowest figure since the survey was first completed in 1992, when it stood at 40 per cent. The most popular answer was "equally Scottish and British", with 32 per cent saying this description best fitted them. [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/scottish-independence/scottish-independence-more-scots-identify-as-british-since-referendum-announced-9662461.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/scottish-independence/scottish-independence-more-scots-identify-as-british-since-referendum-announced-9662461.html) Retrieved 10th December 2014.
122 Mitchell, 2014, p.289
123 The Scottish Nation, September 1914, p.168
124 Colley, 2003, pp.14-15
and Wales and Scottish Presbyterians had access to all levels of the political system, anti-Catholicism was a powerful and pervasive force.\textsuperscript{125}

The proposition that Scottish and British nationalism exist side by side is something that is difficult to ignore by those who pursue more Scottish self-government.\textsuperscript{126} The British dimension is a powerful force.\textsuperscript{127} Adam Smith and David Hume did not think of themselves as Scottish, ‘habitually referring to themselves as North Britons.’\textsuperscript{128} It was, and is, possible for the Scots to do well in the British political system. Yet although the existence of this British nation is a central fact,\textsuperscript{129} it clearly co-exists with other claimants. Research carried out in the mid-1960s claimed that ‘Scotland belongs to those territorial entities less than the nation, which are potentially capable of becoming nations themselves.’\textsuperscript{130} Not surprising as before the Union, Scotland was a nation with a state.

This thesis does not attempt to relate a history of Scottish Nationalism, but to record and try to explain its relationship with the Scottish diaspora. However, having provided a brief summary of nationalism, it is appropriate to try to summarise the Scottish variety. The words National or Nationalist started to appear in Scottish self-government organisations in the 1920s, with the Glasgow University Scottish National Association, the Scots National League and the Scottish National Movement. These groups formed the NPS, described in more detail in chapter three, which later was to become the SNP. Whereas the SHRA had been in the tradition of Labour/Liberal radicalism, the National League was descended from the traditions of Gaelic cultural independence movements.\textsuperscript{131} With the formation of the NPS and then the SNP, the notion of Scottish nationalism as the principle that nation and political unit are congruent had a ready application,\textsuperscript{132} and provides a working definition of the phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., pp.18-19
\textsuperscript{126} Mitchell, 1996, p.49
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ozirimli, 2003, p.17
\textsuperscript{129} Woolf, 1996, p.198
\textsuperscript{130} Budge and Unwin, 1966, p.130
\textsuperscript{131} Brand, 1978, pp.182-3
\textsuperscript{132} Lynch, 2002, p.3
The movements formed to support Scottish self-government can be divided into two groups with distinct aims; those seeking a parliament within the UK, or home rule, and those seeking a separate state for the nation of Scots. The SNP affirmed its objective as independence before the end of the Second World War, its decision to campaign on oil as well as independence in the 1970s saw an increase in its electoral success.\textsuperscript{133}

**Home Rule Movements**

An examination of pamphlets written by and in support of the first SHRA helps to frame the movement in the context of nationalism.\textsuperscript{134} The objectives of the SHRA were ‘To maintain the integrity of the Empire and secure that the voice of Scotland be heard in the Imperial Parliament’; to establish a parliament in Scotland with government over all Scottish affairs except military and diplomatic and to foster the national sentiment of Scotland. Membership was open not only to Scots but all British subjects.\textsuperscript{135} This organisation was not explicitly state seeking, but asking for self-government within a larger entity, the Empire. It supported Scots ethnicity but allowed non-Scots to be members. Scottish interests were recognised as being served poorly by the extant arrangements. Some felt that Scotland suffered an ‘unceasing drain upon our people such that all with wealth, talent or learning are being drawn to London, as towards the rising sun.’\textsuperscript{136}

Despite this, there is re-enforcement of allegiance to the Empire as well as to Scotland. This organisation is more state-led than state-seeking. It is not part of the movement to break up larger units into smaller, more homogenous polities. It is not supporting a singular ethnicity. The interests it represents are not purely Scottish, but more diverse, to include Britons and the Empire. It is not nationalist in the terms stated earlier.

The International Scots Home Rule League, (the League) established in 1913 to address the failure of the SHRA to engage with the Scots abroad, had as its objectives to unite home rulers throughout the world in promoting a national

\textsuperscript{133} Lynch, 2002, p.123  
\textsuperscript{134} Scottish Home Rule Association, 1892, pamphlets numbers 21-27  
\textsuperscript{135} Hunter, 1892, end piece  
\textsuperscript{136} Anon., 1878, On the Neglect of Scotland and her Interests by the Imperial Parliament, pp.6-7
parliament in Scotland. The first edition of its journal, *The Scottish Nation*, refers to ‘the call of the Race’ an appeal to the ethnic Scot wherever in the world to support the call for a Scottish Parliament. The secretary of the St. Louis (USA) branch of the League, Walter Macintyre, wrote at length about the loyalty, interest and patriotism that the Scots, or descendants of Scots, have. He supported home rule for Scotland, but did not link this to the interests of his brother Scots in the US. Such patriotism ‘in no way conflicts with the leal-hearted devotion to the highest interests of the empire.’ There is an allegiance to existing structures. Whereas there is an ethnic strain to its appeal to the Scottish race, the unity of interests is not clear from the evidence of the US member. This ambiguous patriotism is clear in the support of the League for the 1914-18 War. The August edition of the journal features a picture of King George V and a later edition associates volunteering for war duty with patriotism, asserting that the ‘striking patriotism of the Colonies derives its strength from its Scottish elements.’

There were two further major home rule organisations which can be examined for their adherence to the nationalist model, the second SHRA, and the Scottish Convention, later becoming the Scottish Covenant Association. The aims of the second SHRA were similar to those of the first, a Scottish parliament in the context of the British Empire. The experience of Ireland and the loss of faith in the Labour Party to push the Home Rule issue led to a change not only in strategy, from that of pressure group to that of electing MPs to Westminster, but also in objectives. Scotland experienced a multiplicity of national movements at this time. The founder of the second SHRA, Roland Muirhead, remarked upon this in a letter in 1919, emphasising to a Scottish MP that the organisation was operating along different lines to other groups ‘at present in existence.’

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137 *The Scottish Nation*, January 1914, p.44
138 Ibid., p.39
139 *The Scottish Nation*, November 1913, pp.2-3
140 *The Scottish Nation*, October 1914, p.178
141 Hassan, 2009, pp. 20-21
142 NLS Acc. 3721/78/2, Letter from Muirhead to J M Hogge, 17th February 1919
Independence Movements

The Scots National League, the Scottish National Movement, the SHRA and the Glasgow University Scottish National Movement existed at the same time and merged to form the NPS. Muirhead referred to this as the ‘strong spearhead of the Scottish Nationalist movement.’ The new party was split along a fault line between moderates, who supported home rule and nationalists who supported independence. The conference of 1933 saw a vote between the two approaches, won by the home rulers 69 to 45. The emergence of the Scottish Party (self-styled ‘Moderates’) in 1932 encouraged the moderate wing of the NPS to try to broaden its appeal with a merger. In 1934 this formed the SNP.

A further major split in the Party, that of a group of moderates being ejected in 1942, subsequently formed the National Convention. This Convention saw its main task as drafting a home rule bill, but on becoming the Covenant Association stated its task to be ‘to secure the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in Scotland’. It was well organised with a network of active branches. However, this ambition, decidedly not state-seeking, co-existed with other views. After the Convention’s demise in the mid-1950s, the SNP remained the chief proponent of what was by then a claim for independence. During the 1960s, the SNP began to behave like a political party and this decade saw some electoral success. It can be argued that the post-1960 success of the SNP was not only a question of better organisation and the Scotland’s Oil campaigns. The decay of the United Kingdom in the wake of the

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143 NLS Acc. 3721/79/582, Letter sent by Muirhead to prospective supporters
144 Hassan, 2009, p.22
145 NLS Acc. 3721/79/582, Reported in the Scots Independent, July 1933, p.135. The two positions had been debated in Scots Independent, November 1932, pp.4-5
146 Mitchell, 2014, pp. 92-93
147 Hassan, 2009, p.23
148 Hassan, 2009, p.25. Dealt with in greater detail in chapter three
149 NLS Acc. 7295/4, Minutes of the National Committee, 10th November 1945
150 NLS Acc. 7952/9
151 Mitchell, 2014, p.102
152 NLS Acc. 7505/20
153 Hassan, 2009, pp.26-27
Empire’s decline can be seen as the political substance of the nationalist revivals in the British Isles.\textsuperscript{155}

This is the moment to consider the various shades of Scottish Nationalism in the light of the earlier discussion on nationalism and its characteristics. The continuum begins with an appeal to Scots ethnicity. The League appealed to the ‘Scots’ Race,’ the NPS to a form of British nationalism.\textsuperscript{156} Originally focussed on restoring its parliament, the NPS became state-seeking, wanting independent national status, but state-maintaining in its hope to be part of the British family of nations and the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{157} The appeal to the common bond of sentiment which re-enforces existing state allegiance, which is also about minorities seeking statehood is reflected in the movement’s habitual re-assertion of the role of the British Empire in the SNP’s 1934 constitution.\textsuperscript{158} The political differences that can be hidden under cultural similarity were evident from the need after the formation of the NPS to ‘cover all divergences of nationalist opinion.’\textsuperscript{159} By 1937-8 the SNP constitution had been amended to a straightforward demand for a parliament with authority over all Scottish affairs.\textsuperscript{160}

In summary, through much of the length of time dealt with by this enquiry, there was evidence of an ambivalence in Scottish Nationalism which led to a multiplication of agencies vying for ownership of the issue. There is one further feature of Scottish Nationalism to explore, and that is the almost complete absence of violence throughout its history.

The presence, or absence of violence in the nationalist pressure for homogeneity was reflected earlier as a continuum. It will be seen that Scottish nationalism exists at the peaceful end of that continuum. The SNP were and are committed to independence by democratic, electoral methods. The organisation has always been social-democratic not revolutionary and there has

\textsuperscript{155} Naim, 1981, p.194
\textsuperscript{156} NLS Acc. 3721/79/582, Paper to the National Council of the NPS.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} NLS Acc. 3721/86/1, SNP constitution dated 1934/5
\textsuperscript{159} NLS Acc. 3721/79/582, Policy paper circa 1929
\textsuperscript{160} NLS Acc. 3721/86/1
never been a sanctioning of political violence.\textsuperscript{161} A supporter wrote to Arthur Donaldson, who held senior posts in the SNP, to say he was ‘100% against any armed uprising or bomb throwing activities.’\textsuperscript{162} The very nature of nationalism implies a conflict over how best to organise and govern a section of a society. Yet the nature of the movement has been one of non-violence. A brief look at a conflict analytical framework\textsuperscript{163} shows that this is only of limited use in an examination of the movement for Scottish home rule or independence.

However, whilst there has been little violence between the two parties in the conflict, the UK and Scotland, there is nevertheless a conflict, if only of views, on the ‘best’ way to govern the constituents of the United Kingdom. Therefore there is a conflict in the emergent state which never uses violence to resolve its differences. To a limited extent then it can be argued that other nationalist conflict situations can instruct an examination of that of the Scots. Specifically, of the two examples chosen for comparison, the Norwegian national liberation was non-violent, whilst that of the Irish was violent.

**Chronology**

The starting point for this research is the Secretary for Scotland Act, 1885, and the end point is the Scottish devolution referendum of 1979. This time frame is then split into two sections, with the 1939-45 World War providing a convenient if arbitrary dividing line. Although they are not entirely consistent with the time frame, the two parts deal with different types of groups promoting home rule and independence. The first section deals with groups trying to influence those in power, known as pressure groups. The second deals with one group seeking to achieve its aim through electoral power itself, a political party. Although during the period between the two World Wars groups began to seek political power, the pressure group activity really ends with the demise of the Scottish Convention in 1951.\textsuperscript{164} Therefore the second period deals predominantly with the party which pursued independence and devolution through electoral politics

\textsuperscript{161} Esman, 1977, p.264
\textsuperscript{162} NLS Acc. 6038/6, February file. Letter from Grant in Germany to Donaldson, 19\textsuperscript{th} February 1968
\textsuperscript{163} Smith and Stares, 2007, p.27 for this example
\textsuperscript{164} Mitchell, 1996, p.124
and ends with the 1979 referendum. In each case this analysis of groups and events and their engagement with the diaspora is contextualised with a brief reference to Scottish migration during that period. In order to provide a contemporary context, contact and remittance activity by the diaspora is compared with that of other diasporas, the details of which are laid out in this introduction.

The Chapters

Chapter one has already been introduced. Chapter two provides an examination of the Scottish emigrations and the phenomena of diasporas. It identifies types of diaspora both by the nature of the original dispersal and by the role the emigrants played in their new host lands. These typologies then allow the presentation of the comparison diasporas; those of the Irish and the Norwegians. The concept of conflict generated diasporas and whether or not the Jacobite émigrés constituted one, is examined.

Chapters three and four cover the detail of the diaspora’s engagement with Scottish nationalism, including such practical contributions as funds through remittances. The engagement of nationalism with the Scottish diaspora is detailed, as is the contribution the diaspora made to the nationalist movements. This will include the efforts of those in positions of legislative influence in the diaspora in the rest of the UK. The contributions of the Irish and Norwegian diasporas to their respective independence movements are included as a comparison of the engagement of two other major European migrating peoples. Chapter four also relates the attempts by Scottish Nationalists to bring their case to the United Nations, and attempts to understand this in terms of an understanding of the operation of soft power as defined by Joseph Nye\textsuperscript{165} and extended by others.

Chapter five deals with a particular location, England, and particular members of the diaspora, politicians. As such it details the many interventions made in the Houses of Parliament to promote Scottish home rule, including detailed descriptions of the devolution debates. There were many attempts to achieve

\textsuperscript{165} Nye, 1990, p.157
the engagement of the UK legislators in the Westminster Parliament. The chapter concerns itself with the support in Parliament these attempts received from the Scots in the diaspora in Parliament. Despite some definitional and research difficulties, the chapter confronts the issue that the Scots in Parliament by and large acted either severally or in party groups rather than as a Scottish faction.

Chapter six offers some explanations for the nature of the engagement between the diaspora and the nationalist organisations. Hypotheses concerning the reasons for the nature of this engagement between a long standing nationalist cause and a long standing diaspora are proposed. It examines the nature of the diaspora and the nature of the engagement to find explanations for the lack of support. Of particular note is the repeated engagement by nationalist movements with the associational Scots in their Caledonian Clubs and St. Andrews Societies. The nature of these societies and their role as gatekeepers to the diaspora in this involvement is examined.

Chapter seven offers context, particularly for the emigration of the Scots, discussion of a number of issues brought out in the thesis and finally the summarising of the comparison diasporas and the utility of that work. It explores the context of the results of the enquiry. It also provides greater detail about the comparison diasporas. The discussion section looks further into diasporas and assimilation, acknowledging that this is an area where greater study would reveal more insight into the matter under discussion in this thesis. It provides a closer look at the operation of soft power and offers an explanation for why the Irish were apparently successful with it and the Scots a failure. The prediction by a nationalist supporter that success abroad would only come with success at home is tested and refuted. Chapter eight offers a summary of the research under the headings of diaspora and emigration as well as the engagement of home rule groups and the SNP with the diaspora. Additionally there will be suggestions as to where further research may be profitable, providing a conclusion to the enquiry.
Summary

This introduction has served to set the scene for this enquiry into the relationship between the Scots abroad and the movements to give Scotland more self-government. It has dealt with the timeframe, with an overview of the chapters, with methods used and research sources. It has provided a brief context for Scotland’s significant emigrations, with nationalism in general and Scottish in particular and introduced the concept of gatekeepers as social and political actors. The conception of the Union which the self-government movements attempt to amend or destroy has been detailed. Chapter two will deal with the Scottish migrations of the relevant time period in more detail and introduce the phenomenon of diasporas and their activities as agents in international affairs and as actors in the nationalist projects of their homelands.
Chapter Two: The Scots Abroad, Diasporas as International Actors

This chapter describes the size and destinations of the Scottish emigrations from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. They were not unique in their time, and further context and explanations for this exodus will be provided in chapter seven. The longitudinal timeframe of this study begins in the late nineteenth century. The diaspora that would have been extant at the founding of the first SHRA had been substantially built in that century. For that reason the chapter concentrates on the later emigrations.

Then follows a description and typologising of diasporas, using both the original dispersal and the role diasporas play in their new homelands. These are used to identify the nature of the diaspora formed by the Scots. The role of diasporas as actors in international relations and in the nationalist projects of their homelands are examined, as well as the types of actions they may take. Lastly the case for the comparison diasporas is made.

The Scottish Emigrations

It is clear that the Scots have always emigrated in significant numbers.\textsuperscript{166} Migration, movement within the same country and emigration to a different country was long a feature of Scottish economic and social life. The Highlands particularly provided conditions of famine and shortage which resulted in Highlanders seeking work and residence elsewhere.\textsuperscript{167} Periods of hardship were relatively frequent in the Highlands; there was exceptional hardship in 1782-3, 1806-7, 1811, 1816-17, 1836-7 and the famine of 1846-55, all of which produced considerable movement to South and East Scotland\textsuperscript{168} as well as emigration. Emigration was also driven by seasonal factors in the fishing and agricultural economies. It could take 12 years for a Highlander to migrate to

\textsuperscript{166} Dobson, 1994, p.9
\textsuperscript{167} Brock, 1999, p.12
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
Glasgow.\textsuperscript{169} This urban growth eventually drew in Lowland as well as Highland Scots.\textsuperscript{170} Scots were therefore internally mobile, as well as being successful emigrants.

**Nineteenth Century Emigration**

The Scots colonised all areas of the British Empire in all trades, as well as soldiers, businessmen, educators and doctors.\textsuperscript{171} During the Napoleonic Wars, ships bringing timber from British North America to Britain needed cargo for their return trips, and cheaper travel, £3 or £4 for a crossing, encouraged more to travel.\textsuperscript{172} For a voyage in better conditions, with provisions added, the price for an adult in 1801 was £10, falling to £5 in 1802.\textsuperscript{173}

In Scotland the emigration issue was also one of national concern at the depletion of labour for the fields and fisheries, and for the manning of regiments.\textsuperscript{174} The first Passenger Act was passed in 1803 in an attempt to limit emigration.\textsuperscript{175} Nonetheless, the post-Napoleonic wars recession in Britain saw emigration rising again. The extent of nineteenth century emigration has been woven into Scottish life and lore. Scots accounted for 12\% of extra-European departures from the British Isles in this period, representing the loss of around two million people, a significant drain on resources from a country whose population at the 1911 census was only 4,760,900.\textsuperscript{176} These numbers do not include departures to England and Wales.

This was an ‘emigration of rising expectations.’\textsuperscript{177} In an era of self-finance, the truly destitute had little chance of making the crossing.\textsuperscript{178} This was initially an emigration of those in the middle ranks with capital, and also those with connections overseas. In the Highlands, the reality of seasonal migration to the Lowlands for work had more long term significance for the region at this time.\textsuperscript{179}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[169] Ibid., pp.12-14
\item[170] Ibid., pp.12-13
\item[171] Devine 2003, p.xxvi
\item[172] Devine 1992, p.21
\item[173] MS 9646, p.17
\item[174] Donaldson 1966, p.99 and ibid.
\item[175] Lenman, 1984, p.219
\item[176] Harper, 1998, p.2
\item[177] Bumsted, 1982, p.63
\item[178] Devine, 1992, p.21
\item[179] Devine, 1994, p.135
\end{footnotes}
The famines in mid-century caused great out-migration from the Highlands with some islands losing a half or a third of their population.\textsuperscript{180} Although much of the migration was to Lowland destinations over the decade of the mid-nineteenth century famine,\textsuperscript{181} more than 16,000 were assisted to emigrate to Canada or Australia by various means.\textsuperscript{182} Reorganisation of agriculture in the rural Lowlands was unable to provide jobs for the natural increases in population.\textsuperscript{183} These land pressures were in stark contrast to the surplus of cheap land in the Americas.

Figures for the first half of the nineteenth century are estimates, but there are indications that current emigration, those who left, was 1,841,534 for the period 1825 to 1914.\textsuperscript{184} Current emigration between 1861 and 1911 was 1,171,908.\textsuperscript{185} Whilst emigration across the border to England was hard to estimate for the first half of the nineteenth century, the 1851 census recorded 137,087 Scots-born residents in England and Wales.\textsuperscript{186} Improved records and censuses allow more confidence in numbers for the second half of the century.

The destinations of these emigrants changed over the period. In the first half of the century, Scots showed a preference for Canada. However, over the century, 44% went to the United States, 28% to Canada and 25% to Australasia,\textsuperscript{187} the latter destination becoming more popular in the second half of the century. Fewer went to other destinations like South Africa and India.\textsuperscript{188} Initial destinations do not tell the whole story of this migration however. The example of F. G. Cunningham, of Ayrshire, demonstrates the nature of some Scots’ migrations. He was born in 1835, the son of a sojourner, a major in the Indian Army.\textsuperscript{189} He left Ayr for Australia and became a sheep farmer. In 1858, he left Australia with 2,000 head of sheep to emigrate to Otago in New Zealand.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Devine, 1994, p.147
\item \textsuperscript{181} Brock, 1999, p.24
\item \textsuperscript{182} Devine, 1994, p.147
\item \textsuperscript{183} Devine, 1992, p.23
\item \textsuperscript{184} Harper, 2003, p.3
\item \textsuperscript{185} Brock, 1999, p.136
\item \textsuperscript{186} Harper, 2012, p.19
\item \textsuperscript{187} Harper, 2003, p.3
\item \textsuperscript{188} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.2
\item \textsuperscript{189} NLS Acc. 13089/3
\end{itemize}
In 1885 he once more moved, this time to England, where he died in 1911.\textsuperscript{190} Just that one man had lived in four parts of the Empire.

Current emigration figures usefully draw attention to the size of the leaving population. The demography of Scotland was influenced by net emigration numbers, those who left minus those who returned. The following table shows the scale of the net emigration of the period.

**Table II. Scottish Net Emigration by Decade, 1861-1901**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861–1871</td>
<td>116,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-1881</td>
<td>96,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881–1891</td>
<td>215,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891–1901</td>
<td>54,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>482,310</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Brock, 1999, Appendix 10 page 328

These people would write to their relatives at home, their letters giving a sense of their reasons for departure, and why they stayed. Duncan Macarthur had emigrated to Montreal to work for the Hudson Bay Company. He wrote to his sister Bella in Nairn for many years. Duncan was joined by his brother James and companions who had taken 12 days in their crossing. They immediately went looking for work.\textsuperscript{191} The same letter confirms a remittance to home. This one letter shows remittance behaviour and Scots abroad welcoming their relations to Canada.

**Twentieth Century Emigration**

Scotland’s emigration continued after the First World War. English emigration figures are available to enable a comparison. Between 1901 and 1914, Scottish emigration was taking place at almost twice the rate of that of England, 11.2 departures per 1000 versus six departures per 1000 in England and Wales.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{190} NLS Acc. 13089/1
\textsuperscript{191} Acc.10623/4, letter dated 14th May 1869
\textsuperscript{192} Harper, 2003, p.2
This period of emigration has been divided into census periods for the century in table III below.

**Table III. Net Emigration from Scotland, 1901-81**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Of which to the rest of the UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901–11</td>
<td>254,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911–21</td>
<td>238,000</td>
<td>Not available$^{193}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921–31</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-51$^{194}$</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–61</td>
<td>282,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–71</td>
<td>326,000</td>
<td>169,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–81</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total</td>
<td>**1,861,000</td>
<td><strong>901,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These are not all overseas emigrants; ‘this remarkable outflow was directed more towards England than overseas.’$^{195}$ The period divides around the Second World War. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of strong encouragement for emigration to countries like Canada, Australia, South Africa and Rhodesia. Ironically, the improved post-war prosperity in Scotland gave more Scots the resources to undertake long distance migration with confidence.$^{196}$ As table III shows, despite the encouragement to move abroad, 47% of those from 1951-81 moved to England.

Without ever ranking as the highest exporter of people in a particular time span, Scotland achieved centuries of exceptionally high emigration.$^{197}$

$^{193}$ At the start of this decade there were 321,825 Scots born in England and Wales
$^{194}$ The lack of a census in 1941 deprives these numbers of some valuable granularity. Harper, 2003, p.7 characterises the 1930s as a period of net immigration of circa 41,000 since the Depression in the Americas reduced opportunity and those unsuccessful in the 1920s migrations returned.
$^{195}$ Harper, 2012, p.19
$^{196}$ Devine, 1992, p.156
$^{197}$ Brock, 1999, pp.231-2
The Drivers of Emigration

From the mid-eighteenth century the forces of long term change of land use were most evident in the Highlands, though the issue was as much the Highlander’s response as their environment. It is best to avoid short term analysis that concentrates on the clearances.198 The generic causes of the great European exodus of the nineteenth century are outlined in chapter seven. To argue that Scotland was different to other European countries in responding to these conditions would be difficult. Equally, famine, clearance and enclosure were not unique to Scotland. Changes in long term land use, also to be seen in Ireland and Norway, were not the whole story. The causes were not only in rural conditions at home but also in attractions elsewhere. Advice on emigration, given by a visiting Scottish surveyor on his return, asserted that ‘Farms can be purchased (in America) at a small cost, not more than the rent of poor land in Scotland.’199

These complexities can be observed in the Macarthur family. A letter from Duncan in May 1871 to his brother David in Nairn reflects on the relative merits of David staying in Nairn, or going to Canada or London. David apparently has a poor view of his prospects in Nairn. Duncan’s advice is that if he had had £100 to put into a business in Nairn 10 years ago he ‘should never think of leaving it.’ Duncan’s advice to David is to set up in business with his brother James and stay in Nairn. As for going to Canada, he says ‘I cannot conscientiously advise you to do that’, as his own prospects ‘are not yet settled.’200 Duncan was contracted to the Hudson Bay Company for seven years on low wages, probably the original pull factor for him, aided by the push of insufficient capital to set up at home.201 Duncan eventually secured a banking agency in Manitoba. Later he wrote to his sister Bella of his involvement in local politics and was remitting £20 to her several times a year.202 The pull factor of this kind of testament worked into complex forces of rearrangement in the home society, which were real changes in the structure of

198 Cage, 1985, p.4
199 Sutter, 1882, p.100
200 Acc.10623/4, Letter dated 5th May 1871
201 Ibid., letter dated 1st March 1872, Duncan to his sister Bella
202 Acc. 10623/4, 20th July 1886 and 5th May 1887, letters from Duncan to Bella
the social and economic life of the country.\textsuperscript{203} In this example, people were lost but capital was returned.

Although emigration was always an essential part of Scottish life as a device for self-improvement,\textsuperscript{204} the decision was not always straightforward. However, the Scot at home did receive encouragement from the Scot abroad. D. M. Arthur wrote to a friend in Oban from New Zealand in 1862 and the letter was published in the \textit{Illustrated Oban Magazine}. ‘I have no hesitation’ Arthur writes, ‘in saying this is a very fine country’… ‘there is plenty of employment, an abundance of good food and good wages for those who want to work.’\textsuperscript{205} A year later, Arthur follows up with an encouraging letter to the magazine, announcing that ‘the town is built!’\textsuperscript{206}

Within a few years of the end of the First World War, the spectre of mass unemployment loomed and a change in Government policy towards populating the Empire began to take hold.\textsuperscript{207} This new interventionism created a number of schemes to assist the passage of emigrants to the Empire and the US. Unfortunately, the timing of the largest scheme coincided with the US establishing regional quotas on immigrants in 1921-23. Even so, the British schemes like the Empire Settlement Acts for Canada and Australia in 1922, assisted over 400,000 people to leave the British Isles between 1922 and 1935. This was a third of all those who left at that time.\textsuperscript{208} Research carried out in the post-World War Two period demonstrated that economic factors made up only about a third of motivation to emigrate. The desire for change and new experience was at least as strong.\textsuperscript{209}

Those who returned did so for a number of reasons, but they can be classified in three useful ways. Firstly, there were those in the military who served abroad and were neither killed nor tempted to remain with land grants.\textsuperscript{210} Secondly, there were those who never intended to remain, who took administrative,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{203} Devine, 1992, p.16  \\
\textsuperscript{204} Harper, 2003, p.3  \\
\textsuperscript{205} The \textit{Illustrated Oban Magazine}, August 1862  \\
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., July 1863  \\
\textsuperscript{207} Harper, 1998, pp.13-14  \\
\textsuperscript{208} Harper, 1994, p.17  \\
\textsuperscript{209} Devine, 1992, p.160  \\
\textsuperscript{210} Brock, 1999, pp.20-21
\end{flushleft}
skilled, seasonal, or teaching posts abroad or in England and Wales, with the intention of returning with money. The Yarmouth herring industry, for example, was a seasonal source of income for 38,000 Scots at its peak in 1913. A different type of temporary migration is referred to by the *Illustrated Oban Magazine* which published the results of the 1862 Civil Service of India entry competitions, mentioning that thirteen were Scots. The successful might return to patronage and political positions. In 1805, a Scottish Lord wrote to Henry Dundas asking for his support in getting his son, ‘who is coming home from India’ to ‘succeed General Maitland in the representation of this Borough.’ Finally, there were those for whom the emigrant experience had ended in failure and disillusionment. Robert Louis Stevenson met hundreds of these heading home, as he headed west through America.

What is most likely is that those who did return did so out of conscious preference. By one estimate, more than a third of those who emigrated in the second half of the nineteenth century came home again. Return migration probably increased in importance in the second half of the nineteenth century, after the introduction of steamship travel made transient or deliberate temporary migration financially possible. For these sojourners the focus remained on remitting or saving capital for the home trip. What is clear is that the temporary migrant and career nation builder both cultivated networks of fellow Scots with the aim of developing an ethnically based social and economic support group.

In summary, the emigration of the Scottish people from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries was significant for Scotland. It took place in the context of a much wider European emigration, a product not only of the conditions in Scotland but also of the nature of the Scottish people, to whom both migration and emigration were an acceptable strategy for improvement. Whilst the

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211 Devine, 1992, p.120, see also Harper 2012, pp.20-21
212 *Oban Illustrated Magazine*, 1st August 1863
213 MS.1053, Letter from Lord Elcho to Dundas, Lord Melville, dated 10th January 1805
214 Stevenson, 1984, pp.128-9
216 Devine, 1992, pp.120-121
217 Harper, 2003, p.283
Highland emigrations may take on the appearance of exile, most left from Lowland counties at a time of strong economic growth, creating a paradox of simultaneous boom at home, emigration abroad and immigration of other nations to take up opportunities in the mills and factories. Emigration peaked after the forcible evictions had ended.219 Emigration was certainly the result of ‘discontent’, a word used in a report of 1802,220 and ‘differences’ with the local powers that be.221 However they were also drawn by cheap land and encouraged by those that had gone before.

Once abroad, the Scots formed an associational culture that has been preserved to this day through changing circumstances, creating a distinct grouping of many millions. Scotland not only exported large numbers of its people to Empire locations around the globe, it also exported versions of its institutions such as Law, Schools and Churches.222 It is in this ‘global Scotland’ that much of the popular facets of modern Scottish culture were to be established, from Burn’s Night to St. Andrew’s Day.223 These Scots abroad are frequently collectively referred to as the Scottish Diaspora.224 The purpose of the next section is to introduce the concept of diasporas and to examine diasporas as actors in both international relations and in nationalist projects in their homelands.

Diasporas

Characterizing features of a diaspora are usually focused around the physical and social. It will be seen that there is evidence that many diasporas are involved in the nationalist projects of their homelands. Those in a diaspora can feel free to endorse ethnic movements, including those committed to the use of force.225 For some the nature of diasporas is such that they will tend to be involved in the political affairs of home and host land politics.226 Firstly, the characteristics of a diaspora, introduced in chapter one, should be developed

219 Bueltmann, et.al., 2009, p.2
220 MS. 9646, p.29
221 Ibid., p.27
222 Craig, 2009, p.237
223 Ibid., p.238
224 Bueltmann, et.al., 2009, p.4
225 Werbner, 2000, p.5
226 Sheffer, 2003, p.7
further. Recall the four characteristics distilled in that introduction.\textsuperscript{227} The first of these is \textit{special dispersal}. The second, \textit{orientation to a homeland} and the third, \textit{boundary maintenance}. Lastly, \textit{ethnic consciousness} should be sustained over a \textit{long period of time}. The descendants of first generation migrants of the late nineteenth century were fourth or fifth generation in the mid-twentieth century, and yet may still populate the diaspora alongside first generation new arrivals. The dispersal is examined first.

\textbf{Special Dispersal}

Diasporas feature a dispersion from an original place to two or more locations. Some see a diaspora simply as a ‘segment of a people living outside of a homeland’\textsuperscript{228} though this is usually extended as ‘the collective forced dispersion of a religious and/or ethnic group, precipitated by a disaster, often of a political nature.’\textsuperscript{229} This may be coupled with a lack of acceptance in the new host countries.\textsuperscript{230} This definition lies close to the centre of the classical notions of diaspora, of which that of the Jews is paramount. Whilst all study of diasporas must recognise this tradition,\textsuperscript{231} such studies are now long past the stage of being confined to that forced dispersal.\textsuperscript{232} The need for the dispersal to be disaster led is not universal. Diasporas, even from the earliest times, are far more diverse.\textsuperscript{233}

Many groups can be identified as diasporas even if their migratory journey had not involved violence or persecution.\textsuperscript{234} Based on the dispersal, diasporas can be identified as \textit{ Victim, Labour, Imperial, Trade} or \textit{Deterritorialised}.\textsuperscript{235} Additionally, another distinction is whether or not the diaspora is predominantly conflict-generated. There is evidence that such groups involve themselves in and may perpetuate nationalist conflicts.\textsuperscript{236} These diaspora types are summarised in table IV below.

\textsuperscript{227} Brubaker, 2005, pp.5-6; Cohen, 2008, p.17
\textsuperscript{228} Safran, 1991, p.364
\textsuperscript{229} Chilliad and Rageau,1997, pp.xiv-xvii
\textsuperscript{230} Safran, 1991, p.364
\textsuperscript{231} Cohen, 2008, p.34
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., p.35
\textsuperscript{233} Cohen, 1997, p.25
\textsuperscript{234} Georgiou, 2006, p.48
\textsuperscript{235} Cohen, 2008, p.18
\textsuperscript{236} McCarthy, 2011, p.334
Table IV: Main Types of Diaspora by Nature of Dispersal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Nature of dispersal</th>
<th>Dominant examples</th>
<th>Similar groups</th>
<th>Other features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>Forced by slavery or catastrophe, possibly conflict generated</td>
<td>African, Armenian, Jews, Tamil and Albanian</td>
<td>Many contemporary refugees may be incipient victim diasporas</td>
<td>Homeland orientation, return movement, mobilisation as a diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Migration in search of work</td>
<td>Indentured Indians</td>
<td>Italians in the US, Turks in Europe</td>
<td>May not form a diaspora in time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial</td>
<td>Search for opportunity, land and work</td>
<td>British, Irish, Early Tamil</td>
<td>Other colonial powers</td>
<td>Colonisation. Thread of state involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>Merchants migrating to form networks to trade goods and services</td>
<td>Lebanese, Chinese</td>
<td>Venetians, professional Indians</td>
<td>Interrelated net of commercial communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterritorialised</td>
<td>Voluntary secondary migration to find work or opportunity</td>
<td>Caribbean people, Sindhis</td>
<td>Parsis, Scots Irish</td>
<td>Multiply dispersed, interconnected, displaced by a more amenable diaspora</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The majority of these are not initiated by disaster. Dispersal from a homeland can be either traumatically pushed, or pulled in a more voluntary fashion in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions. In the case of deterritorialised diaspora, people did not return to their homeland but emigrated in search of opportunities in more favourable locations, such as the Scots who migrated to Ireland, thence to the US, or Caribbean peoples to the UK or Panama.

Table IV generalises dispersal, which may hide detail. Within victim groups there may be conflict-generated dispersals. For example; Albanian, Armenian, Jewish/Israeli, Sikh, Tamil and Palestinian. Thus diasporas, for example the Tamils, may develop over time with more than one type of dispersal.

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237 Members of the two Zoroastrian groups, the other of which is Iranian. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsi)
239 Devine, 2003, p.xxiv
240 Cohen, 2008, pp.125-127
241 Koinova, 2013, p.433
242 Thiranagama, 2014, p.267
Dispersal is a straightforward notion and can be applied to instances of forced or voluntary movement. Many different types of dispersal can result in the formation of a diaspora. However, not all dispersals form diasporas. Temporary migrations for work, for example, need not lead to a diaspora forming. Other conditions need to be present, conditions that are more explanatory of what diasporas do, as opposed to their origins.

**Home Land Orientation**

Home land orientation is the orientation of a group to a real or imagined home land as a source of loyalty, inspiration and identity. It could include a collective memory or myth about a home land including its idealisation and a commitment to its maintenance or restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation. It may feature a movement to encourage return that remains strong among the group, whereas in some cases only maintaining regular or occasional contacts is sufficient. There may be a collective memory about the original home land’s location, history and achievements, and a commitment to its maintenance, but this memory may be leavened with mythology. This centring on a home land excludes many dispersed groups with a desire to create a culture in diverse locations, for example the African or South Asian diasporas. Although attempts were made, for example in Liberia, Freetown and Lagos, and notwithstanding the symbolic importance of Ethiopia to Rastas, a specific homeland cannot be restored to African Americans. The reality of an origin is present in many of the groups listed earlier, if not the possibility of return. A defined origin may create the desire to maintain links, culture and myths of that origin, leading to the third core feature of a diaspora, boundary maintenance, the preservation of a distinct identity.

**Boundary Maintenance over Time**

Having decided to permanently settle, members of a group may regard themselves as of the same ethnic or national origin and identify with groups

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243 Cohen, 1997, p.32
244 Sheffer, 2003, pp.9-10
245 Brubaker, 2005, p.6
246 Cohen, 2008, pp.43-44
247 Safran, 1991, p.371
seen as of the same background in other countries. The boundary may have security functions. The group may believe that they are not, and maybe can never be, accepted by the host society. This may be tempered by the possibility of a distinctive enriching life bringing economic or political success in the host country.

Boundary maintenance should occur over an extended time. This is crucial, as it must defeat the tension of the boundary erosion tendencies of assimilation. The group’s will to transmit its heritage acts to preserve its identity and thence the will to survive as a distinct minority. Boundary maintenance can be affected by the host lands of a diaspora making some diasporas more visible than others. Catholic immigrants in a Protestant host land are more visible due to their beliefs and religious practices. Racial differences are also visible. This visibility or invisibility will characterise the experience and role of the migrants in their chosen host society. It is boundary maintenance which makes a diaspora more than a collection of people with some secondary characteristic such as a surname associated with a country or region. It is this that enables a diaspora to be seen as a distinct community. Members of such a group are active in cultural, social, economic and political spheres. They establish transnational networks that reflect complex relationships among the diaspora, host countries, home lands and international actors.

The concept of boundary maintenance therefore introduces a sub-characterisation to diasporas, that of transnationalism. Here boundaries are being crossed, rather than being maintained. Yet it is by transnational actions that a diaspora maintains the boundary around itself, an activity that potentially erodes the boundaries of the host states. However, that migrants maintain boundaries is only to be expected. What defines a given group as a

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248 Brubaker, 2005, p.6; Sheffer, 2003, p.9
249 Safran, 1991, p.364
250 Cohen, 1997, p.26
251 Brubaker, 2005, p.7
252 Ibid., p.6
253 Shaffer, 2003, p.9
254 Brubaker, 2005, p.7
255 Ibid., p.6
diaspora is that it maintains these boundaries over at least two generations. Now to apply these characteristics to the Scots abroad.

The Case of the Scots

The lengthy Scottish dispersal has been described. Whilst it was largely voluntary, there were episodes when conditions in Scotland led to emigration being a forced solution. The emigration was to more than one location, and was both significant in European terms and in terms of the country’s population. On both volume and dispersal, the Scots’ emigration fulfils the criteria of a diaspora. It was an Imperial diaspora in the main, not comprised chiefly of victims. Its participants mostly fulfilled the role of settler in the lands to which they emigrated.

The distinction between a stateless diaspora and a state linked one, important in considering the likelihood of diaspora intervention in homeland nationalist projects, provides a conundrum for the Scots. Prior to the Union, regardless of the Union of Crowns, Scotland was the state of the Scots. During the period of the emigration after the 1707 Union, the Scots’ home state was Great Britain, then after the Union with Ireland in 1801, it was the UK. However, they were not a majority in it. Moreover, there is evidence from Caledonian Societies to be presented later, that the Scots members could regard themselves as British, a word sometimes used for those living in the UK. Their own place of birth, Scotland, where they were a majority, was part of that larger governance. In that sense they could be described as a nation without a state. Recalling the earlier definition of a nation, as a grand solidarity, and nationality a common bond of sentiment, there could be a case for this. However, the same could be said of the English, another nation without a state. There have, however, been movements supporting either home rule or Scottish separation from the UK since 1885. This means that in the case of the Scots, the distinction between stateless and state-linked should be treated with caution. Most distinguish between British and Scottish, some are happy to be both.

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256 Butler, 2001, p.190
257 Sim, 2011b, p.213
258 The Economist, 2014 issue 50, 13th December, p.88
Once abroad, the Scots’ nostalgia for Scotland was often cultivated with remarkable passion, persistence and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{259} This was anchored in a number of factors; the religion of the Kirk, philanthropy, culture and the sporting activities of the Highland games.\textsuperscript{260} An example from Australia in 1922 serves; ‘a crowd of Scots got together and decided the place wasn’t a place without a pipe band and decided to set the pipe band up’\textsuperscript{261} The same town had a Caledonian club and a Burn’s club.

National history has always been ‘able to accommodate and revive memories of a distant and mythicized path’.\textsuperscript{262} The notion of a distinct Scottish identity being maintained after emigration is widespread.\textsuperscript{263} The maintenance of Scottish civil society and religion after the Union may be a reason for this.\textsuperscript{264} When a large inward migration of Scots occurred in Corby in Northamptonshire in the 1930s, Scots on both sides of the border contributed to the building of a Church of Scotland.\textsuperscript{265} For the Scots abroad, home land orientation was strong. There exists for many a collective memory of the home land so that there may be second or third generation Scots abroad who have no direct Highland ancestry but still relate to the Highland culture. Lowlanders appropriated Highland emblems through cultural events such as dances.\textsuperscript{266} Some also regard the Highland Clearances as part of their own heritage even though the emigration of their forebears was at a much later period.\textsuperscript{267}

The will to transmit a heritage is abundantly evidenced by this considerable adhesion by generations of Scots abroad to a cultural norm of representative dance, music and dress, often Highland in nature. A letter written in 1804 confirmed that the ‘Highland Society of London have resolved to print (the poems of) Ossian in the original Gaelic.’\textsuperscript{268} There is homeland orientation in abundance among the Scots abroad. However, despite the regular repatriation

\textsuperscript{259} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.19
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., pp.20-23
\textsuperscript{261} McCarthy, 2006b, p.201
\textsuperscript{262} Woolf, 1996, p.30
\textsuperscript{263} Mackenzie, 2007, pp.10-11
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., p.8
\textsuperscript{265} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.22
\textsuperscript{266} McCarthy, 2006, p.213
\textsuperscript{267} Harper, 2005, pp.135-7
\textsuperscript{268} MS. 73.2.15 (58 – 70), letter to Mr Stewart, minister of Moulin by Dunkeld, 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1804
of emigrants, there is little evidence of a return movement. The return to Scotland by descendants of its past migrants may presuppose the existence of a return movement but for leisure rather than a permanent return.\textsuperscript{269} Although there is no evidence to suggest the Scots-Americans might re-locate,\textsuperscript{270} recent ‘homecomings’ demonstrate a propensity for roots tourism.\textsuperscript{271}

The longevity of the associational culture of the Scots abroad has ensured a strong element of boundary maintenance in their settler societies. The Scots Charitable Society of Boston, was founded in 1657.\textsuperscript{272} The Scots set up a wide array of these societies, clubs and institutions. Some were cultural such as Burn’s societies and some philanthropic, caring for less fortunate Scots migrants. They all helped to preserve and celebrate Scots identity.\textsuperscript{273} St. Andrew’s societies, Thistle societies and Caledonian clubs became established wherever the Scots settled. In London alone there were 28 Scottish clubs at the beginning of the twentieth century with a total membership of 4,000 to 5,000.\textsuperscript{274} The Sheffield Caledonian society, founded in 1822, is still active today.\textsuperscript{275} Such associations have become an ‘enduring public vehicle for constructions of Scottishness’.\textsuperscript{276} Scotland has become a global nation from the street patterns of Dunedin to Bonny Doon in California.\textsuperscript{277}

Two cautionary observations should be made. Firstly, these were not necessarily clubs for all strata of Scots emigrant society. Some had to forgo the social pleasures as they were too costly, providing some support for claims that these national, regional and clan societies were often elite clubs.\textsuperscript{278} Secondly, whilst the evidence is difficult to amass, the membership of these associations was probably a small part of the whole diaspora. These issues will be explored further, as will the strong suggestion that the societies provided newcomers

\textsuperscript{269} Sim and Macintosh, 2007, p.108
\textsuperscript{270} Sim, 2011b, pp.179-181
\textsuperscript{272} http://scots-charitable.org, accessed 31/5/13
\textsuperscript{273} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.4
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., p.24
\textsuperscript{275} The author presented a paper to the club in March 2012
\textsuperscript{276} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.101
\textsuperscript{277} Craig, 2009, p.238
\textsuperscript{278} McCarthy, 2006, p.207
with opportunities, social cohesion, jobs and accommodation through networks with fellow Scots, although their objectives were predominantly social.\textsuperscript{279}

Scottish associational culture helps fulfil two of the essential criteria for the identification of a diaspora. The orientation to a real or imagined homeland as a source of identity, loyalty and values can be found in the multitude of Scots societies.\textsuperscript{280} The second criterion is the requirement for boundary maintenance, for the preservation of an identity separate from that of the host lands. They give the Scot a distinct identity held together by an active solidarity combined with the social relationships created therein.

One further element of the Scottish Diaspora remains to be described in this overview, that of a conflict-generated diaspora. Whilst outwith the chronology of this study, there was one clear case of a conflict generated Scottish diaspora, that of the Jacobites. Between the Williamite Revolution of 1688-9 and the final rising of 1745-6, each successive attempt to restore the House of Stuart to the British throne produced a crop of refugees.\textsuperscript{281} Many of these were soldiers, both Irish and Scottish, following the existing tradition of Scots serving overseas.\textsuperscript{282} These Jacobites were few in number, with exiled Scottish regiments in France and Sweden.\textsuperscript{283} However, many of them were aristocrats who came to form a network across France, Spain and Italy as well as Austria, Sweden, Prussia and Russia.\textsuperscript{284} The Jacobite community in Europe was therefore mostly patrician in composition,\textsuperscript{285} supported in its exile by Catholic co-religionists.\textsuperscript{286}

There were many Jacobite supporters in England and Wales when the Jacobite army invaded England in 1745, but by and large they failed to support it.\textsuperscript{287} One exception to this was the Manchester Regiment, but this failed to play a significant role in the fighting.\textsuperscript{288} Following the defeat of the Jacobites, hundreds of war captives began to arrive as bound servants in Maryland and the West

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., p.213
\textsuperscript{280} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.3
\textsuperscript{281} Wills, 2002, p.1; Lenman, 1980, p.8
\textsuperscript{282} Lenman, 1980, p.8
\textsuperscript{283} Szechi, 1994, pp.126-7
\textsuperscript{284} Lenman, 1980, p.8; Wills, 2002, pp. 1-3; Szechi, 1994, p.128
\textsuperscript{285} Szechi, 1994, p.126
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid., p.127
\textsuperscript{287} Plank, 2006, p.78
\textsuperscript{288} Holcroft, 1995, p.63
Indies, but proposals to exile whole communities of Highlanders brought opposition from local landowners.289 This Jacobite diaspora provided support for the Stuart claim during the risings between 1689 and 1746.290 However, the failure of support from France in 1749 defeated the cause that had kept the Jacobite aristocratic diaspora apart from its host societies.291 The result of this was assimilation, which began before the ’45 and was said to be complete by 1784, when Pitt the Younger returned estates confiscated after the ’45 to the heirs of Jacobite families.292

The plotters of rebellion had turned into respectable Frenchmen, Spaniards, Swedes, Austrians or Italians.293 Thus the small conflict-generated segment of the long Scottish emigration ended in assimilation a hundred years before the first Home Rule association was founded. This cannot therefore be considered in the arguments to be presented later for the Scottish diaspora’s indifference to home rule.

It is hard to conclude other than that the Scots abroad form a diaspora even though they were not expelled by a single act of violence, and have not by and large had difficult relationships in their host countries. Indeed, they transmitted aspects of their own civil society to the lands which they settled, rather than being at loggerheads with an established industrialised society. In their connivance in the defeat of American, Australasian and African ‘first nations’ they were no different to other historical conquerors. It can be argued that they exhibit the characteristics of a diaspora, although this assumption will be revisited during the concluding chapter. Having established this, the activities of diasporas in the international space should be considered. This will allow a determination of the conditions under which a diaspora is likely to be involved in the nationalist projects of its home land.

289 Plank, 2006, p.79
290 Lenman, 1980, pp. 8-10
291 Wills, 2002, p.231
292 Lenman, 1980, p.10
293 Ibid., p.10
Diasporas in International Relations

Non-state actors do encroach upon the activities of territorially bound states which are the traditional actors on the international arena.294 These include international corporations, financial institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) of many types. Numbered amongst these NGOs are the world’s diasporas.295 Diasporas can impact international relations in many ways, some of these are examined below. Furthermore, as national minorities, they serve as political conduits for conflict and intervention.296 Both media and academic studies point to the influence of diasporas on international behaviour.297 Much of the activity that makes a diaspora what it is can be transnational; remittances, cultural identity, following sports and political events, and in some cases voting in national and local elections.298 A diaspora must exist in transnational space in order to remain a diaspora. Members may be physically and occupationally in the host country but socially and culturally in the home land they have left behind.299 Because diasporas bridge the gap between the global and the local, globalisation has enhanced their roles.300 Diasporas influence host or home land in several ways. Equally host or home land impact upon diasporas. Some of these influences are listed below,301 with some of the many types of action that demonstrate where such influence has existed.

Members of diasporas can follow political events in the home land, in the way that Albanian Kosovans in Austria joined the Democratic League of Kosovo.302 Diasporas may attempt to influence home land events by direct action. It was the overseas Chinese that overthrew the C’ching dynasty in 1911. From the safety of their host country, diasporas can sustain conflicts in their erstwhile

294 Sheffer, 2003, p.199
295 Esman, 2009, p.121
296 Shain and Barth, 2003, p.449
297 Ibid.
299 Esman, 2009, p.121
300 Cohen, 2008, p.155
301 Ibid., p.121-131
302 Koinova, 2011b, p.342
As soon as they secured the right to vote, the Irish in America used their ballots to affect British rule in Ireland.\textsuperscript{303} Diasporas may also attempt to influence their host government or international organisations to act for or against the interests of their home country government. The American Irish, angry with Woodrow Wilson’s attitude to Ireland, voted against him in 1916 and 1920. When the nationalists declared a Republic in 1919, the Irish cause received strong congressional support.\textsuperscript{305}

Home land governments may attempt to use their diasporas to support their strategic or economic goals. The Scottish Parliament in Holyrood reached out to the Scottish diaspora in 2006-9 to develop international links and connect with the Scottish identity of the diaspora communities, encouraging Scots to return ‘home.’\textsuperscript{306} A diaspora may seek protection from its home government. The Jews in Ethiopia suffered persecution. In the late 1970s their emigration was organised by Israel, facilitated by money raised by world Jewry and some intervention by the US. About 40,000 people were relocated from Ethiopia to Israel.\textsuperscript{307}

Host governments may call on a diaspora to support their strategic or economic goals. The growing suspicion of German-Americans' possible allegiance to the Pan-German movement in World War One prompted demands for their total assimilation in the US. The German-Americans ‘swatted the hyphen’ as other Americans made clear their opposition to things German.\textsuperscript{308} Diasporas may contribute to the political, educational and economic development of their former homeland.\textsuperscript{309} Croatian diaspora remittances for such a purpose amounted to $50 million.\textsuperscript{310}

Finally, to weigh against this, the threat of violent attacks by elements of terrorist organisations has cast suspicion on several diaspora communities.\textsuperscript{311}

\textsuperscript{303} Esman, 2009, p.122
\textsuperscript{304} Vertovec and Cohen, 1999, p.448
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid., pp.448-9
\textsuperscript{306} Sim, 2012, p.99
\textsuperscript{307} Ojanuga, 1993, pp.147-148
\textsuperscript{308} Shain, 1999, pp.15 and 69
\textsuperscript{309} Esman, 2009, p130
\textsuperscript{310} Smith and Stares, 2007, p.233
\textsuperscript{311} Shain, 1999, pp.99-100
Prior to the 9/11 attacks on the US, the IRA, Sikh separatists, Croat militias and both Palestinians and Jews in America had been critical players in conflict in their home lands.\textsuperscript{312} In a post 9/11 environment, the dual political loyalties suggested by a diaspora raises fears of the ‘enemy within’ and mobilised fifth columns.

Diasporas therefore can be mobilised in a number of ways. From the despatch of weapons and other resources to positive action such as lobbying governments and international organisations.\textsuperscript{313} The diasporic actors who are ‘outside the state but inside the people’ can have weight on the international scene because of their stature, means, institutions and connections.\textsuperscript{314} Diasporas can be invaluable to the dominant core ethnic of their host state for this very reason.\textsuperscript{315} It has been argued that diasporas have the luxury of living in the past whilst home governments have the day-to-day to manage, and equally that the diaspora’s faith in issues of kinship reminds the home state to preserve certain values key to the state’s raison d’être.\textsuperscript{316}

**Diasporas and Home Land Nationalist Projects**

This section will argue that diasporas do become involved in home land nationalist movements. Here the nationalism referred to is taken to be that termed *state seeking*, that is to say representatives of some population that currently did not have collective control of a state claim an autonomous political status, or even a separate state, because that population had a distinct, coherent cultural identity.\textsuperscript{317} All nationalist projects defined as state seeking usually involve a form of conflict with the status quo. The Scottish case is one where differences are recognised and given concrete expression,\textsuperscript{318} but those differences have been subject to attempted resolution through peaceful means. As a result, any comparison with diasporas involved in violent nationalist

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., p.199}
\footnote{Smith and Stares, 2007, p.28}
\footnote{Shain, 2008, p.124}
\footnote{Armstrong, 1976, pp.299-300}
\footnote{Shain, 2008, p.124}
\footnote{Tilley, 1994, p.133}
\footnote{Shain, 2008, p.124}
\footnote{Smith and Stares, 2007, p.25}
\end{footnotes}

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conflicts has its limitations in understanding the Scottish case. This is not to say that they cannot be instructive.

A diaspora’s role in a conflict situation will depend on many factors, such as the issues at stake in the home country, the level of organisation in the host, and the international attention given to the issues.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.26} Once involved, they can exert political, economic, military and socio-cultural influences on a separatist conflict.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.29} Some factors have been identified which affect the nature and likelihood of involvement. Firstly, a significant factor in diaspora involvement is the nature of the dispersal. If this has been mainly or partially generated by a nationalist conflict, then such conflict generated diasporas are considered more likely to maintain a myth of return, attachment to the home land territory and to display radical attitudes to home land political processes.\footnote{Koinova, 2013, p.433}

Secondly, the extent to which the diaspora is involved depends on the nature of the host state, of the home state, of economics and organisation.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} The nature of the host state is crucial. Before steam ship travel made migration and return relatively easy, its location may also have served as a strong factor. In the globalised world, the ease with which communities in a host country were ‘permitted’ ethnic nationalism became important. At the turn of the twentieth century many of the American diasporas, whose group identity had been dormant, became ardent nationalists, inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s proclamation of the principle of self-determination, and became increasingly interested in the independence of their countries of origin. Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Albanians and Croats mobilised into powerful forces promoting the cause of their home land’s independence.\footnote{Shain, 2008, p.20} Yet this support was not extended by the American Scot to the cause of Scottish Home Rule.\footnote{See for example Acc. 3721/7/117, letters to Muirhead , 3rd July1930, 25th February 1936, 23rd November 1936}

The diaspora’s role in home land conflict perpetuation or resolution can be so powerful that home land leaders ignore diaspora preferences at their peril.\footnote{Shain, 2008, p.101}
Examples of such intervention can be found in many conflicts. Israel regards the Jewish diaspora, particularly Jewish-Americans, as a strategic asset. This diaspora influences the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict.\textsuperscript{326} The Armenian diaspora supports Armenians in the Karabagh conflict,\textsuperscript{327} transferring substantial remittances there.\textsuperscript{328} From 1916 until the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, concern with Irish affairs reached a new intensity in the U.S. and Canada.\textsuperscript{329} A World Bank Study concluded that:

’by far the strongest effect on war or the risk of subsequent war works through diasporas. After five years of post-conflict peace \textit{the risk of renewed conflict is around six times higher in those countries with diasporas in America} than those without American diasporas.’\textsuperscript{330}

Countries that have recently had a civil war and have a large diaspora in the US have a 36% chance of conflict renewal. Those with a small diaspora have only a 6% chance of this taking place.\textsuperscript{331}

Diasporas provide a supply of money, weapons and recruits as well as acting as a propaganda platform.\textsuperscript{332} They lobby host governments and other international actors.\textsuperscript{333} Economic assistance can be important as it can bring resources to those who might otherwise be denied it, vital if conflict is in poor or less developed states. Diasporas mitigate home land conflicts by aiding economic development. Between 12%-14% of the GDP per capita of post conflict economies may be sustained by diaspora remittances.\textsuperscript{334}

Remitting monies home is for many an accepted part of the emigrant experience.\textsuperscript{335} The size of these remittances can be considerable. In the early 1990s global annual remittances stood at around $30 billion. By 2012, official remittance flows to developing countries was estimated at $401 billion.\textsuperscript{336} Nor is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{326} Sheffer, 2003, p.188
\item \textsuperscript{327} Shain, 2008, p.108
\item \textsuperscript{328} Sheffer, 2003, p.188
\item \textsuperscript{329} Campbell, 2001, p.75
\item \textsuperscript{330} Shain, 2008, p.127 italics in the original.
\item \textsuperscript{331} Koinova, 2011a, p.440
\item \textsuperscript{332} Koinova, 2011b, p.355
\item \textsuperscript{333} Shain, 2008, p.109
\item \textsuperscript{334} Koinova, 2011a, p.440
\item \textsuperscript{335} Magee and Thompson, 2006b, p.539; Delaney, 2007, p.41
\item \textsuperscript{336} Cross, 2014, p.28
\end{itemize}
this a modern phenomenon. Between 1848 and 1900, £52 million at contemporary value was estimated to have been remitted from the U.S. to the UK, although the data is of doubtful quality.\textsuperscript{337} If there were to be an indication of the propensity of Scots to remit, it would follow that there was a potential for Scots to send money for political purposes. It has been difficult to discover research of remittances to Scotland alone. Nevertheless, there is research on remittances by emigrants from the British Isles, and this can at least provide an indication of Scots remittances. Not all types of emigrants sent remittances. Those attempting to set up in farming in the U.S., for example, would have little spare cash to send home.\textsuperscript{338}

Remittances to the UK from the Empire between 1875 and 1913 are estimated to have been between £130 million and £200 million in equivalent 1913 pounds.\textsuperscript{339} Establishing whether these remitters were English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish is, however, more problematic but it has been suggested that most of these funds came from the Irish.\textsuperscript{340} The research claims remittances are driven by five causes. Firstly, if emigration is part of a familial strategy to maximise income and well-being,\textsuperscript{341} the emigrant compensates family members for helping him or her find better circumstances. There is a sense of obligation. These \textit{required} remittances enable future emigration to be funded by the earnings of previous emigrants.\textsuperscript{342} \textit{Affordable} remittances are most likely to be from temporary emigrants whose intentions are to return home with capital rather than fund further emigration. \textit{Desired} remittances involve the movement of capital between locations to improve its value, for example to attain higher interest rates. Remittances help family and community members with \textit{one-off specific difficulties}, such as relief in times of distress. Lastly, \textit{autonomous} remittances are the ‘general background of remitting behaviour.’\textsuperscript{343}

Remittances are therefore an important way in which the diaspora may bolster the resources of family, village, country or causes at home. However, remitting

\textsuperscript{337} Delaney, 2007, p.41
\textsuperscript{338} Erickson, 1990, pp.38-9
\textsuperscript{339} Magee and Thompson, 2006b, p.553.
\textsuperscript{340} Delaney, 2007, p.41
\textsuperscript{341} Magee and Thompson, 2006a, p.181
\textsuperscript{342} Ibid., p.184
\textsuperscript{343} Magee and Thompson, 2006a, p.184
could be restricted by capital requirements in the host country. For example, in Wisconsin, farming was capital hungry and so emigrants could not send money home.\textsuperscript{344} It could be determined by marital circumstances; as the responsibilities of a migrant increased in the U.S., obligations in the home country diminished, so they sent home less money.\textsuperscript{345} Complaints about children not sending money home could also be heard.\textsuperscript{346}

The sense of obligation that binds members to an ethnic community, be it spiritual, cultural or political will affect the propensity to remit. First and second generation Irish-Americans and Irish-Australians gave generously to Parnell’s Land League and Redmond’s Home Rule funds respectively. Magee and Thompson conclude that such remittances would be less contractual and more in the nature of gifts, with the migrant as a benefactor.\textsuperscript{347} It would be reasonable to conclude that it would be from this final category of remitting that any donations to Scottish home rule organisations would come, from those Scots abroad still feeling the binds of the Scottish community.

**The Comparison Diasporas**

It has been demonstrated that diasporas are one of the prominent actors that link the domestic and international spheres of political activity. They may be committed to the use of force, engaging, under some circumstances, in ‘long distance nationalism’ without accountability.\textsuperscript{348} The proposal to compare the Scottish diaspora with others initiates the search for suitable candidates.

Using the diaspora characteristics previously identified, the criteria for establishing the candidates would be as follows. Firstly a proportionately large emigration in the main driven by the search for opportunity, land and work. Secondly, a diaspora is formed. Thirdly, that it is predominantly a settler population in the host countries. Fourth, there should be a state seeking nationalist project in the home country. Lastly, these conditions should be roughly contemporary, providing historical context.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{344} Erickson, 1994, pp.74-75
\item \textsuperscript{345} Magee and Thompson, 2006b, p.559
\item \textsuperscript{346} Delany, 2007, p.43
\item \textsuperscript{347} Magee and Thompson, 2006a, p.184
\item \textsuperscript{348} Werbner, 2000, p.5
\end{itemize}
One diaspora presents itself immediately, that of the Irish. The Irish nationalist movement coincided with Scots home rule activity from 1885-1921, with the Ulster civil disruption occupying the last 10 years of the time frame, 1969-79. There was a large migration over a similar period to that of the Scots, and a diaspora formed in some of the same places. That the emigration was in the main driven by the search for opportunity, land and work rather than conflict is a matter for exploration below.

A second choice, though not as extensively researched in the discourse, is that of Norway. The size of its emigration, spurred by the search for work and opportunity, its settler nature and diaspora are all a good fit. The struggle to end the Union with Sweden provides a non-violent nationalist project. This overlapped Scottish home rule activities from 1885 to 1906. Scotland was different in one factor. Ireland and Norway were overwhelmingly rural and Scotland was a highly industrialised and urbanised country. See table V below for a summary of characteristics.

Ireland

From 1541, English monarchs ruled Ireland in a regal union. In 1801, Ireland was integrated into the expanded United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland until that ended, after a violent struggle, in 1921. The island of Ireland was divided, Republican Catholic Eire in the south and Unionist Protestant Ulster in the north. The Irish emigration was significant. Nineteenth century current emigration to the U.S. is estimated at almost five million,[351] considerably in excess of that of the Scots.[352] No other European country suffered such a sustained depopulation in that period.[353]

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349 Brock, 1999, p.231
350 Davies, 2012, pp.640-653
351 Kenny, 2003, p.135
352 Harper, 2003, p.3
353 Kenny, 2003, p.135
Table V. Summary of Case Study Attributes Compared with Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Diaspora dispersal</th>
<th>Nationalist Project</th>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Main host countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>From 1700 onwards, 9-10 M. Mainly for opportunity. About one-fifth due to famine</td>
<td>Imperial and labour diaspora</td>
<td>Violent and peaceful struggle to leave the UK</td>
<td>Diaspora sent arms, money, violence in host countries</td>
<td>U.S., Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>19th century, 800,000. Opportunity seeking</td>
<td>Labour diaspora</td>
<td>Non-violent end of union with Sweden</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>From 1700 onwards, 3.6M. Mostly opportunity seeking. Some famine victims</td>
<td>Imperial diaspora, minority victim element</td>
<td>Peaceful seeking of home rule or complete departure from UK</td>
<td>Sparse, intermittent and ultimately not significant</td>
<td>Canada, U.S., Australasia, England</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Kenny, 2003, p.135.

In the early nineteenth century, Britain was the preferred destination, with 50,000 arriving each year.\(^{354}\) From the 1840s to 1920 the US took 75% of Irish emigrants. From 1921, Britain was re-established as the destination of choice. The Irish dispersal was much larger than that of the Scots, both in absolute and relative terms.\(^{355}\) An Irish settler reported in 1832 that ‘so numerous have been the arrivals of settlers, with considerable capital, that within a year three hundred thousand sovereigns (one sovereign = £120 in the value of the time) have been deposited in the bank of Upper Canada.’\(^{356}\) This is testament to both the number and wealth of the settlers in this part of Canada.

The reasons for this dispersal have differences and similarities with that of the Scots. Despite the longevity of the Irish dispersal, that triggered by the Great Famine has to an extent been characterised as a single catastrophic event, in the classic diasporic sense.\(^{357}\) This should not be overplayed. Although two million left as a result of the famine, nearly four times as many left at other times for other reasons.\(^{358}\) Despite the prevalence of the ‘exile’ image, few emigrants were compelled by force or famine to leave Ireland during 1855-1922.\(^{359}\) When Thomas Magrath, an Irishman in Toronto, wrote to his friend the

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\(^{354}\) Bielenberg, 2000, p.19  
\(^{355}\) Brock, 1999, p.231  
\(^{356}\) Magrath, 1833, p.128  
\(^{357}\) Kenny, 2003, p.144  
\(^{358}\) Ibid., p.145  
\(^{359}\) Miller, 1980, p.100
Rev. Thomas Radcliffe, he welcomed the fact that Radcliffe’s sons were coming to Canada and there is no hint of compulsion about their departure.\textsuperscript{360} In Ireland as in Scotland, emigration was a commonplace device for self-improvement and part of the national fabric.\textsuperscript{361} One significant difference was that very few Irish went home.\textsuperscript{362}

**Norway**

From 1387 to 1814 Norway was either a part of Sweden or latterly a province of Denmark. In 1814, at the Treaty of Kiev, it was ceded in a regal and political union to Sweden.\textsuperscript{363} This Union was different from that of Scotland or Ireland. Norway never accepted it and contended that the sovereignty renounced by Denmark reverted to the Norwegian people.\textsuperscript{364} Although the King of Sweden became King of Norway, this was by gift of the existing Norwegian parliament or Storting. The Norwegians strenuously resisted attempts to consolidate the two states, asserting that sovereignty rested with the Storting, not the Crown. Therefore the King of Sweden was the King of Norway by permission of the parliament.\textsuperscript{365} The initial formation of the Union was peaceful as both countries were exhausted by war and famine. The continued existence of the Storting was key to the eventual peaceful and successful separation from Sweden.

The Storting made various attempts during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century to amend the conditions of the Union to suit the Norwegians, initially between 1814 and 1836 and then from 1859 onwards.\textsuperscript{366} In 1881 the country split into parties over the constitution, in particular over the King’s veto over constitutional legislation. These parties, a Royal party, a radical opposition and a republican party, fought the 1882 general election and the radicals got a hefty majority of 80 to 34.\textsuperscript{367} In 1883 the principle was introduced that Norwegian ministers were not servants of the King but of the state.\textsuperscript{368} Norway was at that time ruled by a ministry

\textsuperscript{360} Magrath, 1833, pp.15-18  
\textsuperscript{361} Harper, 2003, p.3  
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., p.148  
\textsuperscript{363} Sperry et. al., 1907, p.441  
\textsuperscript{364} Boyesen, 1893, pp.68-9  
\textsuperscript{365} Boyesen, 1893, p.69  
\textsuperscript{366} Burgess, 1886, pp.273-4  
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., p.281  
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., p.292
staffed by Norwegians and the only element of government that was common to both countries was the consular and diplomatic service. In 1893 the government had passed a law setting up a separate consular service which the King had refused to sign. This was seen as a ‘mere entering wedge’ leading sooner or later to a claim for independence.

It can be seen from this brief summary that the liberation in 1905 was the result of constitutional efforts over time by the Storting. In this respect it was quite different from the Scots’ efforts to end their Union, as it was achieved by legislators in a parliament that had remained in being. There was never really a violent option as the King was head of the Army and a considerable portion of the Norwegians would not tolerate a resort to arms. In this respect they were similar to the Scots, though quite different to the Irish.

There was a tradition of movement in Norway and as a result of ‘American Fever’, the U.S. was the main destination. Between 1846 and 1930, 850,000 left from a population that was only 800,000 in 1801. In the period 1866 to 1914, Norway lost over 40 per cent of its natural increase in population, the highest recorded save for Ireland. Emigration was such a strong force in Norwegian life that after 1909 a Society for the Restriction of Emigration was established.

From the second half of the nineteenth century, there were not enough jobs at home, and what had been a rural emigration became predominantly urban from 1873 onwards. Whereas the pull factor of higher wages and plentiful jobs in America were undoubtedly a factor in Norwegian emigration, the push factor of rapid structural change from the rural to the industrial economy meant that for the rural population the move to a Norwegian city and the move to the U.S.

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369 Boyesen, 1893, p.70
370 Ibid.
371 Ibid., p.71
372 Semmingsen, 1978, p.33
373 Lovoll, 1999, p.35
374 Ibid., p.8
375 Moe, 1970, p.267
376 Blegen, 1940, p.471
377 Lovoll, 1999, p.35
were to some extent alternatives. Unlike the Irish, some Norwegians did return. In 1920 there were 50,000 Norwegian-Americans living in Norway.

The Norwegian emigration experience was proportional to that of the Irish and Scots. There was, however, no element of tragic dispersal such as the famine of Ireland or the dearths and clearances of Scotland, additionally, the vast majority of Norwegians went to America. Recalling that the ‘tragic’ dispersal occasions were not the major part of the Scots or Irish dispersals, then on the emigration’s significance alone, it can be argued that Norway is a contender for comparison.

The Norwegians thought much of their home land. They modelled their associational activities around similar activities in Norway. This served as a way of emphasising Norwegian ethnic awareness so demonstrated boundary maintenance. The spontaneous support received from Norwegian-Americans during the independence negotiations of 1905 led one commentator to assert that ‘the desire for tying lasting bonds and encouraging all possible cooperation between Norwegians at home and abroad is now strong on both sides of the ocean.’

The centenary of Norway’s constitution was fervently celebrated by Norwegians in the U.S. on May 17th 1914. Twenty thousand Norwegian-Americans went to Norway for the commemoration.

Norwegians showed considerable remittance activity. From the 1850s they sent considerable sums home and an estimated 12-15 million kroner were sent annually from 1905-14, and $10 million per annum after 1910. Money was raised for victims of natural disasters in Norway, the commemorations of independence in 1905 and the centenary of the constitution in 1914. Norwegian-Americans made a decisive contribution to the founding of the Norwegian-American shipping line, and during the Nazi occupation they organised aid of $8 million to Norway.

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378 Moe, 1970, p.269
379 Semmingsen, 1978, p.170
380 Lovoll, 1984, p.183
381 Semmingsen, 1978, p.164 this equates to $3-4 million at that time
382 Blegen, 1940, p.473
383 Lovoll, 1984, p.211
384 Semmingsen, 1978, p.164
385 Ibid., p.165; Lovoll, 1984, p.211
Boundary maintenance is evidenced by the close association of the Norwegians with the mid-west states in America.\footnote{Lovoll, 1984, p.153} Further evidence is to be found amongst their many associational activities. As with the Scots, Norwegian-Americans were active in forming associations. Many of these centred on the church, but there were also women’s, young people’s and many singing societies.\footnote{Ibid., p.170} They also founded rifle clubs in imitation of those in Norway. They would gather to share the task of a major project, like building a barn. These occasions would have music and dancing.\footnote{Gerber and Kraut, 2005, p.114} From the late nineteenth century, the descendants or emigrants from Norway’s many regions formed 50 bygdelags, annual assemblies to celebrate their home land culture.\footnote{Lovoll, 1984, pp.185} Created in 1895, the Sons of Norway, a lodge-based society with 12,000 members by 1914, provided social activities and insurance.\footnote{Ibid., pp.188} Evidence of boundary maintenance over time is, therefore, abundant.

**Summary**

This chapter has undertaken a detailed examination of the Scottish emigration of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The case has been presented that, although not unusual in a contemporary European context, the volume of emigration was significant for Scotland with the order of 3.5 million leaving between 1825 and 1981. The most favoured destinations were England, the US, Canada and Australasia. Once abroad, the Scots, like the Irish, English and Norwegians, formed an associational culture which presented visible evidence of the formation of a diaspora.

The chapter described the phenomena of diasporas, their characteristics and their undertakings as transnational actors. The agreement has been made that although the term has been overused it provides a useful framework with which to examine the involvement of Scots abroad in the nationalist projects of their home land. In point of fact the broad usage of the term in the discourse eases the argument that the Scots abroad can be regarded as such. Diasporas
are typologised using both the nature of their dispersal and the role they play in the host lands to which they emigrate. To facilitate the analysis of the engagement of the Scottish diaspora with nationalist projects in its home land, comparison diasporas have been identified. It has been advanced that those of the Irish and the Norwegians are appropriate due to their nationally significant emigrations, associational culture, destination host lands and vigorous opposition to an unpopular Union between the home land and another state.

The following chapter looks at the first period of Scottish activism in the search for home rule and independence, that of 1885 to 1951, the period when pressure groups performed a prominent role in the pursuit of the Scottish nationalist project.
Chapter Three: Pressure Groups and Parties; 1885 - 1951

‘To the Scot abroad, - who, enjoying himself the blessings of home rule may assist in restoring them to the dear fatherland - the following pamphlet is respectfully dedicated by the author.' 391 W. Mitchell, Hon. Treasurer, SHRA

This chapter seeks to understand the engagement of the Scottish diaspora with the nationalist projects of its home land. It begins with scene setting and historical context. A brief introduction to the political context of interest in Scottish home rule is provided, as well as a description of contemporary emigration. Further, it lays out the broader picture of democratic and constitutional progress over the period of the chapter. The chapter then examines four of the groups established to promote Scottish Home Rule and Independence. It does not provide a history of these groups; rather to ask how they used the diaspora to further their ends. It describes the methods of operation of pressure groups in general and the home rule groups in particular to identify how the diaspora could have helped. It then looks at examples of the behaviour of the groups and their contact with Scots abroad. Finally, the actions of the comparison diasporas are examined.

Judging Success of the SHRAs

It is important to understand by what measurement the relative successes and failures of the two SHRAs should be determined or judged, and on whose grounds or from whose perspective such judgments can be made. In assessing the success and failures of the two SHRAs in their ability to garner support from the diaspora, their own statements of what they understood they were asking of the diaspora are an essential starting point. At no time was there any formal measurement of their engagement. Their success or otherwise can then be judged fairly impartially by an observer of the outcomes of their activities. Both

391 Mitchell, 1892a, dedication, p.4
organisations were implicitly to be judged by those to whom they directed their message.

For the first SHRA, although it sought to gather public support, the message was, most directly, aimed at legislators in Westminster, the people who could bring their objective into effect. For the second SHRA, whilst also needing to engage legislators, the scope of influence was much wider. Reflecting the extended franchise of its time, there was more emphasis on public opinion, an active and numerous body of members and the support and affiliation of public bodies.

**SHRA 1886**

At the second Annual Conference of the first SHRA, held in Dundee on the 25th of September 1889, it was unanimously resolved that with a view to educating public opinion on the subject, an appeal be “made to Scotsmen, all over the world, for funds.” Mitchell, who wrote this appeal in the 1892 prospectus of the SHRA, revealed that the SHRA wanted support from the Scottish diaspora and that it wanted that support in the form of money. A year earlier, the SHRA had made an Appeal to the Scot Abroad for ‘pecuniary aid,’ that they might organise committees and disseminate information throughout the length and breadth of the United Kingdom.

A week earlier, in Melbourne, Australia, the Scottish Home Rule Association of Victoria was established. It resolved to take steps to ‘establish branches throughout the colony.’ The call to ‘Agitate and Organise’ was made in an undated private letter to anticipated supporters, as well as to ask for as big a donation as possible. There was a clear need for money to promote the prospectus of the organisation, and an understanding that, in Australia at least, that would come from a branch organisation.

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392 Waddie, 1892, p.1  
393 Prospectus of the SHRA, 1892, p.12  
394 Ibid., p.13  
395 Aytoun, 1891 see pamphlets in bibliography  
396 Mitchell, 1892, end piece  
397 Scottish Home Rule pamphlets (23) see bibliography.
The success of the organisation would be judged by its successful influence of legislators to pass a bill enabling a parliament in Scotland. The success of its methods in tapping the resources of the diaspora would be found in funds from abroad and branches overseas.

**SHRA 1918**

When Roland Muirhead wrote to 80 newspapers in Australia, he made some comment as to what he hoped for in the way of support from the Scottish diaspora there.\(^{398}\) Firstly he asked for publicity, to advise Scottish readers of the establishment of this new SHRA. Secondly he asked for members to join, to give moral as well as material support to the Association. He emphasised the failure of Parliamentary efforts reflected in the failure of six bills in the twentieth century to date.

His replies to the correspondents who responded to the articles offered a little more granularity. Although the replies were individually drafted, a small number of themes persisted. He usually stated his overall objective: Scotland’s freedom from English authority and for the betterment of the conditions of the Scottish people,\(^{399}\) in some form or other, reflecting the correspondents’ queries.

He noted that the SHRA had come to the conclusion that Scotland ‘is not the only part that seems interested in this onward movement of ours,’\(^{400}\) hence the appeal to what he referred to as the colonies. He suggested the establishment of local branches of the SHRA, and desired ‘as large a number of members as possible.’\(^{401}\) Additionally, Caledonian societies could be affiliated to the SHRA.\(^{402}\) The distribution of literature to keep up the propaganda battle would be a feature of the assistance of the diaspora that it might bring to the knowledge of the powers that be their demand for self-government. Finally, a constant was the request for money. His replies advised of an Annual subscription of a minimum of 1/-; the SHRA was ‘always in need of finance.’\(^{403}\)

He was, however, less clear about specific actions outside of these broad

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398 NLS. Acc. 3721/187/6, letter to Australian newspapers, dated 15th June 1921
399 NLS. Acc. 3721/187/6, Letter dated 11th October 1922
400 Ibid., letter to J. M. Wardop, Tasmania
401 Ibid., letter to A. J. Kagund, NSW
402 Ibid., letter to J. Anderson, Adelaide
403 Ibid., letter to J. M. Wardop
parameters. As to how they should go about it, he felt that should reflect local conditions; ‘I shall leave you to determine the method by which you can best assist us.’\textsuperscript{404} Having dealt with the issue of judging the success or failure of these organisations, the chapter will now provide context which determined the political climate in which groups proposing a Scottish parliament operated.

**Home Rule and Political Parties**

The SHRA was established in 1886 after the publication of Gladstone’s Bill for Irish Home Rule. It appreciated from the outset that it would encounter prejudice in using the words ‘home rule’ on account of the negative association with nationalist disaffection in Ireland.\textsuperscript{405} Additionally the notion of a Scottish Parliament was seen as ‘an anachronism, an absurdity’ by some.\textsuperscript{406} Gladstone only mentioned Scotland once in his Midlothian campaign of 1879-80.\textsuperscript{407} He was afraid that Scottish home rule would harm England and was worried it would hinder the case in Ireland.\textsuperscript{408} He did consider a scheme for a Scottish Parliament but it was not received well by some at the time.\textsuperscript{409} Gladstone, with Scottish ancestry but residing in England and representing an English constituency, was part of the diaspora. He seemed a likely source of encouragement for the SHRA, due to his support for home rule for Ireland and for his speeches in favour of home rule all round.\textsuperscript{410} However, after the second Irish Home Rule Bill was defeated in 1893, the SHRA was critical of his efforts, doubting that he had embraced the notion of home rule for anywhere but Ireland.\textsuperscript{411}

The introduction of the first Home Rule Bill in April 1886 had a relevance for Scotland. Scotland gave the Liberals a large and solid vote, so the electorate of Scotland were being relied upon by Gladstone’s Liberals to pass the Home Rule Bill.\textsuperscript{412} When asked, he refused to be a Patron of the organisation,

\textsuperscript{404} Letter to Dougan, Sydney
\textsuperscript{405} Lloyd-Jones, 2014, p.864
\textsuperscript{406} MS.19487/273, Letter to A. C. Sellar, MP for Partick from Arthur Eliot MP for Roxburghshire, 16\th October 1886
\textsuperscript{407} Dickinson and Lynch, 2000, p.115
\textsuperscript{408} Ibid., p.116
\textsuperscript{409} MS.19487/154, Letter from Sellar to Elliot, 21\textsuperscript{st} December 1885
\textsuperscript{410} Gladstone, 1892, SHRA pamphlet
\textsuperscript{411} Mitchell,1893b, p.5
\textsuperscript{412} Lloyd-Jones, 2014, p.867
reportedly considering himself too old to take on additional responsibilities.\textsuperscript{413} Gladstone continued to be a target for the home rulers and they dangled their support for him as a quid pro quo for his support of Scottish Home Rule as well as Irish. They continued to be disappointed,\textsuperscript{414} even though in 1894 Charles Waddie (founder of the SHRA) could write that ‘the average Gladstonian elector assures me that he is as good a Scottish Home Ruler as I am.’\textsuperscript{415}

The campaign to establish a Scottish Office genuinely excited public opinion.\textsuperscript{416} The moves towards Irish Home Rule, however, must have provided the significant driver, with resentment that the Irish were receiving more consideration than the Scots in the home rule debates in the early 1880s.\textsuperscript{417} Cabinet records of the time cited the inevitability of home rule for Ireland.\textsuperscript{418} On October 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1888, Lord Hartington expressed the feeling at the time in the ‘Scottish Highlander’ that home rule for Ireland means Scotland and Wales will soon follow.\textsuperscript{419} The political situation contemporary to the first SHRA had much to encourage the debate of home rule for Scotland.

**Emigration, 1885 to 1951**

Net emigration during the period this chapter examines is relevant as contemporary migration can make remittances more likely. It also acts as a counterweight to assimilation to maintain the size and activity of a diaspora. Those emigrating may take with them the political themes and issues of the home land. Scottish emigration continued strongly, with 1.5 million of net migration, of which 540,000 was to the rest of the UK. This was not lost on at least one of the leaders of the new nationalist movements, Roland Muirhead. He identified the emigrants as partly responsible for the state of affairs in Scotland: ‘Scots folk who go to Canada or elsewhere abroad have some responsibility for the state of affairs in Scotland’; ‘reared and educated at much expense to Scotland’ should ‘give some help to the country of their origin.’\textsuperscript{420}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{413}  Aberdeen Weekly Journal, 29\textsuperscript{th} June 1886; PRO, 30/69/1186
\item \textsuperscript{414}  Glasgow Herald, 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1892
\item \textsuperscript{415}  Waddie, 1894, p.11
\item \textsuperscript{416}  Lloyd-Jones, 2014, p.872
\item \textsuperscript{417}  Waddie, 1894, p.2
\item \textsuperscript{418}  CAB, 37/16
\item \textsuperscript{419}  PRO, 30/69/1186
\item \textsuperscript{420}  Acc. 3721/37/1321, Muirhead to James Muir of Toronto, 2\textsuperscript{nd} February 1947
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
They took steps to try to include Scots abroad in their campaigns so as to encourage that help.\textsuperscript{421} It has been shown that help from a diaspora could come in many forms; for the SHRA, as a pressure group, money and influence were the major part of what they wanted.

\textbf{Democracy and Constitutional Change in the Diaspora Host Countries}

The onset of liberal democracy and extended franchises seldom comes as a neat package, but develops over a long period, varying considerably in its completeness over time.\textsuperscript{422} Table VI below takes the extension of the franchise as one measure of liberal democracy in selected countries referred to in this thesis. It can be seen that the period of analysis is one of great change in the countries of the diaspora’s location. Except for parts of the U.S. which began in the 1820s and Australia that had extended the franchise in the 1850s, none of the major countries of origin or settlement had granted male suffrage when the SHRA was founded in 1886. Participation was extremely low in the U.S. however, and African Americans did not begin to get the vote until after the Civil War.

Further political context can be provided by dates for the establishment of statehood in the diaspora host lands. The SHRA was asking the Scots abroad to sanction home rule for Scotland, the SNP later demanding independence. Therefore it is reasonable to compare the progress of the colonial destinations towards home rule and statehood. This would demonstrate whether the diaspora was rooted in states that had established themselves as independent actors, as they were being asked to support Scotland in a similar journey. Table VII below provides a high level summary of this progress in selected countries.

\textsuperscript{421} Ibid.; Acc.3721/95/87, circa 1930, also Acc.3721/42/35, for SHRA members abroad 1921-27

\textsuperscript{422} Fukuyama, 2014, p.414.
**Table VI: Extension of the Franchise, Selected Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Male suffrage</th>
<th>Universal Suffrage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1820s(^{423})</td>
<td>1965(^{424})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1920(^{425})</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1856-1890</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1931(^{426})</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table VII: Progress towards Home Rule and Statehood, Selected Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Home rule or self-governing constitution</th>
<th>Statehood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1855, 1856, 1859 and 1890</td>
<td>1901 (Dominium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>1907 (Dominium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1910(^{427})</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1921(^{428})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1819(^{429})</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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\(^{423}\) Participation was low, although rising to 20% during the 19\(^{th}\) century. Even then the process was full of bigotry, racism, violence and corruption. Tilly, 2007, pp.96-98

\(^{424}\) Although the 19\(^{th}\) Amendment (1920) brought the vote to most Americans, many southern Black Americans had to wait until the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Fukuyama, 2014, p.414

\(^{425}\) Male suffrage restricted by property rights post-confederation until then. Some variations by Province.

\(^{426}\) Whites only. Various property qualifications applied before this, rising to exclude non-whites and poor men.

\(^{427}\) Formation of the Union of South Africa

\(^{428}\) Creation of the Irish Free State. 1937 before all ties with the British monarchy are cut

\(^{429}\) Treaty of Versailles. Norway ceded to Sweden but keeps its own parliament
Pressure Groups, Ways of Working

There were to be many groups formed over this period to promote self-government for Scotland in some way. Such pressure groups, formed to change something in society that requires legislation as opposed to some moral shift, need to influence those who make laws. In the case of the United Kingdom this was the Parliament at Westminster.

Pressure groups comprise individuals using rights of free assembly and expression to combine to achieve the introduction, prevention, continuation or abolition of whatever measures are important to them.\(^\text{430}\) Pressure groups can be distinguished from political parties as groups which ‘seek to influence power whilst remaining apart from it.’\(^\text{431}\) Political parties ‘strive to acquire power and to exercise it.’\(^\text{432}\) Pressure groups can be more or less subordinate to political parties, or the reverse may be true. In some cases there can be equality and common purpose.\(^\text{433}\) Some are mass organisations with large memberships made up of individuals, others compose of groups of affiliated like-minded organisations, yet others consist of small cadres of people with common aims.\(^\text{434}\)

They can be further distinguished into groups which are ‘for’ something or ‘of’ something. The latter may also be thought of as a sectional group, interested in promoting the interests of a section of the population, the former a promotional group, proselytising a particular cause.\(^\text{435}\) The home rule pressure groups may be thought of as being promotional.\(^\text{436}\) Many of these characteristics were shown by the groups that were formed to promote the cause of self-government for Scotland, sometimes changing from one type to another.\(^\text{437}\)

A second type of distinction would be that of insider and outsider groups. In order to achieve their aims, most of these groups had to influence MPs at

\(^{430}\) Watts, 2007, p.2
\(^{431}\) Duverger, 1972, p.101. This translated text, though older, gives a good description of the phenomenon.
\(^{432}\) Ibid., p.101
\(^{433}\) Ibid., p.117
\(^{434}\) Ibid., pp.114-116
\(^{435}\) Mitchell, 1996, p.66
\(^{436}\) Ibid., p.66
\(^{437}\) Mitchell, Bennie and Johns, 2012, p.13
Westminster and the government of the day. To be considered insiders, a group could be useful in some way to the government achieving its aims, or able to provide helpful technical expertise. Sectional groups are more likely to have insider status, and promotional groups less so. This does not mean that insiders are more successful than outsiders. The first SHRA was an outsider body, and one which was pressing for radical change. Popular sovereignty was part of the group’s objectives and so an appeal to the public was unavoidable. The group spread its message through pamphlets, the press, speeches at meetings and through the support of influential figures of the time, and they had to convince the lawmakers, MPs, to support them with legislation.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as government expanded into areas of education, welfare, health and leisure, a variety of public groups emerged to promote specific political agendas. The nineteenth century SHRA, whilst devoting considerable effort to promoting bills in Parliament, was denied influence in Parliament and so took a range of arguments through letters, news articles and publications to make plain the case to the reading public. The post-World War One SHRA summarised its methods as follows: Hold public meetings, get favourable press coverage, secure pledges from political candidates in return for supporting them, publish literature and hold a National Convention.

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438 Mitchell, 1996, pp.66-7
439 Watts, 2007, p.44.
440 Mitchell, 1996, p.68
441 Ibid.
442 A collection of these is noted in the Bibliography
443 Watts, 2007, p.2
444 Dickinson and Lynch, 2000, pp.116-118
445 Brand, 1979, p.175
The First SHRA, 1886 - 1906

The aims of the first SHRA were to promote the establishment of a legislature in Scotland with full control over purely Scottish matters and with an executive government responsible to the Crown, excluding the control of the military, diplomacy and the collection of Imperial revenue. It also wished to accomplish this whilst maintaining the integrity of the Empire and Scotland’s voice in Imperial affairs. All British subjects or persons of Scottish descent were eligible to join the Association which made no distinction as to whether they were nearby or far away, an implied invitation to the Scots abroad. The SHRA membership was a cadre of MPs, academics and other prominent Scots. They included R. B. Cunninghame Graham, a diaspora returnee, who had been a cattle rancher in Argentina. He was a Liberal MP in 1886 and an SHRA Vice President in 1887.

This period featured other public activity to support home rule for Scotland, that of several moves to get the subject discussed and legislation promoted at Westminster. Appendix I contains the detail of these activities. Between 1889 and 1914 there were fifteen attempts under four prime ministers to promote either an amendment or a Bill in favour of more self-government for Scotland. Two of the prime ministers, Gladstone and Rosebery, could be regarded as diaspora Scots. None of these attempts progressed further than a second reading. This activity demonstrates that, except for a gap between 1895 and 1908 when there were Conservative administrations under Salisbury and Balfour, there was regular discussion of the matter in the legislature. Despite this, the diaspora remained lacking in support. The response of the Scots in the House will be dealt with in detail, in chapter five.

To provide further context, it is interesting to examine the position of the SHRA on an extension of the franchise. A pamphlet by Professor J.S. Blackie written in 1892 lists grievances. The lack of a Scots parliament for all Scottish matters, ecclesiastical freedom from Episcopalianism and the treatment of the higher education system. There is no mention of manhood or universal suffrage.

446 Mackenzie, 1890, p.15
447 Mitchell, 1892, Post Script, ‘Appeal’ A record of the 2nd annual conference of the SHRA
448 Blackie, 1892
Likewise, Mitchell, writing in the same year, lists political, financial and social grievances but asks for no improvement in the franchise for the electors of the parliament he demands for Scotland.\textsuperscript{449}

However, Charles Waddie’s draft of the Government of Scotland Bill of 1892 does contain comment on the intended franchise. There are to be four classes of voters, the bottom two (artisans and labourers) would elect 70 MPs using full manhood suffrage. The middle class would elect 30 MPs, if they had a household worth £50 or were income tax payers. Towns and villages would elect 26 MPs but the qualification was not made clear. There was no mention of women.\textsuperscript{450}

Contemporary literature published by, and sympathetic with, the SHRA is supportive of the Empire, and specifically placed Scotland as a peer of Canada or Australia, worthy of Dominion status. ‘home rule all round’ in the Empire meant to them home rule for Scotland as well.\textsuperscript{451}

The SHRA asked for support from the Scots abroad and in England. There was a Colonial Secretary, Thomas McNaught, and it was his job to engage the Scots abroad in dialogue with the Association. McNaught wrote claiming that ‘the whole of the colonial press, with the exception of The Commercial published in Winnipeg, has proclaimed itself in favour of the SHR movement’, that in South Africa and Australia especially. He claimed that ‘committees are being formed in every part of the empire where there are Scots.’ He notes there is one in Trinidad as well as in Jamaica, and Guiana.\textsuperscript{452} Testing the truth of these assertions is best done by location.

**The US and Canada**

McNaught went on tour in the U.S. and Canada in September of 1888, and there is a report of a visit to Chicago in the *Inter Ocean*, a Chicago newspaper. On 5\textsuperscript{th} September 1888 there was a long article in the *New York Herald* about McNaught, home rule and his aim to raise £100,000 for a ‘parliamentary fund’

\textsuperscript{449} Mitchell, 1892, p.48, pp.54-55
\textsuperscript{450} Waddie, 1892, p.5
\textsuperscript{451} Mitchell, 1892b, p.71; SHRA 1889, p.13. These and other pamphlets bound in NLS shelfmark 1892.11. For a full list of titles, see bibliography
\textsuperscript{452} PRO, 30/69/1186
to fight for home rule.\textsuperscript{453} No evidence has come to light of this level of funds being raised by the Scots abroad or at home, although it will be demonstrated that contemporaneous Irish contributions to their nationalist cause may have made it seem possible. There was some evidence of support in the US. Waddie wrote to the \textit{Daily Mail} passing on the contents of a letter from Robert Duncan of Boston, in which he referred to the report in the \textit{New York Herald} of the 5\textsuperscript{th} September 1888, quoted earlier, of an interview given about the SHRA.\textsuperscript{454}

The request for support from the Scots abroad resulted in the establishment of a small number of overseas branches. The New York SHRA was founded and was still in existence in 1913 when it organised meetings with sympathisers in the US for the visit of the International Scots Home Rule League.\textsuperscript{455} There was support from Andrew Carnegie who spoke in favour of American republicanism and democracy and home rule. In a particular instance, he addressed the Glasgow Junior Liberal Association on the subject of ‘Home Rule in America.’\textsuperscript{456} The SHRA published a pamphlet on the speech which also supported Home Rule for Scotland.\textsuperscript{457}

\textbf{Australasia}

In 1891 the Scottish Home Rule Association of Victoria was formed with £100 donated by its chairman, Theodore Napier.\textsuperscript{458} There was evidence of the support of the Irish National League of Victoria with a visit of one of its members at the next meeting of the Association.\textsuperscript{459} The Association’s name was changed at the meeting on 14\textsuperscript{th} January 1892, to the National Association to counter objections to the name. The \textit{Melbourne Argus} reports that attendance was not numerous and the name change was felt by Napier to be necessary to get more members.\textsuperscript{460} There were many Scots in Victoria. In 1881

\textsuperscript{453} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{454} PRO, 30/1186, 22\textsuperscript{nd} September 1886
\textsuperscript{455} \textit{Nation}, 1914, p.75. The first annual report of the League
\textsuperscript{456} Nasaw, 2006, p306. 13\textsuperscript{th} September 1887. He refers to the Junior Labour Association but the SHRA pamphlet on the speech which emphasises his support for Scottish Home rule, claims probably correctly that he addressed the Glasgow Junior \textit{Liberal Association}
\textsuperscript{457} Carnegie, 1887
\textsuperscript{458} \textit{Melbourne Argus}, 19\textsuperscript{th} September 1891
\textsuperscript{459} \textit{Melbourne Argus}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} October 1891
\textsuperscript{460} \textit{Melbourne Argus}, 16\textsuperscript{th} January 1892
Scots-born people made up a greater percentage of the population than was the case for Australia as a whole.\textsuperscript{461} Perhaps because of the number of Scots in Melbourne, and also because it was managed by a Scottish family,\textsuperscript{462} the \textit{Melbourne Argus} provided occasional reports on Scottish home rule activity in its pages, in the context of other political news from the UK.\textsuperscript{463} In 1892 Napier published one of many of his pamphlets in support of Scottish home rule,\textsuperscript{464} and Napier was to sail to Scotland where he was to publish a number of pamphlets on home rule whilst in the UK.\textsuperscript{465} Born in Melbourne and therefore a returnee, Napier was an activist on behalf of the SHRA, petitioning Queen Victoria over the use of the term England rather than Britain.\textsuperscript{466}

\textbf{London}

There was a so-called ‘London Committee’ which appeared to be organised by Mitchell, SHRA treasurer. He recognised that the SHRA ‘has been under great obligations’ to a few London Scotsmen. He also understood that this connection did not reach out to the broader numbers of Scots in the city,\textsuperscript{467} and attempted to appeal to this wider audience.

Therefore, help was sought from the diaspora, and there is evidence that some was given. Appeals were made by the SHRA in various forms. An appeal was made to ‘our countrymen scattered all over the world for pecuniary aid’ to support home rule all round.\textsuperscript{468} By 1895, the reserves of the organisation had declined from an initial balance of £300 to £33, an indication that the support expected from abroad or home was not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{469} The Victorian Association issued an appeal to Scotsmen in Australia.\textsuperscript{470} However, there had been signs in 1893 that the Association was losing its momentum,\textsuperscript{471} and by

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[461]{Prentis, 2008, p.67}
\footnotetext[462]{Prentis, 2008, p.162 namely Laughlin McKinnon and his cousin.}
\footnotetext[463]{\textit{Melbourne Argus}, 27th August 1886, 4th February 1891, 20th, 27th and 28th June 1892, 7th July 1892 for examples.}
\footnotetext[464]{Napier, 1892}
\footnotetext[465]{Napier, 1895}
\footnotetext[466]{Dickinson and Lynch, 2000, pp.120-121}
\footnotetext[467]{Mitchell, 1892a, p.3}
\footnotetext[468]{Appeal to the Scot Abroad, 1892. (Poster). NLS 1892.11}
\footnotetext[469]{\textit{Glasgow Herald}, 31st October 1895}
\footnotetext[470]{Napier, undated. See NLS 3.2820(46)\textit{Glasgow Herald}, 20th September 1893}
\end{footnotes}
1906 it was defunct.\textsuperscript{472} The fund raising and support gathering from the diaspora was a failure in practical terms as it did not support the organisation with sufficient funds and publicity to fulfil its aims. The notes above about remittances from the US and Australia are the only evidence of contributions from the diaspora identified in the research. This is in stark contrast to the Irish experience, which will be examined later. From 1909, continued interest in home rule in Scotland was driven by a very active Liberal interest group, The Young Scots Society.\textsuperscript{473} Which included Roland Muirhead amongst its members.\textsuperscript{474} However this group was not exclusively about Scots self-government.\textsuperscript{475}

**The International Scots Home Rule League (the League)**

The League was formed in May 1913 by Councillor F. J. Robertson. The very name of the organisation proclaims from the outset that its focus was international and its declared object was to ‘unite Scots Home Rulers throughout the world, in promoting the establishment of a National Parliament in Scotland.’\textsuperscript{476} Robertson was a former member of the Scottish Home Rule Council, set up by the government to enquire into how Scotland may run more of her own affairs. The League published a monthly periodical, *The Scottish Nation,* (\textit{Nation}) and at once began appeals to Scots abroad for support. A specific section of the paper, ‘News from Afar’ was established and both a domestic and an overseas edition was published. The League was ‘anxious to enrol members, and for branches in all parts of the world.’\textsuperscript{477} The intention was specifically to make the demand for a National Parliament come from not only Scotland but from the Scottish \textit{race}.\textsuperscript{478} Thousands of Scottish Societies around the world were issued with a circular letter giving information about the League and \textit{Nation}.\textsuperscript{479}

\textsuperscript{472} Brand, 1978, p.40
\textsuperscript{473} Ibid., p.114
\textsuperscript{474} Acc. 3721/2/29 Letter dated 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1929 from J. Denholm to Muirhead
\textsuperscript{475} MacRaidl, 2011, p.134
\textsuperscript{476} \textit{Nation}, 1916, p.368
\textsuperscript{477} \textit{Nation}, 1913, p.39.
\textsuperscript{478} Ibid., 1914, p.75 First Annual Report. Italics inserted
\textsuperscript{479} Ibid.
In late 1913, Robertson sailed to America and travelled over 13,000 miles to speak to Scots and their descendants in many cities in North America and Canada. Branches were established in New York, Philadelphia, St Louis, Chicago, Minneapolis, Seattle, Vancouver, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto, Albany and Boston.480 A year later, additional agents in the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were being called for to push the sale of the Nation’s overseas edition.481 There were ‘Honourable Presidents’ in London, Toronto and New York as well as Scotland.482 By 1914 there were 130 Honourable Presidents of branches of the League, 28 of which were based in the US or Canada and a further five in England.483 In 1916 the number of overseas branches was broadly similar, with 34 out of 124 being outside Scotland.484

Lists of office bearers were published which emphasised the influential nature of those involved. Mr William Beattie, described as a ‘moving spirit in Scottish circles in Toronto’ and John Cairns, ‘actively associated with Scottish societies in Saskatoon’ appear on the Canadian list. Eighteen US office bearers are listed, emphasising their connection with other associations and organs of the Scots in the US; a past Royal Chief, an editor of The Scotsman (in Boston), an editor of the Scottish American, and two officials of the SHRA.485 For the most part these are men and women ranking in the Scots associational culture in the US and Canada. A campaign fund of £1,000 was called for and contributions requested from all members. There was an expectation on the part of the League of receiving material assistance as well as sympathy from its supporters all over the world.486

This seems to confirm the involvement of the Scots abroad in this League. Two caveats must be applied however. Firstly, those involved are Scots engaged in cultural or associational activities. Secondly, it is unclear what real support in the form of money or representation was given. Although there may have been

480 Ibid., 1913, p.50
481 Ibid., 1914, p.175
482 Ibid., 1913, p.48
483 Ibid., 1914, p.175
484 Ibid., 1916, p.368
485 Ibid., 1914, p.120
486 Ibid., 1913, p.39
others, there is reported in the *Nation* only one instance of an overseas branch sending its resolutions to Asquith, the British Prime Minister, in 1914.\(^{487}\) Without direct evidence of the accounts of the League it is difficult to be certain about the existence of support through funding. However, unlike in the later similar periodical, the *Scots Independent*, there are no references to donations in the *Nation*, only unspecified notes of the generosity of its supporters. Therefore the lists of branches in the *Nation* are the only real indication of the size of support.

The League continued into the war years of 1914 to 1918, but its efforts were focussed more towards the war’s effects on Scots people. The question of home rule was declared to be a lower priority until peace returned and the organisation did ‘not conduct propagandist work’ during the crisis.\(^{488}\) The view taken by the Irish Nationalist movement was very different, as will be discussed below. Reports from the ‘International Scots’ section of the *Nation* show meetings taking place, but notes of the meetings do not reveal any deep political debate, just lists of officers and cultural activities.\(^{489}\) It is hard to imagine what would have been the outcome of the League’s efforts if the war had not begun when it did. The Scots abroad, whilst showing some sympathy amongst those already in Associations in the US and Canada do not appear to have been any more forthcoming to the League than they were to the SHRA.

**The Second SHRA and its Successors and the Scottish Convention, 1918-51**

The period after the war saw an increase in the nationalist debate.\(^{490}\) There had been conferences in 1917 and 1919 on the Empire, stating it should be based on the principle of nationhood. A Welsh home rule conference had been organised in 1922 and a Government of Wales Bill produced in the same year.\(^{491}\) Plaid Cymru was founded in 1925 providing a single focus for the wish to establish a government in Wales.\(^{492}\) However, the overwhelming social and economic conditions associated with the 1930s caused a drop in the Labour

\(^{487}\) Ibid., 1914, p.45
\(^{488}\) Ibid., 1916, p.368
\(^{489}\) Ibid., 1915, p.239; 1917, p.430
\(^{490}\) Begg and Stewart, 1971, p.137
\(^{491}\) HO, 45/16119
\(^{492}\) [http://www.plaidcymru.org/content.php?nID=90;lID=1](http://www.plaidcymru.org/content.php?nID=90;lID=1)
party’s support for nationalism.\textsuperscript{493} Socialism proposed centralising power so that the problems of capitalism could be solved by a potent source of authority, home rule was not an important policy for Labour at this time.\textsuperscript{494}

Nevertheless there was some parliamentary activity. Seven Bills supporting Scottish self-government were introduced between 1919 and 1928. One of these, the 1924 Government of Scotland Bill, was introduced during the premiership of Ramsay Macdonald, a Scot in England, whose correspondence with Muirhead is discussed below. The 1927 Bill of James Barr was regarded as radical as it argued for Dominion status and the removal of Scottish MPs from the Commons.\textsuperscript{495} None of these attempts got beyond a second reading. The detail can be found in appendix I and the comments from MPs in the diaspora will be analysed in chapter five.

In 1918, the second SHRA was founded. Although some members were the same as the pre-war group, this organisation was more of the Labour establishment rather than Scottish Liberal.\textsuperscript{496} Roland Muirhead was its founder and Cunninghame Graham was its president from 1925.\textsuperscript{497} Letters were sent to MPs of Scottish constituencies to invite them to the SHRA’s first annual meeting and demonstration on the 29\textsuperscript{th} March 1919. It notes that the SHRA wished to appeal to a broad cross-section of Scottish society rather than a partisan section and had many organisations as affiliates, such as co-operatives, trades unions and other labour bodies.\textsuperscript{498} Therefore, even though this SHRA had as its members followers of Labour and the left, it attempted to be non-partisan.

Like the first SHRA before it, the second SHRA failed in its efforts to change the governance of Scotland. There was no commitment to home rule in the manifestoes of any of the major parties for the 1924 election.\textsuperscript{499} This was recognised by Muirhead as a failure of method.\textsuperscript{500} A new party whose MPs

\textsuperscript{493} Begg and Stewart, 1971, p.137
\textsuperscript{494} Brand, 1978, p.42
\textsuperscript{495} Keating and Bleiman, 1979, pp.102-3
\textsuperscript{496} Brand, 1978, p.169; Mitchell, 1996, p.74
\textsuperscript{497} Acc. 3721/7/114
\textsuperscript{498} Acc. 3721/78/2
\textsuperscript{499} Mitchell, 1996, p.178
\textsuperscript{500} Ibid., p.178
would put the question of home rule above all others was needed;\textsuperscript{501} the NPS was formed in 1928. This was an amalgam of several movements; The Glasgow University Students’ Nationalist Association, The Scots National League, The Scottish National Movement and the SHRA.\textsuperscript{502} The Scottish National Party (SNP) was founded in 1934 on the merging of the NPS (1928-34) and the moderate-rightist Scottish Party (1930-34).\textsuperscript{503} The root cause for its foundation had been the failure of attempts to bring about the reform of government in Scotland.

Muirhead wrote of the diaspora; ‘If we could prevail on an outstanding Scot to go to America or the Dominions and take a series of meetings it should be possible to raise funds.’ He offered to assist by getting in touch with the ‘Scottish organisations’.\textsuperscript{504} The SHRA had determined it needed support from abroad. Efforts to make contact were similar in structure to those methods previously used. A journal, the \textit{Scots Independent (SI)} was available at home and abroad, there were visits by dignitaries of the movement and addresses to Clan, Burns and St. Andrews associations in the US and Canada. The SI was originally the organ of the Scots National League and continued to be published by the SNP. It provides one source of information on the activities of nationalists at home and abroad.

Evidence of the involvement of Scots abroad in the nationalist movement can be found in the reports from Party branches to the SI and also in letters and articles. Entreaties to the ‘Overseas Scot’ appeared in the paper,\textsuperscript{505} adversely comparing the situation of Scotland to the former colonies that had thrown off the rule of the English and asking for help. Early on, the sort of help asked for was the linking ‘of all Scots societies’ establishing branches of the Scots National League in all centres where Scots congregate. League Branches were asked to disseminate information about Scotland not only to other Scottish societies but also the politicians and press of their own state.\textsuperscript{506} Sales of the SI

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{501}{\textit{Ibid.}, pp.179-180}
\footnotetext{502}{\textit{SI}, June 1928, p.119}
\footnotetext{503}{Mitchell,1996, pp.182-183}
\footnotetext{504}{Acc. 3721/7/114, Letter Muirhead to Cunninghame Graham 22\textsuperscript{nd} December 1925}
\footnotetext{505}{\textit{S.I.}, May 1928, p.99}
\footnotetext{506}{\textit{S.I.}, November 1927, pp.6 and 7}
\end{footnotes}
were a source of income and propaganda and there are many references to subscriptions to the paper in Muirhead’s correspondence with overseas sympathisers.\textsuperscript{507} The detail is best observed by location.

\textbf{Australasia}

The SHRA appealed to the Scots in Australia through letters to the editors of eighty newspapers in the country. Thirty-six Sidney papers, twenty-two in Melbourne, nine in Adelaide, two in Brisbane, ten in Perth and one in Tasmania were sent a short letter in June 1921 stating the Association’s aims and asking sympathisers to contact Muirhead.\textsuperscript{508} This was a break with the established route of using the Scottish associations. Muirhead replied to the thirteen resulting enquiries with statements of aims, leaflets to distribute and newsletters. Additionally he stated that members’ annual subscriptions were a minimum of one shilling a year and that (we are) ‘always in need of finance’.\textsuperscript{509} The replies are all nearly a year late, due to an administrative error, a sign of lack of organisation. In a reply to a letter prompted by the insertion in the Tasmanian \textit{World of Hobart}, Muirhead said ‘In every part of the world, wherever Scotsmen dwell, we find support is freely given.’ He talked of extending operations, sending literature and suggested the correspondent established a Branch.\textsuperscript{510} However, Mrs Kennan of Melbourne, a second generation Scot who saw the insert in the \textit{Catholic Herald}, reported that she ‘hears little of Scots in Australia’ though was keen to help. Muirhead’s reply may indicate naivety. If the government knew, he wrote, that ‘Scots sojourning in our colonies’ were so determined, demands would be met much sooner.\textsuperscript{511}

The inserts in the Melbourne papers also prompted a reply from J. M. Watson, secretary of the Scottish National Association of Victoria, still constituted some 30 years after its foundation.\textsuperscript{512} A later letter from Melbourne reached Muirhead which was intended for the \textit{Rosyth Daily Mail} (which did not exist). In his reply,

\textsuperscript{507} Acc. 3721/11/235, correspondence with Alistair Little of Quebec; Acc. 3721/7/127, Jessie Mackay of Christchurch, New Zealand
\textsuperscript{508} Acc. 3721/187/6
\textsuperscript{509} Ibid., Reply to Stevenson, 11th October 1922
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid., reply 11th October 1922 to Wardop in Tasmania
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., reply to Kennan, 11th October 1922
\textsuperscript{512} Ibid., letter from J. M. Watson, Hon. Sec. 23rd January 1922
Muirhead asked Watson to be their corresponding representative; to pass information on that might be of interest, and suggested that the Victoria association affiliated itself to the Scottish movement. He made a specific request, recalling the way pressure groups must pressurise legislators to attain their ends. He asked if Commonwealth members would press forward a resolution in the Federal House in favour of Scottish self-government, and asked for Watson’s opinion on this. He also asked if any Australian Scots would come over and speak in favour of home rule.\textsuperscript{513} There was no offer of expenses, so it is difficult to assess how serious this was. The Victorian Association was probably exceptional in Australia, as other correspondents said they were unaware of the movement,\textsuperscript{514} or that there was local opposition to addressing the local Scottish club on the subject.\textsuperscript{515} A correspondent in New Zealand sent money, but was not going to join.\textsuperscript{516} This reference to the opposition of the Scottish clubs is a theme to be examined later.

Senator Grant, of the Australian Senate, wrote to Muirhead asking for a copy of the speech and Bill of the Reverend J. Barr, who had introduced a Government of Scotland Bill as a private member in the Commons.\textsuperscript{517} One letter in the correspondence is a formal one from the MP for Wellington Central, New Zealand. It replies to an earlier letter from a constituent, Mr Ross Nelson. The MP did not think there was any chance of a Representative putting a motion to the House of Representatives asking the British Government to re-establish a Scottish Parliament, or of it being passed. It would be a waste of time and detrimental to the cause of home rule. He asserted that if the Labour Party in Britain were to do this first, he would ‘do his best’ to have a similar resolution introduced to the House of Representatives. Mr Nelson, his correspondent, sent this to Muirhead suggesting he forward it to Ramsey Macdonald, then leader of the opposition in Parliament.\textsuperscript{518}

\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., Muirhead to J.M. Watson 26\textsuperscript{th} July 1926  
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid., letter from Anderson in Adelaide, 25\textsuperscript{th} August 1921  
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid., letter from Maclean of Sydney, 5\textsuperscript{th} April 1923  
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid., letter from Heriot, Sydney, 12\textsuperscript{th} November 1923  
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid., letter dated 5\textsuperscript{th} August 1926. Although the Bill was read in Parliament in 1927, the Covenant had agreed it by July of 1926  
\textsuperscript{518} Ibid., Letter from Mr Ross Nelson of Wellington, 7\textsuperscript{th} May 1926
In 1929, the High Commissioner for Australia was advised by the SHRA of the amalgamation of the SHRA, the Scots National League and Scots National Movement into the NPS. It appears that the High Commissioner was sending copies of debates in the Australian Parliament to the SHRA.\textsuperscript{519} This indicates a thread of involvement through the 1920s. However, when the occasional and sparse sources of financial contributions are taken into account they indicate that the earlier appeal to Australian Scots through newspapers received a poor response. A tour of New Zealand in 1927 by home rule supporter Reverend James Barr offered Roland Muirhead only six contacts who had claimed to be in favour of Scottish self-government. Five were from New Zealand and one from Australia.\textsuperscript{520} Muirhead contacted them,\textsuperscript{521} and held a long personal correspondence with Jessie Mackay of the Christchurch branch.\textsuperscript{522}

In December 1929 the \textit{SI} reported that steps were being taken in Melbourne to form a branch. The Christchurch branch reported that Scots in New Zealand were being canvassed for support, and there is a correspondent in the Fiji Isles.\textsuperscript{523} The Christchurch branch of the SHRA was in existence in 1928, led by Jessie Mackay. At its Annual Meeting in the Caledonian Society’s Hall, ten office holders were elected, but no numbers for the meeting are given in Jessie’s letter or its accompanying newspaper cutting.\textsuperscript{524} The branch’s name was changed later to the Christchurch branch of the National Party of Scotland.\textsuperscript{525} This seems to have continued to be a small group as Jessie refers to their ‘little association’\textsuperscript{526} and the correspondence is more of a one to one nature with Muirhead rather than her writing on behalf of a group.\textsuperscript{527} There was mention of a Melbourne Branch in one of her letters to Muirhead in 1933.\textsuperscript{528}

An undated pencil diagram of overseas branches of the movement shows eight branches in Canada, controlled by a central body, six branches in the US

\textsuperscript{519} Acc. 3721/1/6, 17\textsuperscript{th} August 1929
\textsuperscript{520} Acc. 3721/7/133, the names were: R. McCallum, R Fraser, Miss McCallum, Jessie Mackay and Robert Hogg from New Zealand, and Richard Kidston of Australia
\textsuperscript{521} Acc. 3721/7/134, Letter 23/7/29
\textsuperscript{522} Acc. 3721/7/127
\textsuperscript{523} \textit{SI.}, December 1929, p.34
\textsuperscript{524} Acc. 3721/7/127, letter 5\textsuperscript{th} October 1930
\textsuperscript{525} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{526} \textit{Ibid.}, letter to Muirhead, 12\textsuperscript{th} July 1931
\textsuperscript{527} \textit{Ibid.}, see various letters 1928-37
\textsuperscript{528} \textit{Ibid.}, letter dated 29\textsuperscript{th} April 1933
controlled from Detroit and four in New Zealand. There is mention made of Australia, South Africa and England.\textsuperscript{529} There was also a proposed constitution for a federation of Scottish Nationalist Societies in the US and the constitution of the Canadian Branch of the SNP.\textsuperscript{530} The diagram must be part reality, part ambition as it is known that the US was organised from Detroit and Muirhead wanted a similar arrangement for Canada.\textsuperscript{531} There was then some response to request for support. Promises were reported from Canada and the US as well as South Africa by December 1926, with London branches re-established a few months later.\textsuperscript{532}

Reports from NPS branches at this time included details of meetings from overseas branches, as well as English ones.\textsuperscript{533} A list of branches in the August 1932 edition of the \textit{SI} gives 122 branches of the party, of which 101 are in Scotland, three in England and 18 overseas, roughly proportionate to the participation of ‘Honorary Presidents’ from overseas of the League before it, and more than the ten branches of the League mentioned in the \textit{Nation}. Those overseas included eight in Canada, four in the USA, one apiece in Australia, New Zealand, Java and Persia and two in South Africa.\textsuperscript{534} This position may be partially verified by an undated list of branch secretaries in the Muirhead archive, save that there were five claimed in the US, not four, and one in Argentina.\textsuperscript{535}

**The US and Canada**

The ambition to succeed in North America is all the more understandable as there was good reason to believe that the Scots there were both many in number and not without resources. \textit{The Glasgow Herald} reported in 1928 that the order of Scottish Clans in America was 24,000 to 25,000 strong with $1.3 million in the bank.\textsuperscript{536} In 1930 there were 5,000 members of the Order of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}
\bibitem{529} Acc. 3721/91/41
\bibitem{530} Ibid.
\bibitem{531} Acc. 3721/7/130, Letter to J. G. McLeod 25\textsuperscript{th} February 1930
\bibitem{532} \textit{S.I.}, December 1926 and February 1927
\bibitem{533} \textit{S.I.}, June 1931, p.127 for example
\bibitem{534} \textit{S.I.}, August 1932, pp.158-9
\bibitem{535} Acc. 3721/95/87
\bibitem{536} Acc. 3721/143/274
\end{thebibliography}
Scottish Clans in New York, and the *Edinburgh Evening News* had reported on the 29th July 1929 that the Order of the Clans in the US was 30,000 strong. A contribution of a dollar was made by James Boyd, Royal Deputy of the Order. Advice to use the Order was being given to Muirhead by a correspondent in Canada almost 20 years later, in 1948.

At the June conference in 1927 the overseas secretary, Angus Clark, reported some hundreds of copies of the *SI* had been sold in Canada. In a later edition Clark reports increasing correspondence from ‘kinsmen overseas’.

In June 1928, the NPS planned to ask ex-bailie William Thompson to travel to America and Canada to promote interest in the nationalist cause. Arthur Donaldson, future organiser in the US, reported to the *SI* of forty meetings in forty-five days, all with ‘Scots colonies anxious to see him’. Thompson, however, is cautious in his summary; ‘it should not be assumed that the Scots of Canada and the United States have gone Nationalist’ but that the Scots in those countries are in step with the Nationalists. His final comments were a warning that success at home must precede success abroad.

In August 1929 the work of organising overseas branches was described as ‘a slow business’. However the Overseas report at the NPS conference held in November of that year reports ‘heartening progress,’ in what is perhaps an optimistic report to the Party Conference.

Tracing the progress of the movement reveals the slow development of the overseas branches. US organiser, Arthur Donaldson, was based in Detroit. On his return to the UK, Donaldson was to occupy several senior roles in the SNP, including that of chairman. His participation, insofar as it is relevant to the Scots abroad, is examined in chapter four. The branch in Rochester, New York, had

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537 Acc. 3721/57/297  
538 Acc. 3721/137/174  
539 Acc. 3721/5/76, Letter dated December 20th 1932  
540 Acc. 3721/7/129, Letter from Mr. McBroom, 18th August 1948  
541 *S.I.*, July 1927, p.11; September 1927, pp.4 and10  
542 Acc. 3721/5/76, Donaldson to Muirhead, 5th January 1931  
543 *S.I.*, August 1929, p.130  
544 *S.I.*, January 1930, p.34
21 paid up members in 1929.\textsuperscript{545} Rochester, home to only about 1,000 Scots\textsuperscript{546} had an active branch with a dedicated secretary, John McQuat. Muirhead corresponded with McQuat between 1929 and 1950. Although there is little about the branch after 1935, it was still in existence then.\textsuperscript{547} In 1929 Donaldson reports contact with up to one thousand sympathisers, but even though Detroit had 15,000 Scots, he was doubtful of a big turnout to greet Muirhead during his intended visit in 1929.\textsuperscript{548} Muirhead went to Detroit to meet Donaldson, where he spoke to a small meeting. At Rochester he addressed a meeting of over 100 according to an article in the \textit{Rochester Herald}.\textsuperscript{549} There are a number of such visits referred to in the \textit{SI}.

At this time there was an Overseas Department of the NPS, headed by Neil MacCormick, to whom Muirhead reported progress on his visit. This progress sounded slow, meeting Mr Little in Quebec and Miss Cooper in Montreal in what appear to be small gatherings. Muirhead reported addressing ‘prominent American Scots.’\textsuperscript{550} There is a note of a dollar sent by an unknown friend in Chicago. A branch was formed by Little in Quebec, and its constitution survives, though undated, amongst papers from the late 1920s. Its objectives are interesting as the society takes on the role of not just ‘support(ing) the National Movement for self-government within the British Commonwealth’ but also to ‘help brither Scots in sickness.’\textsuperscript{551} This combined one of the traditional roles of the Scottish societies abroad, that of charitable aid, with the less traditional support for nationalism.

There were further visits by nationalists to the US and Canada. These were not trips dedicated to raising nationalist support in these countries, but were primarily visits in pursuit of the visitors’ own business. Although Muirhead’s own visit was principally for his own business he was able to fit in some talks to sympathisers. There is evidence that the trips focussed on addressing the

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\textsuperscript{545} \textit{S.I.}, August 1929, p.130; December 1929, ‘news from abroad’
\textsuperscript{546} Acc. 3721/94/75
\textsuperscript{547} Acc. 3721/94/75
\textsuperscript{548} Acc. 3721/6/107
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{550} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{551} Acc. 3721/94/75
\end{flushright}
Scottish Associations from a letter from Muirhead to the Caledonian Society of Montreal about Thompson’s visit of April 1930.⁵⁵²

Thompson’s own report of one of the three trips he made appeared in the *S/I* in 1931 and 1932. Thompson’s report to Muirhead of his 1930 trip is found in correspondence between them from April to July of that year. Thompson’s report is encouraging. In Montreal, his meeting was ‘small but keen’; in Ottawa there were a hundred; Syracuse twenty; Rochester, thanks to McQuat, two hundred. Branches were formed at New York, Brooklyn, Lynn, Montreal, Ottawa, Syracuse and possibly Toronto. Finally, his meeting in Vancouver had 800 attend and a branch was formed.⁵⁵³

There was also a visit to the US by J. M. MacCormick, Hon. Secretary of the SNP.⁵⁵⁴ His availability for addressing sympathisers was limited as his visit was primarily on behalf of Glasgow University. However, MacCormick was not ‘sanguine about getting material support from Americans’ and describes his meetings with Scots as ‘not fruitful but not a waste of time entirely.’⁵⁵⁵ He does not make mention of the visit in his book on his involvement in the home rule movement, nor of Thompson’s visits.⁵⁵⁶ The *S/I* reported a letter from the secretary of the New York Robert Burns Memorial Association, saying the visit of Thompson ‘is still the talk of those Scots you interested. You found them an unkneaded mass of dough, and MacCormick was better understood after you had laid the train.’⁵⁵⁷

The detail of the meetings of the ‘overseas branches’ as reported by the *S/I* reveal the nature of their activities. The Robert Burns Memorial Association in New York refers to Thompson’s last visit, indicating that the associational Scottish cultural societies were once again the target of the nationalist approach in the US and Canada. The same edition had a report from the

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⁵⁵² Acc. 3721/7/130; 3721/7/136, Muirhead’s invitation from the Greater New York Masonic Burns Club in January of that year
⁵⁵³ Acc. 3721/7/117
⁵⁵⁴ *S/I.*, December 1931, p.52
⁵⁵⁵ Acc. 3721/4/80, see the exchange of letters with Muirhead whilst MacCormick is in the US, October to December 1930
⁵⁵⁶ MacCormick, 1955
⁵⁵⁷ *S/I*, May 1931, p.111
Rochester branch which was said to be ‘flourishing’ in 1929, and reported discussing papers on Russia and India at its January and February meetings. As before, the attempts to raise interest in nationalism were focussed on raising the ‘interest (of) the various Clan Associations.’ A meeting of the Montreal group held in December 1930 was reported as being held in the home of a member, therefore probably not a large group. The meeting discussed the aims and aspirations of the Scottish National movement and a favourable election result in East Renfrewshire was seen as a sign of progress in the movement. The March meeting of the same group was in the same member’s house and was very much a cultural evening, with songs and poetry whilst a reading of Thompson’s letters seem to be the only nationalist content.

Reference to these branches in letters from Scots abroad would be valuable context as would comment from Scottish non-members. This has not been evidenced by research to date. Contemporary letters from Ernest Younger in Toronto contain nothing but a record of a busy work and social life. Diaries from George Dott, later an NPS member, in Ottawa are likewise silent on home rule matters, despite a clear craving for home.

In 1935, Muirhead lists the overseas branches for MacNeil, the new Overseas Secretary. They are; Toronto, New York, Brooklyn, Boston, Syracuse, Edmonton and Vancouver. The Overseas Council is still in existence at this time, and MacNeil’s predecessor had sent out 2,000 letters to recruit members whilst in office, demonstrating a continued commitment of some kind to connect with the diaspora. The slow progress in the US and Canada can in part be explained by a letter to the S.I. in 1930. The writer asked ‘What can we do here anyway? The fight will be won in Scotland.’

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558 S.I., December 1929, p.22  
559 S.I., December 1926, p.11  
560 S.I., February 1931, p.63  
561 S.I., May 1931, p.111, Letter from Auld  
562 Acc.9407/2, 1926; 1929  
563 Acc.12987/54, 46, 47  
564 Acc. 3721/94/75, Muirhead to McNeill, 15th October 1935  
565 S.I., May 1930, p.78
London

Despite the importance of London as the seat of government, there was limited branch organisation there. Whilst the SHRA of London was described as ‘thriving’ in 1920, in fact its membership was limited to those in the National Liberal Club and anticipated activity seemed to be confined to a dinner to be arranged.\textsuperscript{566} Muirhead wrote to the Editor of \textit{Forward}: ‘If the Scots MPs cannot get what they need in London, they should, in order to keep faith with the people, explain why they cannot get in London what is so urgently needed in Scotland.’\textsuperscript{567} Muirhead told Cunninghame Graham in 1925 that they had ‘few members in London, no branch’ and that it would be a costly business to set one up.

However, there was a London branch of the Scots National League in existence in 1925.\textsuperscript{568} In February 1927, 21 League district secretaries are listed, of which four are in England.\textsuperscript{569} One of these was in London, which reported a successful gathering on the 12\textsuperscript{th} March 1927 on the subject of ‘The Practicality of Scottish Independence’. The meeting was judged a success, and called for more workers to sell the \textit{SI} at more gatherings of Scots throughout the capital.\textsuperscript{570} The London branch of the NPS sent representatives to the 1930 conference, including Compton Mackenzie, and the address to the conference highlighted the ‘strong band from London.’\textsuperscript{571} One of its leaders, Angus Clark, seems to have been particularly extreme in their nationalist views, as according to MacCormick the expulsion of the branch was necessary to smooth the way for the merger with the Scottish Party.\textsuperscript{572}

The early promise of the visits and correspondence in the late 1920s and early 1930s did not develop, as MacCormick had predicted, into a source of significant material support. Muirhead himself had written to Cunninghame Graham on his return from his US and Canada trip. He saw a large potential but

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{566} Acc. 3721/ 125/25
  \item \textsuperscript{567} Acc. 3721/5/76, letter dated 16\textsuperscript{th} August 1937
  \item \textsuperscript{568} \textit{Glasgow Herald}, 21\textsuperscript{st} September 1925; \textit{Dunfermline Journal}, 26\textsuperscript{th} September 1925
  \item \textsuperscript{569} S.I., February 1927, p.11
  \item \textsuperscript{570} S.I., April 1927, p.11
  \item \textsuperscript{571} Acc. 3721/86/1
  \item \textsuperscript{572} MacCormick, 1955, p.84
\end{itemize}
little practical support until the movement in Scotland was much more in the public eye and the press. In 1938 a list of overseas members was given to Muirhead, it had 136 names on it.

Before the Second World War the SNP had little political impact, reflected in their continued electoral failure, and were split in their aims between nationalists and home rulers. The differences resulted in a walkout of some members, led by John MacCormick, from the 1942 conference of the SNP. Those leaving the conference set up the Scottish Convention under his leadership. This organisation would not seek to stand candidates for election to Westminster, but would seek to influence existing political parties and other organisations, in other words, a pressure group.

**Scottish Convention and Scottish Covenant Association**

The first meeting of the Convention on the 4th June 1942 was chaired by William Power and attended by thirteen supporters. Letters of support from the Rosyth branch of the SNP and six other sympathisers were read out by MacCormick. The confidence of the meeting was such that MacCormick was authorised to approach the SNP with a view to taking over its assets and liabilities, including the S.I. The accrual of new members was described as steady. The organisation had 364 members by the end of August 1942 and at the end of the year 584 members were enrolled. Its activities were those of a pressure group, publication of literature and propaganda, public meetings and press advertisements. However, the organisation was short of money.

The Convention launched a National Covenant to provide a mandate for its position by mobilising all Scots to sign a covenant asking for more power to run

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573 Acc. 3721/7/114, letter dated 1st February 1930 to Cunninghame Graham
574 Acc. 3721/ 65/463
575 Mitchell, 1996, p.85
576 Acc. 6649/1, Minutes of the special meeting held 4th June 1942
577 Ibid., Minutes of meeting held 30th July 1942
578 Acc. 6649/1, Minutes of a meeting of the Provisional Committee 27th August 1942 and of the Executive Committee 24th December 1942
579 Ibid., most minutes contain references to this, see 7th January 1943, 10th December 1942 and 12th November as examples
580 Ibid., minutes of meeting of the Executive Committee 3rd February 1944, also, Acc. 6649/4, 26th October 1944
their own affairs.\textsuperscript{581} By 1951 this became the major focus of affairs and the Convention merged with the National Convention committee to form the Scottish Convention Association.\textsuperscript{582} Its aims were to ‘secure the establishment in Scotland of a Scottish Parliament in Scotland.’\textsuperscript{583}

Despite the success of their covenant with 1.7 million signatures in support of its aims, and a membership of over 4,700 by June 1946,\textsuperscript{584} the covenanters failed even to get a meeting with Attlee, the Prime Minister of the time, and the Convention and Covenant movements lost impetus and decayed.\textsuperscript{585} The Scottish Covenant Association only listed 120 members for the years 1953 to 1955 none of whom were abroad or in England.\textsuperscript{586} However, this register is almost certainly incorrect as the 1953 ledger of Newsletter payments includes a charge of four shillings a month to London for 40 newsletters.\textsuperscript{587} This indicated a continuity of support from a London branch that had been in existence since 1946.

There is no mention of branches overseas in the 1942 meetings, perhaps due to the War.\textsuperscript{588} Advertisements were purely in Scottish newspapers.\textsuperscript{589} Although throughout the period 1942-46 minutes of meetings and AGMs contain no indication that the Scots abroad were being targeted in any way, there are mentions of a Leeds branch\textsuperscript{590} and a ‘small but successful’ London branch.\textsuperscript{591} However the list of members by branch dated 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 1944 mentions neither.\textsuperscript{592} The minutes of a meeting of the National Committee on 3\textsuperscript{rd} June 1944 noted a request from the New South Wales Government Office requesting information on the Association’s new approach to self-government.\textsuperscript{593} The fifth AGM, held on 22\textsuperscript{nd} June 1946 includes apologies for absence from two London

\begin{parlist}
\item Acc. 6649/4, minutes of the Executive Committee 25\textsuperscript{th} August 1949 records the planning of this
\item Acc. 7295/9, minutes of the inaugural meeting 27\textsuperscript{th} October 1951
\item Ibid.
\item Mitchell,1996, p.85
\item Begg and Stewart, 1971, p.140
\item Acc. 7295/11
\item Acc. 7295/31
\item Acc. 7295/4, p.10
\item Ibid., p.15
\item Ibid., p.42
\item Ibid., p.45
\item Ibid., p.75
\item Ibid., p.59
\end{parlist}
and one Leeds member. 594 There was therefore some meagre support by Scots in England. A long report on activities in September 1946 contained no comment about the Scots abroad 595 and minutes of meetings until February 1949 contain no references whatsoever. 596 The Convention constitution contains no mention of the wider Scottish population abroad, 597 although its appeal is to ‘every citizen of Scotland and everyone interested in the welfare of Scotland.’ 598 Recalling MacCormick’s earlier pessimism with regard to fundraising in America, this is not surprising. However, this is the first major group, membership was 4,773 in 1946, 599 examined whose only attempt at exploiting the diaspora was a single visit to the US and Canada.

The visit took place in June 1950, 600 its purpose being to explain the Covenant position to Scots there. These Scots turned out to be the very same associational Scots targeted by home rulers and SNP alike in earlier years. MacCormick himself was not personally very enthusiastic, 601 but nevertheless spoke to Scottish Societies in New York, Washington, Toronto and Chicago. 602 His conclusion from the trip was as follows;

‘The Scot in America is a somewhat peculiar creature… the ties that bind him are one of kailyard sentimentality and it would never occur to him that he had any serious responsibility toward the home that nurtured him.’ 603

The reception in Canada was much warmer, and the party were received by the Mayor of Toronto. 604 There was no definitive outcome of the trip, which was financed by the individuals themselves. The transatlantic voyage had been undertaken to demonstrate to Scots abroad that it was not an irresponsible and unrepresentative body. Whilst it dispelled some of these impressions, the trip worked against the Covenant by associating MacCormick with an isolationist

594 Ibid., pp.115-6
595 Ibid., pp.132-138
596 Acc. 7295/5
597 Acc. 7295/6
598 Ibid.
599 Acc. 7295/4, p.117
600 MacCormick, 1955, p.145
601 Ibid., p.146
602 Ibid., p.151
603 Ibid., p.151
604 Ibid., p.152
figure in the US and led to claims he was stirring up hatred of Britain, in a fashion comparable to De Valera, Irish separatist leader and Taoiseach.\textsuperscript{605}

The SNP meanwhile represented a more extreme position\textsuperscript{606} with the aim of establishing full self-government as an equal within the Commonwealth of Nations and the restoration of Scottish sovereignty. The analysis will return to the SNP in chapter four. The issue of remittances from abroad for all these organisations is addressed next.

\textbf{Remittances from the Diaspora}

Fundraising would be a key part of any contribution that the diaspora might play in support of home rule. In the case of those abroad, however, funds to be sent to a group for political purposes had to compete with other demands on an emigrant’s cash. The expectation driven from the analysis in chapter two is that Scots would have made considerable remittances back home.

Some research, covering the period 1875-1913, helps to provide evidence of background remittance activity. It took the pool of potential remitters to be all British passengers arriving in the previous five years or longer. Net migration from Scotland was 21% higher in the period 1911-51 than 1885-1913. However, economic conditions were undoubtedly difficult during the later period which contained two World Wars and the depression. One Scot in Canada claimed that ‘the 30s were desperate years’ and this particular Scot was not able to clear his debts run up in the depression until 1952.\textsuperscript{607} The number and size of remittances from the US to Ireland dropped rapidly in response to the recession, falling by two thirds between 1930 and 1939. It is reasonable to assume that Scots’ remittances also fell in the same period, just as it can be assumed that the increased migration would have resulted in some remitting after 1918.

Autonomous remittances were much larger in proportion to the whole from the US than they were from Canada or Australia.\textsuperscript{608} This reflected a much greater

\textsuperscript{605}Somerville, 2013, p.42
\textsuperscript{606}Burrell, 1955, p.360
\textsuperscript{607}McCallum,1963, pp.41 and 44
\textsuperscript{608}Magee and Thompson, 2006a, p.189
tendency for temporary migration to the US due to faster and cheaper transatlantic travel, particularly in the latter part of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{609} The US was an important destination for the Scots, being the destination of choice for 44% of Scots 1825-1914\textsuperscript{610} and still taking 20% in the 1919-38 period.\textsuperscript{611} If sums of remittances as a whole were more significant from the US, this held weight for the Scots.

There was some significant Scottish autonomous remittance activity for example the effort to raise funds for a new Celtic Chair at Edinburgh University. It was Professor Blackie’s intention to contact Scottish associations throughout the world to raise £10,000 for the endowment.\textsuperscript{612} More than £10,000 had been raised by 1877. The chair was established in 1882.\textsuperscript{613} Recalling the typology of remittances, these funds raised from the diaspora represent remittances similar in nature to potential contributions to the home rule organisations. Blackie wrote to many Scots associations around the world, in particular to a Scot in New Zealand, McClean, who lived near Oamaru, New Zealand. As well as raising awareness of the appeal with members of the Oamaru Caledonian Society, McClean donated £200 himself.\textsuperscript{614} In Australia, the \textit{North Melbourne Advertiser} reported that promises of funds from the colony had reached £500.\textsuperscript{615} The Clan Mackay collected £100 from members in England, Ceylon and New Zealand, and Blackie had expectations of £1,000 from a lunch for Scots in London.\textsuperscript{616} The Toronto Caledonian Society donated £100, and smaller donations were made by working men in, for example, Adelaide.\textsuperscript{617} Scots abroad did therefore donate for non-family reasons.

Therefore, although the research into UK remittances reveals little about the level of Scots’ funds, it can provide pointers to what could be expected. Firstly, if it is assumed that Scots would not be substantially different to their fellow

\textsuperscript{609} Magee and Thompson, 2006b, p.563  
\textsuperscript{610} Harper, 2003, p.3  
\textsuperscript{611} Ibid., p.7  
\textsuperscript{612} Bueltmann, 2011, p.183  
\textsuperscript{613} Ibid., pp.184-5  
\textsuperscript{614} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{615} \textit{North Melbourne Advertiser}, 10th December 1875, p.2  
\textsuperscript{616} Wallace, 2006, p.273  
\textsuperscript{617} Ibid.
Britons in their remittance activity, and the research indicates that there was remittance activity, then it is reasonable to assume there would have been some Scottish activity. Secondly, insofar as support for home rule organisations would be categorised as autonomous remittances, activity could be expected to be greatest in the US, a major Scots destination.\(^{618}\) Thirdly, there are accounts of large sums being remitted to Scotland, for other than family reasons, as can be seen in the example above. Furthermore, the profits of Scots businesses abroad were being remitted to Scotland in the mid-1880s.\(^ {619}\) Personal accounts show Scots sent money home.\(^ {620}\) For example, in July 1926, Ernest Younger repaid money lent to him by a family member, Sandy, to set up in Canada.\(^ {621}\) Three years later, he was still sending money drafts to his mother and father in Alloa.\(^ {622}\)

The first SHRA appealed in its publications to the Scots abroad for financial support and one pamphlet is dedicated to a J. B. White of Fort Wayne, Indiana for his generous support.\(^ {623}\) There is no mention of the size of White’s donation but the dedication indicates it was of interest. Evidence of only one other donation has been uncovered by the research; The *Melbourne Argus* confirmed later that in 1893, £205 had been donated by the local Association to the SHRA.\(^ {624}\)

There was also cash from outside Scotland for the second SHRA. However the correspondence that Muirhead had with his most active US sympathisers, McQuat in Rochester, New York and Donaldson in Detroit demonstrates how small these remittances were.\(^ {625}\) Letters over a six year period from 1929 include reference to a total of $75.40, £24 13/- and $10 worth of cotton garments sent as a contribution to the fund raising bazaar held in Glasgow. There were local difficulties for McQuat, as he was unable to collect cash at a well-attended picnic in 1930 due to local by-laws.\(^ {626}\) There is evidence to

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\(^{618}\) Magee and Thompson, 2006a, p.189  
\(^{619}\) Cage,1985, p.222  
\(^{620}\) Ibid.  
\(^{621}\) Acc. 9407/2, Letters of Ernest Younger, 11\(^{th}\) July 1926  
\(^{622}\) Ibid., 16\(^{th}\) December 1929  
\(^{623}\) Mitchell, 1892, dedication.  
\(^{624}\) *Melbourne Argus*, Saturday 25\(^{th}\) February 1893  
\(^{625}\) Acc. 3721/6/107, 3721/5/76, various correspondence  
\(^{626}\) Acc. 3721/6/107, letter dated 19\(^{th}\) July 1930
suggest that the NPS were naive in their approach to fundraising. A tour of the US and Canada by the Duke of Montrose was suggested, and McQuat was asked by the Overseas Secretary what financial benefit might be expected. McQuat was unsure, but proposed pledge cards and suggested that this could gather $500 per annum if other centres were involved. Although Muirhead was in favour, neither action materialised.627

Donaldson’s experience was similar to McQuat’s; in July 1931 he was able to send $10 from two members, in September $4 from four new members and $10 later in the year.628 At that time, Muirhead was hoping to raise forty £150 deposits to fight seats in the General Election.629 McQuat’s earlier experience was mirrored in the correspondence with Jessie MacKay, Correspondence Secretary of the Christchurch branch of the SHRA, later SNP, in New Zealand between 1929 and 1937. Remittances of £193 were recorded during this period, of which the major part were subscriptions for the SI.630 In 1930 Muirhead appealed directly to T. D. MacAuley, President of the Sun Life Association of Canada. He asked for £1,000 to fund two organisers and form a by-election fighting fund.631 MacAuley refused to get involved. He wrote that the NPS’s views were ‘so extreme I really have no sympathy for them.’632 The difficulties of raising money for home rule are plainly seen in the accounts of the SHRA from 1921-28. In these years there was a deficit of expenditure over income. Usually, Muirhead made up the difference. Annual expenditure was around £2,500, but the organisation persistently failed to raise this.633

The Scottish National Convention, established to draft a bill for Home Rule, fared no better for diaspora contributions. The Finance sub-committee records of the Convention from 1927 and 1928 show that the most recorded contributions for one fund raising effort in early 1927 are from Scotland, although there are some from Scots abroad.634 One pound was sent from

627 Acc. 3721/94/75
628 Acc. 3721/5/76, letters between Donaldson and Muirhead; 23rd July, 28th September and 13th November 1931
629 Ibid., November letter
630 Acc. 3721/7/127
631 Acc.3721/7/116, letter dated 3rd January 1930
632 Ibid., letter, 13th February 1930
633 Acc. 3721/42/37
634 Acc. 3721/84/4
Assam and one dollar from Rochester New York. \footnote{Acc. 3721/6/107, telegram from Rochester branch dated 22\textsuperscript{nd} August 1931; Acc. 3721/94/75, letter from Muirhead dated 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1935, he claims it came ‘before the old SHRA’} Five shillings was donated by an SHRA council member, \footnote{Acc. 3721/85/27} Edwin Scrymgeour, Scottish Prohibition Party MP for Dundee 1922-1931. A contribution of ten shillings came from two sisters in England, M. and J. Calder; Agnes Paterson in Manchester sent two shillings and six pence; Mr and Mrs Paul from Putney gave five shillings each; Norman Sheave from Bootle paid ten shillings and ten shillings came from Jeremiah Shields in Ireland, making only nine out of 127 contributions in the ledger coming from outside Scotland. Postage records show that this may not be surprising. Ledgers of expenditure on postage from 1924 and 1927 show that of 500 letters sent to ask for contributions, only 15 went to destinations outside of Scotland, in this case to London. \footnote{Acc. 3721/84/4} The committee of the Convention reported in 1928 that it was £130 in the red. \footnote{Acc. 3271/81/2, report dated 18\textsuperscript{th} February 1928} These contributions were insignificant compared to needs, and also to the contributions the Irish made to their nationalist effort.

### The Support of the Irish Diaspora for Home Rule and Independence

The purpose of having a diaspora with which to compare this remitting behaviour is to provide evidence that diaspora support and funding for political causes is a proven phenomenon. It is difficult to strike a direct historical comparison with the contribution of the Scots abroad to their nationalist movement and that of the Irish, as the Irish Free State was established in 1921. This partial resolution of the cause of Irish separatism, together with increased assimilation, had been accompanied by a sapping of political motivation by most of the overseas Irish. \footnote{MacRaild, 2000, p.215} Recall the earlier commentary on the reduction of remittances after this date, curtailed also no doubt by the depression. The new state made little effort to tap the financial power of the Irish abroad until after World War Two. \footnote{Kenny, 2003, p.265} Even so, the Second Irish National Loan issue of the 1920s...
raised $15 million of its $25 million in the US, although this was the last such issue in the US.\textsuperscript{641}

It is however reasonable to compare the Irish and Scottish situations, if not historically, then in terms of process. The Scots’ movement, it can be argued, was in a similar situation in the inter-war period as the Irish had been at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, in that both groups were pursuing constitutional means of resolving their issues. There was a major difference too, that the Irish movement had an unequivocally separatist and violent strand that suppressed the home rule groups.\textsuperscript{642} The Scots did not. Nevertheless, the evidence produced in further chapters will demonstrate that the financial and organisational contribution of the Irish abroad significantly exceeded that of the Scots, even in Scotland itself.

**Support from the Diaspora for the Norwegian Liberation from Sweden**

The Norwegian national liberation took place in 1905, leaving a period of twenty years at the beginning of the research timeframe when its diaspora might have engaged with the movement to free the country from its union with Sweden. The ending of the Union was precipitated by the Norwegian Parliament passing an act to set up separate Norwegian Consular Offices, long a subject of discontent. This was vetoed by the King of Sweden and Norway, leading to the cabinet resigning, and talk of war. This process was repeated two months later, and in June the Parliament asked Michelson to continue as Prime Minister as the King had ceased to function as monarch in Norway. This was confirmed by plebiscite.\textsuperscript{643}

Swedish and Norwegian Americans found it impossible to shed their national interest in the problems of their homelands.\textsuperscript{644} There was plenty of interest in the separation long before 1905 and the Union issue became a public affair in New York, Chicago, Minneapolis, Seattle and the rural mid-west.\textsuperscript{645} In the

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{641}] Ibid., p.278
\item[\textsuperscript{642}] Moody, 1967, pp.440-441
\item[\textsuperscript{643}] Andersen, 1990, pp.106-107
\item[\textsuperscript{644}] Ibid., p.102
\item[\textsuperscript{645}] Ibid., p.103
\end{itemize}
1880s Norwegian-American papers like *Norden* hailed the movement toward parliamentary government in Norway.\textsuperscript{646} Nevertheless prior to 1905, Norwegians in the US exerted no significant pressure on the US government, in fact Knute Nelson, a leading Norwegian-American senator, opposed the effort to dissolve the Union.\textsuperscript{647} However, his speech in favour of the Union caused uproar in the Odin Club of Minneapolis, and most Norwegians in America generally favoured dissolution of the Union.\textsuperscript{648}

The constant stream of emigrants to the US kept the diaspora informed of political battles at home between Liberals and Conservatives over the constitution. Norwegian-American Liberal Groups were formed, notably in Minneapolis. In 1883 there was a suggestion that there should be collections to assist the rifle clubs in Norway should the conflict turn violent. In 1884 the Minneapolis Norwegian-American Liberal Society sent 4,000 Kroner to the Liberal Party in Norway.\textsuperscript{649} However, these actions had little impact in Norway and those at home were ignorant of the Norwegian-American connection except through personal ties. The Liberal Societies were soon dissolved.\textsuperscript{650} This apparently weak support will be discussed further.

The bygdelag movement, raised during a period of ethnic mobilisation of Norwegian immigrants, absorbed the new wave of Norwegian-American nationalism but did not support political undertones of separatism.\textsuperscript{651} This appeared to be because the bygdelags were regionally connected to Norway, not nationally. This was also the case for some Scottish associations. Although Norway’s opposition to the Union with Sweden had many sympathisers in America, the new nationalism was linked to an interest in folk culture.\textsuperscript{652} There is no evidence that the Norwegian-Americans provided direct support to the Liberal groups ending the Union.

Once the Union was dissolved following the plebiscite of August 1905, there was considerable activity to get the US government to recognise the new state.

\textsuperscript{646} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{647} Soike, 1991, p.79  
\textsuperscript{648} Andersen, 1990, p.106  
\textsuperscript{649} Lovoll, 1984, p.133  
\textsuperscript{650} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{651} Norman and Runblom, 1987, p.204  
\textsuperscript{652} Ibid., p.205
Mass meetings were held in cities with Norwegian concentrations and 4,000 signatures came from North Dakota alone. Despite separatist difficulties which the US was having in its Philippines dependency, pressure from the Norwegian press and perceived flaws in the original Union led to Secretary of State Root to extend recognition.\textsuperscript{653} Therefore although there was little evidence that any tangible support was received from the diaspora, there was successful pressure for recognition afterwards. Had the issue been resolved in other ways, by a long drawn out political campaign other than that by the Liberals, or by war or civil unrest, it may be that the diaspora would have behaved differently. As it was, although the Norwegian diaspora was not indifferent in the way the Scots were at the time, positive action was not in abundance until the Union was dissolved.

**Summary**

This chapter was the first of two whose purpose is to study the engagement of the Scottish diaspora with the home rule and nationalist projects at home. Four home rule and nationalist organisations were selected for the work; the first SHRA, the League, the second SHRA with its successor nationalist organisations, and the Scottish Convention. The value of remittances to the organisations was given particular attention. This engagement was then compared with that of two contemporary nationalist projects, that of the Irish and of the Norwegians. The time frame for the study was 1885-1951.

It has been demonstrated that both SHRA organisations courted the Scots abroad in order to raise money and build influence, as did the SNP later in the period. They appear however to have been poorly organised, and fundraising from these sources was poor in relation not only to the volume of money sent to Scotland for other reasons, but in comparison to the support of the Irish abroad for their nationalist cause. If the limited audiences for Thompson and MacCormick in the USA in the 1920s are compared with the thousands attending those of Redmond in Scotland and Australasia earlier in the period, the difference in response is clear. This is dealt with in greater detail in chapter six. However, some individuals in the diaspora were motivated to support the nationalist projects in meaningful ways. Compton Mackenzie, born in West

\textsuperscript{653} Andersen, 1990, pp.109-110
Hartlepool, was a founder activist with the SNP\textsuperscript{654} and Arthur Donaldson, whilst sojourning in the US, became its local organiser, and eventually its chairman.

It has been established that the Scots abroad did send money home for many reasons and that they would have been unusual emigrants had they not. However, records show they did not appear to send money sufficient for the nationalist cause to build a professional organisation with full time staff. This compares very unfavourably with the financial support enjoyed by Irish nationalists. It is clear that despite the potential provided by hundreds of thousands of migrants leaving every decade, and many thousands of Scots abroad associating with the ‘clan’ element of their homeland culture, the numbers of overseas branches of any of the groups were always less than fifty, and overseas members themselves probably never exceeded two hundred. This compares very unfavourably with the membership of Irish nationalist groups in the US, England and Scotland, where membership was in the many thousands.

Having earlier demonstrated that diasporas do get involved in homeland politics, the Scots abroad, at least in this period, did not do so to any great effect. Some possible reasons for this are emerging. First is the nature of the associations targeted by the home rule and nationalist groups. Donaldson’s comment that the Scottish societies were an obstacle who were wrapped up in mutual worship was telling. These organisations will be studied more closely in chapter six. Secondly, the nature of the diaspora and conditions in its host lands may not be conducive to old country politics, as Donaldson found when he came up against local by-laws. The Scots in the US were a less visible diaspora than the Irish; they were Protestant not Catholic, spoke English not Gaelic and tended to be more prosperous. The Irish did not fit in and resentment of this fed their nationalism. These themes will be explored more fully later. Before that the next chapter examines the involvement of the Scots abroad in Scottish Nationalism during the period 1951-1979.

\textsuperscript{654} Mackenzie, 1967, pp.157-159
Chapter Four: Post-War Nationalism

This chapter will deal with the post-World War Two nationalist movement in Scotland and its engagement with the diaspora. Contemporaneous emigration will be presented, as will comparisons with the Irish diaspora and its engagement with nationalist movements in the homeland. The Norwegian liberation from its union with Sweden had been complete in 1905 and there was no continuing political dispute similar to the Irish case in Northern Ireland. Therefore the Norwegians are not considered.

During World War Two, power in Britain became more centralised as powers were transferred to London by the Secretary of Labour.\(^{655}\) This trend continued after the war with the nationalisation of mines, railways, gas, electricity, air transport and others, taking local control away from Scotland. The comment that ‘Scottish enterprise in Aviation has been contemptuously suppressed’\(^{656}\) reflects some of the feeling created by this. In December 1947, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr. A Woodburn, wrote a cabinet paper summarising the causes of the greater agitation in Scotland for a greater measure of Scottish control over Scottish affairs. It was his view that ‘it is the exploitation of Scottish sentiment about the organisation of socialised industries on a Great Britain basis that has been largely responsible for bringing matters to a head.’\(^{657}\)

There was evidence that elements of the UK government took the issue of Scottish nationalism seriously. In 1950, the medieval Scottish Stone of Destiny was removed from Westminster. It was subsequently returned and the Home Office took the nationalist theme seriously by recommending no prosecution should take place to avoid making martyrs out of the perpetrators.\(^{658}\) In 1951, the incoming Conservative administration established a Minister of State post at the Scottish office with an additional parliamentary under-secretary. The new Government met little pressure from the SNP, tiny as it was, but the commitment to a Royal Commission and to enhance the Scottish Office had

\(^{655}\) CP (47) 323 in Prem 8/1517
\(^{656}\) Ibid.
\(^{657}\) Ibid.
\(^{658}\) HO/45
been made by the party in 1949. This had originally been intended to use home rule agitation to embarrass Labour.\textsuperscript{659} It appointed a Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs in 1952, which reported in 1954. Certain responsibilities, previously run at a British level, were to be administered in Scotland by the Scottish Office.\textsuperscript{660}

During the war, the SNP had had some electoral success, partly aided by Scottish resentment of aspects of wartime policy.\textsuperscript{661} After significant gains in the polls in Argyll and Kirkcaldy,\textsuperscript{662} the SNP briefly won its first seat in Westminster in 1945. The SNP had the official aim of establishing independence as an equal within the Commonwealth of Nations. Between 1942, the time of the Covenanters’ split, and 1967, the party had few successes. However it grew more self-assured and to an extent laid down the foundations for its success in later years.\textsuperscript{663}

In the 1960s the SNP increased its percentage of the vote in Scotland, doubling its vote in each national election between 1959 and 1970.\textsuperscript{664} Although in 1966 this was still only 5% of the vote, its membership and organisation continued to grow from 23 branches in 1960 to 484 branches in 1968.\textsuperscript{665} The rise of the SNP took place in the context of the European phenomenon of distrust towards established parties and the political system itself, symptomatic of a decline in class alignment and the rise in interest in Scottish affairs from the 1920s onwards.\textsuperscript{666} This discontent grew with the idea that Scotland’s problems were a result of England’s neglect, and more Scots control would solve the economic problems of Scotland.

**Emigration from Scotland, 1951-79**

Net emigration continued for thirty years after 1951. Though economic factors lay at the heart of the post-war Scottish diaspora, it has also been claimed that

\textsuperscript{659} Mitchell, 1996, p.45
\textsuperscript{660} Burrell, 1955, p.358; Mitchell, 1996, p.45
\textsuperscript{661} Mitchell, 1996, p.191
\textsuperscript{662} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{663} Ibid., p.190
\textsuperscript{664} Lynch, 2002, pp.114 and 119
\textsuperscript{665} Ibid., p.108
\textsuperscript{666} Brand, 1978, pp.22-3. As an example, the Royal Scottish Country Dancing Society was established in 1923
social mobility played a part. Scotland’s economic adjustments of the inter-war period continued and there were claims that the economic policies of political parties in Scotland failed to counter the propensity to emigrate. There was assistance available for Britons who wished to emigrate to Australasia, allowing them to travel for £10. Australians now call this cohort of immigrants the ‘ten pound poms.’ Ironically, between Scotland and England, the emigration flow was both ways.

Nevertheless, the total of 759,000 net emigration for the period 1951-81 was a significant net outflow for a population of slightly over five million. This period saw the second highest decade (1961-71) of net emigration in the twentieth century, after 1921-31. This high net emigration took place during the period of the SNP’s electoral breakthrough. There were therefore thousands of first generation Scots newly arrived overseas. Table VIII below shows the size of first generation Scots populations in some host countries. Although not entirely consistent, the dates are close enough to make comparisons.

### Table VIII. Scots-born in Diaspora Host Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Census date</th>
<th>Scots in the host country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>244,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>226,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>123,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: McCarthy, 2007, pp.228-229

Some of those emigrating in the late 1960s and early 1970s could have known about the activities of the SNP before they left Scotland and some were already members when they emigrated.

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667 Finlay, 2004, pp.302-3  
668 McCarthy, 2007, p.18  
669 Ibid., p.21  
670 Ibid., p.19  
671 Derived from Lindsay in Devine, 1992, p.155  
673 Acc. 10754/17, letter 27th July 1978, J. M. Weir and Acc. 10754/18, W. Tomala
The SNP Engagement with the Diaspora

The SNP was not a pressure group but a political party with its objectives not to influence legislators but to get legislators elected. Its overwhelming need from its supporters were votes, activists to campaign in elections and funding to pay for propaganda, election deposits, wages of full time officials, travel and advertising. The 1949 constitution of the SNP was not encouraging to Scots abroad. It allowed only ‘persons permanently resident in Scotland not members of any other political party’ to be members. However, persons outside of Scotland might become honorary ‘HQ’ members.674

Despite this apparent institutional indifference, Muirhead corresponded with overseas Scots. There are many examples of this. There were letters to Rendall P. Roop of New Jersey,675 and E. W. Sansom of Montreal,676 none of which hint of a movement in those countries although one did result in a donation.677 The correspondence with R. F. Kies in South Africa also included Muirhead’s thoughts on non-violent direct action, using Ghandi as an example.678 There is an expression of gratitude to Muirhead for his service to home rule from the secretary of the Johannesburg branch of the SNP.679 This secretary was Ian Hosack, who will be encountered later in this chapter as a returnee from the diaspora and head of the SNP Association.

Muirhead contacted the UN, asking to whom the Scots should address their petition of demands for liberty. This was front page news on the Chicago Daily Tribune, though the by-line was Glasgow.680 The reply from the UN, that it was not empowered to deal with such matters, was reported in the paper on the 27th February 1947.681 This is dealt with in greater detail in chapter seven.
It has been noted that there was a small group of senior SNP officials who had been part of the diaspora; Cunninghame Graham, Compton Mackenzie and, dealt with in some detail below, Arthur Donaldson.

**Arthur Donaldson, SNP Chairman, 1960-69**

Arthur Donaldson was the NPS, then SNP, organiser in the US. Rather than split the analysis of his involvement in the diaspora and Scotland, this is dealt with in one section here. His activities are dealt with in detail in this chapter due to his seniority in the party at this time. Donaldson had emigrated to the US in 1923 and became heavily involved in the NPS and then the SNP. He returned to Scotland in 1936 and continued his support for the organisation, rising to Chairman in 1962, a post he occupied until 1969. He was a ‘sojourner’ rather than a permanent member of the diaspora. Donaldson, a journalist, became a member of the NPS in 1929. After he returned to Scotland in 1936 he took an active part in the SNP, rising to Chairman. His period of office was characterised by a rise in membership from 2,000 to 60,000 and an increase in the share of the vote in General Elections.

Muirhead corresponded with Donaldson in Detroit, in September of 1929, wanting to discuss things with interested parties during his intended visit ‘so that a live centre of Scottish Nationalism may quickly develop.’ Donaldson’s reply gives his early view of the difficulties of raising support amongst the diaspora. He had not had too much success in getting people for Muirhead to talk to in Detroit, but expected a better turnout in Rochester. He said ‘So far in this country Nationalism has not been able to make much impression.’ His reasons were given as follows. Firstly, there was ‘little or nothing in the Scottish newspapers sent here,’ secondly, there was ‘no international interest so Nationalism does not get into the US newspapers’; presumably reflecting the

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682 Acc. 6038/1/16, Elected Chair of the Executive Committee 20th April 1960. Biography in Acc. 6038/5, January file gives 1962 as the date of his starting as chair of the Party. Acc. 6038/1/18 confirms he was in post 1962. Mitchell 1996, p.207 gives no start date but states Willie Wolfe took over in 1969
683 Harper, 2003, p.283
684 Acc. 6038/5, January 1967
685 Acc. 6038/5, September 1967, membership was 60,000 claimed at the NEC meeting
686 Acc. 3721/74/669, letter from Muirhead to Donaldson 10th September 1929
687 Acc. 3721/74/669, reply to Muirhead, 30th September 1929
weakness, and therefore un-newsworthy nature, of nationalism in Scotland. Thirdly, ‘Scottish Societies are an obstacle…wrapped in a mutual worship’ ‘hugging old fictions of the greatness of Scotsmen in Scotland’\textsuperscript{688} He went on to claim that opposing this ‘Burns Club sentiment is a trying and thankless task’ and most who had been attracted to nationalism had given it up as hopeless. Fourthly, he confirmed in a later letter that the word Party ‘is most objectionable (in the US) as it is associated with Old Country politics’ and he used the name Nationalist Committee.\textsuperscript{689} There were only a few friends in Detroit, he claimed at that time and was able to give only three names for supporters in New York, despite having periodically mailed 1,000 Scots in the US.\textsuperscript{690} Donaldson wrote to eighty people inviting them to hear Muirhead and booked a small hall.\textsuperscript{691} This direct mailing may have been Donaldson’s way of circumventing the lack of interest of the Societies and Associations. Recall the reference to a supporter who claimed that success abroad would be dependent on success at home in Scotland. This has the appeal of common sense; the Scot abroad may well not pay heed to a movement in Scotland that had only 8,000 members in 1932.\textsuperscript{692}

By 1935, Donaldson was very disillusioned with the approach of the movement to reaching its goals. In a long letter to D. H. NcNeill, then on the Overseas Committee of the SNP, Donaldson complained that the movement had become less radical, more respectable and inept in by-elections. He complained that the SI had become too literary since the merger with the Scottish Party. He resigned in protest over the merger.\textsuperscript{693} He went on; ‘I’m in no frame of mind to attempt to do anything for the SNP and I think I am fairly representative.’ He was looking for a change in leadership and management.\textsuperscript{694}

Donaldson’s experience of running Nationalist branches overseas could be expected to influence his decisions about how the SNP gained its support whilst he ran it during the 1960s. However, apart from sending a list of 500 clan chiefs

\textsuperscript{688} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{689} Acc. 3721/74/669, Donaldson to Muirhead, 19\textsuperscript{th} November 1929
\textsuperscript{690} Ibid., reply to Muirhead, 30\textsuperscript{th} September 1929
\textsuperscript{691} Ibid., letter to Muirhead, 14\textsuperscript{th} October 1929
\textsuperscript{692} See Table XIV below.
\textsuperscript{693} Lynch, 2002, p.39
\textsuperscript{694} Acc. 3721/94/75, October 1935
in the US to Muirhead,\(^{695}\) there is no evidence of him using contacts he may have made in the US, or his experience of conditions for nationalists there to gain support in the diaspora. Equally there was no evidence of him opposing contact. In 1946 he was treasurer of the SNP, wrote of the parlous state of the finances but made no suggestion that they try to collect funds in the US.\(^{696}\)

From 1964 there was no constitutional bar to overseas Scots becoming SNP members\(^{697}\) and a report on the organisational structure of the SNP in 1963 did contain an overseas secretary, W. S. Orr, who appears to have held the role since 1960, when he was also convenor of the Finance Committee.\(^{698}\) It was not uncommon for SNP senior officials to have more than one role; Donaldson was both chair of the Executive and convenor of the Publicity Committee.\(^{699}\) Overseas secretary was not a post where the workload was considered great, although the report claimed that efforts were being made to boost it. The job was best carried out by someone who had an interest in it, but its lack of importance was emphasised by its relegation from the National Executive Council (NEC).\(^{700}\) Orr made few reports to the NEC, as evidenced by the minutes of meetings from that time. Apart from a comment that ‘the general expansion of the party has been reflected to some extent in increased overseas support,’\(^{701}\) archived minutes of a number of NEC meetings for 1963, 1964 and 1965 show no references of support from the diaspora or attempts to procure it.\(^{702}\)

In 1967, a member of the NEC, Drysdale, asked the committee to make a pack available to be sent to overseas members.\(^{703}\) This prompted the Organisation Committee being asked to review the functions and work of the overseas secretary. Orr’s report to the 33rd National Conference held in June 1967 recorded that ‘individual support has been forthcoming from overseas Scots,’\(^{704}\)

\(^{695}\) Acc. 3721/30, 5th December 1938  
\(^{696}\) Acc. 3721/30, December 1946  
\(^{697}\) Acc. 6038/5, Amended constitution June 1964  
\(^{698}\) Acc. 6038/1/16, Reports to the Annual Conference June 1960  
\(^{699}\) Acc. 6038/1/16, /18  
\(^{700}\) Acc. 6038/2, December 1963  
\(^{701}\) Acc. 6038/2, NEC minutes 16th August 1963  
\(^{702}\) Acc. 6038/2, NEC minutes for April and June 1963, January, February, March, May and June 1964 and March, April and June 1965  
\(^{703}\) Acc. 6038/5, Exec meeting 14th April 1967  
\(^{704}\) Acc. 6038/5, June 1967
and he anticipated increasing sympathy, saying ‘it is practically certain that
when the time comes to ask for the spontaneous support of the Scot overseas,
there will be a massive moral…’\textsuperscript{705} For the Conference, Orr shows optimism
that there is an untapped resource. However, when Orr resigned in April 1968
due to ill health, although his role as assistant national secretary was
immediately filled, his overseas secretary role was not.\textsuperscript{706}

During 1968, the Central Belt Publicity Committee had taken over the job of
communicating with overseas members. Minutes of the January meeting
indicated that there had been a rise in enquiries since the SNP’s Winnie Ewing
won the Hamilton by-election.\textsuperscript{707} The committee wrote to them all advising them
to stay in touch with the organisation through their local branch, that is the
branch nearest to their old Scottish home. The minutes of the meeting of the
committee on the 4\textsuperscript{th} February 1968 stated that 150 of these letters had been
written.\textsuperscript{708} Similarly the North East Area Publicity Committee was encouraged
by its chair, Provost Braid, that overseas members were becoming ‘more and
more important.’\textsuperscript{709} That being said, there was no mention of overseas
members in the meetings of the National Executive in either February or March,
with only a note in April to say that the overseas secretary had died.\textsuperscript{710}

The earlier comment that the Hamilton by-election had had some impact on
awareness abroad is borne out by the few letters received by Donaldson from
Scots abroad. There was an enquiry for some policy details from the Editor of
the \textit{Northern Advocate} in New Zealand. Donaldson’s reply was focussed on
answering the policy questions and he made no attempt to get the \textit{Advocate} to
sell the SNP to Scots there, even though the editor mentioned that he had been
forwarded the SI by ‘adherents’ in the country.\textsuperscript{711} A letter from R. L. Webster in
the Republic of South Africa, complained ‘on behalf of the Scottish Community’
about the Commons voting record of the SNP MP for Hamilton, stating that the
‘immature leftist posturing of the perennial undergraduate still remains,’ perhaps

\textsuperscript{705} Ibid., the word after moral is obliterated, so unreadable
\textsuperscript{706} Acc. 6038/6, Publicity Committee (Central Belt) meeting minutes 7\textsuperscript{th} April 1968
\textsuperscript{707} Acc. 6038/6, January file
\textsuperscript{708} Acc. 6038/6, February file
\textsuperscript{709} Acc. 6038/6, meeting 16\textsuperscript{th} March 1968
\textsuperscript{710} Acc. 6038/6, February March and April 1968 files
\textsuperscript{711} Acc. 6038/6, 15\textsuperscript{th} November 1967
because she had voted for the arms embargo to South Africa.\footnote{Acc. 6038/6, letter 16th December 1967} A letter from J. T. H. King in Natal stated he had read about the SNP in the *Natal Mercury* of Durban.\footnote{Ibid., letter 2nd December 1967} Donaldson also received a letter from W. T. Martin, an SNP activist, recommending that a Mr Young, a businessman in Toronto be contacted as ‘he would be of great use in building up support for the SNP in North America.’\footnote{Ibid., Letter 4th April 1969}

The increasing professionalism of the SNP during the 1960s brought organisational changes suitable for a mass membership political party.\footnote{Lynch, 2002, pp.93-4; Hassan, 2009, p.27} One of these changes was a Foreign Affairs Department, announced in the report of executive vice chairman for policy, J. H. D. Gair to the National Council, 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 1967.\footnote{Acc. 6038/6, December file} No mention was made of the Scottish diaspora in this announcement, despite there being potential advantage in liaising with prominent Scots abroad. None of the minutes of the meetings of this body examined from 1967 and 1968 made reference to the potential of such contacts.\footnote{Ibid., meetings 25th November 1967; 14th January 1968; 2nd February 1968; 17th March 1968} In drafting a manifesto in April 1968, there is no mention of Scots abroad.\footnote{Ibid., 10th April 1968} In draft notes for the ‘SNP and You’, a document designed to bring SNP positions to members and potential members, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Department, J. Picken, lists Scotland’s international friends as being in Scandinavia and the Baltic, as well as the Auld Alliance with France.\footnote{Ibid., 9th April 1968} A distinctly local European and historic view rather than one inspired by the diaspora.

Whilst no meaningful support appears to be forthcoming, the question of the Scots abroad never completely goes away for the SNP. A correspondent of Donaldson’s, a W. McDougall in Iceland claims the Scots in Canada alone ‘could get us our way’\footnote{Acc. 6038/5, April file} and he is invited to join the party and set up an overseas branch in Iceland by G. Wilson.\footnote{Acc. 6038/5, May file} He writes later to say he has
joined, but of a branch there is no indication.\textsuperscript{722} All in all, this summary shows Donaldson saw no reason to waver from the transactional business of constituency, elections and organisation.\textsuperscript{723}

With Donaldson as chairman no evidence of a meaningful engagement with the diaspora has emerged. The report of office bearers to the 34\textsuperscript{th} SNP Conference in June 1968, towards the end of Donaldson’s term as chairman, contains a report from the Publicity Committee that there are approximately 200 overseas members and that there are 20 information tapes in circulation amongst them.\textsuperscript{724} Add these numbers to the approximately 250 in the London branches,\textsuperscript{725} and the likely number of 450 looks very small against the approximate membership in Scotland of 100,000 given at the 1968 conference.\textsuperscript{726}

**London**

There was an active branch in London in the early 1960s, and a lively debate about how to use it between convenor MacDonald and Donaldson.\textsuperscript{727} A letter was composed by MacDonald to members of the SNP before the 1964 general election saying that the London members were 'strategically placed to harry and prod' Scottish MPs who didn't represent Scottish interests.\textsuperscript{728} In 1967 the London branch had set up an Overseas Press Committee.\textsuperscript{729} In November 1967, Wilson ordered an appeal amongst the London Scots to set up an office for Mrs Ewing after her election.\textsuperscript{730} A second branch was set up, the Bexley and North West Kent, for London activists who did not want to travel into London. These branches were visited in May 1968 by J. Lees, who wrote a report for the benefit of the NEC.\textsuperscript{731} The Bexley branch had 32 members and £20 in the bank.

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\textsuperscript{722} Acc. 6038/5, October file
\textsuperscript{723} Ibid., general correspondence.
\textsuperscript{724} Acc. 6038/6, 31\textsuperscript{st} May to 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 1968
\textsuperscript{725} Ibid., report 6\textsuperscript{th} May 1968
\textsuperscript{726} Ibid., May file, Conference reports
\textsuperscript{727} Acc. 6038/2, note from Kevin Macdonald to Donaldson
\textsuperscript{728} Ibid., July-December 1964
\textsuperscript{729} Acc. 6038/6, Foreign Affairs Department. meeting, 25\textsuperscript{th} November 1967
\textsuperscript{730} Ibid., note from G Wilson to AWD, 12\textsuperscript{th} November 1967
\textsuperscript{731} Ibid., 6038/6, report dated 6\textsuperscript{th} May 1968
The London branch was more substantial with 220 members but only had £10 in funds.

The members saw their function as the SNP’s representatives in London and overseas and that they were at the centre of things. They were disappointed that the SNP had no London office to support Mrs Ewing. They complained they did not have enough to do. Lees’s recommendation to the Executive was to encourage SNP organisations outside of Scotland, and that an Executive member should be given the job of liaising with them. However, he was clear that their role should be limited and the Party should have a separate central function in London. Muriel Gibson, an NEC member, was given the role. In 1969, an NEC meeting discussed twelve English branches and groups. However, only four replied to a suggestion by Gibson that they adopt a Scottish constituency through which to work; London, Bexley Heath, Liverpool and Weymouth.

**The Scottish National Party Association (SNPA)**

Eventually the SNP addressed the issue of non-Scottish branches by setting up an organisation to liaise with these members. It is to this organisation that the research now turns. Whilst there was little success in utilising the Scots abroad during Donaldson’s time as chairman, there was plenty of evidence of some engagement, with an interest in the work of the SNP by some Scots abroad. The convenor of the Policy Committee on Finance and Tax, W. T. Martin, wrote of a conversation with R. A. Young in Toronto. Young had emigrated in 1951 and owned businesses in Canada, England and Scotland. He thought there would be many in Canada that would support independence if they thought the SNP had sensible and responsible people in it. He asked to meet senior officials during a business trip.

The overseas secretary, W. S. Orr, told the Central Belt Publicity Committee in 1967; ‘It is hoped to cover the world by members’ contacts’ to help build the ‘foundations for a future Scottish government’ and to ‘also help party finance,’

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732 Acc. 6038/8, May Conference
733 Ibid., Gibson to the NEC of 14th February 1969
734 Ibid., note by Martin undated and copied to Donaldson, Ewing, Wolfe and a number of other officials. Filed with 1969 papers.
‘this aspect of party membership will be treated with priority and urgency.’\(^{735}\)
The success of Mrs. Ewing in the Hamilton by-election had resulted in many
enquiries. Both the Central Belt and North East Publicity committees made
positive statements about overseas membership.\(^{736}\) There was support for
campaigning abroad from a constituency in a resolution to the National
Council.\(^{737}\) In February of 1969 the SNP national organiser, John McAteer
wrote a letter to members headed ‘Recruitment - Overseas Members.’\(^{738}\) He
began, ‘The Party has members in New Zealand, Australia, USA, Canada,
Holland, Hong Kong and elsewhere and an increasing number of applications
to join flows into HQ every day.’ He went on to assert that ‘overseas members
can be of great value to the party’ and asked members to recruit overseas. This
was aimed at getting the Caledonian societies’ members on board, rather than
them being beholden to the hereditary leaders of Scotland who have ‘nothing in
common with the ordinary Scot.’ The letter finished with a greeting from the
125,000 members of the SNP to the countless thousands of overseas
supporters of Scottish freedom. This was presumably sent out as there was a
reply in July from Los Angeles.\(^{739}\)

The letter was from I. W. Mitchell. Its story reflected the reasons for earlier
failure. Mitchell, a member himself from Aberdeenshire, had tried to interest the
members of the Clan Gordon Association. Their reply was that they ‘don’t do
politics’ and added ‘we’re British.’ The local St. Andrews Society thought the
idea of Scottish independence amusing. His letters to the Los Angeles Times
were rarely printed and so he tried to keep the subject alive through the
classified columns. McAteer’s note on the subject to Donaldson reflected that
‘this will not surprise you since you must have had contact with Scottish
Societies in the States yourself.’\(^{740}\)

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\(^{735}\) Acc. 11987/29, minutes of the meeting of the Central Belt Publicity Committee, 1st October 1967
\(^{736}\) Acc.11987/30, minutes of the Central Belt Publicity Committee 3rd March 1968; North East
Publicity Committee, 16th March 1968
\(^{737}\) Acc. 11987/31, resolution by Kelvingrove branch, 1st March 1969
\(^{738}\) Acc. 6038/8
\(^{739}\) Ibid.
\(^{740}\) Ibid., letter to McAteer 11th July 1969. Note to Donaldson is undated
Also in February 1969 there was a letter to HQ members. It gives the address of an Auckland, New Zealand branch and three English branches are mentioned. It claimed ‘the overseas department of the Party has been strengthened.’ A memo from McAteer to Wilson later in 1969 indicates some ambition to exploit the diaspora; the overseas membership secretary should establish contact with Scottish societies in all countries where they exist, the grip of the establishment on the US organisation should be challenged. There should be special status for active overseas members. There was concern that membership of a foreign political party could threaten citizenship, so this would be clarified with the relevant overseas governments. Shortly after, Dr David Stephenson was appointed the overseas membership secretary but he was given no secretarial assistance. In a reflection of the success of the ‘1,000 Club’ in domestic fundraising, he suggested they established an overseas version, but there is no evidence that this proceeded.

It is clear that this activity did not produce many new members overseas. There is a list of SNP members in the EEC. There were thirty members listed in 1976, nearly half of whom were in the Netherlands, Belgium or Germany. In 1976, the SNP had only 14 members listed in the US. However, a branch was founded in Toronto in August 1974.

According to two reports written in March and April 1976, just prior to the SNPA being formed, only in Canada and Australia were there sufficient branches to form a country association. The case of Canada is well described in these reports by Norman Allen, a supporter from Ottawa. His report on the ‘Patterns and Prospects for the SNP in Canada’ offered a ‘Canadian Model’ for the National Council’s deliberations on the establishment of an SNP Association to bring together all overseas branches. Allan looked ahead to

741 Ibid.
742 Acc. 11987/31, McAteer to Wilson, 5th August 1969
743 Ibid., NEC, 8th August 1969
744 Ibid., NEC 14th November 1969
745 Acc.10754/11, list dated 11th march 1976
746 Acc.10754/23, 7th July 1976, letter to Stewart, membership secretary, from Allan in Canada listing US members
747 Acc. 10754/24
approval for the founding of the SNPA. He provided a list of branches in Canada with ‘round figures’ numbers of members, reproduced in table IX below.

**Table IX: Canadian Membership 1976**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Canada</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Acc. 10754/24, Report by Norman Allan dated 9th March 1976

Of the 70 non-branch members, around 20 were individuals who had been notified to Toronto by Edinburgh, so were prospects. In New Zealand, Mr. Lee in Otago wrote to Muriel Gibson, SNP national secretary in Edinburgh, to suggest forming a New Zealand branch, so there was a little interest. In October 1976 the SNP founded the SNPA to bring together all overseas branches. Minutes of an earlier meeting on 25th July 1976 had noted that individuals needed to be subject to party discipline and so had to be within the SNP. The SNP recognised it had support outside of Scotland, but had to control any response such supporters might give to the local press. The SNPA was formally affiliated to the SNP at the National Council meeting in December 1976.

The constitution of the SNPA stated it was to ‘provide an organisation for persons out with the United Kingdom who wish to support the aims of the SNP primarily, but also wish to further Scottish interests and promote goodwill.’ Muriel Gibson, SNP membership secretary, thought it an inadequate response to the need to accommodate overseas members without having the difficulty of

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749 Acc. 10754/23
751 Acc. 10754/17
752 Acc. 10754/24
753 Acc. 10754/17, extract from minutes
754 Ibid., 28th October 1976
their joining a foreign political party. There was confusion over a recent change in the SNP constitution which had appeared to try to exclude all those not on the Scottish electoral register, even though there was a long standing London branch. The impression left by the correspondence is one of benign neglect of members or aspirants outside of Scotland. However, there were genuine fears about the impact of distant members on publicity.

A discussion paper by David Ross dated 17th September 1977 is helpful in understanding the SNP’s approach to the diaspora in America. The paper recognised the importance of the US to Scotland, second only to England in foreign relations terms and recognised that party policy should reflect that. Caution was added with regard to the support the Irish-Americans were seen to be giving to the Republicans in their violent struggle in Northern Ireland. It was acknowledged that ‘a vital element in any strategy must be to avoid at all costs situations where unfavourable comparisons can be made with any other group or nation.’ There was concern that the Americans could be very enthusiastic and therefore difficult to contain. Additionally it was recognised that federal laws made contributions to foreign political parties difficult, something that had been made clear to Muirhead by his US correspondents many years earlier.

The paper laid out the SNP objectives in the US at that time; influence and motivate in the widest sense those, particularly the elite, who can assist Scotland in achieving independence. To build up a body of committed and informed support in this, maintain the interest and support of those who wish to make a contribution to the Party through a branch of the SNP. The paper also recommended the ‘paramount interests of control’ in that the exercising of executive authority in the US should be tightly supervised from Scotland. Any countrywide membership that existed in the US would have a membership fee and be ‘entirely passive.’ Two months later, a letter to Johnstone in the US from SNP Chairman Wolfe set out his expectations of a US association. The

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755 Acc. 10754/23, 22nd October 1976
756 Ibid., 18th October 1976 from David Stevenson to Wolfe and Gibson
757 Acc.10754/23, see Ross’s paper; Acc. 10754/22, letter 2nd November 1977 from Wolfe, SNP Chairman to Johnstone of the US association urging him to avoid association with the IRA
758 See chapter three.
759 Acc. 10754/21, SNPA correspondence 1978/80
main aim, he said, was to ‘seek influence which is sympathetic to us’ by ‘establishing a non-public network of SNP sympathetic contacts-no PR-no public organisation-you (Johnstone) as SNP rep as the channel between such people and me’ (Wolfe).\(\text{760}\)

Canada, particularly the Toronto branch, was regarded by the SNPA as quite well organised.\(\text{761}\) There was a Canadian Association which organised the branch activity. Wolfe visited Canada and the US towards the end of 1976 and endorsed the view that other countries should organise along the lines of Canada.\(\text{762}\) The role suggested for the Canadian Association was to display solidarity with the aims of the SNP; to act as a PR agent in the country, creating publicity and propaganda for the SNP cause, to cement good relations between Canada and Scotland and to raise such funds as were required to support its own general purposes.\(\text{763}\) The inconsistency of ‘acting as a PR agent’ with Wolfe’s advice to Johnstone is noteworthy. Recruitment was best achieved through local Scottish associations or by newspaper advertisements.\(\text{764}\) These elements of the role of the SNPA overseas were incorporated into the constitutions of the Associations set up for Canada, US, Australia, and New Zealand.\(\text{765}\) The membership policy of the SNPA of Australia was very inclusive, open as it was to all those over 16 who endorsed the aims of the Association.\(\text{766}\)

The fact that there had been some interest from potential supporters outside the UK was reflected in the constitution of the SNP on 26\(^{th}\) May 1977, when it was amended to cater for this. By this time New York and Virginia branches had already been set up.\(\text{767}\) This amendment was forwarded to the convener of the International Council of the SNPA, Michael Spens, on 1\(^{st}\) September that year.\(\text{768}\) Spens was born in Windsor but had Scottish ancestry. He was a diaspora returnee.\(\text{769}\) Spens did not devote his time solely to this role; he was

\(\text{760}\) Acc. 10754/22, letter dated 2\(^{nd}\) November 1979
\(\text{761}\) Acc. 10754/17
\(\text{762}\) Acc. 10754/24, note by Allan dated 7\(^{th}\) April 1976
\(\text{763}\) Ibid., SNPA in Canada Constitution and Rules, III, 3
\(\text{764}\) Ibid., note by Allan dated 7\(^{th}\) April 1976
\(\text{765}\) Ibid., New Zealand constitution 6\(^{th}\) August 1976; Australian constitution 28\(^{th}\) October 1976; International Council of the SNPA meeting 11\(^{th}\) March 1978 describing the US Association
\(\text{766}\) Ibid.
\(\text{767}\) Acc. 10754/21
\(\text{768}\) Acc. 10754/17
\(\text{769}\) The Scotsman, 7\(^{th}\) May 2014, Obituary.
the prospective parliamentary candidate for Orkney and Shetland and the
convenor for the Fund Raising Committee. Running the SNPA was not
regarded as a full time job. Spens himself allotted one day a week to it.\footnote{770}

The SNPA minutes dated 27\textsuperscript{th} February 1977 included a London
representative, but an amendment to include the non-Scottish parts of the UK
was refused by the NEC. The role of non-Scottish branches was to influence
others, not speak for the SNP,\footnote{771} a recognition of overseas interest. A note from
Spens to a prospective member in Atlanta, G. L. McKelvey, stated that the
Association was established to serve the growing number of overseas
supporters.\footnote{772} However some felt the SNPA was not going well, due to the
commitments of its secretary, failure to attend meetings and confusion about its
aims and functions.\footnote{773}

The Association used proxy members to represent those overseas who could
not regularly attend the International Council of SNPA. By November 1977, this
had 12 of its 15 positions filled. There were five residents overseas and the
remainder were SNP nominees or proxies. The minutes of the meeting that first
discussed Dr. MacIntyre’s visit to the Canadian SNPA Conference included
attendees such as a US proxy, W. F. Macdonald, and the proxy member for
South Africa, Ian Hosack.\footnote{774} SNPA delegates were to be invited to the 1978
National Conference.\footnote{775}

A mixed picture about the activities of these overseas branches emerges from
the correspondence. A letter by Macdonald to Spens on 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1978
claimed Johnstone in New York felt neglected, whereas Toronto ‘seems pretty
well organised.’\footnote{776} Later, MacDonald asked for some SNP literature and
merchandise so he could forward it on.\footnote{777} The Canadian Association held its
first conference in May 1977.\footnote{778} Overseas members would attend meetings of

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{770}{Acc. 10754/22, letter to Wolfe 19\textsuperscript{th} June 1977}
  \item \footnote{771}{Acc. 10754/17}
  \item \footnote{772}{Acc. 10754/21}
  \item \footnote{773}{Acc. 10754/22, Unsigned letter to Wolfe dated 10\textsuperscript{th} March 1977}
  \item \footnote{774}{Ibid., 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 1978}
  \item \footnote{775}{Acc. 10754/24, International Council of the SNPA 4\textsuperscript{th} December 1977}
  \item \footnote{776}{Acc. 10754/17}
  \item \footnote{777}{Ibid., letter 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1978}
  \item \footnote{778}{Acc. 10754/24, Announcement date stamped 26\textsuperscript{th} April 1977}
\end{itemize}
the International Council when they were in the UK and Norman Allan wrote to
the SNPA on 12th June 1978 to suggest that they arrange a meeting to coincide
with his visit later that year.\textsuperscript{779}

Letters from Sydney and Adelaide in March and April of 1978 claimed they had
15 and 16 members apiece. Tomala, of the Sydney branch, asked to be
appointed a spokesman for the SNPA of Australia to State Governments and
the press. However, in a later letter Tomala complained to the International
Council that both he and McGill of the Adelaide group felt neglected. They had
not received copies of the newsletter, \textit{Saltire}, and there was a good chance the
branches would close if the situation was not fixed.\textsuperscript{780}

There were similar issues in New Zealand. The New Zealand Association had
sent its draft constitution to the National Secretary of the SNP in August 1976,
so was probably founded around that time.\textsuperscript{781} In June 1978 a letter from Donald
Lee of the University of Otago in New Zealand complained he had had no
\textit{Saltires}. In his reply Spens admitted the \textit{Saltire} was dogged with problems and
offered to send \textit{Contact}, the SNP’s parliamentary newsletter, instead. Lee had
made some efforts with the Otago press and Spens complimented him on his
efforts. The issues with the \textit{Saltire} continued. The editor, Stuart West, wrote to
Spens in 1978 and admitted its ‘days were numbered’ when Canada said they
did not want it. He estimated only 60 people worldwide read it.\textsuperscript{782}

Ian Hosack wrote to Spens in 1978 giving the SNPA contact in South Africa as
Iain Ramsay and asked Spens to send Ramsay copies of the \textit{Saltire} so that he
could photostat copies for his members.\textsuperscript{783} A potential member, J. M. Weir,
wrote in July 1978 to say he was going to South Africa for three years, and
asked to be put in touch with the party there.\textsuperscript{784} There was discussion of a
European SNP Association, but this did not progress.\textsuperscript{785}

\textsuperscript{779} Acc. 10754/17, letter to Spens
\textsuperscript{780} Ibid., letter dated 5th July 1978
\textsuperscript{781} Acc. 10754/19
\textsuperscript{782} Acc. 10754/22, letter dated 12th February 1978
\textsuperscript{783} Acc. 10754/17, 21st January 1978
\textsuperscript{784} Ibid., 27th July 1978
\textsuperscript{785} Acc. 10754/24, International Council meeting of 20th December 1978
A picture emerges of branches with limited membership in the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with mixed support from the SNP through the International council of the SNPA. No summary of members for each year has been located, so the overall number of members outside Scotland is unclear. However numbers may be deduced from the minutes of meetings of the SNPA International Council. These are summarised in Table X.

**Table X: Approximate SNP Membership outside Scotland, 1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>265</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HQ members</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside UK</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>450</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>715</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Acc. 10754/24, minutes of meeting 4th December 1977, Acc. 10754/22, letter from Mr. West dated 14th November 1977.

At the end of 1974 the SNP had a total of 460 branches, and member numbers of 125,000 claimed in 1968. Added to their limited numbers, the passive role of those abroad lessened their impact. Although prior to the General Election in May 1979, the International Council noted that it was planning to circulate relevant material to leading SNPA activists in other countries, there was no intention on the part of the SNP to allow these overseas branches any official status as spokesmen.

Michael Spens visited Canada between 24th November and 1st December 1978. In a summary of his visit he observed that a very fine network of activists, committed and influential, existed across Canada, and ‘we must USE it properly.’ Spens was appointed secretary of the SNPA by the NEC in October 1979, so the organisation was still in existence then. A letter from the

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786 Lynch, 2002, pp.131 and 109
787 Acc. 7295/35, 30th March 1979
788 Acc. 10754/24, report by Spens dated 12th December 1978. Capitals in the original
national secretary, Ian Murray, asked for a report on the current situation.\textsuperscript{789} However, Spens resigned in September 1980, blaming pressure of work.\textsuperscript{790} The need to have control over Party commentary meant the overseas branches were constrained to be politically passive and could not act as official spokesmen, the only other way the overseas supporters could help a peaceful party in a foreign country was through financial support. Early post-war records of contributions are sparse.

Amongst the archived correspondence for 1965-89 there is only one file covering the fundraising committee of the SNP\textsuperscript{791} and this only covers a small part of the period under review, from 1976 to 1979. In meetings of the Fund Raising Committee, for example the meetings of 1\textsuperscript{st} December 1976 and 13\textsuperscript{th} January 1977, there was no mention of fund raising from overseas branches.\textsuperscript{792} However, in 1977, Spens was also appointed convenor of the Fund Raising Committee. Consideration of overseas sources of funding was thereafter on the agenda of the committee.\textsuperscript{793} In a note dated 15\textsuperscript{th} May 1978 Spens says 'the International Council, (of the) SNPA, has in view other sources of funds within its own remit and will be making its own efforts to raise additional support.'\textsuperscript{794} As with the pre-war SHRA and SNP, fundraising was vital but appeared to perform badly. The annual report of the Fund Raising Committee written by Kenneth Fee for 1979 said performance since 1975 was the best 'because there was little to beat'.\textsuperscript{795} Fund raising from abroad featured in the minutes of the meetings of January, March and April of 1979, with no specific news of how this would be done and where the funds would come from.\textsuperscript{796} Spens referred to the failure in fund raising in his resignation letter.\textsuperscript{797}

Part of the problem lay in the constitutions of the overseas groups which did not task them with raising funds other than to fulfil their own needs. In the case of

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{789} Ibid., letter dated 22\textsuperscript{nd} October 1979
\textsuperscript{790} Acc. 10754/23, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1980
\textsuperscript{791} Acc. 10754/4
\textsuperscript{792} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{793} Acc. 10754/4, agenda, 11\textsuperscript{th} October 1977, item 3(b) 'Consideration of overseas sources of funds'
\textsuperscript{794} Acc. 10754/4
\textsuperscript{795} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{796} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{797} Acc. 10754/23, letter to Iain Murray 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1980
\end{footnotes}
the Canadian document, the original wording to raise funds ‘for the assistance of the SNP in Scotland’ was amended by the Scottish organisation to read ‘to support its own general purposes and organisation.’\textsuperscript{798} The overseas branches were expected to fund visits of SNP delegates to their countries, as Toronto did for the visit of Wolfe and Ewing to Canada in 1976.\textsuperscript{799} However, Allan’s note of 7\textsuperscript{th} April 1976 makes no mention of fundraising.\textsuperscript{800}

The draft constitutions of the SNPA (28\textsuperscript{th} October 1976), the New Zealand SNPA (6\textsuperscript{th} August 1976) and the Australian SNPA (28\textsuperscript{th} October 1976) all make reference to raising funds for local needs rather than for the SNP in Scotland. Amendments to these drafts are all procedural and do not change the objectives around fundraising.\textsuperscript{801} Minutes of an SNPA meeting on 25\textsuperscript{th} July 1976 do not refer to fundraising, nor is there any reference in the January, February or December editions of the 1977 Saltire. David Ross, in his discussion paper on the US, anticipates no direct funding for the SNP, just local subscriptions.\textsuperscript{802} Various minutes of the meetings of the International Council of the SNPA contain no reference to fundraising.\textsuperscript{803}

In March 1977, West wrote to Wolfe with his assessment of the first few months of operation of the SNPA. His conclusion was that it was moving too slowly. He attributed this to the Party’s uncertainty as to the role and status of the SNPA, the workload of the International Secretary, and insufficient meetings of the International Council (four in number in ten months, one of which was not quorate.) He felt that if the organisation was more business-like in its approach, this might encourage overseas donations although he did ‘realise that fundraising is not a primary aim of the association.’\textsuperscript{804} There can be no surprise then that the SNPA was unable to raise funds overseas, as it was not constitutionally bound to do so and was poorly organised.

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{798} Acc. 10754/24, SNPA agenda dated 30\textsuperscript{th} August 1976}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{799} Ibid., see Norman Allan’s report on Patterns and Prospects in Canada}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{800} Ibid., Allen’s 7\textsuperscript{th} April 1976 report}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{801} Ibid.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{802} Ibid.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{803} Ibid., minutes of meetings held 17\textsuperscript{th} September 1977, 4\textsuperscript{th} December 1977, 11\textsuperscript{th} March 1978, 26\textsuperscript{th} May 1978 and 20\textsuperscript{th} December 1978}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{804} Acc. 10754/22, 10\textsuperscript{th} March 1977}
\end{footnotesize}
Towards the end of the 1970s the SNP showed many signs of an organisation short of cash. There were plans to cut costs at Head Office,\textsuperscript{805} and predictions that its deficit would be £25,000 in 1980.\textsuperscript{806} The need was therefore great, but the fundraising efforts did not exploit the diaspora for funds. In 1980 a trip to study the US presidential election, whilst considered worthwhile, could not be funded. There was no reference in the correspondence to asking the US SNPA for help.\textsuperscript{807}

Confidential income estimates for 1980-81 have no specific reference to income from SNPAs other than £1,000 from HQ subscriptions out of a total of £76,400.\textsuperscript{808} The last reference to the SNPA in the General Business Committee (GBC) correspondence archive is a suggestion from the Bothwell constituency association that they be allowed to ‘twin’ with overseas branches for fundraising purposes. The national secretary in his reply intimated that the GBC had given some thought to overseas fundraising.\textsuperscript{809} Later a branch suggested a delegation go to Georgia, US, to raise money at a big clan gathering. The idea was rejected, as the SNP were not keen to involve themselves with such gatherings as they had a British orientation and had not responded in the past. Later in 1982 there was an assertion that there was every intention of the GBC writing to ‘Americans with Scottish names’ to raise funds, and the intention is again repeated in a note a year later.\textsuperscript{810} No mention of the SNPA is made.

In conclusion, although some overseas branches were established in the 1970s, the SNPA remained a very small part of the SNP in terms of both numbers of members and impact. Indeed its impact was so low that only six years after its founding it was not considered by the GBC in its fundraising efforts. It is appropriate that Spens has the last word in this assessment of the SNPA; ‘this is an excellent organisation in principle, but I believe it will require more resources and more two-way communication from the overseas

\textsuperscript{805} Acc. 10754/6, 26\textsuperscript{th} January 1978
\textsuperscript{806} Ibid., 3\textsuperscript{rd} January 1979
\textsuperscript{807} Ibid., 22\textsuperscript{nd} September 1980
\textsuperscript{808} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{809} Ibid., letter to Fiona Rice from N MacCallum, national secretary 10\textsuperscript{th} August 1981
\textsuperscript{810} Ibid., letters 20\textsuperscript{th} August 1982, 17\textsuperscript{th} September 1982, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1983 (fundraising suggestions from Pollock Branch) and the 16\textsuperscript{th} September 1983 reply
Associations to succeed continuously.\textsuperscript{811} There had been no meetings for some time and members had resigned as they could see no point in meeting.\textsuperscript{812} The reply to this letter gives no intimation of how the organisation would continue,\textsuperscript{813} although the Canadian organisation held conferences in 1980, and there was some further correspondence that year.\textsuperscript{814}

**The Irish Diaspora Engagement during the Ulster Conflict**

The previous chapter referred to the support for Irish nationalism from the Irish diaspora in the US and Canada. Although the Irish had had their independence for some years by the time of the electoral rise of the SNP, the outstanding issue for Republicans was that the island of Ireland was not united. The six counties of Ulster were still in the UK. In 1967 the demands of civil rights activists proved critical in triggering the outbreak of a bloody conflict in the province.\textsuperscript{815} Although in the immediate post-war period there had been some vocal support in the US for the Protestant Unionist position in Northern Ireland, Irish Catholic Nationalism was more readily marketable to conservative and richer Irish-Americans.\textsuperscript{816}

Founded in 1970 by an IRA veteran, the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) was the most prominent organisation within the republican support network in America.\textsuperscript{817} The group’s fund raising was claimed to benefit the families of imprisoned Provisional IRA (PIRA) volunteers. Noraid sent an average of $200,000 per annum to the PIRA between 1971 and 1994.\textsuperscript{818} Other sources claim between $3 and $5 million were raised.\textsuperscript{819} Noraid became increasingly involved in publicity campaigns and at one stage organised a tour by American relatives of dying hunger strikers, greatly increasing the flow of dollars to Noraid collections.\textsuperscript{820} Irish Republicanism relied heavily on funding from the US and although Irish Canadians lacked the financial muscle of their US counterparts,

\textsuperscript{811} Acc. 10754/23, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1980
\textsuperscript{812} Acc. 10754/23, letter to Iain Murray 3\textsuperscript{rd} September 1980
\textsuperscript{813} Ibid., 8\textsuperscript{th} September Murray to Spens
\textsuperscript{814} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{815} Peatling, 2005, p.55
\textsuperscript{816} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{817} Wilson, 1994, p.41
\textsuperscript{818} Ibid., quoting financial reports filed with the Justice Department
\textsuperscript{819} Byman, 2005, p.246
\textsuperscript{820} Wilson, p.42
there was support for the movement. This remittance and support performance made a complete contrast to that of the Scottish diaspora.

There was never any Scottish equivalent of Noraid, and the Scottish nationalist movement had a very low profile in the US. The SNP was of course very aware of this fundraising effort, and the issues it caused with both British and US governments. The claim that the funds were for the relatives of imprisoned republicans no doubt served to circumvent restrictions on contributions to non-US political parties. The non-violent nature of the SNP’s struggle left that door closed. The support of Irish-Americans for the separatist republican movement was not only financial. There was also the apparent application of soft power.

Both the Irish and Scots appear culturally attractive to the Americans. Only the Irish state could have demonstrated policies, although both groups could demonstrate values. Neither could directly influence the US through hard power, although the PIRA were not afraid to use it to influence the British. There was an attempt by the Scottish Nationalists to set the agenda not only of the United Nations, but of the US Congress, to be examined later. Before that, the success of the Irish in influencing US policy makers is analysed.

Irish America and Northern Ireland

The political relationship between the United States and Ireland is one which has been mediated by generations of emigration from Ireland, creating an organic link. For two centuries Irish-Americans have sought to influence the politics of Ireland by providing assistance to political or underground organisations or by persuading the American Government to intervene. Yet the US also has an important diplomatic relationship with the United Kingdom, of which Northern Ireland is a part, sometimes referred to as a special relationship. Because the US had friendly relations with both the UK and Ireland, its diplomatic approach was to stay out of the conflict in Northern

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821 Peatling, 2005, p.55
822 Sim, 2011b, p.177
823 Acc. 10754/22, 2nd November 1977, Wolfe to Johnstone
824 Cochrane, 2007, p.217
825 O’Clery, 1996, p.1
826 Calvoescoressi, 1987, p.175
Ireland. However, some prominent Irish-American politicians did get involved. Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a resolution to the US Senate calling for the withdrawal of British Troops. Further, US administrations have periodically taken an interest in the Northern Ireland situation and not treated it wholly as a domestic issue for the UK. Two examples of this follow.

The activities of Noraid have been described earlier in the context of supporting the republican fight in Northern Ireland. The Irish National Caucus was vociferous in its criticism of UK policy in Northern Ireland. This body subjected Congress to effective lobbying, one outcome of which was the establishment of an ad hoc committee on Irish Affairs in the House of Representatives. Further, throughout the 1980s the Caucus promoted the MacBride principles of fair employment in Northern Ireland. This was opposed by the UK government and Ulster Unionist politicians, but several US states adopted the principles and forced US companies to apply them. This resulted in a change of strategy by the UK Government, who in 1989 was forced to bring in its own Fair Employment Act. The relative success of this action by the Caucus illustrates the impact of Irish-American civil society on Northern Ireland. The Caucus did not have the power to compel the UK government to accept these principles, but they appeared to use soft power to engage in successful persuasion.

While the British Government recognised that a small number of Irish-Americans made considerable financial contributions to the PIRA, the activities of Irish-American groups were a very minor factor in its decisions on Northern Ireland policy. However this was not the case in 1979, when there was considerable evidence that there were policy responses to American pressure. In the mid-1970s the nature of the PIRA changed from being supported by acquiescence from the Catholic population to a cell based terrorist

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827 Cochrane, 2007, p.217
828 Guelke, 1984, p.29
829 Cochrane, 2007, p.218
830 Guelke, 1984, pp.32-33
831 Cochrane, 2007, p.218
832 Ibid., pp. 218-219
833 Guelke, 1984, p.28
834 Ibid., p.28
organisation dependent on external sources of support and income. Recall that one of these sources of funds was the US.

Support in the US came from the poorer city areas and these communities wielded some influence through the House of Representatives. A group of politicians including Kennedy, the ‘Four Horsemen’, took an interest in Northern Ireland. Their influence had lain behind President Carter apparently treating the situation in Northern Ireland as a legitimate concern for US foreign policy. In 1979, as a result of pressure from the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs, the US government suspended the sale of handguns and ammunition to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) on the grounds of violation of human rights. The UK government hoped that the Northern Ireland secretary calling a conference of Northern Ireland’s four political parties was seen as something that would meet US Congressional approval.

The UK government was concerned that the issue would become a factor in the 1980 presidential contest, particularly as Kennedy was seen as a potential contender for the Democratic nomination. There was concern that a hunger strike in ‘H’ block, part of a prison, would lead to more sanctions like the RUC arms embargo. Part of the Democratic platform spoke of ending the division of the Irish people, but the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iran embassy siege ensured the limelight was elsewhere and the candidates did not take the issue up. President Reagan’s approach was one of non-intervention and the influence of the Irish lobby declined whilst he was in power.

Two examples have been presented of the soft power of Irish-Americans leading to changes in UK government policy. Within the same time frame, an organisation called Scotland-UN (S-UN) was failing to get any support from the same House of Representatives. At this time, it is clear, there were no Scots American politicians forming a cabal like the Four Horsemen, there was no Scottish National Caucus, no interest groups in the US willing or able to use

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835 Senator ‘Tip’ O’Neill, Governor Hugh Carey, Senator Daniel Moynihan and Senator Edward Kennedy
836 Guelke, 1984, p.33
837 Ibid.
838 Ibid., p.36
839 Ibid., pp.36-37
840 Ibid., p.38
soft power close to the hub of government. The phenomenon of Tartan Day was some years in the future.

**Scotland-UN, March 1979-Autumn 1980**

Before the 1979 Devolution referendum the S-UN group was formed to urge support for Scottish self-determination, this time focussed upon appealing to international bodies; the United Nations and the Council of Europe. It is the appeal to the United Nations that is of interest in this analysis, as it included an appeal to the US Congress that invoked the contribution of the Scots abroad to the establishment and success of the US. The body was active intermittently until the early twenty-first century, claiming amongst other things that its submissions to the Council of Europe were responsible for putting Scottish self-determination on to the New Labour Manifesto.\(^{841}\)

Whereas some of its members were SNP, for example John McGill, this was not a party but a pressure group. Its constitution made it clear that it would ‘concentrate its activities on the international scene.’ However, there is no mention of leveraging the support of the Scots abroad.\(^{842}\) A claim of rights to Scottish self-determination was sent to the Director of the Human Rights division at the United Nations in New York. This had a limited demand. The Director was asked to search for a precedent where the UN had become involved in the internal affairs of a member nation. Failing that, he was asked to let Scotland be the precedent and ‘consider our case.’\(^{843}\)

A letter was sent to all members of the US Congress. This included comments on the 20 million or so people of Scottish descent in the US and the contributions of Scots to the Declaration of Independence. It reminded Congressmen of the ‘considerable debt that the US owes to Scotland’ in respect of the formation of the US.\(^{844}\) It asked for their support to end the ‘remote colonial rule of Scotland’, and claimed they had the ‘right to expect the

\(^{841}\) Acc. 12735/1
\(^{842}\) Acc. 12735/6
\(^{843}\) Acc. 12735/4
\(^{844}\) Ibid.
support of the Congress. A letter was sent to Ronald Reagan in December 1980.

The substance of the Claim of Right was a petition signed by thousands of Scots which was submitted with the letter to the UN. No number of signatures was given in the submission, nor is there any given in the archive of the S-UN movement. There is however, a file of 1390 signatories which the archive asserts were received too late to be submitted. The Claim of Right was also sent to 233 UN ambassadors, many Scottish newspapers, a Society of Arts and Culture in Massachusetts and a lady in Toronto. There was no attempt to engage the help of influential Scots in the US directly as sponsors, either in Congress or the UN. In May 1980 the submission to the UN was acknowledged, with a note that it would be copied to the British Government, in accordance with UN protocol. The case was presented by Brenda Carson of S-UN to UNHCR in Geneva in Autumn 1980. There were hints at confidential diplomatic manoeuvres, but what this refers to is unclear.

The appeal to Congress invoking the Scottish diaspora in the US is of interest to this enquiry. There appears to have been little other contact with US Scots. Two letters of support from Florida and British Columbia mark the sum of indirect support, and of the surviving signatories to the Claim of Right, only 55 of 1390 were not from Scotland. This unsuccessful attempt to influence the UN and Congress to intervene in the case for Scottish self-determination contrasts remarkably with the actions of the Irish diaspora during the Northern Irish conflict.

Summary

The chapter covered the second of the two time periods to be analysed and in doing so has examined the engagement of the SNP with the Scottish diaspora. The diaspora was refreshed by considerable net emigration. During the period there was a prominent returnee involved at the highest level of the organisation,

845 Ibid.
846 Acc. 12735/7
847 Acc. 12735/2
848 Acc. 12735/6
849 Acc. 12735/1
850 Acc. 12735/2, eight of these were Indian nationals
Arthur Donaldson. However, no doubt partly because of his own experience in the US, Donaldson correctly gauged the lack of interest abroad and did not encourage the diaspora to support the nationalists in a meaningful way, despite there being a constant awareness of the possibility of support by having an overseas secretary in the Party. There was an active London branch whose existence was treated with detachment. At the end of Donaldson’s tenure there were approximately 450 overseas and English members. The Party’s priorities were to win votes in Scotland and seats in Westminster. Even so, during the 1970s, at a time when the SNP had 11 MPs at Westminster, an association was set up by the party to co-ordinate the overseas branches and members. Despite several branches being established, they were deliberately constrained in their involvement without even a role in fundraising.

Once again the Irish diaspora proved successful not only in fundraising, but apparently also in the apparent application of soft power. Just why the Scottish diaspora was indifferent to the nationalist project in its homeland will be the subject of chapter six. Before that the analysis turns to the performance of the diaspora in the UK parliament during the debates of the Bills to promote devolution in Scotland.

851 Acc. 6038/9, Chairman’s reports for National Committee 6th December 1969
Chapter Five: Home Rule and Devolution at Westminster

This chapter examines a part of the diaspora in England and Wales, Scottish MPs in the Westminster Parliament. During the period researched, many attempts were made in Parliament to legislate for self-government for Scotland. Their chronology falls roughly into two parts, 1889 to 1927 and 1975 to 1978. During the first period, these were private members bills or motions. During the later period a Government introduced the legislation. It must be recalled, however, that for the greater part of the twentieth century the two main British parties, Labour and Conservative, have attempted to suppress the territorial dimension in national politics.  

As a general observation to this research, it should be noted that there are ways other than speeches in parliament for MPs to make their positions known to ministers. It is not surprising that backbenchers should raise matters privately with ministers, or their PPS, when to do so in the House or in committee might expose opposition to their party’s policies. Factors such as how well the member knows the minister, the member’s seniority and the seriousness of the topic are significant. Private meetings can take place, with varying degrees of formality, the outcomes of which are difficult to judge. An MP’s loyalty to his party’s position on a bill will be enforced by compliance through the Whips. However identification with the party and its norms are a stronger influence. Constituency concerns are also a powerful influencer of an MP’s position.

The debates on UK membership of the EEC, roughly contemporary to the period of the 1970s Devolution debates, highlighted the degree to which public issues may cut across party lines. Considerable cross-party cooperation exists at the backbench level on a formalised and regular basis in a wide range of all-party committees and groups. Whilst only a small proportion of these

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852 Keating and Jones, 1991, p.313  
853 Parliamentary Private Secretary; a civil servant  
854 Brand, 1992, pp.33-4  
855 Ibid., pp.34-5  
856 Ibid., pp.27-9  
857 Richardson and Kimber, 1971, p.339  
858 Ibid.
are extensively active, they demonstrate the ability of backbenchers to cooperate across party boundaries.\textsuperscript{859} This is relevant to the question of this chapter, which tries to demonstrate that the Scots abroad in Parliament in England appeared to shrink from this in the passage of the Scotland and Wales and Scotland Bills in the House.

**Significance of the Debates**

The importance of parliamentary activity was recognised and results of votes in the Commons were often published by the SHRA.\textsuperscript{860} The SNP advanced its own candidates for election. Without active support in Parliament and of political parties, home rule or independence could not be achieved by constitutional means. Relevant to the earlier debates in the chronology, the first meeting of the 1924 Scottish National Convention affirmed its determination to ‘use every constitutional means’ to bring control of Scotland’s affairs to Scotland.\textsuperscript{861} The actions of the legislators in Parliament were therefore very important to the supporters of home rule and independence. Likewise the support of political parties was crucial to the success of legislation. Up to 1914, the Liberal party was the only hope for home rule, and it was from the Liberals that the first SHRA largely drew its membership. The Liberal Young Scots group ran meetings and garnered support for home rule in Scotland after the demise of the SHRA.\textsuperscript{862} Whilst this group set up the Scottish Home Rule Council of Scottish Liberal MPs and was successful in getting the 1913 Scottish Home Rule Bill to a second reading, its existence showed the issue was marginal to the main party.\textsuperscript{863}

In 1919, Cowan’s Government of Scotland Bill was counted out (the House was inquorate.) Muirhead saw this as sufficiently significant to write to each Scottish Member asking them to explain their absence from the House at such a time.\textsuperscript{864} Candidates for by-elections were sent questionnaires by registered mail to

\textsuperscript{859} Ibid., p.349
\textsuperscript{860} Napier, 1895, author’s note.
\textsuperscript{861} Acc. 3721/85/27, agenda of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} session of the national convention, 2\textsuperscript{nd} September 1927
\textsuperscript{862} Brand, 1978, p.40
\textsuperscript{863} Ibid., p.41
\textsuperscript{864} Acc. 3721/42/33, copy dated May 27\textsuperscript{th} 1919 to Wm. Graham, MP
ascertain their position on home rule matters.865 In the inter-war Labour
government, home rule fared no better under Ramsay MacDonald with the
failure of Buchanan’s 1924 Bill. The SHRA saw the Bill as very important and
arranged a demonstration in Glasgow to draw attention to it.866 Roland
Muirhead noted to one MP that the ‘Scots members were not able to get
together’ in that parliament.867 The significance of these debates is that their
failure, particularly that of Buchanan’s Bill which had the support of the majority
of Scottish members, made many who favoured home rule begin to think of
independence.868 Notwithstanding, a Scottish National Convention to draft
another bill met in the November of that year. This provided the draft for Barr’s
1927 Bill. The failure of this attempt was closely followed by the Convention
proposing a meeting to form a National Party.869 A note written in January 1928
with some papers on the formation of a National Party claimed that ‘the policy
of depending upon the existing political parties for obtaining self-government
has been tried for many years and found wanting.’870

For the later debates upon the Scotland and Wales and the Scotland Bills, the
issue at hand was the provision of a devolved form of government in Scotland.
The SNP share of the vote in Scotland, as the debates took place from 1975 to
1978, gave the SNP 11 MPs in Westminster, its highest number for the period
of this enquiry. After the failure of the Scotland and Wales Bill in the guillotine
defeat of February 1977, the SNP withdrew its support from the minority Labour
Government, resulting in it having to rely on the ‘Lib-Lab pact’ to survive a vote
of no confidence. With this, and a slump in the polls by Labour in Scotland,871 a
new bill appeared, the Scotland Bill.872 Thus devolution was important to the
SNP, its National Council voting to support a ‘Yes’ vote in any referendum,873
despite internal divisions.874

865 Acc. 3721/51/203, letter 29th May 1925
866 Acc. 3721/49/164, letter to Wilson Raffan, 15th April 1924
867 Ibid.
868 Brand, 1978, p.43
869 Acc. 3721/49/164, letter from Arthur Henry to Muirhead. 4th November 1927
870 Ibid., note dated 15th January 1928
872 Keating & Bleiman, 1979, pp.176-177
873 Lynch, 2002, p.151
874 Ibid., p.147
The proceedings of the Westminster Parliament were important therefore to both home rulers and SNP. Any enquiry into the actions of the diaspora in support or otherwise of self-government for Scotland should therefore, include the actions of Scots in the diaspora in England who were members of Parliament in either House during the discussion of bills and motions supporting home rule.

The purpose of the analysis is to identify the actions of the diaspora in parliament to determine whether or not they supported home rule. In the previous chapter the issue of the ‘Britishness’ of the Scottish associations was briefly covered. This will be dealt with in some detail in chapters six and seven, accordingly this forthcoming analysis will highlight any similar tendencies amongst the Scots abroad in a British institution, the Westminster Parliament. In chapter two, the issue of nationalism and interests was discussed, to highlight that genes were not enough, and people had to have aligned interests as well as common geography or birthright to support a nationalist concept. This is also important, as the interests of politicians may well not be aligned to a territory but a party or group within a party.

Before each analysis of the MP’s actions, a brief background is provided as well as a summary of the attitude of UK political parties to Scottish self-government. The SNP’s approach to devolution legislation in the 1974 Parliament will be included in that section. For the earlier attempts, there was little contemporary electoral evidence that home rule motions or bills reflected the wishes of people in Scotland. However, the case for more self-government was accepted by some. Westminster was seen as too busy running the Empire to deal with both Scotland’s problems and national regeneration, a radical social project conjoined with home rule in the eyes of the Liberal left.875 There was a House of Commons Speaker’s conference in 1919 on the subject. In 1923 one estimate put the number of Unionists amongst Scottish MPs as 15 out of 74.876 In the later debates, on the Scotland and Wales and Scotland Bills, the electoral success of the SNP had arguably demonstrated an appetite for devolution.

875 Hutchinson, 2001, p.7
876 Glasgow Herald, 23rd February 1923
amongst the Scottish people, and it will be seen that this was recognised by some speakers.

Many of the politicians discussed below were either economic or career emigrants; Willie Whitelaw, anxious to get into politics after two failed attempts at winning Dunbartonshire East, was offered an English seat, Penrith and the Borders. Several Scots Tories sat for English constituencies; John MacGregor, Robert McCrindle and David Knox being examples. They demonstrated homeland orientation by referring to themselves as a Scot or part Scot. They would evince boundary maintenance if they used associational groups, regular visits and family ties to link themselves to Scottish people and culture. They might have formed a group for Scottish interests in the Commons, inclusive of other Scots regardless of Party. Political actions more aligned to Scotland’s interests, as they perceived them, rather than that of their English constituents or the UK, would also indicate boundary maintenance. The analysis of the MPs will use this and homeland orientation to identify behaviour linked to Scotland during the debates.

There is an interesting facet to this element of the research, which is to say that the Scottish back-bench MPs (those representing Scottish constituencies, not those in the diaspora) did not find a distinctive voice on issues affecting Scotland until the devolution debates forced them to take a wider view. There was, for example, no evidence that Scottish MPs developed any distinctive point of view on the formation of the British National Oil Corporation, beyond a left wing polemical view about wider state participation.

**The Debates in the House of Commons on Scottish Self-Government**

**1889-1927 Debates**

Gladstone’s 1879 Mid-Lothian campaign brought Scotland a higher profile in Parliament. Later, during the early and mid-1880s it was being argued that

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877 Hutchinson, 2001, p.116
878 Brand, 1992, pp.228-9
879 Ibid., p.229
880 Tanner, Williams, Griffith and Edwards, 2006, p.30
the Scots needed someone in Parliament to oversee Scottish legislation and to guard the interests of Scotland.\textsuperscript{881} The Irish were getting unwarranted attention, it was felt, as a reward for the threat of terrorism.\textsuperscript{882} In 1871 Gladstone had promised Scotland that, 'if the doctrine of home rule is to be established between Britain and Ireland, I protest on your behalf that you will be entitled to it in Scotland.'\textsuperscript{883} The Irish question was central to the issue of devolution or independence being on the political agenda.\textsuperscript{884} Home rule for Scotland became linked to progressive politics in this period, whereas Irish nationalism was seen as backward looking and conservative.\textsuperscript{885} The support for reforms in Scotland was seen to require the support of a dedicated Scottish secretary, but not necessarily a local parliament.

At this time, radical Liberals, a growing power in Scotland, believed in the virtue of minimal government, and therefore few were in favour of an increase of the state in Scotland.\textsuperscript{886} Gladstone's conversion to Home Rule for Ireland in 1886 split the Scottish Liberal Party, but Gladstone was reminded of Home Rule All Round by supporters and seemed to give it succour in 1886.\textsuperscript{887} Gladstone nevertheless held the line against any further home rule measures for the rest of the UK.\textsuperscript{888} The progressive nature claimed by Scottish home rulers attracted the Liberals and they supported home rule before World War One.\textsuperscript{889}

The SHRA was ridiculed by the Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{890} After 1912, the Conservative cause in Scotland was led by the Scottish Unionist Party and Unionists acknowledged that recognition of diversity was central to a robust Union.\textsuperscript{891} For traditional Conservatives, parliamentary sovereignty is identified with a commitment to Crown, Church and Parliament. This is compatible with progressive modification. The Labour Party would not challenge this, believing the massive concentration of power at Westminster would give the party the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item James, 1995, p.114
\item Boyce and O'Day, 2010, p.279
\item Ibid., p.279
\item Mitchell, 1996, p.72
\item Tanner, et. al., 2006, p.32
\item Ibid., p.31
\item Harvie, 1998, p.17
\item Boyce and O’ Day, 2010, p.279
\item Mitchell, 1996, p.72
\item Ibid.
\item Devine, 2008, p.123
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
means to transform society.\textsuperscript{892} The inter-war period saw a fundamental re-alignment of politics in Scotland as the Labour Party displaced the Liberals.\textsuperscript{893} On the face of it, the radical nature of Scottish home rule meant that Labour, particularly the Independent Labour Party (ILP),\textsuperscript{894} supported it.\textsuperscript{895} However in the 1930s, mainstream Labour became more centralist and the economic disruption of the period left little room for constitutional debate.\textsuperscript{896}

In 1918 a new SHRA was formed and sought to influence the election by writing to all candidates for Scottish seats. After the election it did so again to those elected, only nine out of 74 responded favourably. They were split amongst the parties; three non-coalition Liberals, two coalition Liberals, two Labour, one ILP and one Unionist. Ten further replied but did not commit themselves.\textsuperscript{897} No party brought a bill to Parliament.\textsuperscript{898} In 1929 Muirhead was able to write to Joseph Westwood MP; 'I am saddened by the way in which Scottish affairs have been treated at Westminster.'\textsuperscript{899}

Scottish self-government was debated in the Commons on 24 occasions before the 1978 Scotland Act.\textsuperscript{900} This section will deal with the 21 instances up to 1927. It is worth recalling that this earlier period saw the establishment of a Standing Scottish Grand Committee, made up of all Scottish MPs, which oversaw the later stages of Scottish-only law-making.\textsuperscript{901}

The Contributions of the MPs

The full list of speakers in Scottish home rule debates from 1889 to 1927 can be found in Appendix II. The list of those considered to be Scots abroad is found in Appendix III. They are Scots representing Scottish constituencies but spending most or all of their working lives in England. It is worth noting that Ramsay MacDonald was the secretary of the London branch of the first

\textsuperscript{892} Keating and Jones, 1991, p.312
\textsuperscript{893} Devine, 2008, p.124
\textsuperscript{894} Hutchinson, 2001, p.22
\textsuperscript{895} Mitchell, 1996, p.72
\textsuperscript{896} Devine, 2008, p.127
\textsuperscript{897} Mitchell, 1996, p.73
\textsuperscript{898} See Appendix I
\textsuperscript{899} Acc. 3721/8/157
\textsuperscript{900} See Appendix I
\textsuperscript{901} O’Neill, 2004, p.24
SHRA, Prime Minister when Buchanan’s 1924 Bill was debated, he was in correspondence with Muirhead. Whilst claiming to be a ‘home ruler,’ he told Muirhead in January 1924 he was too busy to consider Scottish home rule. Muirhead wrote to him on 16 occasions between then and March 1926, receiving little or no encouragement. This Scot abroad in a position of power did not see home rule as his priority.

This list will not be the whole story, but with 20 MPs it gives a qualitative answer to what the Scots abroad in Parliament did to promote Scottish self-government. It is proposed to analyse the contribution of each, summarised into the following headings; Supporter – put or seconded motions, broadly supportive or supportive with reservations, Opponent – Unequivocal opposition.

Supporters

Dr G. Clark was a founder member of the SHRA in 1886 and was chairman of the London branch. Clark spoke in favour of home rule and moved supporting resolutions on five out of a possible seven occasions in the Commons. He laid home rule motions before the House in April 1889, in February 1890 and on 6th March 1891. He moved amendments to later devolution bills in 1892 and 1893. Clark was a supporter of Scottish home rule in words and deeds in Parliament, and outside of it.

R. B. Cunninghame Graham supported Clark’s motion in 1889. He associated himself with Scotland, using the first person plural, demonstrating boundary maintenance. He was a founding member of the first SHRA and a Council member of the second.
Sir James Dalzeil, moved in 1894 ‘that it is desirable, whilst retaining the power and supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, to establish a legislature in Scotland for dealing with purely Scottish affairs.’ Home rule would, he argued, allow Westminster to discuss Imperial affairs more than they did. The resolution was successful, but there was no bill. In 1894 he spoke in favour of local legislative assemblies as a stage of the home rule movement.

In 1911, Dalzeil asked for ‘leave to introduce a bill to make better provision for the government of Scotland.’ He claimed that 60 of the 70 Scottish MPs supported home rule, ‘a great national question.’ Although Dalzeil won the vote, no bill resulted.

Sir W. H. Cowan moved the 1913 Government of Scotland bill, making nine speeches in favour. He stated that a ‘federation of the United Kingdom’ would lead to a truly Imperial Parliament. In 1914, he spoke in support of home rule. In 1919 he moved a further Government of Scotland Bill.

William Pringle made a brief intervention in the debate for the 1912 Federal Home Rule Bill, and voted in favour. In 1913 he made five interventions in a debate and voted in favour.

Donald Maclean supported the 1919 Federal Devolution Bill. In 1920 he seconded Johnston’s Government of Scotland Bill, acknowledging that it was not perfect. In 1922 he made seven speeches in the bill moved by Shaw, all in support.

George Buchanan moved the 1924 Government of Scotland Bill, saying it was supported by 56 out of 74 Scottish members and addressed a ‘problem to which every man and woman who has the commonwealth of Scotland at heart

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914 Hansard, 3rd April 1894, col. 1287
915 Ibid, col. 1294
916 Hansard, 29th March 1895, cols. 523-4
917 Hansard, 16th August 1911, col. 1929
918 Ibid.
919 Ibid.
920 Hansard, 30th May, 1913, col. 474
921 Ibid., col. 482
922 Hansard, 15th May 1914, col. 1528
923 Hansard, 30th May 1913, beginning at col. 493
924 Hansard, 16th April 1920, col. 2020
925 Hansard, 26th May 1922, cols. 1629-1634
must give attention and serious thought. He did not speak to the Reverend Barr’s 1927 Bill.

Sir James Macpherson moved the Government of Scotland Bill in 1914 and made 15 speeches. He said the bill would ‘give a large measure of self-government to my native country,’ supporting home rule and identifying himself with Scotland. He talked of the ‘sane and practical desire of Scotsmen for local self-government.’ He also claimed that ‘no Scot seeks separation from the Imperial Parliament’ but claims the right to share in the government of Empire. He ends by saying that he wishes Scotland to be allowed to direct her own individuality in her own way.

Dr William Hunter seconded Clark’s 1889 motion, calling home rule beneficial to Scotland, his constituency and the UK. He later stated that the wants of Scotland could never be satisfied by the House of Commons. However, he only spoke on two out of seven possible occasions in the House.

Sir F. C. Thompson identified himself as a Scot in the Devolution debate in June 1919, and despite being a Unionist, supported it. He replied positively to the SHRA’s 1919 letter to Scottish MPs. However, he saw the later Home Rule Bill of George Buchanan as a ‘shearing off from this house of all Scottish legislation’, not a ‘system of devolution all round.’ He made ten interventions in this debate, wanting a solution for the whole UK. He made no contribution to the Reverend Barr’s Bill in 1927.

John Leng Sturrock identified himself in 1920 as a ‘convinced Scottish home ruler’ stating that Scotland ‘must have a measure of devolution’ He voted...
for the Bill. These home rule credentials are contradicted by him talking out the 1924 Bill, preventing a division.

*Sir Robert Reid* intervened in Clark’s 1889 motion. He claimed he did not believe Scots would tolerate a reduction of Scots influence at Westminster. However, he agreed that Scottish business was neglected in the House, voting for the motion. In 1892, he stated that he was unclear what type of self-government the Bill wanted. In 1893 he seconded Clark’s resolution on devolution for Scotland. He supported home rule in a later debate but did not speak on Dalzeil’s home rule motion, or in the debate on Local Legislative Assemblies. He appeared to identify with Scots and their issues, but within the United Kingdom.

*Sir Charles Barrie*, John Seymour Keay, Alexander Shaw, William Young, Edmund Robertson and John Murray Macdonald all spoke on only one occasion, despite having the opportunity to join in further debates on the subject.

**Opponents**

There were only three Scottish MPs in the diaspora who posed outright opposition to home rule. *W. E. Gladstone* was asked, during the debate on home rule for Ireland in June 1886, if he was going to include Scotland and Wales. He responded that it would be too difficult and he was not convinced it was their wish. He did not support the 1889 motion as he felt it would be to Scotland’s advantage to see the question thoroughly examined in the Irish context. The time was not right, and he would vote against. Again in 1890, he voted against Dr Clark’s amendment, ‘whatever sympathy one may entertain on

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938 Hansard, 9th April 1889, col. 115
939 Ibid., col. 116
940 Ibid.
941 Hansard, 23rd June 1893, col. 1833
942 Hansard, 2nd April 1894, cols. 1165-1166
943 Hansard, 19th February 1890, col. 684
944 Ibid.
945 Hansard, 26th May 1922, cols. 1615-16
946 Hansard, 15th May 1914, cols. 1476-77
947 Hansard, 9th April 1889, col. 124
948 Hansard, 3rd June 1919, col. 1882
949 Hansard, 7th June 1886, cols. 1142-1143
950 Hansard, 9th April 1889, col. 108
the point.\textsuperscript{951} He does not speak again on any of the Scottish home rule debates. Gladstone did not support home rule for Scotland in Westminster, even though he upheld it for Ireland.

\textit{Sir Henry Craik} opposed Dalzeil’s request to put a bill before the House in 1911. His response to Cowan’s Bill was that the Bill ‘as always, shall have my strongest opposition.’\textsuperscript{952} He also spoke in opposition in May 1919\textsuperscript{953} and later that year referred to federal devolution as a dangerous project.\textsuperscript{954} He made eight speeches against Johnson’s 1920 bill.\textsuperscript{955} He summed it up as amateur constitution mongering.\textsuperscript{956} He acted as teller for the noes. In May 1924 he spoke of his deep seated opposition to the Government of Scotland Bill.\textsuperscript{957} He believed there was no demand for the proposal in Scotland.

\textit{Frederick Macquisten} spoke only once in a debate on Home Rule, opposing it as divisive.

\textbf{Summary}

During this period the various organisations supporting home rule for Scotland were acting as pressure groups. Their method of achieving their aim was to influence their fellow Scots at home and abroad to support them and persuade legislators to give them what they wanted. Recall that they failed to mobilise the diaspora. However, there was no shortage of opportunity in the Westminster Parliament for the parliamentary diaspora to express their feelings even if the outcome was always defeat for home rule. It should not be forgotten that the Irish presence in parliament, though more massive, also failed to produce home rule without a violent rising.\textsuperscript{958}

Apart from during Dr Clark’s 1889 motion, a majority of the MPs for Scottish constituencies voted in favour of the question, with the majority growing as time went by. However, there were never more than 59 out of 72 Scottish members

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\textsuperscript{951} Hansard, 19\textsuperscript{th} February 1890, col. 723
\textsuperscript{952} Hansard, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1913, col. 527
\textsuperscript{953} Hansard, 16\textsuperscript{th} May 1919, col. 1990
\textsuperscript{954} Hansard, 3\textsuperscript{rd} June 1919, col. 1903
\textsuperscript{955} Hansard, 16\textsuperscript{th} April 1920, col. 2024
\textsuperscript{956} Ibid., col. 2029
\textsuperscript{957} Hansard, 9\textsuperscript{th} May 1924, col. 838
\textsuperscript{958} Regan, 2007, p.199
\end{flushleft}
in the house for the votes, sometimes much lower. For the Government of Scotland Bill of Henry Cowan, only 18 were present and the Bill was counted out. According to W. Graham, MP for Edinburgh Central, in a letter to Muirhead, on this occasion the Government Whips told their MPs to stay away; the turnout of Scottish MPs was disappointing. Muirhead wrote to those absent MPs to castigate them for their absence. Twelve of these replied with good reasons to be absent. The Scottish MPs could not deliver home rule on their own.

Of those identified, although a majority, twelve, supported home rule, six said very little and three were outright opponents. Although most identified with Scotland, most supported the Union and saw pressure on the Imperial Parliament a telling factor in the pressure for devolution as well as the failure of that Parliament to give Scotland’s business sufficient time. Set against this, the failure of the SHRA to engage the Scottish people in nationalism made it easy for opponents to ask for evidence that they wanted it.

In Parliament, this part of the diaspora was in a prime position to make a considerable contribution to the debate on more self-government for the Scots. In that respect they failed to exploit their insider position in Parliament. A brief discussion of the possible causes of this is provided at the end of the chapter.

**The Devolution Debates, 1974-78**

The SNP saw a rise in its electoral fortunes from 1960. A consequence of this was that all three political parties had some form of self-government for Scotland in their policies by the 1974 general elections. In the October 1974 general election, the SNP won eleven seats in Westminster and 30.4% of the Scottish vote, effectively capturing the third party vote in Scotland from the Liberals. There was little doubt that Scotland’s people supported some form of self-government, with 65% of Scots saying that they would vote in favour of devolution.

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959 Acc. 3721/42/33, letter to Muirhead dated 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 1919
960 Kellas, 1980b, p.146
961 Ibid., p.135
962 Mitchell, 1996, p.318
It had been Labour that had set up the Crowther, later Kilbrandon, Commission on the Constitution in 1969. In the Queen’s speech of March 1974, there was a commitment from Harold Wilson, head of the new minority Labour government, to publish a White Paper and Bill on devolution for Scotland and Wales.\textsuperscript{963} From April to May 1974, consultations took place with the SNP, Plaid Cymru, the Liberals, Tories and the Confederation of British Industry on the options put forward by Kilbrandon. By 1975 the need for a form of devolution that enshrined the integrity of the UK and differentiated between a Scottish Assembly with primary legislative powers and a Welsh assembly with secondary powers was accepted in a speech to the House of Commons by The President of the Council, Edward Short. There had been much discussion about the nature of the devolved assemblies.\textsuperscript{964} The Scottish movement towards devolution, though sponsored by UK political parties, was now driven by the political success of the SNP. This is distinctly different from the home rule debates in Parliament in the late 19th century, which had behind them the force of argument of Irish home rule and the notion that home rule for Scotland and Wales would simplify the Imperial Government.

A green paper outlining some alternatives for discussion was published in June 1975. A Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced to the House in 1976,\textsuperscript{965} but this joint Bill was defeated and two separate Bills replaced it. So it was the Scotland Act that finally got the Royal Assent in the summer of 1978. In March 1979 the Labour Government was defeated in the referendums on its plans for devolution. The Welsh voted four to one against devolution and although the Scots voted 51.6% in favour, this only made 32.9% of the electorate and so failed to get over a hurdle that stipulated that a minimum of 40% should vote in favour of the proposals. In the general election that followed the referendum, the SNP lost nine of its 11 parliamentary seats.\textsuperscript{966}

The remainder of this chapter will deal with the response to these Bills by Scottish MPs representing English Constituencies, and selected Scots in the House of Lords in the October 1974 Parliament. Analysis of their participation in

\textsuperscript{963} Hansard, 12\textsuperscript{th} March 1974, col. 10
\textsuperscript{964} PREM 16/461
\textsuperscript{965} Hansard, 16\textsuperscript{th} December 1976, col. 1735
\textsuperscript{966} Taylor and Thompson, 1999, pp.xxiii and 42
debates and votes can reveal how involved these Scots in the diaspora were in the issue, and whether they were acting as Scots reflecting Scots interests, or as representatives of English electors.

Arrangements for handling Scottish business in Parliament, stemming from the separate Scottish legal system, have led to the establishment of Scottish institutions in Parliament. The Scottish Grand Committee has been mentioned above. There had also been a Council of State for Scotland during the Second World War, established on the initiative of the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnson, but it was largely ignored. From 1957 the procedural framework changed, with the Grand Committee being supplemented by two Scottish Standing Committees. Select Committees on Scottish affairs were established from 1968-72 and 1979-87. It can be argued then, that Scots did work together across party lines prior to and after the devolution debates. By way of context, it will be useful to understand the party positions at the outset.

The electoral success of the SNP in 1974 ensured that home rule or devolution, would remain on the UK political agenda for some years. Nevertheless, devolution, despite finally bringing the constitution to the fore of Scottish politics, would prove difficult and divisive for the SNP. It was a key issue and one on which they failed to develop a coherent strategy. However, the 1975 Party Conference debated devolution and produced a vaguely worded resolution to participate in a democratically elected assembly. The debates were seen by William Wolfe, chairman, as a good time to win support for self-government and seek a mandate for independence. Although Margo Macdonald, convenor of the Strategy Committee wanted to push hard for independence, the party had recognised that it would possibly be easier to achieve it through an assembly.

967 Midwinter et. al., 1991, p.65
969 Edwards, 1971, p.305
970 Midwinter et. al., 1991, p.68
971 Devine, 1999, p.586
972 Hassan, 2009, p.33
973 Mitchell, 1996, p.212
974 Ibid., p.214
975 Acc. 11987/13, Wolfe's report to the National Council 12th November 1976
976 Acc. 11987/13, National Council minutes 4th September 1976
The SNP electoral success saw a turning point at the Garscadden by-election, in April 1978 when Labour held the SNP target seat. Some reflections on the defeat written to Gordon Wilson, SNP MP, recognised that as the Labour party now had an assembly option, the Devolution Bill, the electorate would choose to go with it. The same paper recognised that if the SNP opposed the assembly, it would incur years of unpopularity with the voters. Therefore it must support the assembly and try to strengthen it. Even so there was a presumption of ‘non-interference’ from the Party on behalf of the MPs.

The Tories were the party of the Union, with a large proportion of vociferous opponents to devolution. However, they were the first of the two major parties to support devolution. In 1968 Edward Heath accepted the argument for an assembly and set up a committee under Sir Alec Home. The 1970 manifesto had offered a chance for the Scottish people to have a greater say in their own affairs. The Tory manifesto for the October 1974 election - ‘Putting Britain First’ - said of the people of Scotland and Wales; ‘people want more freedom and control of their own lives’ and said that this would shape policy. The policy for Scotland was to set up a Scottish Assembly and give it and the Secretary of State for Scotland the power to decide how to spend the budget.

However, by the end of 1975 there was a majority amongst back benchers against devolution and it was clear that Margaret Thatcher had changed policy. Willie Whitelaw, the Tory devolution spokesman acted as though devolution was an unsatisfactory compromise. This view was shared by others. By 1978 the Tories opposed devolution and their 1979 manifesto contained only a promise of discussions.

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977 Mitchell, 1996, p.216
978 Acc. 13099/5, undated paper presumably written in April/ May 1978
979 Acc. 13099/6, Political correspondence of Gordon Wilson July 1978 to August 1979, specifically an undated note by Wilson.
980 Brand, 1992, p.241
981 Garnet and Aitken, 2003, p.229
982 Ibid.
983 Brand, 1992, p.242. See also Thatcher’s speech: Hansard, 13th December 1976 cols. 996-8
984 Garnet and Aitken, 2003, p.229
985 Pym and Brittan, 1978, p.1
986 Garnett and Aitken, 2003, pp.229-230
Labour had abandoned any formal commitment to home rule by 1958. That was to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the establishment of Kilbrandon was a response to increased interest amongst Labour radicals in Scotland and the loss of Hamilton. In 1968, Scottish Labour MPs unanimously voted against separate parliaments. Kilbrandon had reported in 1973 and was at first ignored by the government as the SNP had suffered a decline. In the General Election of February 1974 the SNP won seven seats and 22% of the Scottish vote. The minority Labour Government announced that the next Labour government, elected in October 1974, would create elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales. However, even as late as 1976, as many as forty Labour MPs indicated that they would have difficulty supporting the Government on the matter.

The Liberals had become less interested in home rule in the 1960s and failed to reach an electoral accommodation with the SNP 1964-66. For the 1974 elections, the party was committed to ‘a substantial devolution of power from Westminster.’

A summary of the passage through the House of Commons of the Scotland and Wales Bill and the Scotland Bill will provide context for the analysis of MPs’ positions. The Scotland and Wales Bill was published on 28th November 1976, receiving a second reading on 16th December. At this stage the Government conceded that referendums would be held should the Bill be enacted. The committee stage ran from 13th January to 15th February 1977, but the motion to impose a guillotine to ensure the Bill’s passage was defeated and the Bill was dead. The Scotland Bill’s second reading was in November 1977. The guillotine motion, allocating 17 days for Committee, report and third reading, was passed. The guillotine resulted in 61 of the 83 clauses and 11 of the 17 schedules being

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987 Hutchinson, 2001, p.130  
988 Brand, 1992, p.238  
989 Kellas, 1980b, p.147  
990 Brand, 1992, p.239  
991 Hutchinson, 2001, p.119  
992 Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1974, p.330  
993 This summary taken from Mitchell, 1996, pp.318-9  
994 Lindley, 1978, pp.1-7 provides the detail from which this summary is written
carried without debate. About 500 of the 638 amendments were not reached. Amongst those was the 40% threshold amendment relating to the referendums which the Government hoped to reverse in the report stage.

In the third reading, the Secretary of State for Scotland announced that the Government had reluctantly accepted the House’s verdict on the 40% rule and had decided to make no further attempt to overthrow it. This, with other concessions ensured the third reading was carried by a comfortable margin of forty.

The Contributions of the MPs

James Lamond stated in 1978 that ‘in the House of Commons there are approximately 20 men and women who were born in Scotland and now represent English constituencies.’ This research has identified fifteen of them. Studying this group of politicians and their behaviour during the debates on devolution will provide insight into whether they acted as part of a group with a common bond of nationality and interest as Scots, or as partisan politicians. As parliamentarians they had a platform to air those views and expectations. However the constraints of party allegiance, pressure from the whips and their own personal view might pull against these bonds or support them.

The Scots identified by the method outlined in chapter one are listed in Appendix IV. This sample is sufficient to produce some qualitative measure of the contribution of these migrants to the debates. The analysis of the contributions of these MPs to the Scotland and Wales Bill and the Scotland Bill is presented in three sections; first those who made no or minimal contribution, next the supporters of devolution and lastly those who opposed it.

Of the MPs whose voting record and speeches were examined in detail, three gave no speeches on the Bills whatsoever, and a further three said little. Sir George Sinclair (Con), Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Con) and Mr David Young (Lab), fell into the first category, Mr David James (Con), Patrick McNair-Wilson (Con) and Albert (Jock) Stallard (Lab) into the latter. All voted on party lines.

995 Hansard, 16th January 1978, col. 25
Supporters

*David Knox* (Con) was unusual in not always voting along party lines during the debates, being one of the rebels against the Tory three line whip in December 1976. In his first contribution he identifies himself as Scottish born, educated and a frequent visitor. Homeland orientation was clear. He saw the Bill as the most important that Parliament would discuss because of its profound effect on both Scotland and the UK. He referred to the long term nature of nationalism in Scotland. He saw this as affecting all Scots, based on his own experiences. Although he recognised that the bill was not very good, he saw it as Parliament’s last chance to stop separation, which would be ‘an unmitigated disaster for England as well as Scotland.’ Here is a clear alignment with what he saw as the wishes of the Scottish people, an active participant in the diaspora, whilst still asserting the interests of his English constituents. Though the Bill was flawed, he saw the rejection of it as being a rejection of devolution.

Knox voted with the government to reject the amendment of the ‘40%’ condition. He did this as he felt it would make devolution less likely. Apart from these two occasions when he made substantial contributions, Knox makes seven further speeches. In the 17 votes analysed, Knox was absent for five, voted with his party six times and with the government six times. Both in his words and deeds he demonstrated that he was acting in what he saw as the interests of the increase in nationalism in his own people, as well as working in the interests of the English.

*Norman Lamont* (Con) made only five contributions to the debates on devolution, all focussed around his interest in the position of the Shetland Isles. He asked what representations had been received from the Zetland County Council. In 1977 he came with a specific proposal from the Shetlands, that the Zetland (now Shetland) County Council Act, which gave extra powers to Shetland to help them manage the oil exploitation in the region, be maintained in the Bill. Although his voting record follows the opposition position, he did not

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996 Hansard, 13th December 1976, col. 1136
997 Ibid., cols. 1137-8
998 Hansard, 25th January 1978, col. 1518
999 Hansard, 26th November 1975, col. 395
speak against it. It is hard to interpret his contributions other than to ensure Shetland was provided for in the devolved arrangements.

Opponents

*John MacGregor’s* (Lab) homeland orientation was apparent in his first speech on devolution in January 1976; ‘I speak as a Scot born and brought up in a Scottish mining village, educated up to and beyond University level and with a family still very much based in Scotland.’\(^{1000}\) He felt devolution would lead to separation; a ‘private nightmare,’\(^ {1001}\) and would not solve Scotland’s economic problems. He summarised four conditions for his support; first that they did not include the devolution of economic powers, second that they reduced bureaucracy, third that they brought government closer to the people and last that they be fair to all parts of the UK. He criticised the bill for its lack of fairness to the English, who would have to pay for it and gain no better system of representation themselves. Worse, he said, there will be Scots and Welsh MPs in the house voting on English matters when the English cannot vote on Scots issues.\(^ {1002}\) The only boundary maintenance in his later speeches is with the English, the UK, and his constituents. MacGregor’s voting supports the opposition. He voted in the Scotland Bill debates but did not speak. In conclusion, whilst MacGregor clearly has a strong homeland orientation, his affiliations were English, UK and lastly Scots.

*Willie Whitelaw* (Con) was the spokesman for devolution during both the Heath and Thatcher leaderships.\(^ {1003}\) He supported Thatcher in her opposition to devolution. This was ‘slightly mysterious, since he was particularly sensitive to opinion north of the border.’\(^ {1004}\) He contributed to the debates on devolution between February 1975 and November 1976. He made no contribution to the debates on the Scotland Bill. He had however, by September 1976, been given a new job as shadow Home Secretary.\(^ {1005}\)

\(^{1000}\) Hansard, 15th January 1976, col. 673  
\(^{1001}\) Ibid., col. 674  
\(^{1002}\) Hansard, 14th December 1976, col. 1473  
\(^{1003}\) Garnett and Aitken, 2003, p.217  
\(^{1004}\) Ibid., pp.228-9  
\(^{1005}\) Ibid., p.230
In his first speech, he described the legislation as the ‘most far reaching reform of the United Kingdom constitution since the Act of Union in 1707.’\footnote{Hansard, 3rd February 1975, col. 970} Thus he set a familiar tone, that this was an important matter for the whole country and required much debate.\footnote{Ibid., col. 971} He spoke for the Conservative Party and its support for the UK, and of the tragedy that would accompany any end to the United Kingdom.\footnote{Ibid., col. 972} He also referred to the difficulties of Scots in England, and the English in Scotland, if Scotland were to become once more a separate nation, highlighting nationality and identity issues.\footnote{Ibid., col. 973} He questioned whether Scotland could afford the same social and health benefits.\footnote{Ibid., col. 974} However, Whitelaw argued against the SNP position, not specifically against devolution, stating ‘we are all committed to giving the people of Scotland and Wales a genuine opportunity to have more control over their affairs.’\footnote{Ibid., col. 976} Whitelaw raised a constitutional question; ‘how does one reconcile the need for real legislative assembly in any Scottish body with the overall requirement of keeping sovereignty in this house?’\footnote{Hansard, 3rd February 1975, col. 979}

Whitelaw set out his (and the Tory) position; this is a major constitutional issue, the sovereignty of Westminster must be maintained, the continuation of the UK a given, no fudging on overall authority and yet a commitment to give the people of Scotland more control over their affairs. Later that year he asked the House to recognise that ‘those of us who support sensible proposals for devolution are nevertheless determined to ensure the basic unity of the UK.’\footnote{Hansard, 5th August 1975, col. 243} He acted as a senior opposition spokesman, and revealed little support for the notion of Scottish devolution beyond those statements. He also protested at the idea of one bill for Scotland and Wales as their situations are so different.\footnote{Hansard, 14th January 1976, col. 404} The house debated the White Paper on January 19th 1976, and Whitelaw responded as the opposition spokesman. His contribution differed little from his earlier positions.\footnote{Hansard, 19th January 1976 cols. 1049-52} However in his concluding remarks, he felt ‘great
unhappiness about the Government’s proposals for Scotland, even though I believe that the needs of the Scottish people require change.\textsuperscript{1016}

Throughout his contribution, he spoke as a member of the Opposition, never using the first person plural when referring to the Scots, but always the third person. Whitelaw supported Britain and the idea of the British as one nation.\textsuperscript{1017} He claimed to understand the Scots, divining their support for change as one for devolution not independence. He acted as a senior Tory politician, not as a member of the diaspora urging Scotland forward.

At the Scottish Conservative Conference in Perth in May 1976, Whitelaw had committed the party to a directly elected assembly.\textsuperscript{1018} However, Margaret Thatcher enforced a three line whip on opposing the Bill and in December, Whitelaw voted accordingly. In fact, Whitelaw and most of his fellow Tory Scots in the diaspora voted with the opposition. David Knox was the exception.

In conclusion, the Tory spokesman on devolution was active in early debates supporting the idea of more democratic oversight of the Government’s decisions in Scotland, but fell short of proselytising a satisfactory solution, merely opposing the Government’s position. When it was no longer his job to contribute, he ceased to do so.

\textit{Roderick MacFarquhar’s} (Lab) position was that he had no sympathy with the SNP, foisting a ‘mean and jealous nationalism on a generous people.’\textsuperscript{1019} He supported the white paper insofar as it was an attempt to satisfy the demands for greater participation in Government, though with some reservations.\textsuperscript{1020} It made no mention of England as a region in need of greater participation. He agreed that devolution would most likely lead to separatism but that not satisfying the demand for it would also lead to a break-up. He argued that the answer to this inevitable and unfortunate break-up of the UK is to collaborate with EEC partners to eventually create a political union of Europe based on

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1016} Ibid., col. 1055
\footnote{1017} Ibid., col. 1048
\footnote{1018} \textit{The Times}, 15\textsuperscript{th} May 1976, pp.1-2
\footnote{1019} Hansard, 14\textsuperscript{th} January 1976, col. 497
\footnote{1020} Ibid., cols. 497-498
\end{footnotes}
regions not nation states. This first speech established him as a Scot, but showed affiliation with the UK and Europe not Scotland alone.

He was critical of the Scotland and Wales Bill but said that not to support it would be to represent a ‘cowardly unwillingness of the house’ to move onto the next historical phase of the Union.\footnote{Hansard, 13\textsuperscript{th} December 1976, col. 1109} His criticism was that he saw it being ‘representation without taxation’\footnote{Ibid., col. 1106} with no solution for England. He voted for the Bill on the 16\textsuperscript{th} December. He supported the Government because ‘A no vote tonight would be seen as a... defeat for the bill itself.’\footnote{Hansard, 22\textsuperscript{nd} February 1977, col. 1263} This was because he ‘can think of no vote more likely to ensure the dissolution of the Union than a vote to ensure that the Bill runs into the sands.’ His voting record for the Scotland Bill was a clear adherence to the Government line, including voting against the 40% amendment. In conclusion, although he used his Scottishness to lend authority to his speeches, he was as concerned about the English as he was the Scots and about the UK as much as devolution for Scotland.

Hugh Fraser’s (Con) first three speeches claimed that the devolved Parliament would move the average Scots citizen that much further from Government. He was concerned that ‘this type of bill will lead to the dissipation and undoing of the Act of Union.’\footnote{Hansard, 14\textsuperscript{th} December 1976, col. 1302} He envisaged conflict between Westminster and Edinburgh, ‘a disastrous situation.’\footnote{Ibid., col. 1303} He accused the Nationalists of promising things they could not deliver.

He claimed the Bill was unworkable and beyond improvement. He suggested the front bench stop trying to improve the Bill and instead cut ‘its filthy throat.’\footnote{Hansard, 19\textsuperscript{th} January 1977, col. 546} He was speaking as a Scot and as a member of the Opposition. He considered the Bill unclear, and called for its defeat.\footnote{Hansard, 22\textsuperscript{nd} February 1977, cols. 1290-91} His opposition is clear throughout. However his homeland orientation is not evident from his speeches in the Commons, although he speaks of concern for getting the right governance for Scottish people.\footnote{Hansard, 14\textsuperscript{th} December 1976, col. 1300}
follows party lines. There were no contributions from Fraser to the debate on the Scotland Act and he voted against rejecting the 40% clause. The conclusion is that he was voting as a Tory rather than as a Scot on devolution.

*James Lamond* (Lab) warned the house that his fellow Aberdonians were ‘the least enthusiastic in all Scotland about even the Government’s modest devolution proposals.’\(^{1029}\) In this speech he both asserted his homeland affinity and a degree of linkage with Scotland. The same speech also saw him express doubts from his Oldham East constituents. He had earlier warned that the SNP could ‘drive the people of Scotland along a desperate and unacceptable road to complete independence.’\(^{1030}\)

During the debates, his interventions were not in support of devolution and his voting record shows a variety of positions, perhaps based on the bills as he saw them. There is no evidence that he supported devolution.

*Robert McCrindle* (Con) made only two contributions on the subject of Scottish Devolution, and neither of those in a debate on either of the Bills. He declared ‘the idea of devolving some meaningful powers to Scotland is a must’ but he was not convinced that the ‘people of Scotland’ would be better off.\(^{1031}\) He expressed the wish to be able to vote for some kind of assembly and hoped that his own party would not wish to impose a three line whip. He gave notice that ‘this will put me in some considerable difficulty.’\(^{1032}\) Finally, he saw devolution as a means of retaining the Union, which in his view would be in danger without it. He did not think the Scots wanted independence.\(^{1033}\)

McCrindle voted with his fellow Tories. Despite his Scottish roots,\(^{1034}\) and his support for an assembly within the Union, he has no contribution to the debates and voted against it.

*George Cunningham* (Lab) was described in the Times as ‘the resolute anti-devolutionist.’\(^{1035}\) He nuanced this position a few days later; ‘our duty is not

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\(^{1029}\) Hansard, 17\(^{th}\) March 1976, col. 1700
\(^{1030}\) Hansard, 21\(^{st}\) June 1976, col. 1093
\(^{1031}\) Hansard, 25\(^{th}\) November 1976, col. 278
\(^{1032}\) Ibid.
\(^{1033}\) Hansard, 13\(^{th}\) June 1978, col. 885
\(^{1034}\) Hansard, 26\(^{th}\) March 1982, col. 1220
\(^{1035}\) The Times, 25\(^{th}\) January 1978, p.2
only to give Scotland an assembly if she wants it, but not to impose an assembly if she does not want it." Cunningham identified himself in a ‘hybrid role’ as a Scotsman. In the same speech he outlined his opposition to the Scotland and Wales Bill. He saw it as a one way ratchet to independence, forced in stages by the SNP. If the Scots face up to the question of independence, he continued, then they will realise they are better off maintaining the connection with the Union.

Cunningham spoke 64 times in the debates on Scottish devolution and the referendum, a considerable contribution. He had a strong interest in the bills. He was derisory about the Scots’ suggested ambitions for a separate state. Cunningham introduced the 40% amendment. He summarised the debates for devolution as being not based on merit but on the ‘irresistible demand for devolution that substitutes for the case on merit.’ Therefore the referendum should reflect that irresistible demand. Over half of Cunningham’s contributions to the debates are about the electoral arrangements for the new assembly and the referendum. He was anti-devolution and ensured with the 40% amendment that there would be a high hurdle for it to be introduced.

**Summary**

The analysis of the participation of Scots MPs representing English constituencies has revealed how these Scots sitting for English constituencies responded to the issue. In the main, with three exceptions, this group did not make a large contribution to the debates. Appendix IV reveals that six of them said nothing and a further six made less than ten interventions. Three, Lamond with 14, Whitelaw with 27 and Cunningham with 64 made significant contributions, Cunningham having the greatest impact, albeit a negative one.

It is easy to see them all as Scots, claiming Scots descent or close association. The case for their homeland orientation is therefore proved. It is not possible however to see any significant boundary maintenance activity. None have

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1036 *The Times*, 2nd February 1978, p. 15, letters
1037 Hansard, 15th January 1976, col. 723
1038 Ibid., col. 726
1039 Ibid., col. 726
1040 Ibid., col. 588
sympathy with the SNP or their case for separation. Although they consider the interests of Scots, they also consider the Union and the Westminster Parliament. There is no evidence of them forming an interest group in the House based upon their nationality. Whereas the members of the group speak of being Scots, they act in the main as party politicians. The exceptions to this were Knox and Cunningham.

At this time the major UK political parties had more Scots self-government in their manifestoes, and the SNP had reached a high water mark of MPs in Westminster and share of the popular vote. Yet most of the Scots working as MPs in England showed little desire for Scottish devolution. MPs that supported the principle of devolving power found issue with the details of the Bills put forward to enact it. Some, like George Cunningham, exhibited a plain dislike of the notion, some in positions of influence, like Willie Whitelaw, though recognising the rise in demand for more self-government by his fellow Scots, chose not to influence his party leadership but to acquiesce to its opposition.

However, the Commons is not the whole of the Houses of Parliament. The Lords also debated the Scotland Bill, and their Lordships did not have to concern themselves with re-election or selection by party officials. It is to this group that the discussion now turns.

**The Debates in the House of Lords**

The background to the selection process has been laid out in chapter one. The research sampled those who spoke on the Scotland Bill in its second reading on the 14th and 15th March 1978, the committee and report stages in April and May and the third reading in June. Out of the many speakers to this bill, 25 selected peers seem to qualify as being in the diaspora. They are listed in appendix V. There may be others, as with the Commons analysis. The Hansard archive does not record party affiliations so these are not included.

The Hansard online archive holds the details of the stages of the Bill in the House of Lords. There are few divisions, and the record does not always list ‘contents’, that is those in favour, and ‘non-contents’, in full. As a result an analysis such as that provided for the Commons research is not as accessible.
As with the House of Commons analysis, the research aims to see if the individuals clearly identified themselves as Scots, and showed evidence of boundary maintenance by associating themselves with Scots in Scotland and the apparent rise in demand for devolved government.

A summary of the Bill’s passage through the Lords assists in navigation through the analysis.1041 The Bill received an unopposed second reading. The chief Opposition spokesman on devolution, Earl Ferrers, gave an assurance that they would not frustrate the Government’s timetable, but that the bill would be scrutinised closely.1042 Lord Home of the Hirshel spoke in support of proportional representation. This issue caused the Government’s defeat, with an amendment proposing the additional member system for Assembly elections. Later, the Earl of Perth moved a significant amendment, to enable the assembly to draw up its own tax raising powers, which the Secretary of State would lay before Parliament. This was carried.

The Report stage began with the defeat of a Conservative back bench amendment reducing the number of Scottish MPs after Devolution from 71 to between 57 and 63. A number of important changes were made to the bill in the report stage and there were 12 more government defeats. An amendment by Earl Ferrers gave the Commons an opportunity to vote on the ‘West Lothian question.’1043 Altogether 239 amendments were passed through the Lords stages, of which 170 were accepted in the Commons and included in the final Act. The Government made 29 substantial concessions during the passage through the Lords and a further eight on its return to the Commons.1044

Supporters

Lord Drumalbyn insisted the Bill should be looked at in the context of whether the need for some Scottish self-governance was likely to lead to separation. His position was to improve the Bill. During the committee stages, 13 days in all, Drumalbyn tabled many amendments and spoke to many others. In all he made

1041 Lindley, 1978, pp.8-16 provides the basis for this summary
1042 Hansard, 14th March 1978, col. 1203
1043 Lindley, 1978, p.12
1044 Ibid., p.14
over 246 speeches on the Bill. Drumalbyn was trying to make the Bill work. He had a strong sense of making sure the Scots benefited, a sign of boundary maintenance. However, he was unhappy with the end result. In the third reading he summed up that the ‘Bill will not work in its present form.’

Viscount Thurso was clear that ‘over purely domestic matters, it is easier to make one’s problem understood in Edinburgh than it is in London.’ He was not a separatist, but wanted to do all he could to help the bill. He appreciated the Bill had its drawbacks, but nevertheless he wanted the Bill to ‘release the wisdom of the Scottish people into the service of their own country.’

The Earl of Perth, who made his opening speech in the second reading, stated that ‘the Bill gives the inhabitants of Scotland what they want – an Assembly. That is in the Bill and that is what we want.’ However he did not support the SNP. His summary at the end of the Committee stage was that he felt a better Bill had gone back to the Commons than arrived at the Lords.

He supported the UK and was clear that there was more risk to the Union without the Assembly. At a moment of great change, he stated, you have ‘to make a start, and that is what this bill is about.’ Perth became an active campaigner in the ‘Scotland Says Yes’ campaign.

Viscount Masserene and Ferrard disliked the Bill. His longest speech described the Union as the most perfect alliance of all time. His dislike of the SNP was very clear. He first called for the Bill to be scrapped but concluded that the answer was to improve the Bill in committee. He voted for amendments demonstrating a reluctant support for devolution.

1046 Hansard, 24th April 1978, col. 1576
1047 Hansard, 29th June 1978, col. 509
1048 Hansard, 15th March 1978, cols. 1373-5
1049 Ibid., col. 1375
1050 Ibid., col. 1377
1051 Hansard, 14th March 1978, col. 1220
1052 Hansard, 24th April 1978, col. 1494
1053 Ibid., col. 479
1054 Ibid.
1055 Hansard, 14th March 1978, cols. 1285-1289
1056 See for example, Hansard, 29th June 1978, cols. 385 and 403
Fraser of Kilmarnock made only one speech on the Bill.\textsuperscript{1057} He was clear that if enough Scots living in Scotland wanted devolution, they should have a right to obtain it.\textsuperscript{1058} Fraser saw many problems for the Bill but did not condemn it outright.

Lord Home of the Hirshel laid out his support for more self-government for Scots. He wanted the Bill to be clear on the scope of the Assembly’s powers, with some power to raise revenue. He intended to ‘get the bill right.’\textsuperscript{1059} He believed that ‘the average Scotsman and woman’ wanted more control over Scottish affairs, so felt able to speak for them, but he spent no time defending the sanctity of the UK and the Union. To conclude with Home, it is difficult to see the association that say, Thurso, made with Scotland. There is an assumption of a right to know Scottish minds. However, Home joined the ‘No’ side in the following referendum campaigns, his motive being that the Tories would produce a better solution.\textsuperscript{1060}

Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal made 33 speeches in the debates. He moved five amendments during the committee stages of the Bill. There was in all of Strathcona’s interventions a degree of aiming to improve the clarity of the Bill.

**Opponents**

The Earl of Glasgow made one speech in the second reading. He was opposed to anything that would damage the Union. He did not think Scots were aware of the benefits of their current arrangements. He considered the Bill a very dangerous one; the thin end of the wedge, the ‘first foundation of the road to independence.’\textsuperscript{1061} He was first and foremost a Unionist.

The Earl of Selkirk was scathing about the Bill; ‘It is totally unintelligible and utterly unfair to press on the Scottish people.’\textsuperscript{1062} His amendment 210 went to the heart of the ‘West Lothian question’. He moved the amendment to force the

\textsuperscript{1057} Hansard, 15\textsuperscript{th} March 1978, col. 1395
\textsuperscript{1058} Ibid., col.1396
\textsuperscript{1059} Hansard, 14\textsuperscript{th} March 1978, cols. 1215-1219
\textsuperscript{1060} Bochel, et. al., 1981, p.19
\textsuperscript{1061} Hansard, 14\textsuperscript{th} March 1978, cols. 1318-1320
\textsuperscript{1062} Hansard, 15\textsuperscript{th} March 1978, col. 1412
Commons to discuss the issue, and to put some balance into the Bill. In his final speech, Selkirk claimed that the real things in Scotland, employment and opportunity, would be untouched by this. He agreed that if the Bill fell ‘not a dog will bark.’

Lord Burton spoke 32 times on the Bill. He described it as horrific and claimed that it would be the pre-cursor to another Northern Ireland situation.

Lord Glendevon declared a belief in the Union, claiming that strength lay in the Union, not the Bill, and he urged the House to think again.

The Earl of Lauderdale aligned himself with the Scots. As a Unionist he deplored the Bill, despite his Scottishness.

Lord Spens was brief but vocal in his condemnation of the Bill. He described himself as an expatriate Scot, but he did not deal with any points on the Bill as he ‘dislike(d) it so intensely.’

Viscount Colville of Culross made detailed speeches on the definition of the assembly’s powers. Culross made 24 amendments seeking for clarity or detail. What was clear was his concern for the outcome for the citizen in cases of unclear legislation. His opinion of the Bill was low even after his amendments.

The Countess of Loudoun’s only concern was for consistency in the management of waterways throughout the United Kingdom.

The Duke of Atholl, Lord Ballantrae, Douglass of Barloch, Hamilton of Dalzell and Alexander of Potterhill had only marginal contributions in the committee
stages. None refer to their Scottish links, or passed comment on devolution or nationalism.

**The SNP Engagement with the Diaspora**

Before concluding the chapter, it is instructive to ask whether the SNP showed any inclination to engage with the diaspora in Parliament in order to strengthen its position as a voting bloc. The minutes of their meetings held between October 1976 and July 1978 make no reference to this, or indeed to any of the actions of other Scots MPs in the house. Similarly there are no references in Gordon Wilson’s archived correspondence from January 1976 to December 1978. Whether unrecorded conversations upon this took place it is impossible to say. The silence of archived correspondence on the issue stands as evidence of only that.

**Summary**

It was established in the introduction to this chapter that these attempts to secure home rule and devolution were of considerable importance to the movements which had been established to promote and achieve such a settlement. Even when the aims of the groups had been changed and coalesced into the independence ambition of the SNP, the party did vote support for the devolved settlement of the 1976-78 debates, and was at least partially responsible for the provision of a Scotland Bill after the earlier joint Bill failed, as it withdrew its support for the Labour government.

The early home rule debates were examined through the speeches of Scots identified as being in the diaspora in England, in Parliament. Whilst a majority of those identified supported home rule, around half of those; Dalzeil, Cowan, Hunter, Thompson and Reid, felt that devolution would strengthen the UK and the UK parliament’s ability to govern. Of those who opposed, Gladstone and Craik appeared unconvinced the Scots wanted home rule. The emergence of the ‘British’ theme provides an interesting reflection of the response of the Scottish societies, and is repeated in the later debates.

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1075 Acc. 13099/70 and 13099/71
1076 Acc. 13099/5
The devolution episode of the late 1970s was an embarrassment to both Labour and Conservative parties. Labour’s commitment to devolution was initially undertaken primarily with their electoral fortunes in mind.\textsuperscript{1077} The argument assumed that as the SNP was enjoying considerable support in Scotland, the interests of the Scottish people could be advanced by self-government. It follows that support for devolution by a Scot in the Commons would be advancing the interests of the Scots. Yet in the speeches of the parliamentary Scots abroad there was in both Lords and Commons a mix of indifference, support and dislike of the Bill.

Of those identified who spoke in the debates, only Knox rebelled against his party whip to support devolution. He did so out of fear that without it the UK would cease as a constitutional entity. He was also aligned with what he saw as the wishes of the Scottish people. Lamond appears supportive but is parochially concerned with Shetland’s settlement. Six of those identified made little or no contribution to the debates, the remainder in the Commons were opposed. This opposition was generated in the main by an adhesion to the UK expressed through a fear that devolution was the first step in a one way ratchet to separation. Whitelaw refers specifically to the idea of Britain and the British as one nation, as well as adherence to the UK. Ultimately only Knox, in supporting devolution, and Cunningham in making it less attainable, voted other than on party lines.

In the Lords, the same arguments that devolution was good but the Bill was bad are put forward, although some of the Peers appeared to attempt to make it a better Bill. However, it is the role of the Lords to act as a reviewing chamber, so there was a sense of duty there as well. In the Commons, the Bill was amended to alter the threshold for success for the referendum, requiring that 40% of the electorate voted yes. Thus an abstention was effectively a no vote. The Commons members were in most cases party men first, Scots second.

The evidence seems to refute any assumption that, free of political control, their Lordships would have a significantly different approach to their colleagues in the Commons. Only two of the protagonists in the diaspora appear in either the

\textsuperscript{1077} Keating and Beilman, 1979, p.166
Yes or No Referendum Campaigns.\textsuperscript{1078} As with the Commons, there was recognition that there was a groundswell of support in Scotland for more self-governance and there was consistent support for the Union, as well as fear that devolution would destroy it.

It has been said that the Scots in Westminster representing Scottish constituencies are usually anxious to be statesmen of Britain as well as Scotland.\textsuperscript{1079} There is evidence here that this applied equally to the Scots diaspora in Parliament. The theme of Britishness that will be presented in future chapters as a barrier to Scots abroad supporting more self-government for Scotland is reflected here in the support by MPs and Peers for the status quo constitutional arrangement. Recalling the short section in chapter one on gatekeepers, the MPs and Peers were also gatekeepers between the Scots and the legislation to provide some form of self-government. Although there was some unstructured support for the idea of more Scots self-government from these Scots at the heart of UK government, they did not provide a unified group to successfully promote a Bill and referendum acceptable to the people of Scotland. Over many occasions over nearly ninety years, although many of the Scots abroad in England and in Parliament supported home rule and devolution motions, they failed to exploit their privileged position.

The analysis presented over the last three chapters has attempted to describe the response of the Scottish diaspora to the nationalist project in Scotland. They have presented the response to home rule pressure groups and an organised political party seeking votes in Scotland, as well as examining the response of those privileged few Scots in the diaspora who were part of the legislature of their times and had occasion to influence legislation to embrace home rule or devolution. The next chapter will draw together the conclusions from the analysis of the contributions of the Scots abroad in both the Empire and England and lay out a series of explanations for their apparent indifference.

\textsuperscript{1078} Bochel, et. al, 1981, pp.26-30
\textsuperscript{1079} Kellas, 1980, p.126
Chapter 6 Scots Abroad: Understanding indifference.

The work presented so far has described the Scottish experience of mass migration and the formation of what is described as a Scottish diaspora. This was followed by evidence that many diasporas are involved in nationalist projects in their homelands. The case for using the Irish and Norwegians as comparison diasporas has been made. Evidence has been presented from both original and secondary sources of the lack of support for Scottish home rule or independence during the period under scrutiny. Files from the archives of the SNP and some of its senior figures have been referenced to support this case. Research into the home rule and devolution parliamentary debates, from 1889 to 1978 has provided evidence of the lack of support from most Scottish MPs and the Lords in the diaspora in England other than that which was partisan.

Yet national identity has long been a component of Scottish people.\textsuperscript{1080} Therefore this chapter begins to analyse why there was little interest. Two hypotheses will be examined. Firstly, that the process of the engagement by the groups supporting self-government in Scotland with the diaspora was for the main part amateurish and spasmodic, perhaps as a result of it having a low priority. Whilst it cannot be denied that all the major organisations\textsuperscript{1081} examined tried to gain support from the diaspora, all these efforts, even when set up to prioritise such contact, were characterised by failure.

The second hypothesis will claim that the target groups in the diaspora chosen for involvement by the nationalist groups were primarily non-political in their objectives and their membership was probably small in relation to the diaspora as a whole. With a different, ‘British,’ horizon for their nationalism, it will be argued that these groups acted as gatekeepers between the nationalist organisations and the diaspora. The comparison of the activities of the Irish nationalist movement and the Irish diaspora is briefly dealt with at the end of the chapter.

\textsuperscript{1080} Leith and Soule, 2012, p.36  
\textsuperscript{1081} Both SHRAs, the League, the NPS/SNP and the Convention
It is appropriate to spend a little time explaining some of the terminology used thus far. The word indifference has been used on several occasions to describe the reaction of the diaspora to Scottish nationalist projects at home. The word here is used as a noun meaning a lack of concern, nonchalance about, lacking sympathy rather than its other meaning of mediocrity or ordinariness. Moreover, it has been chosen specifically because of its late Middle English use of being neither good nor bad, neither for nor against. This is because whilst there was a little interest in the diaspora for Scottish nationalist projects at home, it was insufficient to make a difference one way or another to the outcome of the projects. Whilst the diaspora did not support the nationalist causes, neither did it expressly oppose them. The effect was neither to provide the means of success or destruction. Despite the reaction of the diaspora, Scottish nationalism has grown to a successful maturity in UK politics.

The word ambivalence has been used to describe Scottish nationalism in the context that many organisations were established to support it over time, often existing side by side. The meaning striven for here is to convey equivocation, unsureness, vacillation or inconclusiveness. Recall that ‘home rule’ organisations supported the British Empire and saw themselves as much a part of this as Canada and New Zealand. Their wish was to amend the Union, not to abrogate it. In the case of the earlier movement, Dr Clarke was trying to enforce the Union which he saw as having been weakened. The post-1918 movement comprised four organisations; Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association, the Scots National League, the SHRA and the Scottish National Movement. These formed the NPS in 1928 and with the Scottish Party formed the SNP in 1934. In 1942 this suffered a splinter group, the Scottish Convention, which continued in different forms for 10 years. Thus organisations with different strategies for self-government or independence but which broadly supported self-government of differing kinds for Scotland coexisted, cooperated and competed.\textsuperscript{1082} No doubt the individuals in these organisations were certain of the solution they proposed, although some individuals were common to a number of organisations, but their co-occurrence indicates that the movement had no single focus until the eventual pre-eminence of the SNP during the

\textsuperscript{1082} Lynch, 2002, pp.5-6
1960s. This certainly affected the way the movement looked from the diaspora, as organisations could be broadly supportive but unsure of which organisation to patronise.\footnote{Acc. 3721/4/77, letter from the London Renfrewshire Association 11\textsuperscript{th} August 1934}

The activities undertaken by the various protagonists in the home rule and nationalist projects in Scotland have been described using the adjective amateurish. The word is used in its most basic definition, that of an activity being unprofessional. Suitable synonyms in the context used here would be inexpert, inept and unskilled. Some examples from the text will be sufficient to justify the use of the word. Roland Muirhead’s correspondence with supporters abroad was initially structured, thus the letter to 80 Australian newspaper editors. However, he lost the replies for a year, and was unable to respond in a structured way, merely asking for support and money. There was no sustained effort to build an organisation and the correspondence turned more towards a personal correspondence rather than a business one. The one exception to this might have been the formation of the SNPA in the 1970s, when an organisation of sorts was put in place to coordinate overseas branches. However its governance was poor, there was little money and it was seen by a senior SNP official, Muriel Gibson, as a poor response to interest in the diaspora.\footnote{Acc.10754/23, 22\textsuperscript{nd} October 1976. Gibson felt it had caused disappointment and could have achieved its aim in a cleverer way}

If the use of the word amateurish as described above notes a failure of method, the word spasmodic has also been used in the enquiry to indicate a failure of continual effort. It is used to describe the efforts of the home rule and nationalist organisation in their attempts to recruit the diaspora to their cause. Defined as erratic, the appropriate synonyms relating to the use of this adjective would be irregular, desultory, fitful, or perhaps intermittent or fragmentary. The efforts to engage the diaspora through visits by officials serve as one example of this. Muirhead and his colleagues in the NPS did make some visits to America and Canada, but they were essentially personal business visits with nationalist meetings fitted in where possible. These visits were not regular. Muirhead went once, MacCormick once for the NPS and once for the Covenant, Thompson twice for the NPS. This between 1921 when Muirhead wrote to the Australian...
papers and MacCormick’s visit in 1950. The word as used therefore is designed
to re-enforce the message that there was no sustained, continual effort to woo
the diaspora to the nationalist cause.

To proceed now to the analysis of the nature of diasporas. This should be
preceded by the caveat that, in common with all social groups, they are not
homogenous. Nor will their homeland always carry connotations of loyalty,
belonging or obligation. They are defined as people with a common origin
who reside, more or less permanently, outside the borders of their domestic
homeland. It has been shown earlier that from time to time diaspora are
called upon to take part in homeland affairs, or they become entangled on their
own initiative. Members of such a diaspora can usefully be categorised to
determine their degree or likelihood of mobilisation. The categories used here
are core, passive and silent.

Core members are the organising active elites, capable of mobilising the
diaspora, usually mobilising passive members first. Silent members are the
larger pool of people generally uninvolved in diaspora affairs but able to be
called upon at times of crisis. This simple categorisation will be returned to
after a closer look at the Scottish diaspora. The role of Scottish associations as
gatekeepers also supports the notion of them as core actors in the diaspora.

The Engagement with the Diaspora

It is useful to analyse the movements’ activities chronologically. This
demonstrates how little was learned by subsequent organisations from the
actions of their predecessors. The first SHRA was founded in 1886 with £200
each from Lord Bute and a ‘colonial premier,’ there would be an expectation
that such provenance would encourage engagement with the diaspora. Indeed,
the second annual conference of the SHRA, in 1889, made an appeal to
‘Scotsmen all over the world’ for funds to enable the association to organise in
Scotland. A pamphlet outlining the SHRA cause was dedicated to the Scot

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1085 Shain and Barth, 2003, p.252 footnote 23
1086 Ibid. p.252
1087 Ibid.
1088 Ibid.
1089 Melbourne Argos, 4th February 1891
1090 Napier, 1892; Mitchell, 1892
Abroad. The constitution provided for branches to be set up ‘in Scotland and elsewhere.’ A Colonial Secretary, Thomas McNaught was appointed, toured the US and Canada in 1888 and published an aim to raise a fund of £100,000. McNaught wrote to newspapers around the world in connection with the Association’s ‘Statement of Scotland’s claim for Home Rule’. There is however no evidence that funds of anything like McNaught’s target were collected, although there was evidence that some overseas branches were established. For example, the New York Scottish Home Rule Association was founded.

It was not unreasonable of him to anticipate funds being raised, given the success of the Irish referred to earlier, and given the common occurrence of remittances. It was not unusual at that time for Scots societies in New Zealand to raise funds for relief projects in a particular Scottish locale. The Caithness and Sutherland Association initiated a Shetland relief fund in about 1881, and a year later, highland members of the Oamaru Caledonian Society were also supporting the fund. Highlanders from Invercargill raised £148 pounds for relief of crofters on Skye in 1883. Such relief projects have been claimed to reflect an active connection between the benevolence of the diaspora and domestic politics. A previous chapter has recorded the collection of funds from the diaspora to found a Chair of Gaelic at Edinburgh University during the 1870s. A later example would be the gift of £1,000 from Dunedin to the Edinburgh Lord Provost for the furnishing of a room in the City Chambers. An expectation of some contribution had not been unreasonable, especially in the light of the massive contributions the Irish were making.

In 1891, there was some success for the SHRA in Australia when the Scottish Home Rule Association of Victoria was founded. This organisation existed to ‘support the great patriotic movement in Scotland to obtain local national

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1091 Mitchell, 1892a, frontispiece
1092 Mitchell, 1892a
1093 PRO, 30/69/1186
1094 Bueltmann, 2011, p.199
1095 Nation, 1914, p.75, the first annual report of the League
1096 Bueltmann, 2011, pp.186-7
1097 Ibid., p.187
1098 Ibid.
self-government.'\textsuperscript{1099} It may be recalled from chapter three that it changed its name a year later to the Scottish National Association of Victoria to encourage membership numbers. The Association actually featured fund raising in its objectives; ‘All Scotsmen and others in the Colonies who sympathise with the objectives of the association are requested to forward their donations to the Hon. Treasurer in order that they be transmitted to the parent Association in Scotland.'\textsuperscript{1100}

Theodore Napier was the founder and funder of the Association. Napier was a ‘sturdy Jacobite who was regarded by many as a public benefactor and by a few others as a public nuisance.'\textsuperscript{1101} In 1885 he had moved a motion at the annual meeting of the Caledonian Society of Melbourne concerning the misuse of the word ‘English’ in place of British. The motion was withdrawn and some regarded it as an extreme expression of Scottish nationalism.\textsuperscript{1102} It is notable that the Melbourne Association appears to have been a feature of the successful Caledonian culture that thrived from time to time in Victoria from the 1850s.\textsuperscript{1103} Whilst at first sight this may seem to support the tactic of approaching the diaspora through its associational groups, this is contradicted by the need to change the name to remove the words ‘home rule’ to encourage membership. This Melbourne nationalist association did persist although no records of systematic support through fund raising have been discovered. In 1915 it was reported as passing a resolution of protest at the threatened closure of Rosyth dockyard.\textsuperscript{1104}

Whilst the first SHRA, unlike the League and the NPS/SNP did not have a regular publication to sell to supporters, it did contribute a paper that attempted to reach out to the Scots in London. The first edition of \textit{The London Scotsman} received expressions of support from Cunninghame Graham and Professor Blackie, both SHRA members.\textsuperscript{1105} There are no articles on the SHRA; nor are

\textsuperscript{1099} Napier, 1892
\textsuperscript{1100} Napier, 1892, inside back cover.
\textsuperscript{1101} Prentis, 1983, p.203; Prentis, 2008, p.280
\textsuperscript{1102} Prentis, 1983, p.283
\textsuperscript{1103} Ibid., pp.200-203 for the development of the associational culture in the state.
\textsuperscript{1104} Nation 1915, p.227
\textsuperscript{1105} \textit{The London Scotsman}, Vol. 1, No.1, 7th January 1888

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any to be found in a later, more modest, publication of the same name that was being published between 1897 and 1899.\textsuperscript{1106}

By 1892 the organisation no longer appointed a Colonial Secretary.\textsuperscript{1107} The accounts of the organisation showed funds of £33 only three years later,\textsuperscript{1108} an indication that the support expected from abroad or home was not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{1109} Recall from chapter three that by 1906 the organisation had foundered. The engagement with the Scots abroad had featured some elements which were to be common with most future attempts; a visit to North America, the use of newspapers and the use of Scottish associations to access the diaspora. With the exception of Melbourne, and perhaps New York, this attempt failed.

Established in 1913, the International Scots Home Rule League aimed to bring the Scot abroad into the fight for home rule. It reached out to the Scottish Diaspora through the many Scots associations in the US and Canada. Making a specific point of ensuring the demand for a national parliament came from the Scottish race, it contacted many overseas organisations\textsuperscript{1110} and, superficially at least, had around 30 branches in some way affiliated throughout the diaspora.\textsuperscript{1111} An earlier chapter has described the visit to North America by head of the organisation, Robertson, with this specific aim in mind. These were in part the same associational Scottish societies that had listened to McNaught nearly twenty years previously, the honourable presidents of the League were the prominent Scots in their areas. However, the branches showed little appetite for fundraising and meetings were essentially cultural in aspect.\textsuperscript{1112}

The League did at least add one additional feature to its armoury for attracting the diaspora’s support; that of a newspaper, the \textit{Scottish Nation}. Published from 1913 to 1917, the \textit{Nation} was a bi-monthly paper designed for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1106} Ibid., November 1897, December 1897, January-February 1898, May-June 1898 and September-October 1899
\item \textsuperscript{1107} Mitchell, 1892a, list of officials
\item \textsuperscript{1108} Glasgow Herald, 31\textsuperscript{st} October 1895
\item \textsuperscript{1109} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1110} Nation, 1914, p.75, First Annual Report
\item \textsuperscript{1111} Nation, 1916, p.368
\item \textsuperscript{1112} Nation, 1915, p.239; 1917 p.430
\end{itemize}
consumption both home and abroad with the dual purpose of raising money and spreading propaganda.

The visit of Robertson to North America was superficially welcomed by the Scots associations visited and branches were established,¹¹¹³ however there was no long lasting organisation created and crucially little generated in the way of financial contribution to the cause. The organisations targeted were barren ground for attracting support for the nationalist project in Scotland. Yet this approach was to persist. Chapter three dealt with the ending of League activity with the advent of the First World War.

The new, post-war SHRA’s initial engagement was through letters sent in June 1921 by its founder Roland Muirhead to the editors of 80 newspapers in Australia. There are just 13 responses filed in the correspondence archive.¹¹¹⁴ Many of the responses to these letters were ignored by Muirhead for around a year, reflecting poor organisation. The responses begin encouragingly, with promises to set up branches,¹¹¹⁵ requests for literature¹¹¹⁶ and occasionally donations.¹¹¹⁷ Muirhead sent literature, advised of membership fees and of membership in Scotland and overseas.¹¹¹⁸ As chapter three recalls, over the years these correspondents reveal no great progress in the branches if set up, and eventually the subject matter becomes more social than political.

The only visit to Australasia by a prominent home rule supporter was in 1927, that of The Reverend James Barr who proposed the Home Rule Bill of May 1927. Barr was the guest of academics and churchmen¹¹¹⁹ and although he preached or lectured in many towns in New Zealand, his audience chiefly comprised of churchmen, Labour party members and the temperance movement.¹¹²⁰ There is no mention of nationalism in his accounts of this trip, or the following visit to Australia, where he preached and gave Burns lectures.¹¹²¹

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¹¹¹³ *Nation*, 1913, p.50
¹¹¹⁴ Acc. 3721/187/2
¹¹¹⁵ Acc. 3721/187/6, letter from South Australia, Stevenson, dated 23rd August 1921
¹¹¹⁶ Ibid., letter from A. F. Kaglund, New South Wales
¹¹¹⁷ Ibid., letter from Heriot, Sydney 12th November 1923
¹¹¹⁸ Ibid., for example reply to Anderson, Adelaide.
¹¹¹⁹ Barr, 1949, p.295
¹¹²⁰ Ibid., p.292
¹¹²¹ Ibid., p.299; p.305
All he could give Muirhead on his return was the names of six supporters to contact. Engagement with the diaspora in Australasia was therefore sporadic after the first attempt at recruitment through newspapers, and not maintained in any structured way such as was found in the US with Donaldson’s organisation.

After the formation of the NPS, there were several visits to engage with the diaspora in North America and Canada. However, due to shortage of funds, these visits were primarily for other purposes with the promotion of home rule tagged on to them. MacCormick was in the US and Canada in 1930 on the business of Glasgow University, and the visits of Muirhead and Thompson were primarily business visits. Whilst it can be seen from the description of these visits in chapter three that there were some meetings with small audiences addressed, these visits were not successful from a fundraising perspective and were not repeated often enough to sustain a permanent, growing base of support. They were also coordinated through the local Scottish associations.

There was an organisation in the US and Canada, with an organiser for the US in Arthur Donaldson, described in chapter three. An undated list of non-Scottish SNP branch secretaries lists eight in Canada and five in the US. However, the audience was not necessarily receptive, as Andrew Little in Quebec reported; the Scots got abuse from other Canadians about nationalism, insofar as if they don’t like what’s happening back home they should go back and sort it out. Later he remarked that ‘the attempts to awaken in others the sentimentalism for things Scottish is a thankless and sometimes an unpleasant experience for me but I intend to carry on.’ This seems a curious anomaly, making it sound difficult to encourage the Scot abroad to think about Scotland. However later in this chapter evidence is presented to demonstrate that the associational Scot of Caledonian Societies was by no means the larger part of the diaspora.

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1122 Acc. 3721/4/80, exchange of letters between MacCormick and Muirhead, October/November 1930
1123 Acc. 3721/95/87, twenty overseas secretaries are listed
1124 Acc. 3721/11/235, letter Little to Muirhead, 21st June 1933
1125 Ibid., Little to Muirhead, 11th January 1937
The SNP published a newsletter, in this case the *Scots Independent*. The *SI* was originally the organ of the Scots National League (recall this merged with the National Party of Scotland in June 1928) and continued to be published by the movement when it became the SNP. Early on, the sort of help asked for was the linking ‘of all Scots societies’ establishing branches of the Scots National League in all centres where Scots congregate. League Branches were asked to disseminate information about Scotland not only to other Scots societies but also the politicians and press of their own state.\textsuperscript{1126} Sales of the *SI* were a source of income and propaganda and there are many references to subscriptions to the paper in Muirhead’s correspondence with overseas sympathisers.\textsuperscript{1127}

However, Muirhead would many times affirm his belief that the Scots abroad would contribute, ‘if only they knew of us.’\textsuperscript{1128} Post 1945, the SNP made another attempt at organising the diaspora. The failed engagement methods were repeated. Branches existed briefly in Sydney and Johannesburg in the 1950s and branches in Auckland, Wellington and Vancouver in the 1960s were equally short lived.\textsuperscript{1129} In the case of Vancouver, this was because the driving force, Ian Hannah, left.\textsuperscript{1130} This may have been the reason the SNP tried to improve its approach as its popularity in Scotland grew in the 1960s and 1970s.

The SNP set up an organisation to manage and engage with the diaspora, the SNPA. Like its predecessor, the Scottish Independence Society, it was partly founded to overcome the difficulty of overseas branches being representatives of a foreign political organisation.\textsuperscript{1131} Described in detail in chapter four, minutes of an early meeting of the SNPA on 25\textsuperscript{th} July 1976\textsuperscript{1132} noted that individual members needed to be subject to party discipline and so had to be within the SNPA.\textsuperscript{1133} It can be suggested therefore that this body was as much about control as it was about promotion of the cause overseas. For example, there

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1126} SI, November 1927, pp.6-7
\textsuperscript{1127} Acc. 3721/11/235, correspondence with Alistair Little of Quebec; Acc. 3721/7/127, Jessie Mackay of Christchurch, New Zealand,
\textsuperscript{1128} Acc. 3721/11/240, letter to George Matheson, 13\textsuperscript{th} October, 1939
\textsuperscript{1129} SI, July 1979, p.5
\textsuperscript{1130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1132} Acc. 10754/17
\textsuperscript{1133} Acc. 10754/24
\end{footnotes}
was concern that the Americans could be very enthusiastic and therefore
difficult to contain.\footnote{1134} Muriel Gibson, SNP membership secretary, thought it an
inadequate response to the need to accommodate overseas members who had
difficulty in joining a foreign political party.\footnote{1135} An SNPA supporter in Canada,
Norman Allan, described its role as a PR organisation, one which was able to
host visits by senior SNP officials and facilitate contact with business and
politicians.\footnote{1136} A newspaper, the *Saltire*, was distributed to members.

Nevertheless some progress was made in the mid-1970s. Jim Johnstone,
newly emigrated from Edinburgh, set up the SNPA in the US, founding
branches in New York, Washington and Virginia. Johnstone hosted a visit by
Douglas Crawford, SNP MP, on the 6\textsuperscript{th}-14\textsuperscript{th} of June 1977.\footnote{1137} The visit
encompassed the UN, lunch with journalists, meeting with Congressmen as
well as discussions at the World Bank and the IMF. This was not a ‘flag waving’
visit, but focussed on business and finance. Good though Johnstone was, he
was the only SNP member in the US SNPA. The rest were US citizens
interested in culture, kilts and clans\footnote{1138} and William Wolfe did not think
Johnstone got on well with his members.\footnote{1139} When he returned to Scotland two
years later, the organisation founndered.\footnote{1140}

The management of the SNPA betrayed the same lack of consistent organised
support for those Scots abroad interested in the nationalist cause. Overseas
membership may never have exceeded 700\footnote{1141} at a time when SNP Scottish
members numbered approximately 125,000.\footnote{1142} Organisation was lax,\footnote{1143}
leadership part time\footnote{1144} and the branches abroad were neither expected to raise
funds beyond their own subscriptions,\footnote{1145} nor act as spokesmen for the SNP in
their country. The editor of the *Saltire* wrote in 1978 the paper’s ‘days were numbered’ He estimated only 60 people worldwide read it. The SNPA had to achieve a modus operandi that fell somewhere between a branch of a foreign political party and a Caledonian Society. Norman Allan admitted that ‘the meetings tend to the social’ to attract members.

For the most case these organisations tried to engage the diaspora using the same methods and the same Scots associational bodies, and failed repeatedly to learn from the experiences of their predecessors. The only attempt by a nationalist body to organise its overseas branches by country into one affiliated organisation was blighted by the same poor and part time organisation. The common thread, the approach through the associational Scot abroad was also a mistake of target, not just of organisation. It is proposed that these bodies acted as gatekeepers between the nationalists and the diaspora, so it is to this concept as well as the nature and size of the associations that the chapter now turns.

**Gatekeepers: Brief Examples and a Definition**

Some examples of gatekeepers in social and political environments were given earlier to demonstrate the kind of actors and activities that characterise this behaviour. Further examples demonstrate how gatekeepers influence politics. Although the French presidency was designed as a supra-partisan ofice, the need for Presidents to have a majority in the National Assembly to pass legislation, works against this. The parties effectively act as gatekeepers and enablers for candidates, and the presidential election is the high point of party activity. The parties determine who goes forward to lead.

In the field of academic research, an important factor affecting the choice of topic is the availability of funds to pay for it. The people and organisations who provide these funds act as gatekeepers. Governments may be hostile to research that attacks their policies or which advocates an agenda different to their own. Industrial providers of funds tend to want research to yield practical

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1146 Acc. 7295/35, 30th March 1979
1147 Acc. 10754/22, letter dated 12th February 1978
1148 SI, July 1979, p.5
1149 Hanley, 2007, pp.423 and 437
benefits.\textsuperscript{1150} Media professionals act as gatekeepers by systematically including or excluding certain types of content.\textsuperscript{1151} Governments can also act as gatekeepers by determining who, if anybody, gets access to certain data.

These examples, drawn as they are from political and social arenas, demonstrate common features; gatekeepers can be organisations or individuals, their role as gatekeeper in any specific context may not be explicit in the description of their functions or the role they carry out as commonly understood by employers, sponsors or supporters. Either individually or corporately they act in such a manner which will support their objectives, or those of the organisation they represent, rather than any other. This principle applied to the Scottish Associations.

**Contact through the Associations**

The Scottish Diaspora is distinguished by the associational structure the Scots set up wherever they settled.\textsuperscript{1152} Scottish associations such as St. Andrew's and Caledonian Societies proliferated throughout the British Empire as a vehicle for the expression of ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{1153} This identity tended to be Highland in texture, rather than representative of all Scots, but there was no single narrative of Scottish associational culture at home or abroad.\textsuperscript{1154} Although these clubs of Scots, or descendants of Scots, appeared from the seventeenth century onwards, It is unclear when precisely the Scots started forming these associations.\textsuperscript{1155} They fell broadly into two types; those which were generically Scottish in character and those with a Scottish regional orientation.\textsuperscript{1156} They provided relief and support for Scots in difficulty, and preserved the culture and relevant cultural artefacts. This kind of association was not unique to the Scots; the Irish were very active in this regard as were fellow Britons the English and Welsh.\textsuperscript{1157} In the Irish case, this association was accompanied by the politics of active homeland nationalist activity, sometimes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1150} Haralambos et. al., 2008, pp.814-5
\item \textsuperscript{1151} Ibid., p.721
\item \textsuperscript{1152} Bueltmann et al., 2009; Bueltman, 2011; Harper, 2003, 2012
\item \textsuperscript{1153} Leith and Sim, 2014, p.47
\item \textsuperscript{1154} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.20
\item \textsuperscript{1155} Leith and Sim, 2014, p.48
\item \textsuperscript{1156} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1157} Berthoff, 1953, p.165
\end{itemize}
violent. Although the Scottish associations were by no means the only component of the diaspora, the argument now turns to the nature of these associations and whether or not they supported homeland self-government.

It is preferable to examine the associational Scot through the lens of the host country. This is because conditions in these countries were different and the situation of the diaspora and its associations were also different. Just how different will be seen in the arguments to follow. Note first, that there would be general agreement that all of these countries could be labelled liberal states where diasporas may operate as ethnic lobbies for their kin. However it has been noted earlier that the progress of liberal democracy in these states did not proceed in concert. Nevertheless it is helpful to structure the analysis geographically.

**Canada**

Some Canadian associations have left evidence of their objectives. The constitution of the Caledonian Society of Toronto, dated 1871 in this edition and therefore proximal to the time frame of this thesis, makes clear its aims in Article I, The Objects of the Society.

‘The encouragement of the National Costume and games, the cultivation of a taste for Scottish Music, History and Poetry and the uniting more closely together of Scotchmen.’

There is no intent here to support any return to Scotland, none to support any independence movement, nor to support any remittances to such organisations. Article IV of the constitution says nothing of what can, or cannot be brought to a meeting. The St. Andrew’s Society of Montreal, established in 1835, stated its objects to be ‘strictly limited to charity and acts of philanthropy’. Its membership was restricted to leading, influential and respectable Scots. Its management were charged by the constitution with dispensing the Society’s bounty to ‘Resident Members’ (of the society) ‘who may become indigent, and

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1158 Shain and Barth, 2003, p.250 make this a conditional factor.
1159 The Constitution and by-laws of the Caledonian Society of Toronto 1871, Article I
1160 Narrative of the proceedings of the St. Andrew’s Society of Montreal, 1855, p.3
1161 Bueltmann et. al., 2009, pp.72-3
poor natives of Scotland.\textsuperscript{1162} Through the organisation and its charitable actions, the Scots of the high bourgeoisie, those who founded it, conveyed values and ideas to the rest of the Scottish population.\textsuperscript{1163} There is no specific ban on political activity, except at the outset, when the revival of national feeling is attributed to the racial nature of politics in Montreal as Anglo-Saxons vied with French Canadians and British values needed to be maintained.\textsuperscript{1164}

If the Society did not have an overtly political agenda, then some of its members certainly did; many of them were active in support of the Constitution Act of 1791 which established a British style social and political structure disliked by the French Canadian majority.\textsuperscript{1165} Although its actions were exclusively charitable, it is clear from its offer of help to \textit{worthy} Scots that the elitist regulation of charity was at its heart.

It would be with organisations like these that the representatives of both the SHRA and League would engage to put their case to Scotsmen. The focus on national costume and culture would have been expensive, which would encourage membership from the well-off. The qualification to vote in Canada varied by province until 1920 and was qualified by property ownership until that time. The Canadian provinces had gained some form of self-government progressively from 1848. The concept of home rule by whatever name would have been familiar to the members of the Toronto and Montreal Societies.

\textbf{United States}

Many British immigrants to the United States did not really consider it a foreign country.\textsuperscript{1166} However, they still formed societies and celebrated their national days. For the Scots, the first recorded was the Scots Charitable Society of Boston, formed in 1657.\textsuperscript{1167} St. Andrew’s clubs followed; from 1729 to 1756 clubs opened, starting in Charleston South Carolina,\textsuperscript{1168} with Philadelphia, Savannah and New York following.\textsuperscript{1169} In 1845 a group of Scots met to

\textsuperscript{1162} Narrative of the proceedings of the St. Andrew’s Society of Montreal, 1855, pp.48-49
\textsuperscript{1163} Bueltmann et al., 2009, p.69
\textsuperscript{1164} Bueltmann, et. al., 2009, pp.70-1
\textsuperscript{1165} Bueltmann, et. al., 2009, pp.70-1
\textsuperscript{1166} Ibid., p.138
\textsuperscript{1167} Berthoff, 1953, p.165
\textsuperscript{1168} Leith and Sim, 2014, p.48
\textsuperscript{1169} Centennial Blue Book, St. Andrews Society of Illinois, 1949, p.10
celebrate St. Andrew’s Day, and formed the Illinois St. Andrew’s Society. Its aims were to preserve Scottish traditions and culture and serve Chicago’s community of Scots.\textsuperscript{1170} The first constitution of the Society was published in its annual report of 1889 and refers to ‘A sacred obligation to aid the unfortunate among our countrymen.’\textsuperscript{1171} The aims of the Detroit St. Andrew’s Society were to ‘provide relief and assistance for the unfortunate of their countrymen and to preserve and promote the traditions of Old Scotia in the land of their adoption.’\textsuperscript{1172} Whereas the St. Andrew’s societies were run by small philanthropic cliques (the New York St. Andrew’s Society took in none but the ‘Scottish elite,’\textsuperscript{1173}) the Caledonian Clubs founded from the mid-1800s fostered a type of Scottish culture in the form of games, balls and concerts; activities, games excluded, probably enjoyed by the elite few rather than the many.

By 1918 there were games being held in over 125 towns and cities in the US.\textsuperscript{1174} Benefit Orders akin to the English Odd Fellows lodges began to be formed in the late 1800s with St. Louis founding the first lodge of the national fraternity. This ‘Order of Scottish Clans’ had 160 active lodges in 1914 and 16,000 active members. These clans were not traditional highland clans, just local lodge names.\textsuperscript{1175} In 1926 it was reported that the Order of Scottish Clansmen of America represented societies with a membership of 30,000.\textsuperscript{1176} In contrast, the main purpose of the Highland or Gaelic variety of association was the protection and preservation of Highland culture and language.\textsuperscript{1177}

As in other countries, these associations were either philanthropic or cultural, as is evidenced by their aims and activities. They were not founded for, or used for such a purpose as the promotion of a foreign country nationalism. As Tables VI and VII have shown, the US had been free of foreign rule since 1783 and although participation was low, men who were not slaves had been able to vote since the 1820s, although a universal franchise was not achieved until 1965.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\item[1170] Bueltmann, et. al., 2009, p.138
\item[1171] Bueltmann, et. al., 2009, p.143
\item[1172] Centennial Blue Book, St Andrew’s Society of Detroit, p.7
\item[1173] Berthoff, 1953, p.177
\item[1174] Ibid., p.167
\item[1175] Ibid., p.188
\item[1176] Acc. 3721/137/174, Edinburgh Evening News, 29th July 1926
\item[1177] Leith and Sim, 2014, p.50
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
Old country politics were not encouraged, demonstrated earlier in chapter three.

**New Zealand**

New Zealand is recognised as the first state to allow universal suffrage, in 1893. Some form of self-government was in place from 1857, with Dominium status within the British Empire following in 1907. It is reasonable for the members of the Societies to be aware of the difference in governance circumstances between New Zealand and their place of birth or historical homeland, Scotland.

When a St. Andrew’s Society was established in Auckland in 1855, its aims were listed as the promotion of education, the granting of pecuniary aid to worthy potential immigrants, communication about affairs in the province to Scotland to encourage other emigrants, the revival of old associations and providing relief to natives of Scotland and their descendants resident in Auckland.\textsuperscript{1178}

Themes in the objects of these societies emerge. Benevolence, the support for procuring and disseminating information on the literature, culture and history of Scotland, as well as encouraging excellence in the performance of national feats, games and exercises.\textsuperscript{1179} The New Zealand societies were dominated by the Caledonian Games, which were exploited as a brand by athletics clubs. ‘It is conceivable that many of the new Caledonian clubs set up in the early part of the twentieth century were athletics clubs with no particular rooting in the Scottish Community.’\textsuperscript{1180} This, with the absence of St Andrew’s Societies, made New Zealand different from North America; The Scottish associational landscape in Otago was dominated by Caledonian Societies.\textsuperscript{1181} Here benevolence was not the main driver as it had been in North America. Although usually ranked first in lists of objectives, in New Zealand the clubs outsourced the giving by donating to charities, rather than distributing it as was the case.

\textsuperscript{1178} Bueltmann, 2011, p.82
\textsuperscript{1179} Ibid., pp.70-71
\textsuperscript{1180} Bueltmann, 2011, p.69
\textsuperscript{1181} Leith and Sim, 2014, p.50
seen above in Montreal. It can be suggested therefore that it was less likely to be ethnically focussed.\textsuperscript{1182}

Scottish clubs with specialised associations, such as Burns, were established in the late nineteenth century, and Scottish societies in the early twentieth century celebrated Scottish patriotism, were located in the cultural realm and were defined to invoke Scotland.\textsuperscript{1183} Highland societies like the Gaelic Society in Dunedin existed to preserve language and culture.\textsuperscript{1184} A New Zealand Federation of Caledonian and Scottish Societies was established in 1927. Its objectives were to unite the various societies, unify all Scots throughout New Zealand, and stimulate a general interest in all affairs of social and national concern to Scots people. It encouraged the study of literature, music and art as well as Scottish games, sports and pastimes. It encouraged members to take a brotherly interest in Scots arriving from the mother country and overseas.\textsuperscript{1185} There was no ambition here to support any political cause in the home country, only to celebrate and preserve Scottish culture and other activities, provide vehicles for integration and ethnic identity and be a site of potent memory.\textsuperscript{1186}

Some view of the place that nationalism held in the diaspora here can be deduced from the official organ of the New Zealand Federation of Caledonian and Scottish Societies, the \textit{New Zealand Scotsman}. This paper provided some reporting on nationalist activities. It reported the 624\textsuperscript{th} Wallace anniversary, noting a gradual awakening of the spirit of Scottish nationalism. The author, Mrs Dorothy McClelland, reported that 'the only obstacle to self-government for Scotland was the apathy of the Scots themselves.'\textsuperscript{1187} There was nothing in that issue’s editorial, though, and no letters on the subject in following issues until 1930, when the editorial reported on an article describing Scottish nationalism from the \textit{Spectator} which had been used in an unnamed New Zealand newspaper.\textsuperscript{1188} A year later a correspondent reported on a visit to the Inverness branch of the NPS. They reported 'no crankiness, but good sound Scots

\textsuperscript{1182} Bueltmann, 2011, p.72  
\textsuperscript{1183} Ibid., pp.85-87  
\textsuperscript{1184} Leith and Sim, 2014, p.50  
\textsuperscript{1185} Ibid., p.91  
\textsuperscript{1186} Ibid., p.166  
\textsuperscript{1187} \textit{New Zealand Scotsman}, 15\textsuperscript{th} November 1929  
\textsuperscript{1188} Ibid., 15\textsuperscript{th} April 1930, p.48
sense.' Later that year the sorry state of the Scottish economy was the subject of a full page in support of Scottish nationalism, ending 'can we wonder...that men from all political parties are banding together and making a demand for home rule for Scotland'? However in 1933 a short piece on Scottish nationalism ended 'Scots Nationalism is a subject at the current moment to be approached with bated breath.' Nowhere in the occasional discourse over these four years in this official organ is there pressure to support, join or send money, demonstrating that the societies were maintaining their non-political stance. It may be that the paper did not have the full support of the many societies it represented, as after four years of operation it was still losing money through low subscription, due it claimed to the economic recession.

**Australia**

The Scottish immigrant arriving in Australia did so with dual nationality, Scottish and British. The Sydney based Highland Society formed from two earlier groups in 1877, had as its aims the following; promoting Gaelic and Scots literature, music and Games, the social and intellectual improvement of its members, care for needy Scots and new arrivals and the commemoration of Scottish Days in the calendar.

Membership was for the more distinguished. The first President of the Society was Sir John Hay, Conservative MP and President of the Legislative Council. Five of its first seven vice presidents were MPs, including Alexander Stuart who became Premier in 1883. The objectives of these and the other 130 or so Australian societies that were established were similar to those listed above for the Sydney society. In the Victoria region, there was a great expansion of Scottish clubs in the early 1900s, with 53 recorded in the greater Melbourne and surrounding districts by the outbreak of the First World War. This proliferation of groups was co-ordinated by the Victorian Scottish Union, which

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1189 Ibid., 15th July 1931, p.31
1190 Ibid., 15th September 1931
1191 Ibid., March 1933, p.227
1192 Ibid., 15th March 1930
1193 Prentis, 2008, p.279
1194 Ibid., pp.199-200
1195 ODNB, 2004, vol.53
facilitated the avoidance of events clashing and represented the groups in the pre-war dispute with the Australian Government over the disbanding of Highland regiments.\textsuperscript{1196} By the 1960s, there was more diversity, with clan groups as well as regional groups such as the Western Perthshire society. The Scottish Heritage Council, formed as an umbrella group in 1981 affiliated hundreds of Caledonian, music, clan and county groups.\textsuperscript{1197} However, as with groups elsewhere in the Scottish diaspora, struggles to retain the kilt in uniform apart, they were a part of a preservation movement, of Scottish symbolism, of the constitutional status quo. An MLA of Western Australia stated; ‘The Scottish societies in Australia had no politics. Their only policy was the maintenance of the British Empire.’\textsuperscript{1198} Of course, the maintenance of the British Empire was politics, just not Scottish nationalist politics. Recall the notion earlier that some place nationalism at the periphery, something that belongs to others. The evidence as presented leads to the conclusion that the Scots combined in their Clubs and Societies overseas had objectives and activities which were not aligned to political or financial support for Scottish Nationalism. This situation also obtained where long distance nationalism was not possible, the rest of the UK, specifically England.

\textbf{England}

The Scots in England also established their associations wherever their migration resulted in large co-located groups. As part of the UK, England, like Scotland and the other constituents, did not have universal manhood suffrage until 1918, and universal suffrage for over 21 year olds was not introduced until 1929. Of the selected states examined in Tables VI and VII, only the US and South Africa were more tardy. England, whilst conquered by the Normans in 1066 and subdued over subsequent decades, had been independent for centuries before the time of the first SHRA. This section on Scottish societies in England will concentrate on groups in London. The London Caledonian Society was probably the first of its kind conceived by Lowlanders as an all Scottish alternative to the many Highland-orientated groups in the capital. It served as

\textsuperscript{1196} Bueltmann, et al., 2009, pp.154-160
\textsuperscript{1197} Ibid., p.202
\textsuperscript{1198} Prentis, 2008, p.203, Quote by J. Macallum Smith, MLA Western Australia, 1929
the model for at least one overseas association, the Melbourne Caledonian Society.\textsuperscript{1199}

London, as the centre of the government of the UK and the Empire, was a natural nexus for those having, seeking or wishing to influence power. At the turn of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century Scottish associations in London had, by a contemporary estimate, around 5,000 members.\textsuperscript{1200} Accordingly, it is not surprising that there was formed in 1919 a Scottish Home Rule Association of London,\textsuperscript{1201} although its membership was limited to members of the National Liberal Club.\textsuperscript{1202} Over a year later it was described as being ‘an active body’ and there is a note that a branch of the Scottish National League (SNL) had also been formed in London.\textsuperscript{1203} The body saw itself as ‘a kind of watchdog over parliamentary developments and claimed the support of the majority of Scottish MPs.’\textsuperscript{1204}

The Scottish National Convention was established in 1924 for the purpose of framing a scheme for Scottish self-government.\textsuperscript{1205} It recognised the importance of London and established a parliamentary sub-committee to lobby MPs, convened by Alex McLaren, also a member of both the SHRA and the SNL in London.\textsuperscript{1206} The Convention wrote to 58 actual and prospective Scottish MPs in November of that year.\textsuperscript{1207} Between 1936 and 1939 there was a London Scottish Self-Government Committee, an elite organisation whose members were Scottish MPs and other dignitaries resident in London.\textsuperscript{1208} The importance of London as the seat of power was appreciated by the SHRA and this was highlighted in a letter from Muirhead to John McCormick.\textsuperscript{1209} London, then, was an essential location for those intending to influence law-makers.

The records of the London associations therefore make a useful source to determine the political inclinations of the Scots in these societies. The Ilford

\textsuperscript{1199} Bueltmann, et al., 2009, pp.153-154
\textsuperscript{1200} The London Scotsman, Vol. 1, March-April 1898, p.16
\textsuperscript{1201} Acc.3721/125/25, news cutting of unidentified origin, probably the Glasgow Herald, 1\textsuperscript{st} December 1919
\textsuperscript{1202} Ibid., cutting from the Glasgow Herald 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1920
\textsuperscript{1203} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1204} Ibid., cutting from the Glasgow Herald, 22\textsuperscript{nd} January 1921
\textsuperscript{1205} Acc. 3721/85/27, minutes of first meeting 15\textsuperscript{th} November 1924
\textsuperscript{1206} Acc. 3721/81/2, meeting held 29\textsuperscript{th} May 1927
\textsuperscript{1207} Acc. 3721/84/23
\textsuperscript{1208} Acc.3721/21/608, see letter heading on correspondence with Muirhead
\textsuperscript{1209} Acc. 3721/7/127, letter dated 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1933
Scottish Association was one such organisation. It had around 800 members and did ‘much useful social and charitable work among Scots in the south.'\textsuperscript{1210}

The Caledonian Society of London recorded its activities in a set of Chronicles between the years of 1837 and 1967.\textsuperscript{1211} When the Society was established there were only two Scottish societies in London. Its objects were to ‘promote good fellowship and brotherhood and to combine efforts for benevolent and national objects connected with Scotland’, also to ‘preserve the picturesque garb of Old Gaul.’ This included charitable donations to the Highland Schools (in London), the Royal Caledonian Asylum, the Scottish Hospital and other Scottish charitable organisations.\textsuperscript{1212}

The \textit{Scotsman} newspaper reported the annual dinner of the Society in 1889 and the same edition of the Chronicles noted that ‘the Scottish feeling grows apace in the Metropolis’. A Scottish Festival was held in the Albert Hall that year.\textsuperscript{1213} It was said that at this time ‘Scottish clubs and Societies abound, for all ranks and conditions of Scotsmen, Highland and Lowland.\textsuperscript{1214} The first Chronicles were distributed to other Scottish Societies in London, like the London Caithness Association.

The Chronicles are helpful in learning what the Society actually did, and how it saw itself and this in turn helps to establish why it was not likely to support Scottish home rule. The toast list for the Annual Festival for 1891 was as follows: Her Majesty the Queen, The Duke of Rothsay, other members of the Royal Family, the Army, Navy and Reserve forces, the immortal memory of Burns, the prosperity of the Caledonian Society of London, their visitors, its president and finally Ladies present.\textsuperscript{1215} In this way the Society characterised itself as Royalist, British, cultural and self-interested. Scotland itself does not get a mention.

The nature of the Society is clearly stated in the summary to the 1905-1921 Chronicles. It emphasises ‘social and literary intercourse’ and that the Society

\begin{changed}
\textsuperscript{1210} Acc.3721/125/25, cutting dated 25\textsuperscript{th} February 1929
\textsuperscript{1211} Chronicles of the Caledonian Society of London (Chronicles)
\textsuperscript{1212} Chronicles first volume, pp.2-3
\textsuperscript{1213} Ibid., p.83
\textsuperscript{1214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1215} Chronicles, first volume, p.100 for 1891 list and pp.176-7 for the 1905 list
\end{changed}
‘endeavoured to keep the lion rampant in the Capital of the Empire, maintain a strong Scottish sentiment along with a keen sense of duty to Great Britain.’ ‘Our local patriotism is not an enemy but a complement to our great commonwealth of nations.’ These sentiments would be familiar to associational members amongst the Scot abroad, recall the ‘British’ values of the Montreal St. Andrews Society. The Melbourne Association asked the Society for affiliate status in 1938.

These sentiments were supported by the president, Loudon McQueen, who in 1913 considered the bitter recriminations arising from the 1707 Union to be happily healed. These very British views may be in part explained by the social status of the club’s members. For the year 1904-5, of 17 ex-officio members, there were two colonels, one KC, one JP and one doctor. At this time of restricted suffrage, these would most likely have all been voters, unlike many ordinary Scots that their charity supported.

Periodically a president or a guest offered a ‘sentiment’ or speech to the gatherings. The interests of the society may be fairly judged from the subjects covered. Of a sample of 30 of these given between 1931 and 1938, ten were cultural, ten on life in Scotland (mainly legal issues), two on education, one on faith, four on industry and three on the armed forces. One on Government talked of a fringe of Scottish sentiment about de-centralised government. Offering no opinion, the speaker, one W. S. Gilbert, CB, claimed that the ‘man in the crowd’ did not care for it. This pattern is repeated in the post-war period, for the period 1952-56, 1956-61, and 1961-67. No mention was made, for example, of the Stone of Scone incident in the toast to Scotland’s place and power at the meeting held on 18th January 1951.

1216 Chronicles, 1905-1921, p.216
1217 Chronicles, 1938-45
1218 Chronicles, 1905-1921, pp.110-111
1219 Chronicles, 1905-1921, p.417
1220 Chronicles, 1931-38, pp.31-32
1221 Chronicles, 1938-45, p.32
1222 Chronicles, 1952-56, p.173
1223 Chronicles, 1956-61, p.209
1224 Chronicles, 1961-67, p.33
1225 Chronicles, 1945-52, p.278
The Scottish Unionist MP for Dumfriesshire responded to what he described as a contemporary Scottish attitude that postulated a Scottish state that ‘we want Scotland not to become less united with England but more closely united with her, with the Empire and with Europe’. It is no surprise that a Unionist MP would express these sentiments, but he was a guest of the Society, and received loud applause. This lends weight to the argument that the associational Scot may not have supported the nationalist or home rule cause. They were not unaware of this cause; Alan Gomme-Duncan, MP for Perth and East Perthshire, despite opposing the SNP, urged that the Covenant signed by over a million people in 1950 be recognised as a sign of discontent. Members appreciated the difficulties in the Scottish economy. The speech by Sir Harold Bolton in 1953 asserted that ‘all is not well in Scotland.’

H. B. Boyne, in 1962, said ‘I am convinced there is no better or quicker way of advancing Scotland’s interests than getting the best of her men and women, irrespective of party, to represent her in Parliament.’ Later in the speech he compared this favourably to ‘the choppy waters of chauvinistic nationalism.’ The Caledonian Club, though clearly expressing nationalist tendencies of a state-maintaining, British, sort was clearly not a place Scottish state-seeking nationalism would find support.

In brief, the Scots abroad in England formed their ubiquitous associations but these were not active in Scottish nationalism. However, some of their members did engage in organised political activity through membership of the SHRA and the Convention. Equally, the Canadian, New Zealand, US and Australian associational Scots appear to have had little or no inclination to join or support groups such as the SHRA, NPS or SNP except in Melbourne, and then to little effect. Whilst they held a torch for ethnic consciousness, their expression of Scottish identity was rooted firmly in the Highlands - romantic imaginations of the colonial-era founders. They also tended to be relatively elite.

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1226 Ibid., p.107
1227 Ibid.
1228 The Times, 9th March 1950, p.8
1229 Chronicles, 1952-56, p.55
1230 Chronicles, 1961-67, p.33
1231 Ibid., p.39
1232 Leith and Sim, 2014, p.63
organisations due to the cost of membership, highland dress and social occasions.

However, an explanation for the indifference of the associations to the nationalist projects of the homeland is still wanting. Their association with British nationality and Empire could not have been significant in the early years of nationalism; it was demonstrated in chapter one that the SHRAs and the League were also attached to Empire and Britain. The SNP’s clearer line of Scottish national identity would have jarred with the elite membership of these groups. Clearly a barrier to engagement in the nationalist project at home was their lack of political purpose. To outside observers, the members of these associations would have seemed like the core of the diaspora as outlined earlier. However, this was an elite preserving the status quo. When they mobilised the passive members of the diaspora they appeared to do so only for cultural, philanthropic or sporting events. This does not mean that the members of the diaspora were not individually engaged in politics and this will be explored below.

**Membership in Perspective**

First, it needs to be determined whether or not these groups, with all their prominence, were a numerically significant part of the diaspora. Although these associations were quite visible, they were not the whole of the diaspora. Their membership may not have been numerous when compared to the size of the diaspora. The preceding description of the Scottish diaspora and the lack of support for nationalism might lead to the conclusion of one writer on the subject, that the diaspora was essentially cultural rather than political.\(^{1233}\) This lies in contrast to the Associations’ members, many of whom were. However, this also avoids the issue that the associational Scots were not the whole diaspora, just the most visible part of it to contemporary and historian alike. Whilst it is difficult to determine membership of these associations at any one time, assumptions can be made to assess what participation in these societies there was amongst the diaspora.

\(^{1233}\) Bueltmann, 2011, p.197
It is possible from the 1901 census to obtain the Scots born population of England and Wales, which was 311,680, and in 1911, 322,012. Of these around 90,000 were situated in London and the South East. At the beginning of the twentieth century, London’s 28 Scottish associations had between 4,000 and 5,000 members, or 4.4% to 5.6% of the Scots born population. Some were elite bodies. The London Caledonian Society limited its membership to 100 plus the committee. Like others referred to earlier, it was an elite organisation of core diaspora members. Whilst membership of these clubs was sometimes restricted to Scots, some were open to all who enjoyed cultural aspects such as music or dance. Individual examples of club constituents and membership numbers are scattered throughout texts on this subject without a systematic listing. This is probably because the focus of past studies has been on culture and historic trends rather than an exercise in estimating participation. In order to attempt this estimate, some examples have been used to provide a patchy guide to participation.

The Society of St. Andrews in Hull was initiated to give Scots an exclusive Society. It had a relatively affluent membership, whilst also inviting migrant fish workers to their Grand Scottish Concert in 1912. Membership in 1950 was 463, around the same number as the Wolverhampton and District Caledonian Society. The Hull society had 92 members at its inception in 1910, and in the 1911 census there were 72,000 Scots-born in Lancashire and Yorkshire. The numbers are not directly comparable but the broad appearance is that membership of the diaspora was much greater outside of these societies than within.

At the 1921 census, there were 333,517 Scots-born in England and Wales. In chapter two, net migration to England in the following decade was estimated to be 330,000. There were therefore hundreds of thousands of first generation

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1235 Harper, 2012, p.19
1236 Buellmann, et. al., 2009, p.24
1237 Harper, 2012, p.44
1238 Ibid., pp.44-45
1239 Harper, 2012, p.19
1240 Acc. 3721/125/25
Scots there at this time. Yet in 1929, the Ilford Scottish association was stated to have 800 members,\textsuperscript{1241} the London Ayrshire Society had 300 at its annual dinner in 1932.\textsuperscript{1242} There are unfortunately few totals of association membership available, but some indication can be derived from those for Clan Associations. The Scottish Clans Association held a dinner in London in 1932 and 350 attended.\textsuperscript{1243} Membership in 1929 was given as 1,500.\textsuperscript{1244} Nor was this picture of the associational Scot being of limited number confined to England and Wales. Table XI shows the Scots-born populations of four popular Scottish destinations.

**Table XI: Census records of Scots-born Population in Selected Countries, 1950-54**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Scots born population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>244,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>226,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>123,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>653,626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The population of course is that of first generation immigrants, not the total of Scots in these countries, so the pool from which Scots associations could recruit would be much larger. It does however give a base from which to approximate the proportion of Scots participating in these societies. Membership of the associations at a particular point was hard to obtain for this period and there is much scope for further research into these participation numbers. However, some broad estimates can be made. In the late 1920s, the Scottish associations in the US had between 24,000 and 30,000 members.\textsuperscript{1245} This would have been only 10\% of the 1951 Scots-born population. In 1929,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{1241} Acc. 3721/125/25, *Glasgow Herald* cutting dated 25\textsuperscript{th} February 1929
\item\textsuperscript{1242} Ibid., *Ardrossan and Saltcoats Herald*, 4\textsuperscript{th} March 1932
\item\textsuperscript{1243} Ibid., *Glasgow Herald*, 19\textsuperscript{th} November 1932
\item\textsuperscript{1244} Ibid., *Daily Record*, 23\textsuperscript{rd} January 1929
\item\textsuperscript{1245} Acc. 3721/57/297, Acc. 3721/137/174
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Arthur Donaldson, US nationalist organiser, noted there were 15,000 Scots in Detroit and the St Andrew’s Association had only 200 members. The fashion for Clan associations after 1970 saw a burgeoning of members but of the 150 or so clan clubs in existence at the millennium, 53 claimed a total of 27,000 members out of a supposed 20 million people of Scots descent in the US. This situation appears to continue to the present day, with recent research exposing the reliance of many Scottish clan and cultural organisations on a small group of dedicated enthusiasts rather than a mass membership. In Canada, the 1921 diaries of George Dott, at that time working as a labourer, make only one mention of the St. Andrews Society in Ottawa and it appears he declined the invitation to attend. Likewise the more middle class Earnest Younger makes no mention of the Toronto Society in either 1926 or 1929.

The picture of low participation is not as clear in New Zealand. The societies in New Zealand developed from the 1860s, the Otago society being founded with forty members. It has been demonstrated earlier that in the 1930s there may have been over 600 Scottish societies in New Zealand, though individual membership numbers are difficult to ascertain. Many of these were sporting clubs or pipe bands, but the overall numbers lead to a suggestion that in New Zealand at least the associational scots were perhaps a bigger part of the Scots diaspora population. Recall, however, the failure of the New Zealand Scotsman to attract enough subscriptions to break even.

In Australia, individual societies have been shown to have membership in the hundreds, although there were many of them. For example, although 5,000 were mobilised from the passive diaspora for the Games organised by the Sydney based Highland Society in 1880, the membership peaked in 1892 at

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1246 Acc.3721/74/669, letter to Muirhead, 7th October 1929
1247 Zumkhawala-Cook, 2005, p.125
1248 Sim, 2011b, pp.182-183
1249 Acc. 12987/54, June entry mentioning a Glaswegian called Scott
1250 Acc. 9407/2
1251 For example the Caledonian Society of Otago was founded in 1862, according to its website, http://www.otagocaledonian.org.nz/; Bueltmann et al., 2009, p.176
1252 http://www.otagocaledonian.org.nz/
Similar membership numbers were achieved by the Caledonian Society of Melbourne, 567 in 1886, reducing to 246 in the following recession. It appears to be justifiable to conclude, even with these disjointed figures, that the associational Scots were a minority of Scots born or generational immigrants in these host societies. Therefore, it follows that if there were many outside of these societies, these Scots may have been a source of support for the nationalist movement in Scotland, for the Scots abroad were politically very active in their host lands.

Scots in Politics in the Host Lands

It was the ability of the Scottish elite to integrate themselves with the English elite that deprived any nascent nationalist movement of prospective leadership. The political activity of Scots in England and the UK has been covered in previous parts of this thesis. This presented a considerable participation in the political process in the UK. To complete the picture, the political success of the diaspora overseas should be addressed.

The ethnic origins of Canadian members of parliament were significantly weighted towards the Scots from 1886 onwards; they constituted 25% of the members of the House of Commons in the first 4 decades of the twentieth century whilst persons of Scots origin in Canada stood at 12% in 1941. Six out of sixteen premierships from 1873 to 1979 were held by three men of Scottish birth or descent; Sir John Macdonald, Alexander Mackenzie and W. L. Mackenzie King. A news cutting dated 1926 named eight Scots in the Canadian Cabinet of 18, the largest national group, followed by French with six.

In Australia ‘the Scots and Scottish Australians have been disproportionally represented in the government of Australia since 1788.’ For more of a third of the years since Australia’s Federation, ‘the Prime Minister has been of

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1253 Prentis, 2008, p.200
1254 Ibid.
1255 Leith and Soule, 2012, p.123
1256 Stanford Reid, 1976, p.296
1258 Acc. 3721/65/463. Cutting dated December 1926, no indication of which newspaper.
1259 Prentis, 2008, p.120
Scottish birth or descent, roughly a third more than the Irish.\textsuperscript{1260} Before 1900, 46% of Queensland’s Premiers and 35% of Victoria’s were of Scottish background.\textsuperscript{1261} Federally, in the 1920s, Scots and Scots Australians continued to be prominent and nearly 40% of overseas-born Australian Labour Party federal parliamentarians 1901-1981 were Scots-born.\textsuperscript{1262} In New Zealand, the vigorous embrace of the political was not so evident.\textsuperscript{1263} Between 1856 and 1975, four out of 31 prime ministers were of Scottish descent, accounting for six out of 38 premierships.\textsuperscript{1264} Even so, it cannot be denied that the Scots abroad were active in politics.

In summary, the many visible associations of Scots abroad were cultural and social bodies in nature and to an extent British as well as Scottish. In the terms of the categorisation of members of a mobilised diaspora, these were the outward representation of the core, the active elite. As they made a visible and institutional nexus of Scots and Scottishness, they were used as a means of engaging with the diaspora. This effort was likely to fail from the outset due to the nature of the associations and their adherents. They were not the major part of the Scots abroad but were usually relatively elite in composition so acted as gatekeepers to the passive and silent members of the majority. However, although individual Scots tended to be politically active in their host countries, they were not generally interested in the politics of their home land. Lastly, in the US, American patriotism, or state maintaining nationalism, and to an extent the law, made it difficult to proselytise the politics of old Europe.

Having spent some time describing the failure of the efforts of the Scots to mobilise their diaspora, it is instructive to look at a nationalist project that successfully engaged the support of a national diaspora; that of the Irish.

\textsuperscript{1260} Ibid., p.121
\textsuperscript{1261} Ibid., p.125
\textsuperscript{1262} Ibid., pp.128, 131
\textsuperscript{1263} Bueltmann et. al., 2009, p.157
\textsuperscript{1264} \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Prime_Ministers_of_New_Zealand}
Successful Engagement

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the Irish lent significant support to their own Home Rule struggle.\textsuperscript{1265} The Irish-American was characterised as the avenging wolfhound of Irish Nationalism.\textsuperscript{1266} Supporters of a constitutional settlement as opposed to outright independence, such as the Constitutional MP John Redmond, toured the globe raising funds for home rule.\textsuperscript{1267} Eventually these organisations were suppressed by the Fenian United Brotherhood of the United States. From 1876 onwards this organisation became very strong.\textsuperscript{1268} A note to the UK Cabinet claimed that the society originated in 1869 and seemed in 1885 to have pan-US coverage and about 20,000 members. It appeared to have sent £40,000 to the nationalists in Ireland to use for explosives and weapons.\textsuperscript{1269} A Skirmishing Fund was set up, named after the acts of violence that represented a change of tactics for the Fenians.\textsuperscript{1270} Contributions flowed through these clubs in the US and Canada.\textsuperscript{1271} The British thought it a secret organisation, its workings known to only 5% of its members.\textsuperscript{1272} It supported an armed struggle against England for the independence of Ireland. From 1873-78, a Home Rule League was established in Canada, the Montreal branch sending $693 to Dublin in March 1874.\textsuperscript{1273} In excess of 150 pounds was sent in 1875.

Support in Australasia was mixed, to judge from the reaction to John Redmond’s tour in 1883. Redmond was warmly welcomed in Adelaide with prominent citizens of Irish birth or descent attending his first meeting.\textsuperscript{1274} However, his comparison of what the Irish wanted to the ‘measure of self-government’...‘which you possess here’\textsuperscript{1275} quickly aroused anxiety across

\textsuperscript{1265} Kenny, 2003, p.265  
\textsuperscript{1266} MacRaid, 2000, p.214  
\textsuperscript{1267} MacRaid, 2011, p.204  
\textsuperscript{1268} Moody, 1967, p.439  
\textsuperscript{1269} CAB 37/14  
\textsuperscript{1270} Wilson, 2009, p.42  
\textsuperscript{1271} Ibid., p.43  
\textsuperscript{1272} CAB 37/14  
\textsuperscript{1273} Toner, 1989, pp.11-13  
\textsuperscript{1274} Campbell, 2001, p.349  
\textsuperscript{1275} Ibid., p.350
Australia.\textsuperscript{1276} Opposition was loud in both the press and the New South Wales Assembly and Redmond arrived to his first Sydney engagement finding deep division within the City’s Irish population.\textsuperscript{1277}

News of the murder of Cavendish and Burke in Phoenix Park led to the Protestant press branding Redmond’s visit as an attempt to ‘white wash that blood stained league.’\textsuperscript{1278} Sir Henry Parkes, Australia’s Prime Minister wanted him expelled.\textsuperscript{1279} However Redmond avoided extremism.\textsuperscript{1280} The local Irish population, in the form of working men and the lower middle class supported him.\textsuperscript{1281} They turned out in big numbers for the St. Patrick’s day celebrations, and Redmond was able to announce that £1,000 had been raised and sent to Ireland in the preceding week, and that would be repeated later the same week.\textsuperscript{1282} The visit continued to have mixed support though, with the Catholic archbishop of Melbourne wanting nothing to do with him.\textsuperscript{1283} Recalling the elite nature of some of the Scottish Associations, this division of support along class lines finds echoes in the Scottish experience. However, the objection based on violence had no relevance in the Scottish case.

In New Zealand, Auckland’s more affluent Irish steered clear, but working class support was solid.\textsuperscript{1284} A tour of the west coast alone raised £1,400, more than the £1,000 target for the New Zealand trip. In spite of the mixed reaction, nearly £15,000 was raised for the National League in twelve months,\textsuperscript{1285} and much had been done to elevate the National League’s cause to a level of respectability in the region.\textsuperscript{1286} The tour continued to America, where Redmond’s welcome was led by the Mayor of Chicago and the Governor of Illinois.\textsuperscript{1287} The two year trip was claimed to have raised £20,000.\textsuperscript{1288}

\textsuperscript{1276} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1277} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1278} Ibid., p.351
\textsuperscript{1279} Wells, 1919, p.45
\textsuperscript{1280} Bew, 1996, p.11
\textsuperscript{1281} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1282} Campbell, 2001, p.353
\textsuperscript{1283} Ibid., p.354
\textsuperscript{1284} Ibid., p.357
\textsuperscript{1285} Redmond-Howard, 1912, p.41; Wells,1919, p.45 and Bew, 1996, p.11
\textsuperscript{1286} Campbell, 2001, pp.359-360
\textsuperscript{1287} Wells,1919, p.45
\textsuperscript{1288} Redmond- Howard, 1912, p.45
The Irish diaspora in the UK provided considerable support. In 1908, the United Irish League, a nationalist organisation, had a Glasgow branch with 2,600 members. Leeds had 1,800 and London 1,500, with many other branches with members numbered in the hundreds. In 1911 Redmond addressed crowds of 20-30,000 in Glasgow during a Scottish tour. Sinn Fein’s popularity was greater in Scotland than in any other part of the Irish Diaspora. Glasgow alone had 4,000 IRA volunteers, and there was an arms gathering network for trafficking arms out of the Clyde in most of the towns of central Scotland. High numbers of members would have meant high contributions, in the sense of both financial aid and participation. It was clear that the Irish nationalist cause had considerable support from its diaspora.

Summary

This chapter began to analyse why the Scottish diaspora failed to win meaningful support from the millions of Scots overseas. Two hypotheses have been presented. Firstly, that the nature of the engagement of nationalism with the diaspora was sporadic and amateurish. Secondly that the nature and size of the associational groups that dominated the visible Scottish diaspora meant they acted as gatekeepers to determine its response to nationalism, and did not represent the greater part of those Scots abroad. The case presented is that these factors were factors in the failure of the diaspora to support Scottish Nationalism. A brief case study of Irish success stands in contrast but without analysis of causation.

Indeed, the success of other causes to mobilise the diaspora engagement provided encouragement to the Scots to continue trying. Norman Allen, SNPA activist in Canada, wrote what he thought was the reason he should persist:

‘Perhaps the world would think it strange if there were no organised support overseas for the SNP and might deem that this omission cast doubt about the validity of the Scottish national identity’

1289 MacRaild, 2011, p.134
1290 Ibid.
1291 Ibid., p.135
1292 Ibid.
1293 SI, July 1979, p. 5
The next chapter probes into why some diasporas may find it easier to engage in the nationalist projects of their homelands than others. It also investigates further reasons given for success or failure. The first of these is that it was understood by some in the movement that success at home would promote success abroad. Thompson said after his visit to North America:

‘The measure of support you will obtain from him (the Scot in Canada and the US) will be directly proportional to the results you achieve yourselves in Scotland.’ 1294

The truth of this will be explored in the next chapter. Also considered will be the use of soft power by non-state actors such as diaspora. These issues will be presented alongside further context and discussion of the cause of the Scottish self-government movements’ failure to exploit its diaspora in pursuit of its goal.

1294 Acc. 3721/5/76, Donaldson to Muirhead, 5th January 1931
Chapter Seven: Context, Comparison and Discussion

This thesis has provided a longitudinal study of the history of the involvement of the Scottish diaspora in the various nationalist projects of its homeland. That the diaspora was formed as a result of a significant migration over two centuries was described in chapter two. A later part of that chapter was concerned with the formation of diasporas and typologies were compiled to illustrate that, amongst other factors, the characteristics of a diaspora could be affected by its origins and the nature of its migration. This chapter will provide some historical context for the emigration. It will then examine a phenomenon of diaspora development, assimilation. A theoretical discussion of the nature of assimilation and the effects on an emerging diaspora will be followed by case studies from the experience of the Scots, Irish and Norwegians, introducing the concept of visible and invisible diasporas. The impact of the response of the host lands to the incomers on their propensity to support nationalist projects at home will be examined. Chapter two demonstrated that the nature of the dispersal of a diaspora could affect its characteristics in development. The issue of dispersal and how that affected the propensity of both Scots and Irish to support their nationalist causes will be examined.

The nature of Scottish nationalism receives attention in this chapter, to test how this may have impacted the response of the diaspora. Recalling the assertion of Thompson that success for the Scottish nationalists abroad depended upon success at home, some qualitative indicators of both are examined to determine the validity of this assertion. Finally the chapter further explores the nature of soft power and provides an extended interpretation of the case of the Irish and Irish-American interventions in the Northern Ireland dispute. In contrast with the Irish endeavours, attempts by the Scots to use soft power, and the reasons for their failure, are discussed.
Scottish Emigration

The long history of Scottish emigration has been driven by many factors. Movement within the same country and emigration to a different country was long a feature of Scottish economic and social life. There are references to Scots mercenaries being employed by Gaelic Irish kings as early as the thirteenth century. These mercenary soldiers bolstered the military capabilities of Irish chieftains. Few remained after their service. By the sixteenth century, there are records of Scots fighting in Sweden and the Low Countries. As economic emigrants, Scots went to England as both unskilled workers and professionals. There were estimated to be 7,000 to 11,000 south of the border in the middle of the fifteenth century, when England was a hostile neighbour. Very few of these became naturalised Englishmen, however. Estimates for the size of the emigration of the Scots at this time are just that, and the safest statement is that a clear pattern of emigration had been set in the fifteenth century, with Scots trading and fighting in England and many parts of Europe. Changes in destinations became apparent by the early seventeenth century, with the Americas beginning to feature for the first time.

The Union of 1707 was a significant change in Scotland’s governance, yet provides no evidence of a large emigration from Scotland. Neither was emigration particularly driven by the economic and political difficulties of the last ten years of the seventeenth century. The source material is ambiguous but one estimate of total emigration in the last half of the eighteenth century was that it was 10% higher than for the first half. Of these emigrants, about 80% went to Ireland and only about 7% to America. Of those who left, around 50,000 were driven by the Cromwellian Union and a similar number by the famines of the 1690s. The majority could be inferred to be refugees from a difficult regime or hunger. Additionally there would have been Jacobite supporters in

1295 Perceval-Maxwell, 1973, p.2
1296 Ibid.
1297 Berg and Lagercrantz, 1962, pp.12-13
1298 Simpson, 1996, p.104
1299 Brock, 1999, p.15
1300 Dobson, 1994, p.9
1301 Brock, 1999, p.15
1302 Devine, 2003, p.5
1303 Brock, 1999, p.18
political exile. The Jacobite emigrants were a conflict-generated emigration, which, it has been argued, is a component of diaspora activism in home land politics. Not readily recorded as a total but inevitable due to the earlier union of crowns and proximity, many would have left for England or joined the English Army.\textsuperscript{1304}

An emigration does not always lead to a diaspora.\textsuperscript{1305} However, for those who settled in North America in the second half of the seventeenth century there is evidence of some cohesion through charitable societies and in religion.\textsuperscript{1306} In 1657, a Scots charitable society was founded in Boston.\textsuperscript{1307} However the emigration figures reveal that a relatively small number of Scots were in North America at the end of this century.

Free trade between Scotland and England was the most pressing economic issue at the beginning of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{1308} The Empire seemed too remote, especially after Darien. During the 1680s and early 1690s the Scots had profitably traded in North America, albeit illegally.\textsuperscript{1309} The 1707 Union brought the Scots within the ambit of the British Imperial system and provided the context for closer association with the American colonies.\textsuperscript{1310} Scottish merchant houses, as an example, began providing indentured servants to colonial customers.\textsuperscript{1311} The evidence is that a steady stream of single men and a smaller proportion of women left Scotland for America at this time.\textsuperscript{1312}

The 1707 settlement which paid compensation for Darien also dissolved the Company of Scotland, which traded with Africa and the Indies.\textsuperscript{1313} Scotland had little interest in the Eastern trade at the time of the Union and this would continue for some time to come as the (English) East India company kept its monopoly and Scots traded in the East as its employees, not as Britons.\textsuperscript{1314}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1304} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1305} Kenny, 2013, pp.11-12
\item \textsuperscript{1306} Bueltmann, et. al., 2009, p.20
\item \textsuperscript{1307} http://scots-charitable.org/about
\item \textsuperscript{1308} Holmes, 1969, p.188
\item \textsuperscript{1309} MacKillop, 2008, p.117
\item \textsuperscript{1310} Devine, 2003, p.103
\item \textsuperscript{1311} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1312} Devine, 2003, p.104
\item \textsuperscript{1313} MacKillop, 2008, p.117
\item \textsuperscript{1314} Ibid., p.134
\end{itemize}
However, it is likely that the 1707 Union will have encouraged and created opportunities for Scots in England.\textsuperscript{1315} Some of the nobility moved south, and even before the Union, one in seven Scottish nobles had English wives.\textsuperscript{1316} Those with qualifications or a profession were also amongst those leaving for England.\textsuperscript{1317} The numbers of these professionals, the traders and unskilled workers who left for England, are still uncertain. The estimated Scottish emigration for the eighteenth century ranges from 85,000 to 115,000 for those who left in the first half of the century and 77,000 to 127,000 in the second half.\textsuperscript{1318} It is possible that many travelled abroad as militia.\textsuperscript{1319} Scale has to be judged from knowledge of particular episodes, but the trend was for growth from one broad period to the next.\textsuperscript{1320}

From the later eighteenth century, the common source of these movements was an increasingly turbulent rural society.\textsuperscript{1321} However it would be a mistake to represent these migrations as an undirected flood of poverty stricken victims of agricultural change.\textsuperscript{1322} Through the greater part of this century, Highland society was changing from a patriarchal to a commercial mould.\textsuperscript{1323} Some reasons for the outflow of people from the Highlands were detailed in a report about emigration published in 1802.\textsuperscript{1324} This report listed them as; ‘the dissolution of that feudal state in which the proprietors of land, and the people thereon were mutually necessary to each other,’ the advent of sheep farming and the ‘delusive picture’ of emigration given by agents.

The 1802 report demonstrated the concern caused at the time by the substantial depopulation of the Highlands, a considerable exodus from what was already a sparsely populated area.\textsuperscript{1325} With the increased commercialisation of rural spaces, the middlemen, or tacksmen, who had acted

\textsuperscript{1315} Brock, 1999, p.19; Ffyfe, 1942, p.235
\textsuperscript{1316} McNeill and MacQueen, 2000, p.151
\textsuperscript{1317} Brock, 1999, p.19
\textsuperscript{1318} Brock, 1999, p.15; Devine, 2003, p.5
\textsuperscript{1319} Dobson, 1994, p.37
\textsuperscript{1320} Devine, 1992, p.17
\textsuperscript{1321} Ibid., p.16
\textsuperscript{1322} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1323} Ibid., p.18
\textsuperscript{1324} MS 9646, Emigration from the Scottish Highland and Islands, 1802. Referred to in the text thereafter as the 1802 Report
\textsuperscript{1325} Smout, 1994, p.102
as the owner’s agents became vulnerable. They often led a movement of those who had been their sub-tenants to settle on undeveloped land in America.\textsuperscript{1326} These early emigrants were able to encourage others by both report and letter. For example, one states ‘did thousands in Scotland know it they would desire banishment (here) never to return’ adding, ‘here each may sit safe and at ease’ ... ‘indulging himself in the natural bent of his genius.’\textsuperscript{1327} The early settlers would help to provide a more favourable environment to later arrivals,\textsuperscript{1328} facilitating the later upsurge in movement.

In 1773 Duncan MacDonald of Glengary had a ‘difference with his principal gentry’ This ultimately led to about 1,000 people leaving Glengary after Duncan had reconnoitred the area around Montreal. Each family was settled with 200 acres.\textsuperscript{1329} These settlers, who went to Canada in 1773, were able to afford some assistance to their family and friends by laying aside some provisions for them should they emigrate.\textsuperscript{1330} This would have been of great assistance as it reduced the cost of the outgoing voyage by eliminating the need for emigrants to ship enough provisions to survive the first winter. One result of early Scottish emigration was to form communities, with a dominant representation of Scots.\textsuperscript{1331}

There was a Highland tradition of military service overseas and many would not have returned home for one reason or another. The younger sons of gentlemen obtained commissions in the Dutch regiments which at that time were raised in Scotland.\textsuperscript{1332} During the late eighteenth century, many highland regiments were raised, the majority of which served in Europe, North America and India. The Seven Years’ War provided opportunities for Scots. The Highlander was particularly regarded as suitable for service in North America and by spring 1757 families in the Scottish Highlands who had contributed soldiers to the war in America were declaring their intention to emigrate as soon as the fighting

\textsuperscript{1326} Devine, 1992, p.18
\textsuperscript{1327} Brock, 1982, p.24
\textsuperscript{1328} Smout, 1994, p.101
\textsuperscript{1329} MS 9646, p.27, Glengary spelt as in the original document
\textsuperscript{1330} MS 9646, p.29
\textsuperscript{1331} Devine, 1992, p.18
\textsuperscript{1332} Fyte, 1942, p.235
ended. Two battalions of ‘emigrant loyalists’ were raised in Nova Scotia by a Colonel McLean and a Colonel Nairn for service in the War of Independence. It was even possible to be pressed into the Royal Navy straight from an emigrant ship without reaching Canada, although in this case the men were released after a petition to the Admiral on behalf of the Governor of Halifax. Further evidence for this service abroad can be found in a 1796 petition to the King for pensions for the officers of the late Scots Brigade in the service of the Dutch in the Dutch Wars in 1780. The following year, plans were submitted for ‘regimenting the Highland Clans’ and raising 16,000 officers and men. Scotland was a sufficiently important source of fighting men for Britain to reverse the suppression of the clans after the ‘45 rebellion.

The early Scottish emigration was therefore driven by forces of economic and social change that would not have been unique to Scotland. By the end of the eighteenth century there would have been many small settlements of Scots in North America as the first shoots of the associational culture, alongside the letters of settlers, attest.

The size and nature of the later emigration has been described in detail in chapter two and needs no further analysis here. The Scottish movement was a small part of a significant European migration phenomenon in this century, with over 50 million Europeans going overseas, 40 million going to the New World between 1850 and 1913. Studies of this European emigration have revealed some general causes of this great exodus. Cheap long distance travel coincided with the availability of unsettled land. As an example, in 1881 America had 1.8 billion acres of public land, of which 752 million acres had been surveyed and was available to settle. This land could supply world food and commodity markets. Rates of natural population increase and income gaps between home and overseas destinations were important factors,

1333 Plank, 2006, pp.178-9
1334 MS 9646, p.28
1335 Ibid., p.31
1336 MS 14835, p.84-100
1337 Ibid.
1339 Hatton and Williamson, 1994, p.533
1340 Sutter, 1887, p.117
1341 Foreman-Peck, 1995, p. 40
whilst industrialisation made a modest contribution. The Scottish response to the global economic environment described above was significant for Scotland and led to the formation of what is known as the Scottish diaspora.

**Diaspora Assimilation: Effect on Support for Nationalism at Home**

A decision was made early on in the research to use other diasporas for comparison purposes. The Irish and Norwegians were selected. Table XII tries to simplify the demands a nationalist movement may have of its diaspora; physical evidence of assistance such as funds to buy guns or influence, soldiers to fight or influence on host land polities to support the nationalist projects at home. Recall, four elements were identified that would support pressure groups and political parties. Money was ubiquitous, followed by the sort of influence that would promote the use of soft power. Next, people returning from the diaspora for grassroots campaigning or fighting in the home land, and finally arms to provide hard power.

**Table XII: Enablers Identified for Diaspora Assistance to Homeland Nationalist Causes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Derived in part from table I.

The table illustrates the universality of these factors, but also highlights two anomalies; the Scots and Norwegian nationalist endeavours were non-violent and the Norwegians did not call for funds from the diaspora. The argument moves now to a deeper description and understanding of the assimilation of the diasporas and how that may have affected their response to nationalism at home. In the case of Scotland and Ireland, the nature of their dispersal, earlier examined in chapter two, receives some further attention.
Diasporas operate as ethnic lobbies in liberal host lands.\textsuperscript{1342} They attach great emphasis to kinship identity and have a unique status, being outside the state, but in identity, inside the people.\textsuperscript{1343} With diasporas, identity matters. However, whereas diasporas and emigration have received their due investigation by this thesis, this area, has not been explored, for reasons of space and direction. The question of identity has been shunned, save from the issue of assimilation, to avoid the additional layer of complexity it adds. To give an example of this, the issue of the Highland Games in the US will suffice. These events seem on the surface to affirm a Scottish identity. However it is an identity fixed in the past, in a pre-industrial Scotland not in a real world Scotland.\textsuperscript{1344} It has been shown that the Caledonian Clubs’ objectives usually focussed on preserving the past, in culture or dress. It has also been shown that emigrants can chose their own romanticised past rather than a factual one.\textsuperscript{1345}

Claude Wilson in North America wrote to Muirhead in 1933 that ‘the cause’ gets occasional mention in the San Diego papers but ‘with the gradual passing of our connections with the old country we see fewer home papers.’\textsuperscript{1346} Claude was referring to a symptom of the phenomenon of assimilation. At its simplest level assimilation refers to the absorption and integration of people ideas or culture into a wider society or culture.\textsuperscript{1347} In migration studies, this usually makes the assumption that there is a ‘dominant’ group or norm to which a given ethnic group is assimilating.\textsuperscript{1348}

The term ‘acculturation’ has also been used, sometimes to mean the same thing as assimilation. This describes the phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first hand contact, resulting in changes to the original cultural patterns of either or both groups.\textsuperscript{1349} This notion supports a development of the definition that distinguishes between cultural and structural assimilation. The former includes the acquisition of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1342} Shain and Barth, 2003, p.450
  \item \textsuperscript{1343} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{1344} ‘All bagpipes and Brigadoon’ to quote a sitting MSP, Marlyn Glen, interviewed in 2009
  \item \textsuperscript{1345} Harper, 2005, p.137
  \item \textsuperscript{1346} Acc. 3721/8/156, letter to Muirhead, 18\textsuperscript{th} December 1933
  \item \textsuperscript{1347} http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/assimilate
  \item \textsuperscript{1348} Vallee, et. al., 1957, p.541
  \item \textsuperscript{1349} Gordon, 1964, p.61
\end{itemize}
language, social and ritual characteristics of the host society, whilst still maintaining a degree of differentiation. The latter is the large scale involvement into the institutions of the host society, including intermarriage and the disappearance of particularism.\textsuperscript{1350} It is possible to identify stages in this assimilation process which provide more granularity. These are summarised in Table XIII below, derived from studies of immigrants to America.

### Table XIII Assimilation Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-process</th>
<th>Type of Assimilation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change of cultural patterns to those of the host society</td>
<td>Cultural or behavioural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions of the host society</td>
<td>Structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large scale intermarriage</td>
<td>Marital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of a sense of peoplehood based exclusively on the host society</td>
<td>Identificational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of prejudice</td>
<td>Attitude receptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of discrimination</td>
<td>Behaviour receptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of value and power conflict</td>
<td>Civic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced from Gordon, 1964, p. 71

These types of assimilation quickly coalesce into two distinctive groups, culture and society, which serve as a useful distinction, as cultural assimilation (or acculturisation) can be performed by the immigrant ethnic, but assimilation into society can only be done with the permission of the core group. For this reason the former is usually faster than the latter.\textsuperscript{1351} This deconstruction of assimilation begs an all-important question, that of identifying the ‘host society.’ There is no intention here to write a comprehensive analysis of these phenomena, merely to draw upon the discourse to illustrate the characteristics of the diasporas under scrutiny. It is useful therefore to look at studies of assimilation in relevant countries, for example America. Here there is some agreement that the host society, the ‘core group,’ of the Scottish diaspora in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a white Protestant one at any social level.\textsuperscript{1352}

\textsuperscript{1350} Green, 2006, p.240
\textsuperscript{1351} Vertovec, 2010b, p.85
\textsuperscript{1352} Gordon, 1964, pp.73-4
This could lead to a presumption that the stages of assimilation would be easier for the Scottish emigrant to America as they were in the main Protestant and almost exclusively white. However successful adaptation was not easy and the immigrant depended more upon living in an immigrant group than on participating in American life, particularly for agricultural workers.\footnote{1353 Erickson, 1990, p.78} Industrial workers welcomed the atmosphere of social equality they found in America.\footnote{1354 Ibid., p.255}

It is clear, however, that not all immigrants are assimilated to the same degree, if at all. This pluralism\footnote{1355 Vertovec, 2010b, p.83} or multiculturalism\footnote{1356 Vertovec, 2010a, p.6} can, like assimilation, mean many things; a set of institutional accommodations, the objectives of a political movement or the multiculturalism through which black and other ethnic minorities in the US have called for greater or separate recognition.\footnote{1357 Ibid., pp.6-7} It is tempting to see the pluralist and assimilationist views as bipolar. However, the study of diaspora assimilation is longitudinal and the study of new immigrations into the early colonial host lands will probably find a mix of relatively rapid acculturisation with slow assimilation.\footnote{1358 Vertovec, 2010b, p.95}

This process should be by no means taken for granted. Host land states could manage relationships with foreign immigrants in one of three ways. Firstly, by maintaining and enforcing pluralism. If the Chinese in Malaysia converted to Islam and absorbed into the community, they would still not have the same rights as ethnic Malays.\footnote{1359 Esman, 2009, pp.142-3} Secondly, governments could react by promoting and rewarding integration or thirdly by tolerating pluralism and respecting diversity.\footnote{1360 Ibid., pp.144-5} A proportion of most diasporas becomes, through intermarriage and through social, political and lingual integration, identifiable more readily with its host land populous than that of its home lands. The phenomenon of assimilation affected the Scottish and comparison diasporas. The selected diaspora are now discussed below to assess the impact it had on the support for home rule and nationalist movements.
Scotland

The Scottish diaspora was subject to assimilation. What matters here is whether degrees of assimilation and acculturation affected the propensity to support home land nationalism. The Scots were emigrating over all of the period from 1885 to 1979. Therefore there was at all times a tranche of new arrivals, which might offer more radical support to nationalist projects at home.

Set against this ‘latest arrivals’ scenario there is the ‘third generation’ theory. This holds that the ethnicity of the first generation gives way to an acculturated second generation, but that the third could return to an interest in the home land. Recall that remittances for certain reasons, for example to assist family left behind to migrate, are likely to be the province of first generation diaspora. However, it was noted that third generation Irish-Americans were more likely to fund a cause like Noraid due to a romanticised longing for the homeland. As assimilation progresses so the propensity to support homeland nationalism may change.

The Scottish experience as an eighteenth century American immigrant was initially one of unpopularity driven from, amongst other things, the likelihood of the Scots being Loyalist at the time of the American War of Independence.\(^{1361}\) Whilst it is unwise to generalise, the diaspora of the Scots in America had a series of different experiences as immigrants. Farmers, artisans and clerical or professional arrivals had experiences of a different character. A successful economic adaptation was the indispensable basis for an immigrant’s adjustment in the US.\(^{1362}\) Money for farms could be saved from employment, those with a trade or without could take employment to save.\(^{1363}\) By the middle of the nineteenth century, a generally positive stereotype of the Scots abroad in the US was emerging, asserting that they were more desirable as American citizens than the Irish.\(^{1364}\) The Scots were praised as exemplary citizens.\(^{1365}\) If the Scots succeeded in making the economic adjustment to life in the US, then few apparent obstacles blocked the social adaptation of these peoples. Fewer

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\(^{1361}\) Devine, 2012, pp.135-139
\(^{1362}\) Erickson, 1990, p.40
\(^{1363}\) Ibid., p.42
\(^{1364}\) Devine, 2012, p.140
\(^{1365}\) Ross,1896, p.viii
difficulties seemed to have presented themselves to these invisible immigrants for rapid assimilation into nineteenth century America, and it may not have been an exaggeration to claim that ‘no new citizens are more cordially welcome to the new republic’ than the Scots.

From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Scots in America were not an oppressed group that suffered the kind of discrimination afforded others such as Italians or Irish. The Protestant religion and English language of the Scots in North America made their assimilation relatively easy. Perhaps as a consequence of this, there can be no doubt that Scots in the US were sensitive to being accused of being a member of a foreign political party. Donaldson was acutely aware of this and this has been reflected earlier.

This was a continuing theme in the nationalist engagement. In 1931 Donaldson wrote to Muirhead to say that the name (at this stage the National Party of Scotland) was a problem. He suggested ‘Friends of Scotland’ as an alternative. This was still an issue for the party in 1969, when the National Organiser wished to go direct to the relevant government department in the host country to ensure that membership of the SNP would not threaten the supporter’s citizenship. A year later a note to the National Executive suggested the need to form a ‘Scottish Independence Society’ to overcome fears of US citizens becoming members of a foreign party. Coupled with the orientation of the Scots associational groups towards culture and philanthropy rather than politics highlighted earlier, this can be seen as a barrier to membership and support of a foreign political party.

The invisible nature of the Scottish diaspora and its generally more comfortable position in society may have made contrariness more difficult for them to contemplate. This in turn may have led to a reluctance to support ‘old country’ politics. The Scots diaspora, invisible as it has been described, did not in general have the same difficulties as that of the Irish, detailed below, and had

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1366 Erickson, 1990, p.64
1367 Ross, 1896, p.2
1368 Acc. 3721/5/76, letter 12th January 1931
1369 Acc.11987/31, memo 5th August 1969
1370 Erickson, 1990, Title
no need of supporting its nationalist causes to strengthen its cohesion in America.

Previous analysis has emphasised the nature of the dispersal of a diaspora as being important to its characteristics. There was a difference in the support for nationalism in the lands from which the streams of emigrants entering the diaspora came. There was no support in depth for the first SHRA in Scotland itself. Both it and the League after it were elite organisations unable to find significant indigenous support. Membership numbers shown later in this chapter show it was not until 1927 that membership of the second SHRA rose above 3,000. Therefore in all probability those leaving for America and elsewhere would not have been aware of the movement. This contrasts with the Irish situation. It is useful here to recap what is known about these two similar diasporas. Both dispersals were significant and largely voluntary but with undertones of exile and hardship from famine and clearances. Both demonstrated boundary maintenance and homeland orientation. Both inhabited similar destinations, albeit the Irish were concentrated in the US. Neither had a significant return movement but they were similar in that the Scots had their roots tourism and the Irish their emotional loss of home. What was different was the nationalist support in the regions from which the Irish in the main came and the treatment they received in the host countries.

Ireland

For different peoples, the same host land could react with different responses. The attitudes of Americans to the arrival of large numbers of poverty stricken Irish Catholics in the slums of Eastern cities were characterised by fears of Popery and Rome.\footnote{Gordon, 1964, pp.91-2} This reflected the earlier reaction of the nervously Protestant seventeenth century England which had constructed a legislative framework that had confined Catholics and their civil rights, excluding them from national and local government and the Army. These laws were harsher still in Ireland.\footnote{Colley, 2009, p.332} However, by the time of the major Irish and English emigrations of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Catholics found a more relaxed
regime in England. From 1764, they could enlist and by 1793 hold a commission. Powerful opposition to the Penal Laws grow from this time, leading to the emancipation in 1829.\textsuperscript{1373} The American reaction could be characterised as an exaggeration, all the more so as there were a considerable number of Protestants amongst the Irish immigrants.\textsuperscript{1374}

Although the Protestant Northern Irish were by far and away the most numerous emigrants from the British Isles in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, those that left later were predominantly Catholic, and Irish speakers.\textsuperscript{1375} The Irish that emigrated to the US between 1845, the first year of the famine, and 1891, the death of Parnell, were prisoners of their own poverty.\textsuperscript{1376} The majority of them, 85\%, were living in the cities. They were the exploited and proscribed poor, not accepted by the Protestant majority but used by it.\textsuperscript{1377} Irish emigrants interpreted their experiences in ways which were distorting and alienating, and sometimes conducive to Irish nationalism.\textsuperscript{1378}

If the Scots were invisible immigrants, the Irish were more visible. They were segregated in slums in the urban centres of the Northeast, cut off occupationally and culturally from their Anglo-Saxon neighbours. They developed a distinct group consciousness and separate institutional life.\textsuperscript{1379} There were fears mid-century that the Irish immigrants would prove to be an unassailable proletariat.\textsuperscript{1380} However, after 1880, new immigrant Irish were joining a largely American born Irish-American society that showed signs of increasing affluence.\textsuperscript{1381} The image of the homesick Irish emigrant in English-imposed exile would be easier to dismiss if the emigrants themselves had not deployed it so readily.\textsuperscript{1382} This self-image, powerful in rendering homeland orientation, is not however, the whole story. Although many regarded themselves as exiles, or as acutely homesick, this standard nationalist

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1373} Ibid., pp.333-5
\textsuperscript{1374} Bielenberg, 2000, pp.111-2
\textsuperscript{1375} Devine, 2012, pp.125-6
\textsuperscript{1376} Brown, 1956, p.328
\textsuperscript{1377} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1378} Miller, 1980, p.98
\textsuperscript{1379} Gordon, 1964, pp.134-5
\textsuperscript{1380} Drudy, 1985, p.89
\textsuperscript{1381} Ibid., pp.87-9
\textsuperscript{1382} Miller, 1980, p.99; Drudy, 1985, pp.92-4
\end{footnotesize}
explanation for their self-image does not reflect the whole reality.\textsuperscript{1383} Recall that many left voluntarily to better themselves.

Their homeland orientation was demonstrated not only by the characteristic homesickness for which there is much literary evidence,\textsuperscript{1384} but also their support for the cause of Irish nationalism,\textsuperscript{1385} which was at least partly a function of their having derived from the more intensely nationalistic parts of Ireland.\textsuperscript{1386} In a powerful expression of this, Patrick Ford, child immigrant who became editor of the radical US Irish organ, \textit{Irish World}, came to see himself as the victim of poverty and enslavement that gripped Ireland and considered it ‘necessary for everyone of Irish blood to do all in his power to change that state of things.’\textsuperscript{1387}

The boundary maintenance of the Scots was revealed by their cultural and associational activities in host lands in their continued ‘Scottishness’ abroad. So too with the Irish, particularly in the US. There were mutual aid and other, open, Irish associations similar to the Scots’ St. Andrew’s Societies, such as the Irish Catholic Benevolent Union, and secret societies such as the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH). Since its founding in the 1970s, the American Ireland Fund and its international associates has raised hundreds of millions of dollars for Irish charitable causes.\textsuperscript{1388} Thus a tight boundary joined the nationalists at home and those abroad in the US.

Support shown by the Irish diaspora for Irish nationalism was much stronger amongst the diaspora in the US than in the British Dominions.\textsuperscript{1389} The US had been through a War of Independence, and had been at war with Britain in 1812. Whilst Irish nationalism offended the Anglo-American protestant establishment, other ethnic groups were indifferent to, or shared, the anti-British feelings. Additionally, most of the emigrants from the Great Famine went to the US, taking an anti-British grudge with them. Many came from the south and east of Ireland where pronounced social and economic changes had been taking place.

\textsuperscript{1383} Miller, 1980, p.100
\textsuperscript{1384} Ibid., p.99
\textsuperscript{1386} Miller, 1980, p.102; Munster, West Ulster and Connacht.
\textsuperscript{1387} Moody, 1967, p.439
\textsuperscript{1388} http://theirelandfunds.org and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_American_Ireland_Fund
\textsuperscript{1389} Fanning, 2000, p.20
before they left for the US. However, much of the anger that Catholic Irish immigrants and their descendants visited on Britain was an emotional reaction to the unpleasant experiences and discrimination they found in their new home in the US. This generated an ethnic and religious chauvinism as a result of the psychological stress of assimilation and the social rejection that the Irish suffered.

In the late 1880s an agricultural crisis in the US and the rise of Parnell fuelled a significant rise in nationalist support in the country. This support built upon earlier cohesion around the Fenian cause after the famine emigrations and the American Civil War. A Fenian Society was founded in New York in 1859, built on a nucleus of organisations such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood from the 1840s. Irish people around the world bought the Fenian newspaper, The Irish People. The most distinctive institutions were primarily the Fenian organisations Clan na Gael and the Irish National Land League of the US. Clan na Gael was to become the most powerful Irish revolutionary body in the US at this time as it supported the Land League’s campaigns for tenant proprietorship in Ireland.

Arguments put forward in chapter two supported the view that a diaspora generated by a conflict in the home land was likely to support nationalist projects there. Conflict-generated diasporas living in liberal states channel the sovereignty-based claims of their original home lands through state-based and transnational means. It has already been concluded that there was no conflict-generated Scottish diaspora beyond that of the Jacobites. The powerful nationalism of the Irish diaspora provides a temptation to regard it as being at least in part driven by a conflict-generated dispersal. The Irish nationalist revolution and civil war, 1919-23 undoubtedly led to a surge in emigration from

1390 Drudy, 1985, p. 257
1391 Fanning, 2000, p. 20
1392 Drudy, 1985, p. 272
1393 Meagher, 2001, p.178
1394 Drudy, 1985, p.253
1395 Meagher, 2001, p.179
1396 Drudy, 1985, p.253
1397 MacRaild, 2011, p.207
1398 Moody, 1967, p.439
1399 Drudy, 1985, p.255
1400 Koinova, 2014, p.1064
the new country. Although the absence of a 1921 census makes emigration numbers difficult to obtain for this period, they are estimated to have numbered around 167,000 in the period 1911-1923. Although there were Catholics in this cohort, there were over 100,000 Protestants. These left for Great Britain and North America.\textsuperscript{1401} The Protestants would have made unlikely nationalist supporters in their host lands. Additionally, the nature of support must have changed as the nationalists had partly achieved their objectives.

The only other armed conflicts in Ireland in the twentieth century were the Easter Rising, and the ‘Troubles’ of the late 1960s onwards in Northern Ireland. Although the threat of Home Rule in Ireland in 1912 saw the founding of Protestant Northern Irish volunteer forces and Southern Irish responses to this, there was no armed conflict then. The romantic myth of exile has already been described and so has the fact that although many left due to the mid-nineteenth century famines, millions more left voluntarily. The Irish consistently regarded emigration as an exile, although with varying degrees of intensity and sincerity.\textsuperscript{1402} There was, in short, no conflict-generated diaspora to strengthen the likelihood of Irish diaspora support for nationalism during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. This makes the absence of such an element in the Scottish diaspora less likely to explain the absence of significant interest in home grown nationalism.

There has already been comment that their dispersal affected the nationalist support of the Irish in the US. Many migrants were from areas of Ireland strong in nationalist support. Support was much stronger, not only in Ireland but in the diaspora in England and Scotland, where branches of the United Irish League had 2,600 members in Glasgow alone in 1908,\textsuperscript{1403} as many as the SHRA had in total in 1925. The Irish diaspora was more nationalist in part because the parts of Ireland that were its home were more nationalist.

By the mid-nineteenth century Irish revolutionaries were well aware of the potential of the Irish communities abroad.\textsuperscript{1404} As a result of the factors outlined

\textsuperscript{1401} Bielenberg, 2013, p.231
\textsuperscript{1402} Miller, 1980, p.98
\textsuperscript{1403} MacRailld, 2011, p.134
\textsuperscript{1404} Ibid., p.204

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earlier, there was a large population in the US that was predisposed to support any Irish nationalist movement that offered the prospect of success.\textsuperscript{1405} A ‘Fenian Fair’ in Chicago in 1863 raised $50,000 for the cause.\textsuperscript{1406} The success of the Irish in mobilising cash and support from its diaspora can be seen in the example of John Redmond’s tour of Australasia and that of the fund raising success of Noraid highlighted earlier. Successful fundraisers even carried out paramilitary acts with Skirmishing groups.\textsuperscript{1407} These groups operated secretly in the US. They were not political parties, they were more akin to terrorist funding organisations.

Irish-American nationalism was a response to their needs in a land in which for the most part they were amongst the lowest social and economic strata,\textsuperscript{1408} taking the form of open institutions like the Irish Catholic Benevolent Fund and secret societies such as the freemason-like AOH. Whereas the ostensible function of Irish nationalism in America was to help Ireland gain self-government, its hidden purpose was to enable the immigrant Irish to gain a self-respecting place in American life and was the most effective way open to them to help their morale.\textsuperscript{1409} Even though after the 1880s the Irish generations were becoming wealthier, the new arrivals still fed the ghettos\textsuperscript{1410} and the working class dominated nationalist societies.

Recall from chapter one, one of the characteristics of nationalism was conformity of actions to interests, as the coincidence of birth could not be strong enough alone to ensure coordinated activity. What was at work with the Irish in America was this matter of interests. It was in the interests of the Irish-Americans to support Irish nationalism because it would, as Michael Davitt wrote in the \textit{Irish World}, November 13\textsuperscript{th} 1880, ‘help remove the stain of degradation from your birth and the Irish Race here in America will get the respect you deserve.’\textsuperscript{1411}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Drudy, 1985, p.272
\item MacRaid, 2011, p.207
\item Toner, 1989, p.15
\item Moody, 1967, pp.438-9
\item Ibid.
\item Brown, 1956, p.329
\item Ibid., p.334
\end{thebibliography}
There can be no question of the support offered to Ireland’s nationalist projects at home by the diaspora. With their anti-British sentiments, the nationalism extant in their home land and their position of relative subservience in the chief host land, Ireland’s diaspora was very different from the Scots. The Irish-Americans were described earlier as the wolfhound of Irish nationalism. The suppression by the Fenians of Irish Home Rule organisations, during the second half of the nineteenth century, was also noted. It may have been that the nature of the Irish diaspora, concentrated at first in urban ghettos, its visible nature, may have meant its members were less attached to the social structures of the US than were the Scots.

**Norway**

The chief similarities between the Norwegian diaspora and that of the Scots were; a large contemporary emigration to the 'new world', no conflict generated diaspora and although many emigrants returned, there was no return *movement*. There was also the fact that the home country was in a Union with another state, Sweden. The differences were that Norway was a predominantly rural state at the start of the emigration and Scotland was industrialised, there was no tragic element of dispersal and that there was no nationalist movement in Norway.

Extending this comparison to include factors from the analysis of the Irish diaspora above, whilst the Norwegians went to the US with a foreign language they were predominantly Protestant. They established schools, churches and Norwegian-American newspapers. They formed associations like the Irish and Scots, but like the Scottish examples these were predominantly cultural and philanthropic groups. By the 1890s, Norwegian-Americans began to raise their interest as voters which soon matched that of other Americans.

It has been demonstrated that one of the conditions which encouraged the Irish in America to support nationalism at home, that of emigration from regions of

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1412 Lovoll, 1984, p.55
1413 Ibid., p.70
nationalist support, could not apply in the Norwegian case as, although the Union was not popular, the active opposition was parliamentary in nature.

However, the Norwegian-Americans did take an interest in the pressure for separation at home, due to a natural interest in activities in their home lands. By 1905, the Union issue had become a public affair in New York, Chicago, Minneapolis, Seattle and the Mid-West.\textsuperscript{1415} Norwegian newspapers like Busstikken and Norden hailed the movement toward parliamentary self-government in Norway and both editors spoke for a growing number of Norwegian-Americans.\textsuperscript{1416} However, prior to the crisis in 1905, Norwegians in the US exerted no significant pressure upon the US government for their cause.\textsuperscript{1417} In point of fact, recall that Senator Knute Nelson, the leading Norwegian-American politician of that time opposed the dissolution of the Union until it became inevitable.\textsuperscript{1418}

It can be seen that the Norwegian diaspora, irrespective of its inclinations, had a reduced opportunity to engage, although as has been demonstrated earlier that there was some contribution. However although the diaspora had little impact there was a level of engagement with the subject by the diaspora in America. In the Scots case there was little of this.

This review of the comparison diasporas has highlighted that the nature of the assimilation of a diaspora into the host country can affect its characteristics. The Irish case demonstrated most similarities to the Scottish situation, and yet the response of the diaspora to nationalism in Ireland was quite different. The visible, initially poor, Catholic Irish immigrants found that serving Irish nationalism also served their interests. For the invisible, more assimilated and welcome Scot, interests were not best served by adherence to old country politics.

\textsuperscript{1415} Andersen, 1990, pp.102-3
\textsuperscript{1416} Ibid., p.103
\textsuperscript{1417} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1418} Soike, 1991, p.79
Nationalism in Scotland

The issue of the nature of Scottish nationalism during the period under review has not been explored yet and this will be discussed next. It is not unreasonable to examine this in an enquiry that asks why something Scottish did not appeal to large groups of emigrants who otherwise celebrated much that was.

‘for the SNP it (Bannockburn) represents a long and unfinished history of Scots trying to define themselves politically; for heritage, the frequent reference by most clan societies to Bannockburn asserts the family’s participation in a legacy removed from contemporary images of cultural and political resistance.’ 1419

Ironically, one of the more mobile populations on earth appears to have developed the most home-bound nostalgic ideology. 1420

The Act of Union in 1707 created something called Great Britain. This was a union of policy rather than affection and the reasons for it and the process of its negotiation have been described in detail. The progress of the Union was marked by ambiguity and reluctance on both sides of the border; those Scots wealthy or ambitious were torn between the loss of the ancient state and the opportunities provided by the wider stage now provided to them. The English were torn by the affront to older English identities and resentful of sharing opportunity with the poor neighbour, but keenly balanced this with fear of a Catholic succession. Over the early years of the Union the fear of more invasions like the ’15 and ’45 provided further encouragement to make it work. 1421 The new British identity was not easily grasped by either the English or the Irish, who later seceded. 1422 The Anglo-Scottish union failed to produce a comprehensive British identity, only one of which is Anglo-British, dependent on the evolving constitutional solution of the Crown in Parliament. 1423

1419 Zumkhawala-Cook, 2005, pp.122-3
1420 Maxwell and Ramand, 2014, p.397
1421 Colley, 2005, pp.12-13
1422 Craig, 2001, p.3
1423 Kidd, 1993, p.1
It has been argued that Scottish identity was substituted by the end of the eighteenth century by a sort of Britishness.\textsuperscript{1424} An alternative view is that nationalism as it emerged in the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a response to the spread of capitalism creating unequal societies. These societies responded to the inevitable imperialist colonisation with locally based popular struggle; nationalism.\textsuperscript{1425} Scotland’s early onset into the industrial revolution preceded this and so it did not develop nationalism in the same way as Greeks, Czechs, Polish and Slavic states. It never developed a nationalism contemporary to these, so the argument goes, because the Scottish bourgeoisie did not need nationalism to achieve their economic purpose.\textsuperscript{1426} Scotland was not unique in this, Western Europe has experienced the demise of many historical nationalities; Burgundia, Aragon, Galicia and Etruria to name but a few.\textsuperscript{1427} What was different about Scotland, is that this occurred in the eighteenth century not the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{1428} The Scots therefore, despite lacking full political autonomy, missed out on the development of a full blown ‘romantic’ nationalism.\textsuperscript{1429}

Scotland’s weak response at the time of the nationalist surges in Europe has also been attributed to a failure of Scots politicians to sustain themselves in the face of the overwhelming power of the English Whig tradition into which they were absorbed. History too, became irrelevant to political discourse after the fading of the Jacobite threat.\textsuperscript{1430}

This ‘weak’ nationalism had alternative explanations. Rather than the Anglo-British identity inferred by the explanations above, the weak Scottish nationalism could be accounted for by the paradox that Scotland’s nationalism was already enshrined in the Act of Union and that late nineteenth century home rule activity was focussed on returning Scotland to its position of equality in it. The second sentence of Dr Clarke’s opening speech on the first motion on Home Rule for Scotland Bill ever to be raised in Parliament begins: ‘I have no

\textsuperscript{1424} Craig, 2001, p.3
\textsuperscript{1425} Nairn, 1981, p.127-8
\textsuperscript{1426} Craig, 2001, p.3
\textsuperscript{1427} Davies, 2012, p.vii
\textsuperscript{1428} Nairn, 1981, p.129
\textsuperscript{1429} Kidd, 1993, p.1
\textsuperscript{1430} Ibid., p.96
desire to repeal the Union between England and Scotland, and I think that Union has been mutually beneficial—a good thing for Scotland, but a better thing for England.  

He goes on; ‘the main practical ground on which I urge this Motion is that Scotch business is neglected.’ He lists police, public health and education as areas of public policy that had suffered because legislation has not been attended to. Scottish nationalism in the nineteenth century was, this accounting proceeds, challenging England’s failure to preserve the independence of Scottish institutions guaranteed in the union.

This weak nationalism, or cultural sub-nationalism has, it has been argued, been superseded by a neo-nationalism ignited by the discovery of oil and the nationalist’s campaigning response to this. This occurred during the decline of the United Kingdom in the post-World War Two environment of the dissolution of the Empire. This neo-nationalism is seen as a response to the age of the multi-national and the internationalisation of capital. The relative deprivation flowing from these realities generates a response through the new nationalism, aided by a weakening political system in the UK.

At the time of this suggested fracture in the nature of nationalism in Scotland, the organisational embodiment of its aspirations was the SNP. Whilst it can be recalled it began to achieve political success in the 1960s, the SNP began the 1970s with a brief decline. The rise and fall of its share of the popular vote in the 1970s has been described. The rise of the party's electoral fortunes seemed to be a result of more successful organisation, fundraising and a shift to the left, in other words transactional causes rather than systemic. There followed many years of decline in the party’s fortunes, outside of the chronology of this study, but it seems that the tectonic shift identified from the globalisation

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1431 Hansard, 9th April 1889, col. 69
1432 Ibid.
1433 Ibid., col. 70
1434 Craig, 2001, pp.5-6
1435 Ibid., p.5
1436 Nairn, 1981, pp.127-8
1437 Mitchell, 2014, p.157
1438 Nairn, 1981, p.129
1439 Ibid., p.128
1440 Lynch, 2002, p.124
1441 Ibid., 2002, pp.131-133
of capital and the intrusion of multinationals into the Scottish political economy were not obviously at work. What remains unanswered here is whether the ‘weak’ nationalism was a cause of the diaspora’s indifference.

This more systemic rather than transactional view of Scottish nationalism leads this enquiry to the question of whether this shift between a cultural sub-nationalism to neo-nationalism affected the response of the diaspora. It has been argued that the major communications channel to the Scot abroad was through the associations. These have been characterised as ‘British’ and elite, so could be regarded as likely to respond poorly to a call to amend an arrangement that had suited the Scottish elite well in their colonising of the Empire.

As evidence, here are two examples from London of the opposition or indifference of the associational Scot in the diaspora. The following cutting from 1929 recalls this theme;

‘The Scottish Clans association which has a membership of 1,500, has snubbed the Scottish National League London branch by refusing to insert a paid notice about it in the souvenir of its Burns Concert in the Albert Hall.’1442

A Scottish Clans Association annual dinner in London was attended by 350 and addressed by Lord Meston, as Ramsay MacDonald was unwell. Meston made mention of the home rule issue, saying that it was ‘swollen into something more serious’ and the ills of Scotland did not need to end the Treaty of Union to be fixed.1443

Recall the earlier assertion that not all migrations lead to a diaspora. They may instead lead to an ethnic community. As with diasporas, these will mark and maintain symbolic boundaries and preserve a collective identity. However, they differ from diasporas in that the latter maintain a connection with the home land and its kin communities in other states at an institutional not individual level. In ethnic communities this is weak and intermittent.1444 It may be argued that in

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1442 Acc. 3721/125/25, Daily Record, 19th February 1929
1443 Ibid., Glasgow Herald, 19th November 1932
1444 Zumhkawala-Cook, 2005, p.132
this context, the Scots abroad were acting more as an ethnic community than a diaspora. The Scottishness of the associational culture could be seen as a Scottish heritage identity that links not with modern Scotland but with ‘auld Scotia’ and the commodities of early Scottish life.\textsuperscript{1445}

**Success in Scotland Brings Support from the Diaspora**

The first SHRA aimed to publish propaganda and convene public meetings with the aim of garnering the support of the MPs already representing Scots in Westminster. Its success could be judged by laws passed in Parliament to bring self-government to Scotland. Although by 1908 most Scottish MPs who voted on Scottish home rule motions were voting in favour,\textsuperscript{1446} the organisation itself had little impact\textsuperscript{1447} and received no more than token overseas support in return.

The success or otherwise of the 1919 movement can be judged in the early years by the same measures as above, and by membership. From the beginnings of the movement as a political party, membership, branch numbers and electoral success were the yardsticks of progress. The first two would demonstrate the level of individual and institutional support for nationalism, the third its progress in gaining representatives in the only body which could help it achieve its aims, the Westminster Parliament. Chapter four dealt at length with the correspondence and travel between Scots in the diaspora and officials of the second SHRA. Membership records for the period from foundation to the time of the visit of Thompson to North America, shown here in table XIV, show a growing organisation.

\textsuperscript{1445} Ibid., p.111
\textsuperscript{1446} See Appendix I
\textsuperscript{1447} Mitchell, 1996, p.72
Table XIV. SHRA/NPS Membership, 1919-32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Affiliated organisations</th>
<th>District secretaries</th>
<th>English secretaries</th>
<th>Foreign secretaries</th>
<th>Foreign branches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>3,148</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: An undated summary, and additionally notes for the Hon. Secretary’s. Report 14th April 1927 in Acc. 3721/42/35; NPS data from Lynch, 2002, p.39

Although the organisation grew during the period its membership was tiny compared to the population at the time, growing from 0.034% in the census year of 1921 to 0.16% the year after the 1931 census. Thompson’s assertion that success abroad would come with success at home is supported by the low number of foreign secretaries at this time of poor support in Scotland. Chapter four charts how the failure to succeed drove a change in the nature of the organisation, from pressure group to political party and it was as the SNP that the nationalist movement bridged the years of the Second World War.

This was a time of correspondence with the diaspora by Muirhead, and members like Donaldson in the US were organising, drumming up support for meetings with Thompson, Muirhead and MacCormick. However, these were busy times at home for the SHRA, which in 1919 alone organised 173 meetings attended by almost 19,000 people. In 1924 it established the Scottish

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1448 At this time the National Party of Scotland
1449 Lynch, 2002, p.30
Convention which met until 1927 with the intention of designing a home rule bill that would get support in Scotland and Westminster.\textsuperscript{1450} Recall the letters written to MPs in 1924. Whereas it is clear the diaspora did not respond to the SHRA, so it is also possible that the SHRA had other priorities. The Convention’s third session in 1927 had 116 attendees from Town and Parish councils, Co-operative movements, Guilds, Unions and MPs. Additionally, 12 MPs declined their invitations. All appeared to have been invited individually by Muirhead.\textsuperscript{1451}

After an immediate post war period where the SNP continued to be a tiny organisation, the 1960s saw it ‘transformed to a mass political party in a matter of a few years.’\textsuperscript{1452} By 1968 the party had 125,000 members,\textsuperscript{1453} or 2.4\% of the population based on the 1971 census. It fielded candidates in 65 out of 71 Scottish constituencies in the 1970 general election. This success in membership was reflected in electoral results, as is demonstrated by table XV below.

**Table XV; UK General Election Results for Scotland – SNP % of votes cast, 1945-79**

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lynch 2002 p.16

Another indication of SNP success was the increase in the number of branches, reflected in table XVI below.

\textsuperscript{1450} Ibid., p.31
\textsuperscript{1451} Acc. 3721/84/23
\textsuperscript{1452} Lynch, 2002, p.93
\textsuperscript{1453} Ibid., p.109. See however, Acc. 6038/6, May file, Conference reports, where an estimate of 100,000 is given. The 125,000 number is also used by a letter from the National Organiser, probably in 1969, written to overseas scots, Acc. 6038/8, February file
Table XVI; SNP Branches 1960-69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of branches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lynch, 2002, p.100; Acc. 6038/7 Minutes of the Organisation Committee 16th November 1968; Acc. 6038/8 Minutes of the Organisation Committee 22nd March 1969.

Yet at this time of significant growth, overseas members were only around 200,\textsuperscript{1454} with a further 250 in England and Wales in 1969.\textsuperscript{1455} During 1964 there was a significant re-organisation of the party, and still some considerable disagreement as to how the party should proceed. At one point, Arthur Donaldson effectively resigned by leaving the chair vacant at an NEC meeting.\textsuperscript{1456} This may explain a lack of attention to the diaspora. Recall also, the party’s priority was winning elections.

In October 1976 the SNP founded the SNPA to bring together all overseas branches.\textsuperscript{1457} Clearly there was some expectation that the diaspora would deliver something to the SNP. The failure of this organisation has been described in detail. By 1977, there were estimated to be only about 700 members not based in Scotland.\textsuperscript{1458} In the case of the Scots abroad it is reasonable to conclude that in the time frame examined, success at home had no impact upon support from abroad. Equally, that success was a drain on resources and focus. Success abroad was not a priority.

\textsuperscript{1454} 34\textsuperscript{th} Annual conference, 31\textsuperscript{st} May 1968, Reports of office bearers.
\textsuperscript{1455} Author’s estimate, see chapter four
\textsuperscript{1456} Wilson, 2009, p.12.
\textsuperscript{1457} 34\textsuperscript{th} Annual conference, 31\textsuperscript{st} May 1968, Reports of office bearers
\textsuperscript{1458} See chapter four

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Soft Power and the Promotion of Nationalism

Soft power is important in any analysis of the actions of a pressure group because in the absence of violence the application of soft power is an important way the group can achieve its objectives. Just as with interstate relations, soft power in intrastate dynamics is less visible than hard power and is characterised by the ability to influence others to set a given agenda rather than use threat or coercion.\textsuperscript{1459} The application of soft power has been described in chapter four. The argument was that it appeared to depend upon influencing another actor to accept a particular argument. Resources for that influence were culture, values and policies. The difficulty with this paradigm in assessing the engagement of the movement with the Scots in diaspora is that the SHRA and nationalist movements were non-state actors, as were the Irish until 1921. The argument presented the position that the original conditions for soft power to be effective were in fact flawed and hard power was needed as a fall back to make it effective. The example of the Irish success given is not directly comparable to the Scots’ position. The Irish were a state actor at that time, even if the PIRA were not. Also the absence of violence in the Scots efforts was arguably a metaphor for the lack of hard power.

The introduction noted that the soft power paradigm was devised with interstate relations in mind. It was demonstrated that soft power flows from one actor influencing another to do its bidding using resources such as culture, values and policies to bring this about. Whilst accepting that there may be alternative concepts of power,\textsuperscript{1460} Cochrane extends the soft power model to intrastate relations.\textsuperscript{1461} As pressure groups can only work with soft power, influencing legislators, this appears a reasonable position to take. Diasporas are complex constructs that must distinguish between the membership of a trans-state community and the rights and duties of the legal construct of citizenship of the host state.\textsuperscript{1462}

\textsuperscript{1459} Cochrane, 2007, p.216
\textsuperscript{1460} Ibid., for Boulding’s notion of threat, exchange and integrative power.
\textsuperscript{1461} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1462} King and Melvin, 1999, p.114
To add to this complexity, the examples used in the present argument do not lend themselves to classification in a straightforward way. Firstly, a number of different relations can be deconstructed from the Irish-American contribution to the Good Friday agreement. Secondly the nature of soft power may have other facets not accounted for by an attachment to a given culture or set of values. To take the relationships first, these are both intrastate and interstate.

The relationship between the Irish-Americans and the US policy making elite was of an intrastate nature. Part of the reason why US governments have taken an interest in Northern Irish politics is the size of Irish America, around 19% of the US population at the 1910 census. This had been accompanied by the Irish-American civil society formed from associations such as the AOH. From time to time, this has provided a shallow interest in Irish issues outwith the US.\textsuperscript{1463}

Additionally, two interstate relationships were in play, that of the US and the UK government and the Irish government in the form initially of the Irish ambassador to Washington, Sean Donlon. There was also that of the SDLP leader John Hume, a UK party leader and the ‘four horsemen’ alluded to earlier. They played government roles in their attempts in the early 1970s to take public positions opposed to British government policy, including Senate resolutions.\textsuperscript{1464}

As well as this they played roles that placed them as a buffer between the US administration and the more radical sections of Irish America.\textsuperscript{1465} In this latter they played a role as intrastate actors. The extent to which the soft power model can account for this complexity is doubtful, yet the attitudes of the UK government and the US government were altered without apparent hard power application. Figure I presents this complexity graphically.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[1463] Cochrane, 2007, p.218
\item[1464] Ibid., p.219
\item[1465] Cochrane, 2007, p.220.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
It has been asserted that Nye’s original concept was flawed as a means of explaining international politics because it was not America’s culture or values that gained it so many allies\footnote{Economist, 3\textsuperscript{rd} May 2014, p.38, of the 150 largest countries, 99 are either US allies or lean towards the US} in the post war world. Its hegemony rested on its military preponderance,\footnote{Ibid., p.39} or hard power, which cannot be asserted by those unable to outgun the hegemon.\footnote{Parmar and Cox, 2010, pp.71-2} However, there was a change in the application of hard power at the time of the acceleration of the internationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict, with the involvement of President Clinton and the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires. This was that the IRA was in a situation of relative failure.\footnote{Cochrane, 2007, p.217} This brings with it the likelihood that the
soft power approaches, the ‘other means’ referred to by Gerry Adams,\textsuperscript{1470} were only successful because of a change in the hard power configuration. The IRA and its provisional wing were being out-killed by the British Army and the loyalist paramilitaries. This makes the success of the Irish-American influence on the Northern Irish conflict easier to understand alongside the utter failure of the contemporary Scottish attempts to use the Americans to influence the UN. However, the argument would benefit from further research to prove the link between the success of hard power by the Loyalist cause and the success of the soft power initiatives.

**Scottish Nationalists and soft power**

The Scottish home rule and nationalist movements attempted to raise their agenda formally to an international level on a number of occasions earlier than the Scotland-UN events described earlier. This section will deal with three occasions where an attempt was made to involve the League of Nations, The Commonwealth and the UN. On none of these occasions was the attempt supported by an appeal to Scots abroad.

Firstly, in response to President Wilson’s call in 1918 to support self-determination for some nations, specifically Poland and peoples within the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Irish had been at lengths to assert their independence of Britain to the French leader at the Treaty negotiations in Versailles, evidenced by Eamonn De Valera’s note to the Irish delegation in Paris.\textsuperscript{1471} During the war Irish-American leaders had hoped for a German victory to ensure Irish Independence. With the US entry to the war they sought to include Ireland in Wilson’s principle of self-determination. However, after the Easter rising, US sympathy for the Irish situation waned. Although soft power did not aid the Irish this time, it was the violent nature of the nationalists’ project that influenced the American policy makers against them. However, the Irish diaspora in return failed to support Wilson on the war effort, the Treaty and the

\textsuperscript{1470} Ibid., p.216
League of Nations.\textsuperscript{1472} There was no such mobilisation of the Scottish vote, something which was seen as a positive for them as American citizens.\textsuperscript{1473}

The Scots also found the League a tempting target for self-expression. Just as the Irish had demanded a seat at the League at Geneva, so it was seen in some quarters as a gross anomaly that Scotland had no separate voice at this table, especially when ‘it is remembered that the political psychology of Scotland is so different from that of England.’\textsuperscript{1474} In 1927, The Scottish National Convention would ask the League of Nations ‘to remove the wrongs under which Scotland is at present suffering under the existing ‘treaty’ with England.’\textsuperscript{1475} Canada was a non-permanent member of the League council at this time, but no effort to engage the Scots diaspora in Canada has been revealed by research in the Muirhead and SNP archives.

The second occasion was after World War Two; this involved requesting the help of Commonwealth Prime Ministers as well as the UN. Muirhead wrote to five Commonwealth prime ministers, those of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This letter asked them to raise the issues of self-government for Scotland at the forthcoming Imperial Conference. Other than a reference to the fact that their countries were states in which ‘so many Scots are happily established,’\textsuperscript{1476} there is no apparent effort to mobilise the diasporas to pressurise local politicians in the way the Irish had done to punish Wilson after the establishment of the League of Nations.

Muirhead wrote to the Secretary-General (S-G) of the newly founded UN organisation, asking for it to review the Treaty of Union of 1707 on the grounds that England had broken its terms.\textsuperscript{1477} This was front page news in the Chicago Daily Tribune in February 1947. The Tribune wrote to Muirhead asking for a comment on the UN’s reply and finally published the news that ‘Scots’ Freedom bid to UN fails’ as the UN S-G stated it was not empowered to deal in such

\textsuperscript{1472} Noer,1973, pp.95-114
\textsuperscript{1473} Ross,1896, p.2
\textsuperscript{1474} Acc. 3271/143/288, cutting from the Scottish Co-operative 14\textsuperscript{th} October 1927
\textsuperscript{1475} Ibid., Evening Times, 15\textsuperscript{th} December 1927
\textsuperscript{1476} Acc. 3721/104/19, letter dated 9\textsuperscript{th} May 1946
\textsuperscript{1477} Acc. 3721/36/1207
This was not the end of the SNP’s attempts to use the UN to serve their cause. The SNP appealed to 55 members of the new organisation on the basis of a claim for sovereign independence on the basis of equality with those nations.

Later in 1947, Muirhead drafted a letter to Jan Smutts, PM of South Africa, asking that he raise the subject of Scotland having its own seat at the Council of Commonwealth Nations during the visit of King George VI. It is not clear if it was sent. In 1954, Muirhead wrote to Dag Hammarskjold, S-G of the UN, putting the case that Scotland could contribute more to the UN if it had a national government of its own. Muirhead’s case centred on the ability of the S-G to act on occasion to prevent blood being shed. He wrote in similar terms to the Prime Minister of India, cautioning that ignoring Scottish protests tends to encourage the use of violent methods. Nehru was attending a Commonwealth Conference in London. Muirhead also appealed at a later conference for the intervention of John Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada. Muirhead’s correspondence of this nature spanned ten years, and is pursued through the United Nations Association as well as the UN itself.

Many news clippings and handwritten notes bear witness to his eagerness to pursue this line of attack. However letters to the UN and the PMs of Canada and South Africa do not invoke the support of the Scottish diaspora in their territories, they are a direct request to a national leader to intervene on behalf of Scotland. No corresponding communication with the diaspora in the US or Canada, such as that evidenced in the 1979 Scotland-UN case, has been found.

Muirhead’s repeated correspondence came at a time when the SNP itself was in some sort of decline, with candidates put forward at elections declining from

1478 Acc. 3721/76/726, letter from the office of Trygve Lie, 29th January 1947 and separately from the assistant S-G Ivan Kerno; Acc. 3721/104/19
1479 Acc. 3721/104/19, Claim of Right dated August 1947; copies of correspondence to separate nations
1480 Ibid., letter dated 30th January 1947
1481 Acc. 3721/76/726, letter 3rd June 1954
1482 Ibid., Letter 28th January 1955
1483 Ibid., letter 24th June 1957
1484 Acc. 3721/37/1221
8 in 1945 to 2 in 1955. There was a party split in 1955. Muirhead favoured extra-parliamentary tactics at this time and he founded the Scottish Congress in 1950 as his term as SNP president expired. This context makes the ‘soft power’ approaches better understood as amateurish attempts. That the help of the diaspora was not invoked is more easily understood as part of Muirhead’s lack, first of resources and later of executive power.

**Summary**

This chapter began with some historical context for the big emigrations of the nineteenth century. Although the popular diasporic imagination is dominated by a rhetoric of exile, the reality was one of a morally ambiguous history of emigration and colonisation. This has displaced the proposition which accounts for the vast majority of emigration from Scotland; that is the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions. The nature of assimilation of migrating peoples has been dealt with, and how the strength of assimilation affected the nature of the Scots abroad. This was contrasted with the experience of the Irish and Norwegians.

That of the Irish, a visible diaspora with a less successful assimilation provides compelling evidence of the reasons for that diaspora’s support for its homeland nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century to early twentieth century. In contrast to that of the Scots, Irish nationalism helped the Irish define themselves in an environment of poverty, suspicion and exploitation. The Scots were a very different kind of diaspora, an invisible one, a more welcome one, which eventually assimilated well and whose interests lay not in the support of old country politics. The paradigms of assimilation have not been a major part of this study, but it can be seen from the above that there could be significant interest in looking at the effect of assimilation on diaspora support for homeland causes.

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1485 Brand, 1978, p.251
1486 Wilson, 2009, p.1
1487 Brand, 1978, pp.252-3
1488 Ibid., p.140
The nature of Scottish nationalism has received some attention, identifying its late development in European terms, noting the nationalism of the early part of the chronology of this thesis was more British, in the sense that the Scottish elite could achieve their aims through the Union and had no need of a different nationalism. It was noted that the main communication channel to the diaspora, the associations, were more British in character and their Scottishness could be seen as a heritage identity without modern links.

The notion that success at home would bring success abroad had been noted in earlier chapters. This has been examined with more detail and the evidence presented implies that success of the SNP in Scotland did not improve their ability to draw support from the diaspora. Finally, the issue of soft power was returned to with a further analysis of the Irish-American interest in the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’. The notion that success came without any change in the hard power configuration was argued against, making the Scottish failure easier to understand. More research here would usefully clarify the impact hard power had on those outcomes. Some further Scottish attempts to use soft power emphasised the failure of method.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Further Steps

Appeal: to ‘all Scotsmen all over the world’ for funds to enable the Association to organise in Scotland. 2nd Annual Conference of the SHRA, 25th September 1889. 1490 T. Napier.

(The SNP) ‘is anxious to broadcast its aims in the USA, looking for,’ and certain of receiving ‘at least moral support from Scots or those of Scots descent.’ 1491 R. Muirhead.

There has been an ‘unmistakable increase’ in overseas interest in subscriptions to the Scots Independent. 1492 SNP 1956 annual conference.

‘It is hoped to cover the world by member’s contacts’ to help build ‘the foundations for a future Scots Government’ ‘also help party finance.’ W. S. Orr, Overseas Secretary to the Publicity Committee, 1st October 1967. 1493

These comments, spanning the beginning, middle and end of the time period of research, demonstrate the longevity of the ambitions of the nationalist projects of Scotland to connect with and exploit the diaspora of the Scots. This final chapter of the thesis will summarise the forgoing research under the familiar headings; those of emigration and diaspora, associations as gatekeepers and the concepts of nationalism and soft power. The theoretical framework outlined in chapter one with the main concepts employed are summarised alongside the selection of case studies and sources for the research. The activities first of the home rule pressure groups in their engagement with the Scots abroad, then of the SNP and finally the performance of Scots in the diaspora in Parliament in Westminster are examined in three chapters. These are followed by two chapters of arguments to explain the position of the diaspora to nationalist projects in the Scottish home land. These summaries will use additional,

1490 Napier, 1892.
1491 Acc.3721/9/240, letter to George Matheson 26th July 1939
1492 Scottish National Party 1956 annual conference, p.8
1493 Acc. 11987/29

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Theoretical Framework, Case Studies and Context

The framework laid out the key concepts to be employed during the thesis. These were; the propensity of diasporas to engage in nationalist projects in the home land, the history and nature of the relevant emigrations, nationalism, diasporas, soft power and gatekeepers. The analytical strategy was to use comparative case studies, one of the basic methods of general empirical propositions.\textsuperscript{1494} Comparison across several countries enables research to assess whether a particular phenomenon is simply a local issue or part of a broader trend. The issue of many variables and few cases was addressed, and the variables selected to identify cases were laid out. They emphasised emigration, diaspora formation, union with another state and nationalism at home. Table I clearly makes the case for using two of the top three nineteenth century European exporters of people; Norway and Ireland.

The sources for the research have been described in detail, including as they do considerable original material as well as the use of secondary sources from the discourse for matters such as diaspora and nationalism. Analytic descriptions of nationalism, diasporas, soft power and gatekeepers introduced the concepts which were deployed to attempt to understand the Scottish diaspora’s reaction to nationalism in its home land. These were followed by a short history of the Union the nationalists wished to amend or put aside, as well as a description of Scottish nationalism itself. The chronology for the period studied, from 1885 to 1979 was described and justified. Its beginning anchored in the re-establishment of the Scottish Office and the founding of the SHRA, its conclusion in the failed referendum on the Scotland Act of 1978.

Emigration, Diasporas and the Scots

The study has described the well documented historical emigration of the Scots. This emigration was significant in its size relative to the Scottish

\textsuperscript{1494} Lijphart, 1971, p.682
population; 1.8 million people left in the nineteenth century and around two million in the twentieth century.

Such was the popularity of emigration that on the 150th anniversary of the first Scots landing at Pictou in Canada, The President of the Highland Association of Canada, visiting Scotland, declared that Nova Scotia could take all of the population of the Highlands and this would have the benefit of keeping Highlanders together rather than scattered across the globe.\textsuperscript{1495}

This emigration was not exceptional in European terms. It has been shown that the emigrations of Norway and Ireland equalled or exceeded the Scottish contribution to the great nineteenth century emigrations from Europe. These emigrations exploited the coincidence of availability of cheap unsettled land in North America, Africa and Australasia with technological improvements which resulted in cheap long distance travel. Once exploited, this land could supply global food and commodity markets.\textsuperscript{1496} National labour markets had become integrated with the global labour market. Emigration was the result of a stronger national supply of labour than demand. Workers moved from economies with higher population density to those with lower labour supply. They also moved for greater political and religious freedoms.\textsuperscript{1497}

The emigration is important to the theme of this study because emigration is a necessary forerunner of the formation of a diaspora. The size of the emigration matters because whilst multitudes do not always make a diaspora, where there is a diaspora, a large emigration will contribute to it being large in size.

Characteristics of diasporas have been studied from the many sources in the discourse, distilled to a dispersal, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance over time. The characteristics that made the millions of Scots abroad into a diaspora included their propensity for homeland orientation, demonstrated by attachment to the Kirk and culture to the extent of appropriating highland-type symbols and activity irrespective of origin. Likewise

\textsuperscript{1495} Acc. 3721/137/166, \textit{Glasgow Evening News} 6th July 1923
\textsuperscript{1496} Foreman-Peck, 1995, p.140
\textsuperscript{1497} Ibid., pp.143-4

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their boundary maintenance, evidenced by the associational culture they enkindled, is a recognised mark of a diaspora formation.

Studies of diaspora also highlight the characteristic of special dispersal, perhaps precipitated by disaster, exile or war. The Scots’ dispersal, though significant, was in the main a voluntary one. However, there is in literature and culture a strong flavour of exile generated by the clearances. This was also true of the Irish in America, one of the comparison diasporas. Outside of the timeframe of the study but within scope for the purposes of understanding the dispersal to the diaspora, the Jacobite exiles must get some consideration. As has been highlighted, a conflict generated element to a diaspora can contribute to support for nationalist projects or insurrection against the expelling forces in the home country. In one other respect the Scots perhaps failed the litmus test of diaspora characteristics, that of the lack of a return movement. Whereas for some the concept of homeland is elusive,\textsuperscript{1498} it is at least geographically clear for the Scots: there is a place called Scotland.

Whilst it is true that around a third of emigrants from Scotland returned home, there was never a movement to return to the homeland. Notwithstanding, there is the phenomenon of ‘roots tourism.’ These are journeys made by people of Scottish descent living in those parts of the world where Scots have historically settled. They are made to places associated with the traveller’s ancestry. This kind of visit has been a key market segment for the Scottish Government’s Tourism Strategy,\textsuperscript{1499} and is an activity which was undertaken during the whole timeframe of this enquiry. A devolved Scottish government, concerned about falling population numbers in Scotland considered returnees from the diaspora as one option to explore.\textsuperscript{1500} Despite contact and attendance at Tartan Day in the US, the result was that although the diaspora were happy to indulge in roots tourism, they were unlikely to return. This was supported by academic research.\textsuperscript{1501}

\textsuperscript{1498} Skrbis, 1999, p.38
\textsuperscript{1499} A New Strategy for Scottish Tourism, \url{http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/158158/0042797.pdf} p.8
\textsuperscript{1500} Sim, 2012, p.99
\textsuperscript{1501} Sim, 2012, pp.111-112
However it is enabled as a mass activity by the Internet and cheap intercontinental air travel which post-dates the time period of the enquiry. One view is that the discourse of the clearances, including as it does the meanings of exile, loss and dislocation is translated for some into a desirable form of self-identification. If this is the case, the argument proceeds, then the Scots have indeed formed a diaspora despite the voluntary reality of their leaving.1502 With the exception of Zionism, the role of ‘homeland’ in diasporas has been largely symbolic and additionally the definition of diaspora has come to be inclusive rather than exclusive.1503 If the characteristics outlined in Table III are accepted, then it is certainly possible to posit the existence of a Scottish diaspora.1504

Having determined that the Scots abroad can be analysed as a diaspora, the next question addressed was that of the propensity of diaspora to encroach upon the activities of territorially bound states. Diasporas are a force in identity formation.1505 They reside outside of their kin-state but can in some ways claim a stake in it. Many diasporas are deeply involved in the nationalist projects of their homelands. Insofar as such projects are usually democratic and emancipatory, those in the diaspora can feel free to endorse ethnic and exclusionary movements.1506

Non-state actors do impinge upon the traditional actors on the international arena.1507 These include NGOs of many types. Numbered amongst these are the world’s diasporas.1508 The many different ways diasporas can obtrude upon home and host land affairs have been described. Significantly for analysis of the Scottish diaspora, burnished as it has been by popular associational culture, diasporas can influence homeland policy and contribute huge sums to nationalist projects. The analysis has demonstrated that diasporas do try to influence the nationalist projects in their home lands and have many ways to do so.

1502 Harper, 2005, p.147
1503 Esman, 2009, p.14
1504 See also Harper, 2005, p.139
1505 Shain and Barth, 2003, p.450
1506 Werbner, 2000, p.5
1507 Shaffer, 2003, p.199
1508 Esman, 2009, p.121
Engagement with the Scottish Diaspora

In chapters three, four and five, the analysis moved to examine the engagement of the various actors promoting more Scottish self-government and independence with the diaspora and its proclivity to support them. Context was provided by an attempt to understand what these organisations expected to achieve from their engagement with the Scots Abroad, and this in turn was driven by what they needed to do at home to achieve their aims, initially as pressure groups and ultimately as a political party. Democracy and constitutional change in the home and host states provided an understanding of the stages of self-government and independence the host states passed through, and the likelihood of the diaspora having the vote at particular stages of the chronology.

The actions of the major home rule and nationalist groups have been examined in some detail from original manuscripts; minutes of meetings, reports, notes and letters. For the whole of the period under study, outside of the two World Wars, there were few periods when the attempts to engage the Scots abroad in the activities of the various groups promoting self-government for Scotland were interrupted; the early twentieth century, and the period immediately after the second World War. Both as pressure groups and as a political party they attempted in many ways to contact and gain support of the diaspora; trips to North America, dedicated journals, correspondence and organisational change all played their part. For many years during the period, senior officials were given responsibility to engage the help of the overseas Scot.

There were, of course, some activists amongst the diaspora or its returnees. R. B. Cunninghame Graham, an ex-cattle rancher from Argentina, spoke to an early Home Rule Bill whilst an MP and was recruited by Roland Muirhead for the second SHRA in 1920. The case of Arthur Donaldson has been covered in some detail. Compton Mackenzie, born in West Hartlepool, was a founding member of the NPS. John Leng Sturrock, MP for Dundee and supporter of the

1509 Acc. 3721/7/114, letter 5th August 1920
April 1920 Scottish Home Rule Bill,\textsuperscript{1510} was born in Hull in Yorkshire. The more famous case of Andrew Carnegie was recorded in chapter three.

In some cases, the emigrants took abroad with them an interest in Scottish nationalism. Duncan Mallock in Christchurch, New Zealand was a Young Scot supporter of home rule before emigration. He wrote to Muirhead complimenting him on his campaign, yet did not appear to have joined Jessie Mackay’s Christchurch branch.\textsuperscript{1511} Mr. Young in Toronto emigrated in 1951 and had business interests in Canada, England and Scotland. He wrote in 1969 that he was certain that many Canadian Scots would support the cause if they could be satisfied that the SNP had reasonable and sensible people. According to a note from W. T. Martin, convenor of SNP policy on Finance and Tax, to Donaldson and other senior figures, Young was keen to meet senior party officials.\textsuperscript{1512} This individual activity does not obscure the absence of a supporting movement or campaign in the diaspora.

Aspirations by the SNP to engage the diaspora were clearly expressed in 1969 in a letter to all members headed ‘Recruitment - Overseas Members’ and was published by John McAteer, SNP National Organiser. During the May 1969 SNP 35\textsuperscript{th} conference, reports of office bearers revealed that correspondence was carried on with many members and sympathisers all over the world and consideration was being given to establishing the role of overseas secretary.\textsuperscript{1513} The letter claimed there were members in Australasia, USA, Holland and elsewhere and asked members to help in an effort to recruit more. Overseas members, it urged, ‘can be of great value to the party.’\textsuperscript{1514} The letter was sent out, as there was a reply found in the same archive. However, even after the failure of previous attempts the members were still urged to recruit in the Caledonian societies. The letter acknowledged the elite nature of these by claiming they needed to be coerced away from their being beholden to ‘the hereditary leaders of Scotland who have nothing in common with the ordinary Scot’. This latter issue was emphasised by McAteer in a memo to Gordon

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1510} Hansard, 16\textsuperscript{th} April 1920, col. 2030
\item \textsuperscript{1511} Acc. 3721/25/738, letter 16\textsuperscript{th} February 1938
\item \textsuperscript{1512} Acc. 6038/8
\item \textsuperscript{1513} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1514} Ibid., February file and July file
\end{itemize}
Wilson a few weeks later. The strategy was to engage through the Scottish Societies but to counter the failure of the past, the ‘grip of the establishment on the US organisations’ was to be challenged. No remedies were offered.\footnote{Acc.11987/31, memo 5th August 1969}

This letter is quoted because it demonstrates a number of themes of the thesis; firstly that the aspiration to target Scots abroad as recruits was still making policy as it had been in 1889, 1913, 1939 and 1956. Secondly, that the associational groups were consistently used as a channel to generate activism. Although Muirhead’s letters to Australian newspapers to promote the second SHRA proved an exception to this, they produced little correspondence, as was demonstrated earlier. Thirdly, the elite nature of these groups was understood, and that this was itself an issue, and finally that the SNP was unable to imagine another route to the hearts and wallets of the Scots abroad. As early as 1929, Jessie Mackay, correspondence secretary of the Christchurch branch of the SHRA summed up this issue quite well in a letter to Muirhead, writing that ‘the wealthy Scots stand aloof from us.’\footnote{Acc.3721/7/127, letter dated 8th March 1929}

The persistent absence of any appreciation by the nationalist organisations of the gatekeeper role of the associational Scot was mirrored by the failure of the gatekeepers to stop them trying, despite the class differences Jessie referred to. From NcNaught, Colonial Secretary of the SHRA in the 1880s to Spens, Convenor of the International Council of the SNPA in the 1970s, activities of varying intensity have been described in forgoing chapters. In 1977, membership outside Scotland was around 700 in total. All efforts failed to generate more than a minor, passing interest with overseas members counted in their hundreds whilst Scottish members numbered many thousands.

It was mainly for money that the home rule and nationalist movements targeted their supporters overseas. Remittance contributions have been hard to quantify but McNaught’s target of a £100,000 could not have materialised as the SHRA was low on funds only a few years later. In the interwar period contributions, as recorded in the archives of the second SHRA as well as the later Convention, were limited to the low hundreds of pounds. During this period, the Irish
nationalist project received considerable support and the evidence produced in further chapters demonstrated that the financial and organisational contribution of the Irish abroad in this period significantly exceeded that of the Scots, even in Scotland itself.

Norwegian liberation was in 1905, leaving a period of twenty years at the beginning of the research timeframe when its diaspora might have engaged with the movement to free the country from its union with Sweden. Like the Scots and Irish, Norwegian-Americans found it impossible to shed their national interest in the problems of their homelands. Nevertheless prior to 1905, Norwegians in the US exerted no significant pressure on the US government. However, there was pressure after the Union ended for the US to recognise the new country.

This picture continued into the post-World War Two period. In 1969 the Kelvingrove Constituency Association placed a resolution before the National Council to encourage the emigrant Scot to remit funds. The National Treasurer suggested extending the successful ‘1,000’ Club scheme to the one thousand or so names on the ‘overseas’ records. This was supported but commuted to a pilot scheme. This was not reported in later minutes or records so may have foundered. In the 1970s, as at other times, the SNP were frequently short of funds. Nevertheless, overseas branches affiliated through the SNPA were constitutionally discouraged to raise funds for the party in Scotland. As with recruiting, the attempt to generate remittances from the diaspora was always under consideration but never well executed. This may not only have been a failure of process. There may well have been a successful prioritisation of effort which pursued near and present goals in favour of the distant and future benefits.

By contrast, the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland raised hundreds of thousands of pounds from organisations like Noraid in the US. The Irish

\[1517\] Ibid., p.102
\[1518\] Acc. 11987/ 31
\[1519\] Membership research outlined earlier demonstrates this probably included England and Wales.
\[1520\] Acc.6038/9, National Executive Committee minutes 14th November 1969
\[1521\] Acc.6038/9, National Executive Committee minutes 10th October 1969
Republicans relied heavily on support from the US and sources claim that $3-$5 million dollars were raised.\textsuperscript{1522} The Irish were also apparently successful at the application of soft power in this conflict, to be discussed in more detail below. The Scottish attempt at this, the Scotland-UN movement in 1979-80 was a complete failure.

**The Diaspora in Westminster**

There were many unsuccessful attempts made in Parliament to legislate for self-government for Scotland. Their chronology falls roughly into two parts, 1889 to 1927 and 1975 to 1978. Chapter five examines the actions of the Scots in the English diaspora who served in Parliament in these times. The lack of success in the many attempts to bring self-government to Scotland in parliament has also been examined. Home Rule Bills were passed by the House of Commons on seven occasions between 1885 and 1914.\textsuperscript{1523} However, the status quo remained. It has been argued that the nineteenth century home rule activity was focussed on returning Scotland to its position of equality in the Union, as it was felt that the Treaty had been broken in some ways.

A variety of governments were in power on these occasions; Conservative, Liberal, Labour and coalitions. The importance of parliamentary activity was recognised and results of votes in the Commons were often published by the SHRA.\textsuperscript{1524} The policy of depending upon the existing political parties for obtaining self-government was tried for many years and found wanting, hence these debates were of vital interest to the home rule promoters and the failure of this strategy led to the formation of a political party trying to win seats in parliament. The debates in the late 1970s took place at a time when the SNP were at a height of success in the polls.

The actions of the Scots in the diaspora in England and Wales who were in Parliament at these times was examined through their speeches in Parliament, recognising whilst doing so that these would never be the whole story of a Member’s interventions. The early home rule debates were examined through

\textsuperscript{1522} Byman, 2005, p.246  
\textsuperscript{1523} Craig, 2001, p.6  
\textsuperscript{1524} Napier, 1895, Author’s note.
the words of Scots in Parliament. Whilst a majority of those identified supported home rule, around half felt that devolution would strengthen the UK and the UK parliament’s ability to govern. Some of those who opposed appeared unconvinced the Scots wanted home rule. For the later debates, the argument assumed that as the SNP was enjoying considerable support in Scotland, the interests of the Scottish people could be advanced by self-government. It follows that support for devolution by a Scot in the Commons would be advancing the interests of the Scots. Yet in the speeches of the parliamentary Scots abroad there was in both Lords and Commons a mix of indifference, support and dislike of the Bill. On the occasion that a devolution Bill became an Act of Parliament, in 1978, the Scots did not support it in sufficient numbers to persuade the government to promulgate it. In the British constitution referendums are regarded as advisory to the government and the incoming Conservative Government repealed the Act.

Whilst it appeared that some did support home rule or devolution, it was clear from the analysis that the Scots abroad in either Lords or Commons never acted as a coherent group to promote these constitutional changes. This may well have been because, as a Scottish elite, they were capable of achieving their goals within the Union and had no need of independence to do so. It was clear that although some of the Scots in parliament supported home rule and devolution bills and motions, they failed to exploit their privileged position at the centre of government.

Some Explanations Offered

Having established that the diaspora viewed Scottish self-government with indifference, the thesis has advanced a small number of likely reasons for this unconcern. Firstly, that the process of the engagement with the diaspora by the groups in Scotland was for the main part amateurish, spasmodic and a low priority for most. Secondly that the objectives of target groups in the diaspora chosen for involvement were primarily non-political and their membership was small in relation to the diaspora as a whole.

Although the associational culture was and is quite visible, it was not the whole part of the diaspora. It can be regarded as an organising, active elite. Elite
because membership of the associations was expensive, and they were to an extent lent to exclusivity with their glittering social occasions and philanthropy. Recall that studies of diaspora activity in homeland projects differentiate between core, passive and silent members of the diaspora. To an analyst of the Scottish diaspora, these associations appear as core actors in preserving a Scottish heritage identity. However they also acted as gatekeepers to the passive and silent members, organising them for Highland Games whilst preserving their own British flavoured identity. Other reasons have been explored for the lack of concern of Scots abroad for the nationalist projects of their homeland. Assimilation can destroy the distinctiveness of diaspora and so has been explored further. The alleged use by the Irish of soft power led to the need to understand why the Scots failed to exploit this with their peaceful, latterly electoral, activism.

In considering the comparison diasporas, nationalist activity at home was relevant to understanding why the Irish diaspora’s approach to homeland self-government was so different. Evidence that a forced dispersal can lead to considerable diaspora involvement in nationalism at home has been presented. Host land conditions for a given diaspora can make it more visible and therefore alienated, something that at least is regarded as a contributor to the activism of the Irish in their nationalist projects. It can be seen that the comparison between the activism in homeland nationalism of the case studies gave rise to two further areas for discussion. The first was the extent to which the lack of a conflict-generated diaspora affected Scots’ desire to support nationalism at home. Secondly, the ‘invisible’ nature of the Scots abroad could be a contributory factor in determining its approach to projects to promote self-government at home.

Of the arguments above, that of the approach to engaging the diaspora and the nature of the channels to the Scots abroad, the associations, has it is considered, been adequately disposed of. The explanations are attractive because of the transactional nature of engagement activities. By this is meant it relies on examining the nature and effectiveness (or otherwise) of activities.

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1525 Bueltman, et al., 2009, p.69
1526 Bueltman, et al., 2009, p.5
The nature of the associations can be seen from their activities, the speeches of their guests, their objectives and priorities. Therefore the commentary can now proceed to examine two further notions to lay out in the search for an understanding of the Scots’ diaspora’s failure to support the promotion of self-government in their homeland.

Irish-American nationalism was a response to the needs of the people in a land in which for the most part they were amongst the lowest social and economic strata.\textsuperscript{1527} It took the form of institutions like the Irish Catholic Benevolent Fund and secret societies such as the AOH. Whereas the ostensible function of Irish nationalism in America was to help Ireland gain self-government, it also enabled the immigrant Irish to gain a self-respecting place in American life and was the most effective way open to them to help their morale.\textsuperscript{1528} Even though after the 1880s the Irish were becoming wealthier, the new arrivals still fed the ghettos\textsuperscript{1529} and the nationalist societies.

The appraisal of the Scottish diaspora in the US, describing it as invisible, more successful and welcome in the late nineteenth century, migrating from a Scotland with little activism in nationalism, contrasts with that of the Irish to understand their differing responses to nationalist projects at home. These differences fall into two categories; Firstly, It was established that the Irish had emigrated from parts of Ireland that were already nationalist in character, and there was no equivalent in Scotland. Secondly, the nineteenth century Irish diaspora in the US, a visible catholic diaspora in the lowest echelons of society satisfied its own interests by supporting organisations set up to support nationalism.

With Norway, a Protestant diaspora, albeit one with a new language to learn, the diaspora conditions were similar. However the apparent similarities in the cases of Norway and Scotland become less clear as the process of ending the Swedish Union is considered. Whilst there was no significant fund raising in the diaspora, there was equally no demand for it, unlike the Scottish case. It is the case that the Norwegian press in the US supported the case for separation, and

\textsuperscript{1527} Moody, 1967, pp.438-9
\textsuperscript{1528} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1529} Brown, 1956, p.329
eventually the diaspora came out in favour and with the press, influenced the American recognition of the newly independent state. There was no comparability to the Irish situation, but there was support in some visible ways once the Union was under fatal pressure. No such support came from the Scots in America at any time in the chronology of this study.

The argument considered the possibility that the nature of Scottish nationalism may have influenced the response of the diaspora. It has been shown that early home rulers supported the Union and thought their task was to strengthen it. This, it was argued by some in the discourse, reflected a ‘weak’ nationalism, a sub-set of Britishness. The turnaround in the SNP’s fortunes may have been a response to the globalisation of capital in the intrusion of multinationals in Scotland through the oil industry. However, the conclusion was that the success was due to transactional not systemic reasons. Moreover, the associational Scots were still the conduit to the diaspora at this time, with their ‘Britishness’ and elite nature. These Scots had no need of independence to further their aims. The possibility that the Scots abroad act more like an ethnic community than a diaspora was examined, with the associations reflecting a heritage identity, not one rooted in modern Scotland. It had been asserted by an SNP activist that when the movement was successful in Scotland, the diaspora would support it. This was researched using membership and electoral success as measurements and found to be unsupportable as an argument.

There were a number of attempts by Scottish nationalists to influence supra-national bodies and other heads of state through the use of what has been termed soft power. One attempt, referenced earlier, followed the failure of the devolution referendum in 1979 to generate sufficient support to make a Scottish Assembly possible. The case that Scotland had in fact said yes was taken to the UN in a process described in some detail. A later chapter described how there was an attempt to support this by writing to US congressmen pointing out the debt the US owed to the Scottish diaspora, a petition was raised but in the main supported only by Scots in Scotland. In none of these cases was the institution to institution level relationship of an active diaspora core at work. They were individual transactions between one official and another.
Final comments; further research

This thesis began with the proposition that many diasporas are deeply implicated in the nationalist projects of their home lands and has concluded that the Scots in this time period were not. All the groups established to promote first home rule, then independence for Scotland attempted to enlist the help of the Scots abroad, as the introduction to this chapter demonstrates. It can be stated with reasonable confidence that reasons for the lack of support in the diaspora for the nationalist projects in Scotland have been identified, analysed and confirmed or, like the notion that success at home would bring more support abroad, refuted. It is clear that the globally acknowledged hallmarks of Scottish identity, its associations, commodities and culture, did not translate into the support for the long running movement to provide Scotland with more self-government or independence.

Apart from an appeal directed through Australian and New Zealand newspapers, and the brief life of the SNPA, they did so almost exclusively through the many Scots associations that had become established in the countries of their settlement. These outward representations of the diaspora were however not political organisations but cultural and sporting associations. Recall from chapter one, where Walter Macintyre of St. Louis was reported in the Scottish Nation in 1914 to hold that a patriotic interest in home rule for Scotland in no way conflicted with a devotion to the highest interests of the Empire. He did not link this patriotism with the interests of his brother Scots in the US. It will be recalled also that in the discussion on nationalism in chapter two, aligned interests were seen by some as a key contributor to a nationalist endeavour. Simply being born in a place was not enough.

Chapter six confirmed two ‘transactional’ reasons for the failure to engage; the poor organisation of the groups targeting the diaspora and the fact that they were targeting the associational Scot, groups whose stated objectives were cultural and philanthropic. They had politicians as members and guests, however what politics was to be seen was more British and there is no evidence that they embraced Scottish nationalism. As relatively elite organisations, their members had succeeded without it.
Further from these conclusions, closer examination of the comparison diaspora highlighted some significant differences that could account for the lack of nationalist success. Firstly, the Irish dispersal had been in the main from militant nationalist areas of Ireland. Therefore the nationalism travelled to the US and the dispersal was a component of the reason for the nationalist support. There was no nationalist movement or conflict in Norway, and whilst there was some support in the diaspora it was not key to the success the nation had in the ending of the Union with Sweden.

Additionally, the impact of conditions in the host country was seen to be a point of difference between the Irish and the Scots in the US, with the nationalist fervour of the Irish providing the immigrant Irish with a means to improve morale and gain a self-respecting place in American life. As an invisible diaspora, the interests of the Scots did not align to a nationalist fervour to get respect in America. While most Scots seem to have had an initial advantage over most Irish Catholic immigrants, this general picture obscures the granular reality of varied circumstances. More detailed research should be done in this field than has hitherto fore been the case, to produce a more accurate picture.\textsuperscript{1530}

At one level, the diaspora’s core can be seen to be mobilising the diaspora, but not for the purposes of supporting autonomy in the home land. This mobilisation was and is for organising cultural and sporting events tending to support an idealised, Highland, Scotland. Without re-opening the discussion about whether the Scots form a diaspora, it is possible to look more closely at the nature of that diaspora and see that it exhibits the characteristics of an ethnic group; maintaining a connection with the home country and its kinfolk but at an individual level rather than an institutional one. Thus the associations connected with like-minded citizens in other states and Scotland. Irrespective of the fact that members could be involved in political activity in their host land, it has been shown that those Scots did not deal in a coherent way at a national level to further Scottish nationalism with pressure groups or political parties or institutions of State.

\textsuperscript{1530} Devine, 2012, pp.146-7
This made the exercise of soft power impossible, with the engagement being at an individual level rather than, as with the Irish, at a level which would mobilise labour union and political party support through the vote. The analysis of the Scots associations abroad highlighted the lack of firm evidence of the penetration of these associations into the Scottish expatriate body. Further research could emphasize membership numbers and an ‘outside-in’ view of the associations from the view of the migrant Scot.

Further research on the part soft power plays in diaspora impacts on homeland nationalist projects, by which it is meant between states and non-states would be needed to make firmer judgements about the failure of the Scots. Further research would also clarify the link between the success of hard power by the Loyalist cause and the success of the soft power initiatives which brought a halt to hostilities in Northern Ireland. The impact of the nature of Scottish nationalism would also benefit from deeper analysis, as would whether or not the absence of violence in all of the campaigns, in short the lack of martyrs, affected the diaspora’s interest in the cause.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gov’t</th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Mover/seconder</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Division MPs</th>
<th>Scottish MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>Home Rule for Scotland motion</td>
<td>Dr G Clark Dr Hunter</td>
<td>9th April 1889</td>
<td>Defeated in the Commons</td>
<td>200 to 79</td>
<td>19 for 22 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amendt. in response to Queen’s speech</td>
<td>Dr G Clark</td>
<td>19th February 1890</td>
<td>2nd division defeated</td>
<td>183 to 143</td>
<td>25 for 17 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Home Rule motion</td>
<td>Dr G Clark Sir S T Evans</td>
<td>6th March 1891</td>
<td>Counted out</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Govt. of Scotland</td>
<td>Dr Hunter</td>
<td>26th April 1892</td>
<td>Proposed for 2nd reading</td>
<td>House adjourned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Home Rule motion</td>
<td>Dr G Clark Sir John Leng Sturrock</td>
<td>29th April 1892</td>
<td>Defeated in the Commons</td>
<td>74 to 54</td>
<td>14 for 10 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Gladstone</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule motion</td>
<td>Dr. Clark Mr. R.J.Reid</td>
<td>23rd June 1893</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td>168 to 150</td>
<td>37 for 22 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Rosebery</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule Resolution</td>
<td>Sir H Dalziel Mr Birrell</td>
<td>3rd April 1894</td>
<td>Carried in Commons; No bill</td>
<td>180 to 170</td>
<td>35 for 21 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Rosebery</td>
<td>Amendt. to Local Legislative Assembly Bill</td>
<td>Sir H Dalziel Lloyd George</td>
<td>29th March 1895</td>
<td>Carried in Commons; No action</td>
<td>128 to 102</td>
<td>29 for 15 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Asquith</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule Bill</td>
<td>D V Pirie</td>
<td>26th May 1908</td>
<td>1st reading carried. No 2nd reading</td>
<td>257 to 102</td>
<td>44 for 9 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Asquith</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule bill</td>
<td>Dalziel</td>
<td>16th August 1911</td>
<td>1st reading carried. No 2nd reading</td>
<td>172 to 73</td>
<td>31 for 4 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Asquith</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule (to follow Ireland) motion</td>
<td>Dr. Chapple M Fergusson</td>
<td>28th February 1912</td>
<td>Carried</td>
<td>236 to 128</td>
<td>43 for 6 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Asquith</td>
<td>Federal Home Rule bill</td>
<td>A M Scott</td>
<td>3rd July 1912</td>
<td>1st reading carried. No 2nd reading</td>
<td>264 to 212</td>
<td>43 for 7 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Asquith</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule Bill</td>
<td>Sir W H Cowan</td>
<td>30th May 1913</td>
<td>1st reading carried. No 2nd reading</td>
<td>204 to 159</td>
<td>45 for 8 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Asquith</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule Bill</td>
<td>I. Macpherson</td>
<td>15th May 1914, 1st reading 13th March</td>
<td>2nd reading adjourned</td>
<td>No division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Asquith</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule bill</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>20th May 1914</td>
<td>PM rules no time for debate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Mover/seconder</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Scots MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition Govt. of Scotland Bill,</td>
<td>Sir H Cowan</td>
<td>16th May 1919</td>
<td>2nd reading counted out</td>
<td>No division</td>
<td>18 in the house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Sub-legislature</td>
<td>Wood, J M Macdonald</td>
<td>3rd and 4th June 1919</td>
<td>Carried</td>
<td></td>
<td>35 for 1 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule Bill</td>
<td>J. Johnstone D Maclean</td>
<td>16th April 1920</td>
<td>Counted out (in quorate)</td>
<td></td>
<td>36 for 9 against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Lloyd George</td>
<td>Govt. of Scotland Bill,</td>
<td>J Wallace A. Shaw</td>
<td>February 10th 1922; 26th May</td>
<td>1st reading 2nd reading</td>
<td>Adjourned, not resumed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Lloyd George</td>
<td>Govt. of Scotland and Wales Bill</td>
<td>J, M Macdonald</td>
<td>May 8th 1922 1st reading</td>
<td>2nd reading ordered for 22nd May – never occurred</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Ramsey Macdonald</td>
<td>Govt. of Scotland Bill</td>
<td>G Buchanan T. Johnston</td>
<td>8th / 9th May 1924</td>
<td>Talked out by Leng Sturrock</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>Baldwin</td>
<td>Govt. of Scotland Bill</td>
<td>James Barr T. Johnston</td>
<td>13th May 1927</td>
<td>Talked out before 2nd reading by P.J. Ford</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>Baldwin</td>
<td>Govt. of Scotland Bill</td>
<td>James Barr</td>
<td>27th March 1928</td>
<td>First reading given</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>Scottish Self-Govt. Bill</td>
<td>R Johnston</td>
<td>30th Nov. 1966</td>
<td>1st reading adjourned to 28th April 1967 no 2nd reading</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>Scottish and Wales Referenda bill</td>
<td>James Davidson</td>
<td>14th February 1969</td>
<td>2nd reading</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Callaghan</td>
<td>Scotland and Wales bill</td>
<td>Lab Govt.</td>
<td>28th November 1976</td>
<td>Guillotine defeated 1977</td>
<td>See chapter 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mitchell, 1996, pp.303–305; NLS Acc. 3721/46/102; NLS Acc. 3721/7/114; NLS Acc. 12735/6
## Appendix II: Full list of speakers in Commons Home Rule activity 1889-1927

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Speaker 1</th>
<th>Speaker 2</th>
<th>Speaker 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Munro</td>
<td>Sir William Raeburn</td>
<td>Sir James Greig</td>
<td>Sir Charles Barrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Clarke</td>
<td>David Lloyd George</td>
<td>W. Pringle</td>
<td>Frederick Macquisten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Hunter</td>
<td>J. Redmond</td>
<td>T. P. O’Connor</td>
<td>Sir Patrick J. Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Shaw M. Stewart</td>
<td>Ralph Neville</td>
<td>R. Falconer</td>
<td>Russell Johnstone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Elliot</td>
<td>J. Dillon</td>
<td>Sir James Ian Stewart Macpherson (Strathcarron)</td>
<td>George Buchanan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C G Cunningham- Graham</td>
<td>Dr Donald MacGregor</td>
<td>William Young</td>
<td>Sir John Baird</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Crawford</td>
<td>Duncan V. Pirie</td>
<td>William Watson</td>
<td>Duchess of Atholl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W E Gladstone</td>
<td>Sir Henry Craik</td>
<td>Sir James Duncan Millar</td>
<td>Neil Maclean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. J. Balfour</td>
<td>Munro Ferguson</td>
<td>James Clyde</td>
<td>James Maxton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. T. Reid</td>
<td>Sir Halford J. Mackinder</td>
<td>Daniel Turner Holmes</td>
<td>Sir Samuel Chapman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Hozier</td>
<td>A. Wilkie</td>
<td>John Wallace</td>
<td>Peter Raffan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>Dr Chapple</td>
<td>Alexander Shaw, 2nd Baron Craigmyle</td>
<td>Sir F. C. Thomson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Robertson</td>
<td>Marquis of Tullibardine</td>
<td>Sir Donald Maclean</td>
<td>Duncan Graham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Herbert Maxwell</td>
<td>Sir W. Menzies</td>
<td>Lord Eustace Percy</td>
<td>Edwin Scrymgeour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir G Trevelyan</td>
<td>Stephen Gwynn</td>
<td>Dr Murray</td>
<td>Sir A Hunter-Weston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir C Pearson</td>
<td>Eugene Watson</td>
<td>Sir Robert Thomas</td>
<td>Hugh Ferguson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. C. Morton</td>
<td>Sir G. Younger</td>
<td>Joseph Johnstone</td>
<td>John (leng) Sturrock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Walter Thorburn</td>
<td>McKinnon Wood</td>
<td>Charles Murray, Lord Advocate</td>
<td>David Kirkwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Graham Murray</td>
<td>A Bonar Law</td>
<td>Gideon Murray</td>
<td>Col. Ralph Glyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir H. Dalziel</td>
<td>Sir W. H. Cowan</td>
<td>Captain Walter Elliot</td>
<td>William Graham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine Birrell</td>
<td>Murray Macdonald</td>
<td>Rev. James Barr</td>
<td>James Kidd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Lewis</td>
<td>Scott Dickson</td>
<td>Thomas Johnston</td>
<td>Capt. John Jameson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seymour Keay</td>
<td>Mark Stewart</td>
<td>Mr. Majoribanks</td>
<td>D. Crawford</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hansard
## Appendix III: Scots Abroad; Speakers to Home Rule Motions and Bills: 1889-1927

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Constit'ncy</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Scot abroad</th>
<th>Position on the Bills</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Clarke</td>
<td>Caithness</td>
<td>Crofters Party</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Medical practice in London. Spent time in South Africa – was Consul General in London, 1881-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Hunter</td>
<td>Aberdeen N</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Academic career in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cunningham-Graham</td>
<td>Lanark N.W.</td>
<td>Sojourner</td>
<td></td>
<td>For</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Gladstone</td>
<td>Mid Lothian</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.T Reid, 1st Earl Loreburn</td>
<td>Dumfries Burghs</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Robertson, 1st Baron Lochee</td>
<td>Dundee</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Worked in Government and Law in England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir H James Dalziel</td>
<td>Kirkcaldy</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>London address, worked there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Henry Craik</td>
<td>Aberdeen and</td>
<td>Scots Unionist</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Lived and worked in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glasgow Unis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir W H Cowan</td>
<td>Aberdeen E</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Also two English constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray Macdonald</td>
<td>Falkirk Burghs</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>English address. Served on Marylebone schools board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Pringle</td>
<td>Lanarkshire NW</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Numerous Scottish and English cons. Law work in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir James Ian Stewart Macpherson (Strathcarron)</td>
<td>Ross and Cromarty</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For – no vote but moved 1914 bill</td>
<td>Law in London, and address, Scots interests e.g. Freeman of borough of Dingwall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr William Young</td>
<td>Perthshire East</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Director of London Bank, London address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Shaw, 2nd Baron Craigmyle</td>
<td>Kilmarnock</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Lived and worked in London, director of many large companies, e.g. P and O, Bank of England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Donald Maclean</td>
<td>Peebles andSouthern</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Son of a Scot. lived in London. President of Board of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Macquisten</td>
<td>Argyll</td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Lived in England after 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Buchanan</td>
<td>Glasgow Gorbals</td>
<td>ILP/ Lab</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Scotland in early life, then National and Government jobs in England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir F C Thomson</td>
<td>Aberdeen S.</td>
<td>Scottish Unionist</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>In Law and Army in Scotland, then England for Law, London address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John (Leng) Sturrock</td>
<td>Montrose</td>
<td>Coal. then Nati Lib</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For and Against</td>
<td>Address In Bournemouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seymour Keay</td>
<td>Elgin and Nairn</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>India for 20 years, then lived in London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Hansard, Who was Who, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Wikipedia.
### Appendix IV: Scots with English Constituencies in the October 1974 Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Place of birth and education</th>
<th>Speeches in the house</th>
<th>Speeches on the Bills</th>
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<td>David Wright Young</td>
<td>Bolton East</td>
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<td>Born Greenock, educated Glasgow University</td>
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<td>Robert McCrindle</td>
<td>Brentwood and Ongar</td>
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<td>Lived in Scotland until 1964. Anglo-Scot by his own words</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albert (Jock) Stallard</td>
<td>Camden St. Pancras</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Born Hamilton (English family) moved to London aged 16</td>
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<td>Sir George Sinclair</td>
<td>Dorking</td>
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<td>Educated in the Colonies Scots colonial family</td>
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<td>David James</td>
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<td>Family seat in Torosay, Mull. 1979, a.k.a. David Guthrie James</td>
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<td>Norman Lamont</td>
<td>Kingston</td>
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<td>Born Shetland, educated Loreto, near Edinburgh</td>
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<td>David Knox</td>
<td>Leicester East</td>
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<td>Born Dumfriesshire</td>
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<td>Sir Arthur Irvine</td>
<td>Liverpool Edge hill</td>
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<td>1532</td>
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<td>John MacGregor</td>
<td>Norfolk South</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Born London, educated Edinburgh, St. Andrews. Describes himself as a Scot</td>
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<td>James Lamond</td>
<td>Oldham East</td>
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<td>Willie Whitelaw</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Born Dumfriesshire, brought up in Nairn, educated Winchester.</td>
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<td>Hugh Fraser</td>
<td>Stafford and Stone</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Younger son of 14th Earl Lovatt. Born Inverness, educated Ampleforth</td>
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<td>Roderick MacFarquar</td>
<td>Belper</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Born Lahore, educated Fettes, Edinburgh. Identified himself as Scottish.</td>
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<td>Patrick McNair - Wilson</td>
<td>New Forest</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Identified in the House</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>1536</td>
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Source: Hansard; Wikipedia; Who's Who; Who was Who.

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1531 Hansard, 25 November 1976, Education and Social Services, col.277
1532 Hansard entry suspect due to confusion with Bryant Irvine
1533 Hansard, 18th March 1976, col.1697
1534 Hansard, 14th January 1976, col.501
1535 Hansard, 25th November 1976 col 269
1536 Also spoke at length on devolution in the above speech (ibid)
## Appendix V: Scots Abroad in the House of Lords

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<th>Commentary</th>
<th>Location of residence</th>
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<td>Anglo/Irish</td>
<td>Self-identified as ‘ex pat’ in a speech</td>
<td>England</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lord Ballantrae</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Created 1972</td>
<td>Retired to Scotland but spent most of his life overseas in Army or Government jobs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duke of Buccleuch and Queensbury</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
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<td>Seats in Scotland, two Residences in England</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baron Burton</td>
<td>Anglo/Scots</td>
<td>The baronetcy was inherited by Scots</td>
<td>Scotland / Burton on Trent</td>
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<td>Countess of Loudoun</td>
<td>Anglo/Scottish</td>
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<td>England</td>
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<td>Duke of Atholl</td>
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<td>Scotland / England</td>
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<td>Earl Cathcart</td>
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<td>Earl of Glasgow</td>
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<td>Earl Of Perth</td>
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<td>Residences in England and Scotland</td>
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<td>Representative. Peer for Scotland</td>
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<td>Lord Alexander of Potterhill</td>
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<td>Lord Douglas of Barloch</td>
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<td>Born Canada, educated in Scotland</td>
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<td>Lord Drumlalbyn</td>
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<td>Lord Fraser of Kilmorack</td>
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<td>Lord Howe of Troon</td>
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<td>Lord Spens</td>
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<td>Refers to himself as an ‘expat’ in his speech</td>
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<td>Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal</td>
<td>Scots/Canadian</td>
<td>Main residence England, also Colonsay, Scotland</td>
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<td>Marquis of Aberdeen and Temair</td>
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<td>Spent his life in England</td>
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<td>Viscount Colville of Culross</td>
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<td>Viscount Lauderdale</td>
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<td>Viscount Massereene and Ferrard</td>
<td>Anglo/Scottish/ Irish</td>
<td>Freeman of the City of London. Claims to be 2/3 Scot</td>
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<td>Viscount Thurso</td>
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<td>Home of the Hirshel</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Ex P.M.</td>
<td>England residence and two in Scotland</td>
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**Sources:** Hansard, Who’s Who, Who was who, Dictionary of National Biography, Wikipedia.
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NLS: National Library of Scotland, Prefixes: Acc., MS, MSS

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The Scottish Nation
The Scots Independent
Times Digital Archive
### National Library of Scotland: Files accessed

**Muirhead / Scottish Secretariat Archive 3721**

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MS 26900. Ff. 34-41
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MSS 2636, 2637
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MS 1053 Melville Papers
MS 19487 ff 154 273
MS 10023
MS 9646

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MS 35.6.18
MS 19295/ 308
MS 14835 ff 95-98
Other shelf marked items
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